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OIKISTES

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STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIES, AND MILITARY POWER IN THE ANCIENT WORLD. OFFERED IN HONOR OF A.J. GRAHAM

EDITED BY

VANESSA B. GORMAN

AND

ERIC W. ROBINSON

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

A.J. Graham

PREFACE

This project began with the idea of honoring John Graham by producing a collection of new scholarly work by his students. Not surprisingly, perhaps, the subject areas explored in this volume fall within the broad ambit of work on Greek and Roman history produced by Graham himself, including topics in colonization, political and military affairs, and the application of epigraphy and archaeology to specific ancient historical questions. Our hope as editors is that this volume will prove useful to scholars, advanced students, and other readers interested in such topics in ancient history.

A number of individuals and organizations deserve our particular thanks for helping us put this volume together. Martin Ostwald belongs at the top of the list for his early suggestions and encouragement, as well as providing the introduction on John Graham's career (to this point!) which begins this volume. Thanks also go to Albert Henrichs, David Mitten, and Nino Luraghi for their sensitive readings of some of the contributions, and Gary Bisbee for his help copy editing. At Harvard University, the Department of the Classics provided financial support from the Loeb Classical Library Foundation and the Department of History provided faculty research funds. Finally, we would like to thank all the contributors for their help and their patience, and of course John Graham himself, to whom their work and ours is most affectionately dedicated.

Vanessa Gorman
Eric Robinson
December, 2001

ABBREVIATIONS

AA	*Archäologischer Anzeiger*
AAA	*Archaiologika analekta ex Athenôn*
AAntHung	*Acta Antiqua Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae*
AASOR	*Annual of the American Schools of Oriental Research*
ABSA	*Annual of the British School at Athens*
AC	*L'Antiquité classique*
AD	*Archaiologikon Deltion*
ADAJ	*Annual of the Department of Antiquities of Jordan*
AE	*L'Année Épigraphique*
AHB	*Ancient History Bulletin*
AION	*Annali dell'Istituto universitario orientali di Napoli*
AJA	*American Journal of Archaeology*
AJAH	*American Journal of Ancient History*
AJP(h)	*American Journal of Philology*
AK	*Antike Kunst*
AMI	*Archäologische Mitteilungen aus Iran*
Annales (ESC)	*Annales: économies, sociétés, civilisations*
ANRW	H. Temporini, ed., *Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt* (Berlin, 1972–)
AR	*Archaeological Reports*
ArchClass	*Archeologia classica*
Arch. Eph.	*Archaiologikè Ephemeris*
ATL	B.D. Meritt, et al., eds., *The Athenian Tribute Lists*, 4 vols. (1939–43)
AW	*Ancient World*
BABesch	*Bulletin Antieke Beschaving*
BAR	*British Archaeological Reports*
BCH	*Bulletin de correspondance hellénique*
BICS	*Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies of the University of London*
BMQ	*British Museum Quarterly*
BN	*Bulletin de numismatique*
Bull. Ep.	*Bulletin Epigraphique*
C&M	*Classica et Mediaevalia*
CAH	J.B. Bury et al., eds., *Cambridge Ancient History* (Cambridge, 1923–)

CArch	*Cahiers archéologiques*
CIL	*Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum*
ClAnt	*Classical Antiquity*
CP(h)	*Classical Philology*
CQ	*Classical Quarterly*
CR	*Classical Review*
CRAI	*Comptes rendus de l'Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres*
CSCA	*University of California Studies in Classical Antiquity*
CW	*Classical Weekly*
EA	*Epigraphica Anatolica*
EMC	*Échos du monde classique*
FD	*Fouilles de Delphes*
FG(r)H	F. Jacoby, ed., *Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker* (Berlin and Leiden, 1923–)
G&R	*Greece and Rome*
GGA	*Göttingische gelehrte Anzeiger*
GJ	*Geographical Journal*
GRBS	*Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies*
HSCP	*Harvard Studies in Classical Philology*
HT(h)R	*Harvard Theological Review*
IA	*Iranica antiqua*
ICS	*Illinois Classical Studies*
IEJ	*Israel Exploration Journal*
IG	*Inscriptiones Graecae* (Berlin, 1892–)
IGBulg	G. Mihailov, *Inscriptiones Graecae in Bulgaria repertae* (Serdicae, 1958–70)
IGRom	R. Cagnat et al., eds., *Inscriptiones Graecae ad res Romanas pertinentes* (Paris 1911–27)
II	*Inscriptiones Italiae* (Rome 1931–)
ILabraunda	J. Crampa, ed., *Labraunda Swedish Excavations and Researches,* vol. 3: *Greek Inscriptions* (Lund, 1969 and 1972)
ILAlg	S. Gsell and Pflaum, H.-G., eds., *Inscriptiones latinae de l'Algérie,* 2 volumes (Paris, 1922 and 1957)
ILLRP	A. Degrassi, ed., *Inscriptiones latinae liberae rei publicae* (Rome, 1957–)
ILS	H. Dessau, ed., *Inscriptiones latinae selectae* (Berlin, 1892–1916)
IosPE	B. Latyschev, ed., *Inscriptiones orae septentrionalis Ponti Euxini* (Petersburg, 1895–1901)
I. Lindos	*Lindos Fouilles et recherches, 1902–1914.* Vol. 2*: Inscriptions,* ed. C. Blinkenburg and K.F. Kinch (Berlin 1931–41)
IvDidyma	*Didyma,* vol. 2: *Die Inschriften,* ed. A. Rehm (Berlin, 1958)

IvEphesos *Inschriften von Ephesos*, ed. H. Wankel, Inschriften griechischer Städte aus Kleinasien Bd. 11–17 (Bonn, 1979–)
IvMilet *Milet*, vol. 6: *Die Inschriften von Milet*, ed. P. Herrmann (Berlin 1997–)
IvPerge *Inschriften von Perge*, ed. S. Sahin, *Inschriften griechischer Städte aus Kleinasien*, Bd. 54.1 (Bonn, 1999–)
IvScythia *Inschriften von Scythia Minor*
JADIS G. Palumbo, ed., *JADIS. The Jordan Antiquities Database and Information System. A Summary of the Data* (Amman)
JDAI *Jahrbuch des Deutschen Archäologischen Instituts*
JEA *Journal of Egyptian Archaeology*
JHS *Journal of Hellenic Studies*
JNES *Journal of Near Eastern Studies*
JÖAI *Jahrbuch des Österreichischen Archäologischen Instituts*
JRS *Journal of Roman Studies*
KP K.J.F. Ziegler et al., eds., *Der Kleine Pauly* (Stuttgart, 1964–75)
LCM *Liverpool Classical Monthly*
LIMC J. Boardman, et al., ed. *Lexicon Iconographicum Mythologiae Classicae* (Zurich 1981–)
LSAG L.H. Jeffery, *Local Scripts of Archaic Greece*, 2d ed. by A.W. Johnston (Oxford, 1990)
LSAM F. Sokolowski, ed., *Lois sacrées de l'Asie Mineure* (Paris, 1955)
MAI *Mêmoires de l'Académie des Inscriptions et Belles Lettres*
MAMA E. Herzfeld, et al., eds., *Monumenta Asiae Minoris Antiquae* (London, 1928–)
MDAI(A) *Mitteilungen des Deutschen Archäologischen Instituts (Athens)*
MDAI(I) *Mitteilungen des Deutschen Archäologischen Instituts (Istanbul)*
MdI *Mitteilungen des Deutschen Archäologischen Instituts*
MEFRA *Mélanges de l'École française de Rome, Antiquité*
Milet Wiegand, T., et al., eds., *Milet* (Berlin, 1906–)
ML R. Meiggs and D. Lewis, eds., *A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions to the End of the Fifth Century BC*, rev. ed. (Oxford, 1988)
MNIR *Mededelingen van het Nederlandsch historisch Instituut te Rome*
NC *Numismatic Chronicle*
OJA *Oxford Journal of Archaeology*
PAA *Praktika tēs Akadēmias Athēnôn*
PAAH *Praktika tēs en Athēnais Archaiologikēs Etaireias*
PalEQ *Palestine Exploration Quarterly*
PBSR *Papers of the British School at Rome*

PCPS	*Proceedings of the Cambridge Philogical Society*
PMG	D.L. Page, ed., *Poetae Melici Graeci* (Oxford, 1962)
PP	*La Parola del passato*
PRIA	*Proceedings of the Royal Irish Academy*
QS	*Quaderni di storia*
QUCC	*Quaderni urbinati di cultura classica*
RBi	*Revue biblique*
RE	A. Pauly et al., eds., *Real-Encyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft* (Stuttgart, 1842–)
REA	*Revue des études anciennes*
REG	*Revue des études grecques*
RFIC	*Rivista di filologia e di istruzione classica*
RHR	*Revue de l'histoire des religions*
RN	*Revue numismatique*
RPh	*Revue de philologie*
RSA	*Rivista storica dell'Antichità*
SB	*Sitzungsberichte*
SEG	*Supplementum Epigraphicum Graecum*
SIG	W. Dittenberger, ed., *Sylloge Inscriptionum Graecarum*, 3rd ed. (Leipzig, 1915–24)
StudPap	*Studia papyrologica*
TAM	E. Kalinka and R. Herberdey, eds., *Tituli Asiae Minoris* (Vienna, 1901–)
TAP(h)A	*Transactions of the American Philological Association*
TAPhS	*Transactions of the American Philosophical Society*
Tod	M.N. Tod, *Greek Historical Inscriptions*, 2nd ed., 2 vols. (Oxford 1946)
TürkAD	*Türk arkeoloji dergisi*
ZPalV	*Zeitschrift des Deutschen Palästina-Vereins*
ZPE	*Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik*

INTRODUCTION

Martin Ostwald

The genesis of this volume, the names of its editors and contributors, and the range and quality of its contributions constitute a far more eloquent and authentic tribute to the man to whom it is dedicated than an introduction can indicate. A. John Graham spent the last eighteen years of his active teaching career (1977–95) as Professor of Classical Studies and Allen Memorial Professor of Greek at the University of Pennsylvania. When he was approached by two of his former doctoral students for approval of a Festschrift they planned to publish in his honor, he accepted on condition that only former students be invited to contribute. His international renown as a scholar notwithstanding, Graham's first loyalty was to transmit the heritage of Classical antiquity to his students. The degree to which his affection for them was reciprocated is shown in that the idea of publishing a Festschrift in his honor came from them; in the impressive number of contributors (which, be it noted, exclude other friends and colleagues); and in the unusually wide range and high quality of their contributions, most of them sprung from seeds planted by John Graham's teaching and example.

Before John Graham came to the University of Pennsylvania in 1977, he had been initiated into Classical Studies at the famed Quaker school, Bootham, where he counted Victor Ehrenberg and John O. Burtt among his teachers. Their influence, and particularly that of Ehrenberg, was to give decisive direction to his scholarly career. After a year's National Service in the British Army, he gained a scholarship and admission to King's College Cambridge in 1949, where he won a number of distinguished prizes and awards in Classics. After receiving his B.A. from Cambridge with Distinction in Ancient History in 1952 (M.A. in 1956), he spent part of his post-graduate studies at the University of Munich in Germany and at the British School at Athens. While holding his first job as an assistant lecturer at Bedford College, London, the British Academy awarded his essay on the authenticity of the Cyrene foundation decree (later published in *JHS* 80 (1960)) the prestigious Cromer Greek Prize, for which

Arnaldo Momigliano was his examiner. He completed his Ph.D. at Cambridge under the sponsorship of Professor Sir Frank Adcock in 1957. His dissertation was crowned with the Hare Prize of the University of Cambridge, and formed the basis of his pioneering work on *Colony and Mother City*, which was published in 1964 by the Manchester University Press (2nd ed., corrected and revised, by Ares Publishers, 1983). After two years at Bedford College he accepted a position at the University of Manchester, where he was Senior Lecturer in Ancient History when the University of Pennsylvania succeeded in enticing him to accept a professorship in Classical Studies in the United States. Thus, the modern authority on ancient Greek colonization became himself—a Quaker by origin and upbringing—an *oikistes* (colony-founder) in what had been colonized three centuries earlier by British Quakers.

For Graham the appointment as Professor of Classical Studies gave him an opportunity he had long coveted: his new duties now encompassed also the teaching of texts in the original Greek and Latin languages, and they included more work with graduate students, including the supervision of doctoral dissertations. For the University of Pennsylvania the presence of Graham in what had been primarily a department of language and literature provided a tremendous boost to the newly-instituted Graduate Group in Ancient History. This program was first devised at the University of Pennsylvania by Graham's predecessor, Professor Michael H. Jameson, and has since spread to many other institutions of higher learning in the United States. The Graduate Group has no teaching staff of its own, but depends on participation by the faculty of all departments concerned with the teaching of ancient cultures. It requires of its students proficiency in two ancient cultures, including their language and historical literature—preferably also their religion and non-historical literature—and the writing of a dissertation that spans the two cultures chosen. Since Greek and Roman are the preferred cultures of most students, the Department of Classical Studies has always had a special interest in the Graduate Group of Ancient History, although the combinations chosen have also involved Egyptian, Hittite, Assyrian, Akkadian, and a number of other ancient cultures either in combination with Greek or Roman history, or combined with one another.

Dr. Graham's special interests were, one might say, tailor-made for this kind of program. Not only had his pioneering studies in Greek

colonization made him thoroughly conversant with the cultures Greek settlements encountered all around the Mediterranean basin throughout the more than four centuries of the colonization movement, but he had also made the study of imperial Roman history, especially under the Severi, his own, both in courses he taught and in his publications. Furthermore, by its very nature his work on colonization had given him expertise not only in the interpretation of ancient texts, but also in the epigraphy, archaeology, and social and religious institutions of the lands colonized and penetrated by the Greeks.

At Penn Dr. Graham gave of himself in courses and seminars on various aspects of Greek colonization to students of history as well as of archaeology. He explored with them the complexities of the Athenian Empire, of the Peloponnesian War, and of Macedonian expansionism under Philip and Alexander. He introduced many graduate students to the study of Greek epigraphy and taught them to exploit it for historical knowledge. He regularly offered courses on Herodotus, Thucydides, Demosthenes, and Aeschines. On the undergraduate level, he offered introductory courses to Greek History, as well as reading courses in the Greek and Latin historians and orators.

When a background of this range and depth is found in a warmhearted, humane, and brilliant teacher, thoroughly devoted to his students, significant results are bound to follow. Few faculty members of the Graduate Group in Ancient History have had as loyal a following among their students as John Graham did (and still does). His relations with his former students extend far beyond their completion of their doctorate; his interest in their work as well as in their personal welfare remains lively long after they have made a name of their own in the international scholarly community. Despite his stubborn refusal to surrender to the use of e-mail, his contact with them remains frequent and far-flung.

John Graham has inspired and directed dissertations at the University of Pennsylvania on the role of religion in the foundation of Greek colonies, on colonial sites, on Persian coins, on the defenses of Attica, on Attic phratries, on the diplomatic use of kinship terminology in the Hellenistic age, on the chronology of Delphi, on the history of Miletus, on textual problems in Thucydides, on views held of Sparta in the Greek world, on democracies outside Athens, and on several other subjects primarily in the field of Greek colonization. Many of these have meanwhile been published in book form and have enhanced

Graham's reputation through the product of his students. The reverse has also occasionally happened: by publishing jointly with a student, his prestige has enhanced beginners' records.

Even a cursory glance at his list of publications (see below) will show how Graham's own scholarly production flourished during his time at the University of Pennsylvania. Of the twenty-five (plus) articles and contributions to collective enterprises and the eleven (plus) major reviews he published between 1978 and 2000, he is most widely known for his fundamental contributions on 'The Colonial Expansion of Greece' and 'The Western Greeks' to the third volume of the revised *Cambridge Ancient History*.

In addition to his activities as a teacher and publishing scholar, John Graham also gave distinguished service to the professional community. At the University of Pennsylvania he chaired the Graduate Group in Ancient History from 1978–81, the Graduate Group in Classical Studies from 1985–86, and served as Chairman of the Department of Classical Studies (1982–85). It was by dint of his good sense and diplomatic skill that Classical Archaeology became part of Classical Studies during his incumbency. He served the Classical world at large as a member of the Advisory Committee of *Expedition*, the journal sponsored by the University Museum (1984–87); from 1987 to his retirement in 1995, he was a member of the Managing Committee of the American School of Classical Studies at Athens; and from 1989–94 he was appointed a Senior Fellow at the Center for Hellenic Studies in Washington, D.C., a prestigious international research institution in Greek studies for young post-doctoral scholars.

The articles contained in this volume reflect John Graham's own extraordinary expertise in matters pertaining to colonization, government, law, religion, and the military, while the diversity of approaches involving epigraphy, numismatics, literary evidence, and historiography attest the remarkable range of his teaching. They are a worthy tribute to the work, accomplished so far, but, we hope, not yet finished, by one of the most beloved and influential Classical teachers and scholars of his generation.

CURRICULUM VITAE OF A.J. GRAHAM

Alexander John Graham, born at Lowestoft, Suffolk, England on March 9, 1930. Father Godfrey Michael Graham. Mother Edith née Meek. Married to Jenny Elizabeth née Fitter. Two children.

EDUCATION

1949–55	King's College, Cambridge
1952	B.A.
1956	M.A.
1957	Ph.D.

with periods of Study at Munich (1953) and at the British School at Athens

AWARDS

1946	Open Scholarship in History at King's College, Cambridge
1952	Richards Prize of King's College, Cambridge
1952–53	Sandys Student of the University of Cambridge
1953–54	Augustus Austen Leigh Student of King's College, Cambridge
1956	Cromer Greek Prize of the British Academy
1960	Hare Prize of the University of Cambridge
1981–82	National Endowment for the Humanities Fellow

PROFESSIONAL APPOINTMENTS

1955–57	Assistant lecturer in Classics, Bedford College, University of London
1957–77	Assistant lecturer (1957–59), lecturer (1959–70) and senior lecturer (1970–77) in Ancient History, University of Manchester
1977–95	Professor of Classical Studies and Allen Memorial Professor in Greek, University of Pennsylvania
1995–	Emeritus Professor of Classical Studies, University of Pennsylvania

PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITIES

1958–62	Secretary, Classical Association, Manchester and District Branch
1959–62	Member of Council, Society for the Promotion of Hellenic Studies
1967–73	Treasurer, Manchester University Archaeological Society
1970–73	External Examiner in Ancient History, University of Leeds
1971–72	Examiner in History, Classical Tripos Part II, University of Cambridge
1973–74	Chairman, Classical Association, Manchester and District Branch
1974–77	Member of Council, Society for the Promotion of Hellenic Studies
1975–77	External Examiner in Ancient History and Classical Archaeology, University of Liverpool
1977–	Member of the Graduate Group in Ancient History, University of Pennsylvania
1977–92	Member of the Graduate Group in Classical Archaeology, University of Pennsylvania
1978–81	Chairman, Graduate Group in Ancient History, University of Pennsylvania
1978–81	Member of Coordinating Committee, School of Arts and Sciences, University of Pennsylvania
1980–95	Member of the Graduate Group in Religious Studies, University of Pennsylvania
1982–85	Chairman, Department of Classical Studies, University of Pennsylvania
1984–87	Member of the Advisory Committee of *Expedition*, University Museum, University of Pennsylvania
1985–86	Acting Graduate Chairman, Classical Studies, University of Pennsylvania
1985–86	Member of Committee to draft statement of research for School of Arts and Sciences Strategic Plan, University of Pennsylvania
1986, 1992	Honors Examiner, Swarthmore College
1987–95	Member of the Managing Committee, American School of Classical Studies at Athens
1988–89	Member of Personnel Committee, School of Arts and Sciences, University of Pennsylvania

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SECTION ONE

LAW, HISTORY, AND CONSTITUTIONS

THE PREHISTORY OF GREEK CHRONOGRAPHY

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Introduction

The earliest attested written chronographies in ancient Greece date to the end of the fifth century BC. The traditions recorded in these lists go back as much as three centuries before the date of their writing, to the eighth and seventh centuries BC. We have no direct evidence for the sources.[1] In broad outline, scholars have proposed two solutions to the problem. Either the chronographies were transcriptions of earlier written documents that were kept current from the beginnings of the tradition, or they were first composed retrospectively, at some time between the beginning of the tradition and its writing. If the chronographies were composed retrospectively, then they were based on some tradition other than writing—most imagine an oral tradition of some kind—or they were simply fabricated.

Resort to hypothetical and procrustean 'early documentary lists' or to amorphous and equally hypothetical 'oral traditions' is unenlightening and unproductive. In evaluating the issue of sources, the first question to consider is what material might have been available to those who composed the early chronographies. Evidence is at hand: Herodotus is far the most important witness for early chronographic practices.[2] In this paper I will look at the documentation for the 'monumental tradition', by which I mean the tradition associated with dedications of various kinds. This monumental tradition was pertinent and available to those compiling early chronographies. I do not exclude the possibility that other kinds of evidence—e.g., written documents and oral traditions—may have been used as well.

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[1] Cf. generally Samuel (1972); Mosshammer (1979).
[2] Cf. Mosshammer (1979) 105–11.

Early Chronographies

I begin with the earliest and most discussed of the chronographies, the Athenian Archon-List. The Archon-List is first attested by four non-joining fragments of an inscription, discovered in the Athenian Agora, dated to the last third of the fifth century BC (*IG* 1^3.1031).[3] Only a few entries have been preserved, but the list probably starts from the archonship of Kreon, traditionally dated to 683/82 BC.

Felix Jacoby is the most influential exponent of the position that the Archon-List was based on a written document that was kept from the very beginning.[4] Jacoby observed that from the end of the fifth century the Archon-List represented in the literary tradition was authoritative and uniform. He further noted that the list preserved by the literary tradition represents a number of irregular details (i.e., gaps in the list for anarchy and usurpation). In view of the unanimity and specificity of the tradition, Jacoby felt that the inscribed list must have been based on a written document kept from the seventh century on. To put the point in a negative form, if the inscribed list had been constructed on the basis of scattered sources, it might be expected that some trace of competing traditions would have survived in the later literary tradition, and there would be some anachronisms in the list. Jacoby expected that the original written document should have included notes attached to the names of various archons. Since the inscribed list includes only names, and not even patronymics, he argued that it must be a revision, or excerpt of an original. On the basis of this reconstruction, he supposed that the written list was kept by successive archons in the Prytaneion, probably on a white-washed wooden board.[5]

These arguments are speculative. The Atthidographic tradition does not provide a witness for the archons mentioned in the surviving fragments of the inscribed list, so we do not know what the relationship was between the literary tradition and the inscription.

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[3] See ML no. 6 and Sickinger (1999) 47–51, with bibliography at 210–12, notes 47–71. On the date, see Stroud (1978) 41 n. 57.

[4] Jacoby (1949) 169–76. Cf. Bradeen (1963) 205 n. 88; Stroud (1978) 32–5; Sickinger (1999) 47–51.

[5] Jacoby (1949) 174. Cf. Pritchett (1996) 36. Some add that for practical reasons a written list must have existed from 683/82: Stroud (1978) 32; Cadoux (1948) 79; Sickinger (1999) 49–50. Opposed, see Miller (1969) 65, 288. Comparative examples do not support the argument: Lowenthal (1985) 219–24; le Roy Ladurie (1978) 277–82.

Even granting that the two are identical, earlier competing traditions about the Archon-List might have been eliminated by the erection of the public inscription—but the point is moot, because despite Jacoby's assurances there is evidence for competing traditions.[6] We do not know enough about the circumstances of the composition and erection of the inscription, the details of the Archon-List or, for that matter, the history of Athens to pronounce confidently about the possibility of manipulation or fabrication of parts of the list. No one has ever attempted to give an account of any kind, favorable or hostile, of the 'oral tradition' that supposedly produced the list. There is no obvious reason why, in given circumstances, an oral tradition might not produce irregular details in a list as easily as a written tradition. We know nothing of an early documentary list. There is no other preserved list of *eponymoi* contemporary with the inscription. Consequently there is no reason to be surprised that it was composed of a bare list of names, or to expect that it should have included further details and annotations.[7] Jacoby's lightest opinions of course warrant an attentive hearing, but the simple weight of his name should not be enough to convert them into facts.

Jacoby's account of the 'prehistory' of the Archon-List is not based on direct evidence, but it is extrapolated from features of the inscription and the Atthidographic tradition. Consequently, those who believe that an Archon-List was kept in writing before the erection of the inscription also tend to maintain that the inscription was based on this hypothetical early document. There is ample evidence for Athenian use of writing from the end of the seventh century, particularly in preserving laws. According to tradition Drako's laws were written down around 630, and Solon's laws were certainly displayed toward the beginning of the sixth century. Numbers of substantial inscriptions, however, are preserved only from the end of the sixth century. There is no evidence for any document comparable to an Archon-List, or

[6] There is a discrepancy in the tradition regarding the date of Solon's archonship: see Jacoby (1949) 346 n. 22; Miller (1959) 42–52; Miller (1969); Rhodes (1993) 120–1. According to the list, the Alkmeonid Kleisthenes held the archonship under the Peisistratids, which contradicts the traditions known to Herodotus (5.62.2 and 6.121, 123.1) and Thucydides (6.53). Most scholars presume without warrant that the Archon-List preserves objective truth and that Herodotus and Thucydides preserve biased traditions: cf., e.g., Thomas (1989) 144–53, 261–4, 287–8; Lavelle (1993); Plommer (1969); Lewis (1988) 288–9; Fornara and Samons (1991) 17.

[7] Cf. Jacoby's concession, Jacoby (1949) 58–9; also Thomas (1989) 287. The fourth century lists from Thasos and Miletus (below) include names and patronymics only.

for the maintenance of archives at all, before the last part of the fifth century.[8]

Many scholars have argued that the Archon-List was first written down at some date after the creation of the magistracy.[9] All agree that much information, written and oral, would have been available concerning the fifth century, though no one says what precisely this information was, how it might have been collected, and who might have collected it. For the sixth and seventh centuries no likely documentary sources have been identified, and most fall back on a vague 'oral tradition'. This oral tradition has been poorly served by both critics and advocates. Critics tend to dismiss it as a synonym for 'fiction' or 'fabrication'.[10] Advocates generally invoke it like the genie from the bottle: it appears just long enough to explain the Archon-List, then it vanishes without a trace.[11] If the appeal to oral tradition is to be persuasive, those who invoke it should produce evidence to show who the keepers of the tradition were, how it operated, and how it was perpetuated.

The other earliest chronographic lists are well known and pose the same problems as the Athenian Archon-List. Hippias supposedly composed a list of Olympic victors (Plut., *Numa* 1; cf. Pl., *Hippias Maior* 285 e). Hellanikos (*FGH* 4) made use of a list of victors at the Karneia and composed a list of the priestesses of Hera at Argos, as well as a list of the Attic kings. These late fifth-century chronologies provide lists of magistrates going well back into the archaic period. After the Athenian Archon-List, the first examples of publicly inscribed lists of magistrates date to the fourth century. The list of archons at Thasos was first inscribed and displayed on the walls of a public building around 360, and it includes names of magistrates going back

[8] Archaic Athenian inscriptions: Stroud (1978); Whitley (1997) 640–5; Hedrick (1999) 397–8. Laws of Drakon and Solon: Ruschenbusch (1966); Stroud (1968); (1979). For arguments that Athenian archives existed earlier than I say here, see Pritchett (1996) 24, 35, 88–9; Sickinger (1999). One of their chief reasons for alleging the existence of the early archives is the Archon-List; their use of other evidence seems to me equally speculative and circumstantial. Furthermore, their discussions are founded on an objectionably broad definition of 'archive'. I will return to the subject elsewhere.

[9] Various terminal dates have been put forward. By the time of Solon: Sickinger (1999) 51, cf. 195. Peisistratids: Thomas (1989) 287–8. By 479: Jacoby (1949) 174; Samuel (1972) 196 n. 3; Miller (1969) 64. In late fifth century: Plommer (1969); Samuel (1972) 197.

[10] See Jacoby (1949) 175. Cf. Stroud (1978) 34–5; Sickinger (1999) 48–9; Thomas (1989) 287–8.

[11] Cf. Miller (1969) 64–5; Thomas (1989) 108–23.

perhaps to the seventh century and the foundation of the colony.[12] The list of *stephanephoroi* from Miletus was inscribed on a stele around 335, and it includes names dating back to 525/24. The list continued to be inscribed down to Roman times on a series of *stelai.*[13] A catalogue of victors at the Pythia was composed by Aristotle and Callisthenes at about the same time.[14] We have little evidence for the early sources of any of these lists. Scholars have dealt with the problem in these cases in the same way that they have dealt with the sources of the Athenian Archon-List.[15]

The available evidence, scanty though it is, does not support the position that the early chronographies were originally maintained as documents in archives, and then copied out onto stone. In fact, I find no evidence that chronographic lists were preserved and maintained by any Greek state at any time in any form except as public inscriptions.[16] Nor can I find any evidence, early or late, that 'oral tradition' or 'trained memories' were the ultimate guarantors of the texts of chronographic lists.

We might reasonably approach the problem by asking who composed the lists. In many cases we do not know. Where there is evidence, the authors are prominent intellectuals, such as Hellanikos and Hippias. According to Plutarch (*Numa* 1.4 = *FGH* 6 F 2), Hippias' list of Olympic victors was based on no certain information (ἀπ' οὐδενὸς ὁρμώμενον ἀναγκαίου πρὸς πίστιν).[17] The passage implies that he did more than simply memorize and transcribe a documentary source. Aristotle and Callisthenes were honored for composing the list of Pythionikai, and their work, written on *pinakes*, was first copied onto stone, and then dedicated in the sanctuary.[18] In an interesting Roman inscription (3rd century AD) an eponymous *stephanephoros* of

[12] See Salviat (1984); cf. Pouilloux and Dunant (1954–57) 1.263–78; 2.104–16; Guarducci (1967–78) 2.338–9; École française d'Athènes (1968) 25–7.

[13] *Milet* 1.3, no. 122, cf. 123–8; cf. Guarducci (1967–78) 2.339–41; Wörrle (1988) 431–7; Gorman (2001) ch. 3.

[14] See Plut., *Solon* 11; *SIG*³ 275 = Tod 187; Bousquet (1984); *FD* 3.5, 58.42.

[15] Cf. Dow (1934) 103–4; Pritchett (1996) 1–91; Sickinger (1999) passim, esp. 184.

[16] On such lists see generally Guarducci (1967–78) 2.328–47; Wilhelm (1909) 287–8; *LSCG*, comm. to no. 138.

[17] Cf. Herrmann (1972) 216 n. 14; Hosshammer (1979) 92–3; Sickinger (1999) 255 n. 107.

[18] *SIG*³ 275 = Tod 187; cf. Bousquet (1984). As I understand the text, these *pinakes* are not an archival copy, which will be maintained and regularly up-dated, but the authors' finished text, which they dedicate in the same way that Heraclitus dedicated his book more than a century before (Diog. Laert. 9.6). Cf. Pomtow in *SIG*³ 275 n. 3; Pritchett (1996), 27–8.

Iasos named M. Aurelius Daphnos is honored, in part for making a list of his predecessors in office over the preceding century (*SEG* 45 (1995), no. 1521). Some scholars imagine that such people simply copied archival documents and released them under their own names. If an archival copy of the list already existed, there was no need of a Hippias or a Hellanikos or an Aristotle, but only a scribe. Nor, in such a case, would there be any reason to honor the composers of the lists.

Nor does what is known of the methods of maintaining such lists support theories so far advanced. The early lists are all inscribed at a time long after the beginning of the traditions they record. The first centuries of such lists are inscribed at one time. Subsequently, however, the lists were normally maintained on the stone, not in some archive. So the first several hundred names of archons at Thasos were inscribed by one hand around 360. The names for subsequent years were added to the stone at regular intervals. The first two hundred or so names of *stephanephoroi* at Miletus were inscribed at once, around 335; the list continued to be inscribed down to Roman times on a series of *stelai*, and it was inscribed year by year. A list of priests at Halikarnassos, which went back to most ancient times, was inscribed in the first century BC—copied not from an archival document, but from an 'old stele' (*SIG*³ 1020.1–2). A decree of the first century BC from Rhodes (excerpted from an archival document and inscribed), enjoins the priests of Apollo Erethimios to maintain the list of those holding the position, inscribing the names annually (*SIG*³ 723 = *LSCG* 138). The inscription recording the list, updated annually in different hands, has been recovered (*SIG*³ 724). A comparable inscription of about the same period from Halasarna on Cos orders the revision of a list of priests and its inscription on stone; during a recent period of political usurpation the names of a number of persons had been chiseled out of various public inscriptions (*SIG*³ 793 = *LSCG* 174). There is nothing in all this of archival documents or 'official rememberers'.

The Monumental Tradition

A source of information available to those compiling early chronographies was the 'monumental tradition'. Greco-Roman traditions about the past were frequently associated with dedications. This 'mon-

umental tradition' was public, accessible to the entire community, and most Greek historians made use of it. I do not claim that this tradition would have been the sole source of information, nor that it would have been 'historically accurate' in the manner of an annually up-dated written catalogue. The evidence for Greek dedicatory practice is immense and has not been systematically considered since the beginning of the twentieth century.[19] Nevertheless, the history and nature of the monumental tradition is well known and, in general outlines, undisputed. I briefly rehearse a number of more or less uncontroversial points.

1. *The Classical 'monumental tradition' can be traced back to the eighth century*

At all times in the Classical period Greeks dedicated objects to commemorate various events. Some of these were large (statues, buildings and the like); others were small (votive offerings, for example). Some were marked as belonging to clearly defined collections; others stood isolated. Such dedications are attested almost universally, among most peoples and at most times. On the Greek mainland, for example, votive offerings are found all through the Bronze Age. Nevertheless, open-air sanctuaries (*temene*) typical of the Classical world first emerge in the ninth and eighth centuries, and this event can reasonably be regarded as marking the beginning of the Classical dedicatory tradition. These sanctuaries provided a stable environment for the accumulation, preservation, display, and interpretation of dedications of all kinds.[20] The monumental tradition known to the Classical Greeks certainly goes back earlier than the emergence of these sanctuaries. Writers from Herodotus to Pausanias claimed to know of objects dedicated by figures such as Herakles and the Homeric heroes, but they also distinguished between the time of heroes and the time of people. This 'human time', or better, historical period, was reckoned to have emerged in the eighth century, that is, at about the time that the Classical monumental tradition begins.[21]

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[19] Rouse (1902); cf. Straten (1981); Hansen (1996).

[20] Langdon (1987). Cf. Morris (1998) esp. 15–16. Contra Morris, see Sourvinou-Inwood (1993).

[21] See Hdt. 3.122. Cf. Mosshammer (1979) 105–11; Strasburger (1956); Lateiner (1989) 118–19.

2. *Dedications were associated with traditions about the past*

Dedications had a variety of connotations for the ancient Greeks, some contradictory.[22] For example, dedications frequently had a financial value that might be regarded as conflicting with other meanings of the object.[23] Dedications were also sacred objects, gifts that served to define the relationship between men and gods.[24] Above all they were vehicles of tradition: physical, enduring manifestations of past events, displayed to the community, preserved for posterity. The commemorative motive has long been known and documented,[25] and it was frequently spelled out in inscriptions attached to the object. One of the generic terms for such objects was *mnema*, which, like the Latin *monumentum*, German *Denkmal*, etc., means 'reminder'. Dedications were displayed in sanctuaries in part to 'call to mind' past events.

3. *The monumental tradition was preserved informally by the general public*

The past does not exist and concrete experience of it can be had only indirectly, by interaction with enduring objects.[26] In Greece, as in the modern world, public tradition was tied to objects in the lived space of the community. When a dedication is placed on open display, the tradition associated with it is 'made public' in two senses. First, the community as a whole is enabled to participate in its preservation. On the other hand, control of the tradition is abandoned by the dedicator. Whatever intentions may have prompted the dedication give way to mutable popular perceptions.

4. *The monumental tradition was also formally maintained by public officials*

There was some institutionalized state control of the monumental tradition. Dedications lodged in sanctuaries were usually in the charge of officials, who were expected to keep account of them. Their duties

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[22] Linders (1987) 120; Straten (1992); Hansen (1996); Rouse (1902).

[23] So at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War the Athenians drew on the resources of the sanctuaries to pay for the war. See the 'Kallias Decree', ML 58, and Thuc. 2.13. Cf. Ferguson (1932) 85–96; Kallet-Marx (1993) 104 and n. 83; Hansen (1996).

[24] Burkert (1985) 68–70; Linders and Nordquist (1987).

[25] Cf. Jacoby (1949) 169: 'Monuments, to which legends are often attached, are not documents, because they are mute'.

[26] Cf. Lowenthal (1985) 125–82, 238–49, 263–362; Hedrick (2000) chs. 5 and 7.

are reflected in the surviving inscribed inventories.[27] Such lists were doubtless made of objects in sanctuaries throughout the Greek world, though irregularly and in a haphazard way. At Athens, Delos, and Didyma, however, inventories of dedications were made at relatively regular intervals.[28]

Several series of inventories are known from Athens: those kept by the treasurers of Athena and the Other Gods; those kept in the Asklepieion; those kept at Eleusis; and those of Artemis, which were kept in copies both on the Acropolis and at Brauron.[29] The inventories of the Treasurers of Athena are the earliest attested, beginning from 434. Nevertheless, officials were keeping track of dedications on the Acropolis long before the mid-fifth century BC. The Treasurers of Athena are mentioned in connection with the Laws of Drako (Ps. Xen., *Athenaion Politeia* 4.2), and are attested epigraphically in the middle of the sixth century (*IG* 1^3.510).[30]

5. *The inventories show how officials preserved and interpreted the monumental tradition*

Through these reviews and verifications, information about the collection was passed on. In Athens inventories of dedications were typically made on three occasions: when an official or board left office and handed over responsibility for the objects to others (*paradosis*); when objects were removed from the sanctuary (*kathairesis*); and when an 'extraordinary inventory' of dedications was carried out (*exetasmos*). Objects were listed on the inventories with very different degrees of precision. Some receive only the most generic notice. In other cases detailed description, including information about the circumstances of dedication may be provided. The inventories were also organized according to various principles, which reflect particular understandings of the collection. For example, dedications were sometimes grouped according to the material of which they are made—gold,

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[27] See Guarducci (1967–78) 2.189–315; Knoepfler and Tréheux (1988); Brommer (1985).

[28] Guarducci (1967–78), 2.191–2; Aleshire (1989) 103 n. 1; Tod (1954) 3. The Delian inventories after 167/66 certainly come out of the Athenian tradition: see Linders (1988) and esp. 37 n. 1. The accounts from Didyma do not: see *IvDidyma* 424–78; cf. Guarducci (1967–78), 2.312–15; Fontenrose (1988) 56–9.

[29] Ferguson (1932), Linders (1975); Harris (1995) (Athena and the Other Gods); Aleshire (1989) (Asklepieion); Linders (1972) (Brauron); Cavanaugh (1996) 1–17 (Eleusis).

[30] Cf. Jordan (1979) 56–62; Harris (1995) 11–19.

silver, bronze, wood, and so on—and this organization may suggest a financial interpretation of the dedications. In other cases dedications might be listed according to type, location in sanctuary, name of the divinity to whom they are dedicated, or date of dedication.[31]

6. *Literary accounts record the traditions associated with the dedications collected in various sanctuaries*

Some authors wrote about dedications collected in local sanctuaries.[32] The most famous such account is the *anagraphe* of the dedications in the temple of Athena at Lindos by Timachidas and Tharsagoras, which was commemorated on an inscription of 99 BC.[33] This inscription includes a Lindian decree ordering the composition of the work, as well as the work itself. The *anagraphe* includes a description of some 45 dedications that stood at one time in the sanctuary, including the names of authors who have mentioned them in their writings. The dedications are said to date from mythic times down to the third century BC. Theopompos wrote an account 'On the Dedications Plundered from Delphi' in the fourth century (*FGH* 115 F 247–9).[34] In the second century BC Heliodoros of Athens wrote about objects on the Acropolis at Athens (*FGH* 373 T 1–6) and Anaxandridas of Delphi wrote 'On Plundered Dedications in (*sic*) Delphi' (*FGH* 404 F 1). At about the same time Leon of Samos wrote an account of the dedications in the Heraion of Samos (*FGH* 540 T 1). Plutarch wrote on statues at Plataiai (*FGH* 388 F 1–2).[35]

7. *Historians used the monumental tradition as a source for their narratives*

The monumental tradition was one of the chief sources available and almost all ancient historians recurred to it to some extent. The most important case for our purposes is Herodotus, who mentions hundreds of objects as both occasions and evidence for his stories.[36]

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[31] The local priest might be charged with the arrangement of dedications in the sanctuary: see *LSAM* 74; cf. Linders (1972) 68–73; Straten (1992) 248–54, 285–90.
[32] Generally Tresp (1914) 1–39, esp. 13–14, 28; Chaniotis (1988) 52–7 and 308–9.
[33] Better known as the 'Lindian Temple-Chronicle', *I. Lindos* 2. Cf. Blinkenberg (1915); *FGH* 532; *SIG*³ 725; Guarducci (1967–78) 2.302–8; Chaniotis (1988) 13.52–7.
[34] Cf. Flower (1994) 36, 71, 162–3, 187 n. 9.
[35] Cf. Mossman (1991).
[36] See Dewald (1993) with bibliography cited at 57 n. 4; West (1985); Flower (1991).

His account of Croesus, for example, is based on information derived from Delphi, and linked with dedications there. In his account of the early history of Egypt, he constantly appeals to the authority of monuments at Memphis. By referring to a monument in connection with a story, he is offering the reader tangible evidence of the truth of the story. At the same time, he is providing an account of his source of his narrative. For example, when Herodotus wishes 'to get clear knowledge' about the antiquity of the cult of Herakles, he visits Tyre, where he sees a sanctuary and dedications, and he receives an oral explanation of the antiquity of both from the priests there (Hdt. 2.44). Here the object is a kind of prompt for the story; it is also evidence for the truth of the tradition.

8. *The monumental tradition is not exclusively oral*

The Greeks took it as a principle that memory was more reliable when coupled with objects. Greco-Roman mnemonic theory, which traditionally took its beginning from Simonides, elevated the monumental tradition to a *theoretical* practice. The association of oral tradition with material objects is scarcely unique to the Greeks. Even psychologists have argued that memories endure more effectively when associated with concrete images.[37]

In the monumental tradition, oral tradition and concrete dedication complement one another. Oral traditions can explain, but they are fragile and susceptible to corruption. Physical objects endure unchanged, but they are mute and cannot of themselves explain what they mean. The dedication helps to preserve and prompt memory. The oral tradition explains what the dedication cannot. The dedication in turn serves as evidence of the truth of the oral tradition.[38] Oral tradition and monument influence one another. Objects need not be passive 'pegs' from which oral traditions are hung; they can also prompt the creation of oral traditions. So, for example, recent work suggests that images on Greek vases contributed to the formation and standardization of certain Greek myths, as monuments contributed to the perpetuation of early traditions about Rome.[39]

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[37] Yates (1966); Blum (1969); Carson (1999) 38–44 (Greek theory); Vansina (1985) 157 and 187; Connerton (1989) (comparative evidence); McDaniel and Pressley (1989) (modern psychology).

[38] See Hedrick (1994).

[39] See Powell (1997) (Greek myth); Wiseman (1994) (Roman tradition).

The interaction of oral tradition and physical object is itself monumentalized by the inscribed inventories. There is no evidence that writing was used at all to keep account of dedications until the inventories of the mid-fifth century. Texts written on some more ephemeral and portable material, papyrus or wooden boards, were doubtless produced in connection with the inscriptions.[40] Otherwise we know little about the documentary background of the inventories—when they began to be written, where they were kept, how long they were preserved, or how they were used.[41] The inventories were certainly not, and were not intended to be, full and complete accounts of the votive offerings in a given sanctuary, and they cannot have served as a complete and adequate guide to the objects in the collection. The work of reviewing and verifying the collection was done face to face, in front of witnesses. The inscribed inventories should be regarded as monumental commemorations of this oral process, not as functional records of the collection.[42]

The Composition of Chronographic Lists

Clearly, individual dedications might call to mind interesting narratives, but they did not of themselves establish an abstract chronology. For example, in Thucydides' account of Sicilian colonization (6.3–5), the 'foundational' event is the establishment of the altar of Apollo Archegetes at Naxos (later the site of Tauromenium). Thucydides remarks that this altar marked the arrival of the Greeks in Sicily, and it retained a great prestige among the Sicilian Greeks in Thucydides' day. Nevertheless, the altar has only a tangential importance in the dating scheme here. The chronology adopted by Thucydides is based on a generational count, and the central event, the benchmark by which other dates are determined, is not the altar, but for the most part the foundation of Syracuse.[43] The altar of Apollo

[40] See the mid-fourth century inventory of the Heraion in Samos, put up by Athenian cleruchs: Michel 832, lines 38–39); cf. Ohly (1953) 46–9; Guarducci (1967–78) 2.310–11; Cargill (1995) 116–19.

[41] For speculation Harris (1995) 17 nn. 66–8.

[42] Linders (1988); Harris (1995) 17. Cf., however, Aleshire (1989) 107 n. 3 and the responses in Linders (1992a and b).

[43] See Compernolle (1960); Gomme (1945–81) 4.198–210; Miller (1970); Graham (1982).

Archegetes was of unquestioned antiquity and prestige. By linking such an object to his chronology Thucydides (or his source) doubtless increased the persuasiveness of the chronology, but the chronology was not extrapolated from the altar.

The chronological uses of the monumental tradition are not located in traditions associated with particular dedications, but in the rationale tying together a set (or in temporal terms, a series) of objects and the uses to which the list is then put.[44] Herodotus provides an example of such a set of monuments, and also of its interpretation as a chronology. At the beginning of his account of the legendary kings of Egypt (2.99–143), he mentions that the Egyptian priests 'recited to him from a papyrus text' the names of the 330 kings who followed the first king. The temple was supposedly founded by Min (2.99), and objects from the sanctuary are often mentioned in connection with the various kings named (2.101, 108, 110, 112, 121, 136, 141). At the end of the section Herodotus remarks that the logographer Hekataios had claimed to the Egyptians that his personal genealogy went back to a god in the sixteenth generation. Herodotus had made no such claims; nevertheless the Egyptian priests showed him how they had refuted Hekataios: they took him into a hall of the temple and counted a series of statues there (2.143).[45] According to Herodotus, the priests appealed to two sources for the early chronology: a written document and a series of statues. The written document provided a list of the kings, the statues a list of the priests of Hephaistos. The two lists included the same number of names, and they coincided at the end in the person of Sethos, who was both king and priest. Herodotus uses two lists in conjunction. In accordance with the familiar pattern, the verbal account (here, written) provides the names of the kings, and the monuments provide the material proof of the antiquity of the chronology to those who may doubt. The verbal and monumental traditions support and explain one another; the two doubtless had coexisted for as long as the statues had stood in the temple.

In Greece, local chronographies are typically founded on important political and social institutions. Traditions regarding such institutions were systematized and recorded at a certain point by the writing of chronologies, but these institutions existed before the making of the

[44] Mosshammer (1979) 86–7.

[45] See, e.g., Plut., *Moralia* 873b3. Cf. Lloyd (1976–88) 1.175–8.

lists, and their various histories were connected to local traditions in many ways, not all of them dependent on writing.[46] It was customary for those who had achieved something notable or held prestigious positions to make dedications (or have dedications made on their behalf) to commemorate their service.[47] When chronographies came to be written, they were based on institutions that were already deeply implicated via the monumental tradition in the maintenance of local memory.

Magistrates in Athens typically made dedications to commemorate their achievements. I am aware of no evidence for a series of statues or offerings dedicated by Athenian archons, comparable to the statues of the Egyptian priests described by Herodotus. Nevertheless, it would be surprising if archons, like other officials of the state, did not make dedications to commemorate their terms of office. We hear, for example, that private citizens and magistrates (*archontes*) might dedicate herms (Harpocration, s.v. 'Hermai').[48] A series of dedications by the board of archons has been found on the North Slope of the Acropolis in the sanctuary of Apollo Hypakraios.[49] We hear of isolated dedications made by archons. The most famous of these is Thucydides' account of the altar set up by the younger Peisistratos in the Pythion to commemorate his term of office (Thuc. 6.54, cf. ML 11).[50] Likewise the terms of archons at Thasos and of *stephanephoroi* at Miletus were doubtless from time immemorial commemorated by lasting monuments.

It is possible that Hippias made use of earlier written chronographies.[51] Pausanias mentions two such lists (6.6.3 and 6.8.1). In addition the monumental tradition was available. As Pausanias' narrative shows (5.21–7; 6.1–18; cf. Pliny, *Naturalis Historia* 34.16), these dedications, coupled with local oral traditions about them, were a source

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[46] Cf. Mosshammer (1979) 91–7.

[47] Cf. Rouse (1902) 259–73.

[48] Cf. Shear (1984) 40–3; Wycherley (1957) 103–8.

[49] See Wycherley (1957) 179; Traulos (1980) 91–5.

[50] Jacoby (1949) 163, tendentiously claimed that 'as Thucydides found the name of the younger Peisistratos in the archons' list, he permitted himself a brief digression about two considerable votive gifts dedicated by him in his archonship'. There is no reason to imagine that the passage has anything to do with the Archon-List. Thucydides does not place the date of the archonship of the younger Peisistratos relative to other archons or relative to his own time. He simply claims that the inscription on the altar confirms his general statement that the Peisistratids always kept a family member in a position of power.

[51] If so the source was unreliable. It is difficult to reconcile the chronographic tradition with the archaeological evidence: see Lee (1988).

of information about the Olympic victors.[52] There is no evidence that a written list existed before Hellanikos wrote his account of the Priestesses of Hera at Argos (*FGH* 4).[53] In the time of Pausanias, however, statues of 'women who had served as priestess' stood in front of the temple of Hera (Pausanias 2.17.3). These statues, and the traditions associated with them, might have served as one source for the account.

The monumental tradition was an available source for other kinds of lists as well. For example, the inscriptions recording the Athenian *didaskalia* were erected in the second half of the fourth century. There is no evidence for the ultimate source(s) of the list. It records a tradition going back at least to the end of the sixth century. Most scholars have assumed that the *didaskalia* are based on an archival tradition dating to the sixth century.[54] There is, however, ample evidence that victors in the dramatic contests dedicated monuments, particularly tripods, in commemoration. The dedications were usually set up on a particular avenue, which was accordingly named the 'Street of the Tripods', and they figured prominently in Athenian traditions about the past.[55] The fifth-century inscriptions that accompanied these monuments preserve the same information compiled in the fourth-century lists.[56]

Conclusion: Monuments and Lists

For those composing chronological lists in Classical Greece, the monumental tradition was both a pertinent and available source. Chronologies were generated out of existing institutions, not vice-versa. The Athenian archonship, for example, did not come into being in order to provide the Athenians with a dating system; rather

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[52] Cf., e.g., Frazer (1898) on Paus. 6.1.1; W. Dittenberger and K. Purgold in *Olympia* 5, cols. 235–42; Moretti (1957); Morgan (1993) 20–7.

[53] For the chronological scheme see notably *FGH* 323a F 79b. Cf. Pritchett (1996) 42–8.

[54] The list may have been based on a work by Aristotle. If so we do not know what sources the philosopher used. See *IG* 2^2.2318–25; Pickard-Cambridge, Lewis et al. (1988) 70–4 (with texts at 101–25); Pritchett (1996) 21–2 and 38; Sickinger (1999) 41–7, 209 n. 32.

[55] See Isaios 5.41; cf. Traulos (1980) 566–8.

[56] Except that they do not typically include reference to archon-year: see *IG* 1^3.957–70.

the chronography was based on an appropriate pre-existing institution. Why the Greeks began to inscribe such lists in stone is an interesting question, which has, I think, received little serious attention.[57]

Inscriptions are by definition monumental, and we should think of inscribed lists first in terms of a dedicatory tradition, not a documentary one. The earliest attested lists—like many later lists—were erected for monumental reasons, not to serve as chronographies. Pausanias mentions a list of Olympic victors composed by a certain Paraballon at some time between 540 and the mid-fifth century: 'He left for future generations an object of competition, writing up the names of those who won at Olympia in the gymnasium in Olympia'.[58] The purpose of this list is not chronographic but honorific: it is not intended so much as a record, but as an honor for those who have won and as an incentive to spur others to comparable achievement. Likewise we should ask ourselves whether the early lists that came to serve as the basis for chronographic systems were concocted for that purpose, or if they were, like Paraballon's list of Olympic victors, first intended as a monument to honor past magistrates and provoke future competition. It is also necessary to try to imagine the uses that were made of such lists. I think that it is a mistake to think of them as public calendars, where aspiring historians would check their facts and citizens of all stripes would verify disputed dates of contracts and the like. To a Greek of the late fifth century, the lengthy lists of names doubtless were impressive in general way, but they were of little practical use. The typical Greek will have had no more reason to read or consult such inscribed lists any more frequently than a typical American has to pause in the town square to read or consult the list of names on a Civil War memorial.[59]

A list of magistrates is not chronographic unless it is used to date other events.[60] I take the Athenian Archon-List as an example. Regardless of when it was committed to writing, it was not used as the basis for chronology, literary or official, until the end of the fifth century. There are few mentions of Athenian archons or archon-

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[57] Most has been written on the Athenian Archon-List. Bradeen (1963) 205, is often quoted: '(The list) must indicate an awakening of interest in the past, or, more specifically, in the details of chronology in the past'. Cf. Mosshammer (1979) 86–92; Miller (1959) 49–52; Pritchett (1996) 8–11.

[58] Cf. *FGH* 416, and Jacoby's introduction to the section on Elis and Olympia, *FGH* 3b T 221–8, esp. 225 and n. 41.

[59] Cf. Hedrick (1994).

[60] Wilhelm (1909) 287–9.

years dating before the 420s. Herodotus mentions an archon only once (8.51.1); Thucydides names archons four times (2.2, 5.19, 5.25 and 6.54). There is no reason to think that Herodotus had access to an official Archon-List. It seems to me that Thucydides was aware of the possibility of dating events by archon years, though he regards the chronology as too inaccurate to serve the purposes of his history (cf. 2.2 and 5.25 especially).[61] Furthermore, in Athens archon-years do not occur in public documents at all until the 450s, and then only sporadically. Such dates are not regularly used in inscriptions until after 421.[62]

There is no direct evidence for the ultimate sources of the early chronographies. In the absence of evidence, any explanation is possible. In principle such lists may have been composed on the basis of an earlier list, an oral tradition, or evidence of some other kind; for that matter it may be a complete fabrication. In this paper I have attempted to evaluate the tradition within which the lists were produced and the sources available to those compiling them at the end of the fifth century. The relation of epigraphical lists to the tradition of inscribed honorific monuments is manifest. As for sources: there is no doubt that monuments served to commemorate tradition, and that ancient Greeks used them as a source for the past. My explanation of the connection of this 'monumental tradition' with the specific composition of the Archon-List has at least the virtue of linking the composition of the list to a documentable tradition.

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[61] See Cadoux (1948) 70–7; Samuel (1972) 198–237. On the historians, see Jacoby (1949) 350 n. 49; Mosshammer (1979) 88–9. For a dissent, Stroud (1978) 34 and n. 64.

[62] Henry (1977) 1–18; Mattingly (1996) 53–4, 109, 274, and especially 325–7 and 342–5; for an opposing view see Sickinger (1999) 50, 85–7. Pritchett ((1996) 1–11) argues that in the fifth century 'there were two eponymous officials at Athens', the archon and the secretary.

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Νόμος Δεσπότης: SPARTAN OBEDIENCE AND ATHENIAN LAWFULNESS IN FIFTH-CENTURY THOUGHT

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In his account of the events leading up to the battle of Thermopylae, Herodotus describes a dialogue between the Persian king Xerxes and the exiled Spartan dyarch, Demaratus (7.101–5; cf. 7.209.2). Xerxes pauses after his crossing of the Hellespont to question Demaratus about the nature of his Greek opponents and receives in reply a glowing account of the Lacedaemonians and their absolute refusal to accept any terms that would involve the enslavement of Hellas (7.102.2). Xerxes responds to this eulogy of Spartan courage with incredulity and wonders under what compulsion the Lacedaemonians fight so determinedly. Demaratus then explains that law (νόμος) functions as a master (δεσπότης) over them, a master that they fear and that commands steadfastness in battle (7.104.4–5):

> So it is with the Lacedaemonians: fighting singly, they are no worse than any other men, but fighting together, they are the best soldiers among all men. For although free they are not free in every respect. *Nomos* ('law') is master over them, and they fear it far more than your subjects fear you. Whatever this master commands, they do; and its command is always the same: never to retreat in battle, however great the odds, but always to remain at their posts and either conquer or die.[1]

Modern scholars have generally viewed Demaratus' response to Xerxes as a panegyric of Spartan valor and lawfulness that constructs a polarity between Greek obedience to law and tradition, on the one hand, and the blind obedience of the Persian subjects to their human master, on the other.[2] Many have gone further and argued that

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[1] Hdt. 7.104.4–5: ὣς δὲ καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι κατὰ μὲν ἕνα μαχόμενοι οὐδαμῶν εἰσι κακίονες ἀνδρῶν, ἁλέες δὲ ἄριστοι ἀνδρῶν ἁπάντων. ἐλεύθεροι γὰρ ἐόντες οὐ πάντα ἐλεύθεροί εἰσι· ἔπεστι γάρ σφι δεσπότης νόμος, τὸν ὑποδειμαίνουσι πολλῷ ἔτι μᾶλλον ἢ οἱ σοὶ σέ. ποιεῦσι γῶν τὰ ἂν ἐκεῖνος ἀνώγῃ· ἀνώγει δὲ τὠυτὸ αἰεί, οὐκ ἐῶν φεύγειν οὐδὲν πλῆθος ἀνθρώπων ἐκ μάχης, ἀλλὰ μένοντας ἐν τῇ τάξι ἐπικρατέειν ἢ ἀπόλλυσθαι.

[2] Gigante (1956) 114ff.; Ostwald (1969) 31; Waters (1971) 97; Cragg (1976) 103, 201; de Ste. Croix (1977) 138; Hartog (1988) 334; Lateiner (1989) 155; Cartledge (1990) 38; Munson (1993) 42; Lévy (1999) 130–1.

Demaratus' speech is designed primarily to portray legality as a feature of Spartan society in particular rather than a characteristic of Hellas as a whole.[3] In this essay I argue that Demaratus' description of his compatriots, on the contrary, is not a simple eulogy of Spartan lawfulness. A close analysis of the speech's language, its role in the larger context of the *Histories*, and its parallels with contemporaneous representations of Spartans reveals that it is rather an example of the negative representation of Spartan legality that runs through works written by writers either based in Athens or influenced by the currents of thought that circulated in Athenian society during the second half of the fifth century BCE. Many works of this period, responding to contemporary criticism of Athens' democratic constitution and admiration for the Spartan *politeia* ('constitution'), defended democracy by pointing toward the instinctive, internalized lawfulness which it engendered in citizens.[4] The lawfulness of Spartiates, on the other hand, came to be viewed as an artificial and fragile obedience reliant on an external discipline imposed by a repressive oligarchy.

Demaratus and Spartan Legality in Herodotus' Histories

Several aspects of Herodotus' account of the exchange between Demaratus and Xerxes suggest that Demaratus' eulogy of Spartan obedience to the law is, at the very least, ambivalent. First, one must wonder why Herodotus would put a speech supposedly intended to

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[3] Vlastos (1953) 351; Tigerstedt (1965–78) 1.93–6; Fornara (1971) 49–51, esp. 50–1 n. 25; Cragg (1976) 103, 201; Lateiner (1984) 272; (1989) 30; Ostwald (1991) 142. Other scholars have looked at this passage from a wholly different perspective, focusing on the sophists' influence on Herodotus. See Dihle (1962); Thomas (2000) 19, 109–14, 122–5.

[4] On the strong influence that Athenian democratic ideology exerted on Herodotus' treatment of Spartan society and institutions as well as his construction of Spartan power relations, see Millender (1996) 94–184; (2002). See also Forsdyke (2001), who argues that Athenian democratic ideology and specifically the ideological association between democracy and civic strength influenced Herodotus' account of this dialogue between Xerxes and Demaratus. Forsdyke, however, is primarily interested in demonstrating the Athenian influence on Herodotus' formulation of this passage and its many correspondences with Aeschylus' *Persians*. While she does not consider in detail the negative aspects of this Athenian-based portrait of Spartan legality and courage, she agrees that Demaratus' comparison of Spartan law to a despot may indicate criticism of the 'authoritarian rigor' of Sparta's military system. On the close structural and thematic correspondences between Demaratus' conversation with Xerxes and Aeschylus' *Persians*, see Lévy (1999) 131 n. 40.

contrast Greek constitutionality and legality with barbarian tyranny and illegality in the mouth of this deposed Spartan king.[5] The *topos* of illegality structures the Demaratus logos from beginning to end, including Herodotus' description of the dyarch's birth and reign. While recounting King Cleomenes I's successful engineering of his Eurypontid enemy's deposition on the grounds of illegitimacy, Herodotus provides a relatively detailed account of Demaratus' birth, complete with piquant details concerning his parents' 'courtship' and his conception (6.61–9).[6] Herodotus claims that Demaratus' father, King Ariston, fell in love with the wife of his best friend, cruelly tricked the latter into giving her up, and took her as his third wife after divorcing his second (6.61.2, 62–63.1). Soon thereafter, before the customary 'ten' months had passed, this woman gave birth to Demaratus, whose early arrival led Ariston to question his paternity in the presence of the ephors (6.63.1–2, 65.3) and later gave rise to the rumor that he was the product of an adulterous liaison between his mother and an ass-keeper (6.68.2–3). Exploiting the questionable circumstances surrounding Demaratus' birth, Cleomenes ousted his foe and replaced him with Leotychidas (6.64–6), a member of a collateral branch of the Eurypontid house, who sought requital for Demaratus' illegitimate seizure of his intended bride, Percalus (6.65.2). By using force to steal his wife from another man, Demaratus built upon his father's—and perhaps also his mother's—disrespect for the legitimate bonds of marriage and fulfilled his destiny as a product of wife-snatching and possibly even adultery.[7]

Herodotus' choice of Demaratus as a spokesman for Spartan legality and constitutionality appears even odder in light of his account of the dyarch's relationship with Hellas' barbarian enemies. Demaratus, after all, not only appears to have blocked his rival Cleomenes' attempt to curtail Aeginetan medism (6.50.2–3, 51, 61.1, 64) but also parallels several tyrants and ex-tyrants in the *Histories* by seeking refuge in the

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[5] On the figure of Demaratus in Herodotus' *Histories*, see Lang (1944) 236–41; Tigerstedt (1965–78) 1.91–9; Cragg (1976) 171–2; Boedeker (1987) 185–201; Millender (1996) 154–7, 167, 175–84, 229–30, 249–50; (2002). On the specifics of his deposition, see Parke (1945) 106–12, esp. 108–9; Klein (1973) 70–3.

[6] See Millender (1996) 154–7, 167; (2002).

[7] Benardete ((1969) 173–4) notes the link between Ariston's illegitimate desire for his third wife and Demaratus' possible illegitimacy. On these accounts of wife-snatching, see Immerwahr (1966) 197; Boedeker (1987) 188–9; Millender (1996) 166–7 and (2002).

Persian court and becoming a vassal of the Great King (6.70.2).[8] Herodotus also suggests that Demaratus was no simple vassal but actually became an advisor to the Persian king, securing Xerxes' succession to the throne (7.2–3) and later accompanying Xerxes in his expedition to enslave Hellas (7.101–4, 209, 234–7). Assuming the role in the Persian court formerly occupied by the exiled Athenian tyrant Hippias (6.94.1, 102, 107; 7.6.2–5), Demaratus supposedly aided Xerxes' attack, wisely advising him to use the island of Cythera as a base for attacks on Lacedaemon (7.235).[9] Although Xerxes did not adopt this plan, Herodotus claims that he defended Demaratus against Achaemenes' attacks and greatly valued the exiled Spartan dyarch, whom he viewed as a trustworthy counselor and friend (7.237).

Demaratus' eulogy on the Spartans' fear of *nomos* becomes even more ironic given the circumstances that directly led to his deposition and flight to Persia. Herodotus' tale of Spartan court intrigue, especially his account of Cleomenes' impious and unlawful bribery of the Pythia (6.66.2–3, 74.1, 75.3, 84.3) and Leotychidas' possible perjury (6.65.3) to effect Demaratus' deposition, hardly brings to mind the picture of a rigidly law-abiding society.[10] Demaratus' fate rather refers the reader to the Spartans' reputation for susceptibility to corruption, a trope that runs through the *Histories* and other works of this period, including Thucydides' *History*, Euripides' *Andromache* (451), and Aristophanes' *Peace* (622–4).[11]

Herodotus alone provides nine accounts in which the Spartans are the targets, receivers, or givers of bribes.[12] Greek tyrants twice attempt

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[8] Hartog (1988) 329.

[9] Boedeker ((1987) 192) discusses the striking parallels between Demaratus and Hippias.

[10] Cf. Paus. 3.4.5–6. For other examples of Spartan corruption of oracles, see Thuc. 5.16.2–3; Plut., *Moralia* 403b; Ephorus, *FGH* 70 F 205 (= Plut., *Lysander* 25–6); Diod. Sic. 14.13.2–8; Nepos, *Lysander* 6.3.1. See Robinson (1992).

[11] See Thuc. 1.95.7, 109.2–3, 131.2; 2.21.1; 5.16.2–3; 8.50.3, 83.3. Cf. Xen., *Constitution of the Lacedaemonians* 14, *Agesilaus* 2.26.7; Theop., *FGH* 115 F 85, 312, 323; Arist., *Politics* 1270b6–13, 1271a3–6, 1272a40–b1; *Rhetoric* 1419a31–5; Plut., *Lysander* 16–17; *Pericles* 22.2. See also Xen., *Hellenica* 2.4.29 and Harvey (1985) 78–9. On the ancient sources' accounts of Spartiates' accepting or giving bribes, see Noethlichs (1987). On the Spartans' reputation for venality, see Harvey (1985) 90 n. 54, 99, 106; Flory (1987) 69, 72; Bradford (1994) 68, 70, 72; Hodkinson (1994) 185–7; (2000) 20, 172, 359–61.

[12] In addition to the examples discussed below, see Hdt. 1.70.2–3 and the discussion in Cooper (1975) 30–1. Contra Lévy ((1999) 125–6), who does not believe that Herodotus stresses Spartan corruption. Although Hodkinson ((2000) 20, 172) recognizes that Herodotus attaches more accounts of bribery to Sparta than to any

to exploit this Spartan flaw in Herodotus' descriptions of the Samian Maeandrius' flight to Lacedaemon (3.148) and the Milesian Aristagoras' attempt to gain Spartan support for the Ionian Revolt (5.51.2–3). In the former account, Herodotus emphasizes King Cleomenes I's attraction to Maeandrius' gifts of gold and silver drinking cups and suggests that Cleomenes' self-control in refusing to accept the offered gifts was extraordinary—among Spartans, it would seem (3.148.1). Herodotus also claims that it was Cleomenes' recognition of both his own weakness and his compatriots' inability to resist such temptation that led him to request Maeandrius' expulsion from Sparta (3.148.2). When later approached by Aristagoras, Cleomenes apparently only managed to avoid yielding to bribery when his eight-year-old daughter, Gorgo, advised her father to leave the room before the Milesian could corrupt him (5.51.2–3).[13]

In his account of the aftermath of the Greeks' victory at Plataea in 479, Herodotus insinuates that the captured Theban medizers similarly hoped to utilize the Spartans' inclination to corruption in order to secure their acquittal (9.88). Although the regent Pausanias foiled the Thebans' attempted bribery by quickly executing them at Corinth and followed Cleomenes' example of restraint, several episodes in the *Histories* suggest that such incorruptibility was indeed extraordinary among the Lacedaemonians and ultimately proved impossible for Cleomenes as well. Herodotus twice records accusations of bribery lodged against this dyarch by his enemies, the first during his expedition to arrest those responsible for Aegina's submission to Darius (6.50.2) and the second after his failure to capture Argos (6.82.1). Together with Herodotus' account of Cleomenes' subornation of the Pythia (6.66.2–3, 75.3), all of these examples imply that bribery played a key role in Spartan politics in the time of Cleomenes I,

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other Greek state, he underestimates their importance for understanding Herodotus' portrayal of Sparta. He largely dismisses those accounts connected with the dyarchy as 'juicy stories' and argues that such tales indicate that Sparta 'was viewed no differently from other poleis as regards the valuation and use of wealth'. While Herodotus does recognize other Greeks' susceptibility to bribery (cf. 9.2, 41), the disproportionate number of stories of bribery attached to the Spartans is striking and worthy of careful consideration. As we shall see, the Spartans' reputation for venality illuminates not only Spartan attitudes toward and employment of wealth (as Hodkinson rightly notes) but also, more importantly, contemporary Athenian representations of Spartan legality.

[13] On Gorgo's role as wise advisor in this scene and function in the *Histories* as a whole, see Millender (1999) 357.

as a tool utilized by both Spartans and others to influence Lacedaemonian domestic and foreign policy.

Cleomenes, however, is not the only Spartan in the *Histories* who succumbs to the lure of bribery, either as a giver or a receiver. In his account of the Lacedaemonian expedition against Samos ca. 525 BCE, Herodotus includes a popular story that Polycrates, the Samian tyrant, coined a large amount of the local money in lead, which he then gilded and successfully used to buy off the Spartans and hasten their departure from Samos (3.56). Although Herodotus casts doubt on this story by calling it 'foolish' (ματαιότερος), one must question its inclusion in a work that reports many similar instances of Lacedaemonian venality and repeatedly portrays the Spartans as particularly inclined to this moral failing. The same weakness for wealth supposedly led to the banishment of Leotychidas, Demaratus' kinsman, whom Cleomenes illegally had installed on the Eurypontid throne. In a vivid passage describing Leotychidas' acceptance of a large bribe to suspend his campaign against the Thessalians, Herodotus claims that the Spartan king was brought to trial and banished after being caught red-handed, sitting in his tent on a glove stuffed full of coins (6.72).[14] The Spartan Eurybiades also appears to have yielded easily to bribery, readily accepting money from Themistocles in return for keeping the Greek fleet at Artemisium and engaging the Persian fleet on the Euboean coast (8.5.1).[15]

Spartan venality, although not connected with bribery, appears again and with particular force in the story about the Spartan Glaucus. Herodotus has Leotychidas tell this cautionary tale in an attempt to

[14] Thucydides provides a similar instance of the successful bribery of a Spartan king while on command in his account of King Pleistoanax' later abortive invasion of Attica in 446 BCE (2.21.1; cf. 1.114.2, 5.16.3). See also Plut., *Pericles* 22.2.

[15] Although Herodotus notes both Themistocles' and the Corinthian Adeimantus' (8.5.2–3) susceptibility to bribery, his account casts Eurybiades' acceptance of the bribe in a particularly negative light. Eurybiades appears simply venal and self-serving in contrast to Themistocles, who never attempts to abandon the other Greeks, uses some of the money to force the Greeks to engage the Persians on the Euboean coast, and castigates Adeimantus for his attempted betrayal of the Greeks (8.5.2–3). It is also noteworthy that Themistocles offers Eurybiades a bribe without first attempting to persuade him to change his mind, as he does in the case of Adeimantus. On Herodotus' focus on Peloponnesian insularity in this passage and elsewhere in the *Histories*, see below, n. 22 and Podlecki (1975) 17. For a detailed discussion of Herodotus' account of bribery at Artemisium, see Wallace ((1974) 22–44), who argues that the bribes recounted by Herodotus were actually sums of money paid to maintain the Hellenic League fleet.

convince the Athenians to return the Aeginetans whom he and Cleomenes had deposited in Athens as hostages (6.86). Leotychidas explains that a Milesian, having learned about Glaucus's reputation for honest dealing, entrusted this Spartan with a large sum of money to hold in trust for his sons. When the Milesian's sons arrived in Sparta years later bearing tokens authorizing the return of this money, Glaucus feigned ignorance of his earlier agreement with their father and impiously attempted to seek Delphian Apollo's approval of his perjury and robbery. Although Glaucus eventually returned the money to the Milesian's sons, the gods punished his oath-breaking by depriving him of descendants. Leotychidas' narration of this cautionary tale is noteworthy, given his own possible use of perjury to effect Demaratus' deposition (6.65) and his supposed punishment for this offense through exile on the grounds of bribery (6.72).

The pervasiveness of this *topos* of Spartan corruption in the *Histories* and its key role in Herodotus' account of Demaratus' deposition, together with the other examples of illegality that structure the Demaratus logos, undermine the exiled Lacedaemonian dyarch's eulogy of Spartan lawfulness. Herodotus, however, subverts Demaratus' portrait of Spartan legality not only through his choice of Demaratus as its spokesman but also through Demaratus' striking use of the term 'master' (δεσπότης) to describe the rule of *nomos* at Sparta. When describing the Hellenes in general, Demaratus refers to the important place of *nomos* in the Greeks' conceptual framework. Together with wisdom, strong law produces the 'virtue' (ἀρετη) that will eventually help the Greeks to overcome their enemies (7.102.1). The power of *nomos*, however, takes on negative overtones when Demaratus describes the role that it plays among the Spartans in particular. As a *despotes, nomos* exercises a type of arbitrary authority at Sparta that parallels the relationship that exists between master and slave and between absolute rulers and their subjects.[16] Demaratus' terminology, in other words, suggests

[16] In the *Histories* the term δεσπότης refers to the ruling party in the relationship between owner and possession (3.134.2; 5.29.1; 7.88.2), master and slaves (1.129.4; 4.43.7; 6.83.2), king and subjects (1.8.3, 11.4, 90.2, 91.1, 111.2, 112.3, 115.2; 2.2.4; 3.1.4, 14.9, 34.2, 35.4, 62.3, 85.2, 89.3; 4.126, 136.4; 5.105.2; 7.5.2, 9.1, 35.2, 38.1–2, 147.3; 8.68α1, β1, 88.2, 100.2, 102.2, 118.3; 9.111.1, 5, 116.3; cf. 5.18.3), tyrant and subjects (5.78), and god and man (1.212.3; 4.127.4). See Hartog ((1988) 334), who rightly remarks that 'all in all, despotic power manifests itself as the power of master over slave'. As Sara Forsdyke has suggested to me, Demaratus may describe Spartan *nomos* as a *despotes* in order to explain the strength of Spartan *nomos* to a barbarian despot in a language that he will understand. While this is a reasonable

that the Spartans construct the power relations that organize their society according to the despotic model. This model of power firmly locates Sparta in the conceptual realm of the barbarians—like the Medes (1.97.2), the Egyptians (2.147.2), and the Persians (3.83.1–2), who repeatedly demonstrate an inability to live under more constitutional types of rule.[17] It also links the Spartans with such barbarian peoples as the Massagetae (1.212.3) and Scythians (4.127.4), who even conceive of their relations with the gods in despotic terms.

By using this unusual term to describe the rule of law, moreover, Herodotus suggests that the Spartans are lawful only under duress.[18] As a product of neither reasoned thought nor courage but rather of compulsion and obedience, Spartan steadfastness in battle comes to resemble the motivation driving Xerxes' subjects (7.103.3–4; cf. 7.22.1, 56.1, 223.3; 8.15.1, 69.2, 86).[19] Demaratus builds upon this portrait of an externally induced courage and legality in his description of

interpretation of the passage, Herodotus' purposeful use of language throughout the *Histories* and his employment of the term *despotes* to imply external compulsion suggest that Demaratus' use of the metaphor of the despot carries, at the very least, an undercurrent of criticism of Spartan obedience to *nomos*.

[17] *Contra* Munson ((1993) 42–3), who argues that 'Spartan virtues are all Hellenic features that only manifest themselves to a greater degree and more consistently in the Spartans than in anyone else. Herodotus does not represent Sparta as peculiar vis-à-vis other groups of Greeks, but rather as the fullest representative of Hellenic culture'. On the barbarians' inability to avoid living under despotic rule, see Hartog (1988) 324. The Samians provide the only Greek example of this inability to live freely (3.142.5–143), and this hostile depiction accords with Herodotus' generally negative treatment of this island and the Ionians in general (cf. 6.12–14). For detailed discussions of Spartan power relations and specifically Herodotus' construction of Spartan kingship as despotic in nature, see Millender (1996) 112–84; (2002).

[18] See Waters (1972) 150; (1985) 130. Contra Lateiner ((1984) 272; (1989) 185), who believes that 'this praise of the despotic power of law and custom at Sparta varies the theme of the undependable and destructive despot'. See also Raaflaub ((1985) 294–5) and Hartog ((1988) 334), who views *nomos* alone as the negation of tyranny and transgression.

[19] See Lateiner (1989) 170. Cf. Evans ((1965) 149–50), who compares the *nomos* that exercises a kind of compulsion over the Spartans with the *nomos* that made the Persians fight (cf. 7.103.3–4) but does not examine the link that Herodotus thus forges between the Spartans and the Persians and what it reveals about his representation of Lacedaemonian courage and lawfulness. His conclusion that *nomos* exerts a kind of compulsion over all men in the *Histories* also overlooks the fact that Herodotus only specifically describes *nomos* as a *despotes* in the case of the Spartans. Although Benardete ((1969) 191) rightly refers to Spartan *nomos* as an 'invisible whip', he fails to consider the power of the term *despotes* when he differentiates this *nomos* from Xerxes' tyranny and use of the whip and argues that it exerts a form of persuasion rather than compulsion.

the Lacedaemonians' fearful obedience to *nomos* as a *despotes*.[20] According to Demaratus, the Spartan troops will remain at their posts and defend Hellas not from an innate love of freedom or their fatherland but rather because of their fear of *nomos*. This passage makes fear the motivating force behind Spartan valor and obedience and refers the reader to the striking number of instances in the *Histories* in which the Spartans demonstrate fear.[21] Herodotus' portrayal of Sparta, in fact, makes fear the guiding principle behind the Lacedaemonians' participation in the Persian War—fear that ultimately negates the Spartans' compelled obedience to a *nomos* commanding bravery by producing, instead, insularity and hesitancy towards involvement in the conflict.[22]

Scholars, of course, may object that Leonidas and the Spartans at Thermopylae gloriously proved Demaratus' claim (cf. 7.234.1) and provided a famous exemplum of both unswerving patriotism and obedience to Spartan *nomos* in action (cf. 7.219–28, esp. 228.2). Herodotus' accounts of those Spartans who managed to avoid death at Thermopylae, however, suggest that the courage that the Lacedaemonians exhibited in that battle was to some extent motivated by fear of social humiliation.[23] According to Herodotus, Aristodemus, who missed the action at Thermopylae because of acute inflammation of the eyes (7.229), suffered reproach and disgrace upon his return to Sparta and was called a 'Trembler' (7.231). In order to retrieve his lost honor, this Spartan supposedly rushed to his death at the later

[20] Although the Spartans are 'inwardly afraid' (ὑποδειμαίνουσι) of *nomos*, the internalized compulsion that *nomos* exercises over them produces a courage that is 'imported' rather than natural. See Benardete (1969) 191–3.

[21] Herodotus uses terms signifying fear and panic far more often in connection with the Spartans than with any other Greek people. In addition to Hdt. 7.104.4, see 6.74.1, 75.1; 7.235.2–3; 8.63, 141.1, 144.1; 9.7ß1, 8.2, 33.5, 46.1, 56.2. Cf. Hdt. 9.48 and 9.58. Herodotus attributes fear and panic to the Peloponnesians in general at 7.207; 8.70.2, 72. Cf. Hdt. 8.75.2 and 8.132.3. On Spartan fear, see Epps (1933) 12–29; Cragg (1976) 198–200.

[22] For examples of insularity and hesitancy, see Hdt. 1.152; 3.148; 5.49–51; 6.106, 120; 7.206.1, 207; 8.5, 40, 49, 56–63, 70.2–72, 74–5, 108, 132, 144.4–5; 9.6–10, 11, 77, 106, 114.2; cf. 1.83. On Sparta's reputation for insularity, particularly during the Persian Wars, see Hignett (1963) passim, esp. 37, 63–4, 118, 126–7, 276–85; Immerwahr (1966) 120, 202–6, 217, 276; Cragg (1976) 63, 103–4, 154–5, 160, 200.

[23] I would like to thank Sara Forsdyke for reminding me of this important point. See Forsdyke ((2001) 348), who rightly argues that 'Spartan military courage does not depend on political freedom, as Athenian military strength does in Athenian democratic ideology'.

battle of Plataea, exhibiting a courage motivated by shame and fear that ultimately produced unthinking recklessness (9.71). Pantites, another possible survivor of Thermopylae, ostensibly committed suicide upon his return to Sparta, again suggesting that Spartan military courage was socially enforced through the fear of shame and censure (7.232).

Herodotus' narrative of Spartan courage at Thermopylae, moreover, is undercut not only by these accounts of the severe social sanctions meted out to the survivors of the battle but also by Herodotus' own assessment of the factors that motivated the Spartans' intrepidity. Herodotus attributes the Spartans' desire to remain at their posts to: (1) Leonidas' belief that it would be unbecoming for the Spartans under his command to desert their posts (7.220.1); (2) Leonidas' awareness of the oracle predicting that either Sparta would be sacked by the Persians or a Spartan king would be killed (7.220.3–4); and (3) Leonidas' desire that Sparta acquire more fame than any other Greek city (7.220.4). The sheer compulsion exercised by *nomos*, which Demaratus earlier extolled (7.104.4–5), also appears as a main motivator of Spartan bravery in the epitaph honoring the Spartans killed at Thermopylae, which Herodotus quotes at 7.228.2: 'Go, stranger, tell the Spartans that here, obeying their orders, we lie dead'.[24] Nowhere do we see the positive desire for freedom or the interest in the greater good of Hellas that ostensibly motivated the Athenians, as we shall see below (cf. 8.143–4).

Others may point out Herodotus' warm praise of the Spartan victory at Plataea, which clearly emphasizes the Lacedaemonians' achievement in meeting the strongest part of the enemy army and defeating it (9.71; cf. 64.1). Herodotus' unusually detailed account of the events leading up to the battle of Plataea in 479 (8.140–9.58), however, rather elucidates the obliquely negative portrayal of Spartan courage and obedience that underlies Demaratus' supposed panegyric of the Lacedaemonians at 7.104.4–5. Spartan fear plays a large role in this section of the *Histories*, and Herodotus makes base cowardice characteristic of Spartan behavior even during the diplomatic moves that took place before the Greeks met the Persians at Plataea. Herodotus portrays the Spartans as unwilling to leave the protection of their wall across the Isthmus until their fear concerning oracles predicting their eviction from the Peloponnesus at the hands of the Athenians

[24] Hdt. 7.228.2: ὦ ξεῖν', ἀγγέλλειν Λακεδαιμονίοις ὅτι τῇδε / κείμεθα τοῖς κείνων ῥήμασι πειθόμενοι.

and Medes makes them send envoys to Athens to persuade the Athenians not to come to terms with Xerxes (8.141.1). After being reassured of Athens' loyalty to Hellas, the Spartans immediately return to their insular policy and only agree to send out a force after the Athenians threaten to go over to the Persians, and they themselves receive a lesson on Athens' strategic importance (9.7–9). Fear and the compulsion that it exerts over the Spartans become the main motives behind their fateful decision to send troops into Boeotia and to put the welfare of the Hellenes before their fear for their own skins.[25]

Fear plays an equally important role in Herodotus' description of the military maneuvers preceding the Greeks' victory at Plataea, which provides a far less heroic portrait of Spartan courage and obedience to *nomos* than that furnished by Herodotus' earlier account of the battle of Thermopylae. Unlike Leonidas and the stalwart men who remained at the pass and fought the Persians to the death, Pausanias and his forces demonstrate irresolution, cowardice, and, most importantly, disobedience.[26] When Pausanias learns of Alexander I of Macedon's message concerning Mardonius' plans to attack, he is struck with fear of the Persians and orders the Athenians to change places with the Lacedaemonians. Mardonius detects this alteration and switches his troops to match the original arrangement, whereupon Pausanias countermands his change of battle-order (9.46–7). These repeated movements bring the Spartans into disrepute with Mardonius, who believes that Pausanias' behavior belies the Spartans' reputation for valor and steadfastness (9.48). When the Spartans and the rest of the Greek army later move to another position under cover of night, Mardonius again expresses disdain for the Spartans' reputation as stalwart warriors who never flee the battlefield (9.58.2–3). In the face of a frightening enemy, Spartan intrepidity has given way to panic and chaos. More importantly, the Spartans have twice failed to obey the *nomos* commanding them to remain at their posts.

While Pausanias' fear of the Persians produces a change of tactics that disrupts the Spartan battle order and reveals Spartan cowardice, this later shift in the Spartan position and the ensuing disobedience of one of the Spartan commanders completely throw

[25] See Tigerstedt ((1965–78) 1.100–1), who discusses the pro-Athenian bias of Herodotus' account of the negotiations between Athens and Sparta before the battle of Plataea.

[26] See Hignett (1963) 316–18; Tigerstedt (1965–78) 1.101; Evans (1982) 131–5; Lévy (1999) 128.

the army into disorder. When Pausanias decides to move his army to a position that is both safer and better supplied by water, one of his subordinates, Amompharetus, fails to obey his instructions and thereby endangers the safety of the whole army by separating the Pitanate battalion from the rest of the Lacedaemonians (9.53–7).[27] Amompharetus upholds the Spartans' reputation for remaining at their posts, and his refusal to flee from the Persians and bring shame upon Sparta serves as a powerful counter to the panic and disorganized flight of his compatriots (9.53.2, 55.2). His disobedience, however, reveals a serious flaw in the Spartan system that is capable of rendering the type of decisive, unified action described by Demaratus at 7.104.4–5 as the ideal rather than the norm. By disobeying Pausanias' orders and unthinkingly obeying the Spartans' despotic, *nomos*, Amompharetus puts the safety of both the Spartans' ranks and the other members of the Greek coalition at risk even more than his compatriots' repeated shifts in position. The Spartans' fearful and compelled obedience to *nomos*, through its rigidity and consequent fragility, produces an unreflective form of courage that ultimately undermines the other Greeks' confidence in the efficacy of Spartan leadership (cf. 9.54.1).

The compulsion and fear that drive the Spartans at both Thermopylae and Plataea again firmly associate Sparta with the barbarian enemies of Hellas and, more specifically, barbarian autocracy.[28] As Herodotus repeatedly demonstrates, especially in his accounts of Xerxes' relations with his subjects, fear characterizes the relations between the tyrant and his subjects and, together with compulsion, serves as one of the main mechanisms with which the despot controls his subjects.[29] Herodotus' Xerxes himself underlines the centrality of both fear and compulsion to despotic rule in his incredulous response to the Spartan Demaratus' praise of Spartan courage (7.103.4):

[27] As Cragg ((1976) 140) plausibly argues, Herodotus likely received a garbled or misunderstood version of some type of tactical assignment that he dramatized as insubordination.

[28] On the important role which the motifs of fear and compulsion play in the construction of the tyrant in Athenian democratic ideology, see Forsdyke (2001). On the role of fear and compulsion in Herodotus' construction of Spartan power relations, see Millender (2002).

[29] E.g., Hdt. 7.22.1, 56.1, 103.3–4, 223.3; 8.15.1, 69.2, 86, and the charts outlining autocratic behaviors in Lateiner (1989) 172–9.

> Indeed, if they were ruled by one man according to our custom, fearing him they might become better than they are by nature and they might go forward into battle under the compulsion of the whip against an enemy which greatly outnumbered them. But since they are left to their own free choice, they would do neither of these things.[30]

Although the Spartans' obedience to *nomos* ultimately proves superior to the Persians' slavish submission to the king and the necessity of the whip, it compares unfavorably with the more natural and spontaneous bravery demonstrated by the other leading Greek protagonists, the Athenians.[31] Herodotus' Athenians refuse to let fear of the Persian invasion or threatening oracles force them to abandon Hellas or surrender to Xerxes (7.139.2, 6). Herodotus also repeatedly emphasizes the Athenians' lack of fear and hesitancy in their military encounters with the Persians, which offers a striking contrast to the fear and caution routinely exhibited by their Lacedaemonian allies.[32] The Athenians before the battle of Marathon seek Spartan aid (6.105–6) and debate their course of action (6.109), but they finally take on the specter of the Persian army with only the help of the Plataeans. Herodotus also describes their unusual tactic of charging their enemies at a run and comments on their ability to endure the sight of the Medes with unparalleled equanimity (6.112). The Athenians show a similar propensity to take the offensive at Artemisium (8.11.2, 17) and Salamis (8.75, 80, 84.1), and they eagerly offer to switch places with the Spartans before the battle of Plataea and face the Persians alone (9.46.3–47).

What especially sets the Athenians apart from their Spartan allies in Herodotus' eyes, however, is the motivation behind their intrepid

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[30] Hdt. 7.103.4: ὑπὸ μὲν γὰρ ἑνὸς ἀρχόμενοι κατὰ τρόπον τὸν ἡμέτερον γενοίατ' ἂν δειμαίνοντες τοῦτον καὶ παρὰ τὴν ἑωυτῶν φύσιν ἀμείνονες καὶ ἴοιεν ἀναγκαζόμενοι μάστιγι ἐς πλεῦνας ἐλάσσονες ἐόντες.

[31] While the Spartans die nobly at Thermopylae and ultimately achieve victory at Plataea, Herodotus portrays the Persian forces fighting under Xerxes' tyrannical compulsion as weak, cowardly, and disordered, in both their victory over the Greeks at Thermopylae (7.223.3) and their losses at Salamis (8.86) and Plataea (9.65–70).

[32] While Herodotus repeatedly uses terms denoting fear and panic in his representation of Spartans (cf., above, n. 21), he ascribes fear to the Athenians in only one passage, where he recounts the mythical Deceleans' alarm for the safety of Athenian territory when Tyndareus' sons' invaded Attica to recover Helen (9.73.2). It is also noteworthy that Herodotus repeatedly emphasizes the Athenians' lack of fear, particularly in contrast to their Spartan allies. See, for example, 7.139.2–5; 8.144.1; 9.56.2. On Herodotus' implicit comparison between Spartan torpor and insularity, on the one hand, and Athenian initiative, on the other, see Immerwahr (1966) 116–20.

opposition to barbarian tyranny and slavery. In contrast to the Spartans, who remain at their posts out of fear of a despotic *nomos*, Herodotus' Athenians fight eagerly and successfully without having to don the yoke of necessity. At several points in the *Histories*, Herodotus explicitly attributes the Athenians' willingness to oppose the Persians and key participation in the Persian defeat to a conscious choice on the part of the Athenian people to remain firm and preserve the freedom of Hellas rather than any sort of compulsion. In their response to Alexander's attempt to bring about an alliance between Athens and Persia, for example, the Athenians emphasize their love of and commitment to freedom, along with their resolve to trust in the help of their gods and heroes (8.143). The same type of thoughtful reasoning lies behind their attempt to allay the fears of their Spartan allies, who had left the protection of the Peloponnesus ostensibly only out of fear of such an alliance (cf. 8.141). The Athenians claim that their willingness to oppose the Persians and again risk Athens' devastation arises from two particular motives: their desire to avenge Xerxes' burning and desecration of their temples and their common bonds with the rest of the Hellenes (8.144). Herodotus particularly stresses the role that conscious deliberation played in the Athenians' opposition to the Persians in his emphatic statement that Athens was most responsible for the preservation of Greece against the threat of Persian tyranny (7.139.5):[33]

> If then someone should now say that the Athenians were the saviors of Hellas, he would hit the truth. For to whichever side they inclined, that was where the scale would come down. Having chosen that Hellas should remain free, they roused the entire remaining part of the Greek world which had not gone over to the Persians and, next after the gods, repelled the king of Persia.[34]

As Herodotus makes clear elsewhere in his account of the Persian Wars, Athens' bravery and conscious decision to defend Hellas were the products of the same constitutional shift toward democracy in

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[33] See, in addition, Hdt. 8.3.1, 109.1; 9.5, 7; cf. 8.57–63. Herodotus also portrays particular Athenians as the exponents of freedom against barbarian despotism, especially Miltiades (4.137.1), the Alcmaeonidae (6.123.1), and Themistocles (8.57–62, 75–80).

[34] Hdt. 7.139.5: νῦν δὲ Ἀθηναίους ἄν τις λέγων σωτῆρας γενέσθαι τῆς Ἑλλάδος οὐκ ἂν ἁμαρτάνοι τἀληθέος· οὗτοι γὰρ ἐπὶ ὁκότερα τῶν πρηγμάτων ἐτράποντο, ταῦτα ῥέψειν ἔμελλε· ἑλόμενοι δὲ τὴν Ἑλλάδα περιεῖναι ἐλευθέρην, [τοῦτο] τὸ Ἑλληνικὸν πᾶν τὸ λοιπόν, ὅσον μὴ ἐμήδισε, αὐτοὶ οὗτοι ἦσαν οἱ ἐπεγείραντες καὶ βασιλέα μετά γε θεοὺς ἀνωσάμενοι. On Herodotus' encomium at 7.139, see Evans (1979) 112–18.

the late sixth century that fueled Athenian growth and success in war. According to Herodotus, the simultaneous overthrow of the Peisistratid tyranny and the establishment of the Cleisthenic democracy supplied Athens with the necessary freedom to become an even greater city than it was before (5.66.1) and also made it possible for Athens to become a military power in its own right (5.78; cf. 91.1):[35]

> Thus Athens increased in power, and it is clear that the equal right of speech (ἰσηγορίη) is an excellent thing, not in one respect only, but in all. For while the Athenians were under despotic rule, they had no better success in war than any of their neighbors; yet, once they were freed from tyranny, they became by far the finest fighters in the world. This clearly shows that, so long as they were oppressed, they deliberately shirked their duty in the field, as slaves shirk working for their masters. But when they were freed, then each man was interested in his own cause.[36]

The effect of this combination of Athens' newly won *isegoria* and military might became clear at Marathon, where open debate and courage together enabled the young democracy to defeat the Persians (6.109–10). In his aforementioned praise of Athens' responsibility for the Greeks' victory, Herodotus further suggests that the Athenians' new-found power and freedom to control their own destiny rendered them alone capable of making the fateful decision to preserve Greek freedom against barbarian enslavement (7.139.5). For Herodotus, it would seem that the Spartan brand of courage, the product of a fearful and blind obedience, ultimately proved to be less effective in action than the thoughtful, and yet more spontaneous, bravery of the Athenians, whose democracy and the freedom it created encouraged the rise of a self-determined citizenry.

Thucydides and Spartan Transgression

Building upon Herodotus' representations of Spartan illegality and his implicit opposition of Sparta's dependence on compulsion and

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[35] Lateiner (1984) 268, 272; (1989) 170, 185; Nakategawa (1988) 271. See also Ostwald (1969) 108–9.

[36] Hdt. 5.78: Ἀθηναῖοι μέν νυν ηὔξηντο· δηλοῖ δὲ οὐ κατ' ἓν μοῦνον ἀλλὰ πανταχῇ ἡ ἰσηγορίη ὡς ἐστὶ χρῆμα σπουδαῖον, εἰ καὶ Ἀθηναῖοι τυραννευόμενοι μὲν οὐδαμῶν τῶν σφέας περιοικεόντων ἦσαν τὰ πολέμια ἀμείνους, ἀπαλλαχθέντες δὲ τυράννων μακρῷ πρῶτοι ἐγένοντο. δηλοῖ ὦν ταῦτα ὅτι κατεχόμενοι μὲν ἐθελοκάκεον ὡς δεσπότῃ ἐργαζόμενοι, ἐλευθερωθέντων δὲ αὐτὸς ἕκαστος ἑωυτῷ προεθυμέετο κατεργάζεσθαι.

state-instilled discipline against the conscious freedom and individual initiative that underlay Athens' path to greatness, Thucydides' account of the Peloponnesian War constructs an antithesis between self-regulating Athenians and Spartans who are obedient rather than lawful.[37] This polarity is particularly explicit in Thucydides' account of Pericles' Funeral Oration delivered in 431/30 BCE.[38] Through its praise of Athens' democratic *politeia*, the Funeral Oration offers a compelling response to King Archidamus II's earlier eulogy of the Spartans' rigorous schooling in self-control and obedience to the laws (1.84).[39] In his attempt to undercut the Corinthians' criticisms of Spartan 'slowness' (βραδυτής), Archidamus portrays Sparta as a stable and well-ordered society that produces men who are both 'warlike' (πολεμικοί) and 'good at deliberation' (εὔβουλοι).[40] His ensuing description of the roots of Spartan character not only praises the 'ignorance' (ἀμαθία) that prevents them from despising the laws but also makes a strict education in 'self-control' (σωφροσύνη) responsible for their maintenance (1.84.3).[41] According to Archidamus, this training in the severest discipline promotes lawfulness and produces the best men (1.84.4). Pericles' funeral speech, however, suggests that the Athenian democracy's inherent rational freedom and promotion of the natural talents and aspirations of its citizens produced a far more vigorous, creative, civic-minded, and law-abiding citizenry than the Spartans' harsh discipline and compulsory dedication to the state.[42]

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[37] As Scanlon ((1994) 143–76) has rightly noted, Thucydides clearly echoes and elaborates upon certain key passages in Herodotus' *Histories* that deal with the notion of *nomos*. For an example of a striking parallel between the two works that Scanlon oddly does not mention, see below, n. 45.

[38] Although the Athens of the Funeral Oration proves elusive, particularly in the face of the plague and the harsh effects of war, the Funeral Oration still provides a clear articulation of Athenian democratic ideology and 'the roughly official democratic idea about the role of law in the late fifth-century democracy'. See Thomas (1994) 119. On the ideological significance of law to the Athenian democracy, see Swain (1995) 551, 553, 555; Allen (2000).

[39] Finley (1963) 131–5. According to Scanlon ((1994) 171 and n. 95), Pericles is also responding to Demaratus' speech at Hdt. 7.104.4–5.

[40] On Archidamus' speech, see Wassermann (1953) 193–7; Finley (1963) 131–5; (1967) 14–15, 80; Edmunds (1975) 94–7; Bloedow (1981) 129–43; Allison (1989) 45–60; Pelling (1991) 120–42; Tompkins (1993) 99–111; Crane (1998) 196–236.

[41] Although the ephor Sthenelaidas adopts a different position than Archidamus, both his harangue and supposed inability to understand Athenian speeches also emphasize Spartan ignorance (1.86). On Thucydides' representation of the Spartans as ignorant and hostile toward speech, see Millender (2001) 149–50, 154.

[42] Millender (2001) 149–50. Cf. Arist., *Ethica Nicomachea* 1180a24–8, along with Finley (1963) 149; (1967) 14–17; Edmunds (1975) 44–6, 67–8.

Throughout the Funeral Oration, Thucydides has Pericles draw a close connection between Athens' liberal *politeia* and its citizens' forging of a power that reached new heights in Greek cultural, social, political, and economic development.[43] Pericles claims that the freedom and openness that characterize Athenian political and social life allow all citizens to serve the state, regardless of their status (2.37.1). Given these opportunities, the average Athenian citizen demonstrates a conscious and willing involvement in the maintenance of the polis' general welfare and an unusual degree of participation in public affairs (2.40.2).[44] All decisions on policy arise from such citizens' reasoned reflection and discussion, which, in turn, produce courage and daring (2.40.3). It is no wonder, then, that unlike Sparta, Athens has no need to rely on elaborate preparations or stratagems but rather gains strength and achieves military success through the 'good courage' (εὐψυχία) of its citizens (2.39.1; cf. 1.123.1). As Pericles makes clear, Athens' free and relaxed way of life naturally prepares its inherently courageous citizens to confront the dangers of war no less effectively than the Spartans' laborious training in manhood and state- or *nomos*-induced bravery (2.39.1, 4):[45]

> There is also a great difference between us and our opponents in terms of military practices. . . . In education, while our rivals from earliest boyhood pursue manliness by painful training, our relaxed way of life makes us no less ready to face like dangers. . . . And yet if we are willing to face danger with an easy mind rather than diligent toil and with courage inherent in our character rather than produced by law (μετὰ νόμων), we have the advantage of avoiding the suffering of hardships which are still in the future and of facing them when they are upon us as courageously as those who are forever undergoing hardship.[46]

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[43] Finley (1963) 92, 145–59 and (1967) 17; Edmunds (1975) 44–6, 57–8, 67; Brunt (1993) 178–80.

[44] While Archidamus lauds the Spartans' ignorance and looks down upon knowledge of 'useless matters' (τὰ ἀχρεῖα) that fall outside of practical military skill (1.84.3), Pericles praises the Athenian citizens' knowledge of 'civic affairs' (τὰ πολιτικά) and applies the term 'useless' (ἀχρεῖος) only to those who do not participate in public life (2.40.2).

[45] The contrast between Athens' natural courage and Sparta's externally produced bravery structures Thuc. 2.39.1–2, 4, and Pericles' description of Sparta's *nomos*-produced bravery (2.39.4) strikingly parallels Demaratus' description of Spartan courage (Hdt. 7.104.4–5).

[46] Thuc. 2.39.1, 4: Διαφέρομεν δὲ καὶ ταῖς τῶν πολεμικῶν μελέταις τῶν ἐναντίων τοῖσδε. . . . καὶ ἐν ταῖς παιδείαις οἱ μὲν ἐπιπόνῳ ἀσκήσει εὐθὺς νέοι ὄντες τὸ ἀνδρεῖον μετέρχονται, ἡμεῖς δὲ ἀνειμένως διαιτώμενοι οὐδὲν ἧσσον ἐπὶ τοὺς ἰσοπαλεῖς κινδύνους χωροῦμεν. . . . (4) καίτοι εἰ ῥᾳθυμίᾳ μᾶλλον ἢ πόνων μελέτῃ καὶ μὴ μετὰ νόμων τὸ

The benefits accruing from Athens' promotion of individual freedom and initiative become particularly clear, however, in Pericles' later eulogy of the men who loved Athens and freely gave the city their lives (2.42–3).[47] Through an accumulation of terms and phrases denoting the exercise of free will, Pericles emphatically links these citizens' courage with their personal sense of duty to Athens and conscious choice to put the city's needs before their own (2.42.4).[48] The Funeral Oration thus provides a portrayal of the Athenian democracy that accords with Herodotus' explanation for Athens' increased military strength following the overthrow of the Peisistratids (5.78) and his interpretation of the Greeks' victories over the Persians (6.109–10; 7.139.5).[49] Athens' democratic freedom and equality promoted and exploited the energy and motivation of its people by giving them an active role and personal stake in its welfare.[50]

Although the Athenians enjoy an unusual degree of freedom in both their government and general way of life (2.37.1–2), Pericles points out that openness and tolerance in private relations does not produce lawlessness in public affairs. Athens' citizens not only obey those in positions of power but also demonstrate a particularly strong adherence to the laws out of a proper and deep 'fear' (δέος)[51] of them, especially those that are aimed at the protection of the wronged and those unwritten laws that it is an acknowledged shame to break (2.37.3). As Lowell Edmunds has pointed out, both types of law 'involve subjective conviction on the part of the citizen'.[52] The provision of the Solonian constitution that anyone could prosecute on behalf of an injured party (Plut., *Solon* 18.2–3; Arist., *Constitution of the Athenians* 9.4), on the one hand, presupposes the willing and active involvement of the Athenian citizenry in the maintenance of the law. Obedience to the unwritten laws, on the other hand, arises from

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πλέον ἢ τρόπων ἀνδρείας ἐθέλομεν κινδυνεύειν, περιγίγνεται ἡμῖν τοῖς τε μέλλουσιν ἀλγεινοῖς μὴ προκάμνειν, καὶ ἐς αὐτὰ ἐλθοῦσι μὴ ἀτολμοτέρους τῶν αἰεὶ μοχθούντων φαίνεσθαι, καὶ ἔν τε τούτοις τὴν πόλιν ἀξίαν εἶναι θαυμάζεσθαι καὶ ἔτι ἐν ἄλλοις.

[47] See Finley (1963) 147–8; Connor (1984) 68.

[48] For a detailed analysis of this speech, see Edmunds (1975) 60–5; Rusten (1989) 164–8.

[49] Brunt (1993) 178.

[50] Thucydides later alludes to this close connection between Athenian liberality and its fostering of a motivated and dedicated citizenry in Nicias' speech to his troops at 7.69.2. See Brunt (1993) 178.

[51] For this translation of the term δέος, see Gomme (1945–81) 2.112; de Romilly (1956) 126; Edmunds (1975) 58, 60, 65, 218–23; Rusten (1989) 147.

[52] Edmunds (1975) 58.

natural feelings of shame. The Athenians, in other words, obey both written and unwritten laws through an internalized and instinctive sense of what is right, without recourse to either constraint or 'shame' (αἰδώς) and self-control rigorously inculcated by the state.[53]

The Athenians' spontaneous and natural respect for their laws and leaders contrasts greatly with the Spartans' reliance on external discipline, which Archidamus first lauds in his response to the Corinthians at the debate in Sparta in 432 (1.84.3–4) and later demonstrates in his speech to the generals and important members of the states involved in the first invasion of Attica (2.11). In this speech the conservative king advocates caution and again reveals his belief that the Peloponnesians' strength and safety lie in their discipline (2.11.9):[54]

> Considering, then, the great city against which we are marching and the greatness of the reputation which, according to the event, we shall win or lose for our ancestors and ourselves, follow where you may be led, considering discipline and security of the greatest importance and giving prompt obedience to the orders given to you. For the best and safest thing of all is when a large force appears to follow a single discipline.[55]

The Lacedaemonian citizen, unlike his more self-consciously patriotic Athenian counterpart, seems to lack the opportunity to make the free choice either to put Sparta's needs before his own or to obey its laws. Spartan distrust of human nature and preference for discipline

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[53] See Edmunds (1975) 58–60, 67. Finley ((1967) 17) concludes that 'the argument may have run somewhat as follows: although democracy lacks the strict νόμοι of oligarchy, democratic man with his freer trust in himself feels instinctive accord with the great natural laws'.

[54] Archidamus' belief in the efficacy of strict and unquestioned obedience in both passages parallels both the Herodotean Demaratus' description of the Spartans' fear of and obedience to *nomos* as a veritable δεσπότης (7.104.4–5) as well as the Spartan king Menelaus' disquisition on the efficacy of obedience and fear in Sophocles' *Ajax* (1067–90). On these parallels, see Finley (1967) 15. See also Stanford ((1963) 194–5), who notes the similarity between Menelaus' and Archidamus' view that orderly rule depends on fear but less soundly argues in favor of a connection between these two passages and Pericles' discussion of the Athenians' 'proper fear' of the laws at 2.37.3. Although all three passages underline the importance of veneration of the laws, the Athenians' αἰδώς and δέος with respect to the laws comes from within and do not depend on external compulsion. Stanford's equation between φόβος (*Ajax* 1076) and δέος (Thuc. 2.37.3) is equally questionable. See above, n. 51.

[55] Thuc. 2.11.9: ὡς οὖν ἐπὶ τοσαύτην πόλιν στρατεύοντες καὶ μεγίστην δόξαν οἰσόμενοι τοῖς τε προγόνοις καὶ ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς ἐπ' ἀμφότερα ἐκ τῶν ἀποβαινόντων, ἕπεσθ' ὅπῃ ἄν τις ἡγῆται, κόσμον καὶ φυλακὴν περὶ παντὸς ποιούμενοι καὶ τὰ παραγγελλόμενα ὀξέως δεχόμενοι· κάλλιστον γὰρ τόδε καὶ ἀσφαλέστατον, πολλοὺς ὄντας ἑνὶ κόσμῳ χρωμένους φαίνεσθαι. See Gomme (1945–81) 2.14–15.

over the promotion of natural inclination rather produces an unreflecting obedience.[56]

Thucydides highlights this profound contrast through Pericles' advice to the Athenian mourners to understand the close connection between freedom and valor exemplified by their city's war-dead (2.43.4): 'Emulating these men, then, and judging happiness to be freedom and freedom to be bravery, do not hang back from the dangers of war'.[57] By its very structure, this passage at once recalls and subverts the similarly gnomic argument earlier offered by Archidamus in his defense of Sparta's *politeia* (1.84.3): 'We are good at both war and deliberation because we are well-ordered. We are warlike because self-control is largely based upon a sense of shame, and a sense of shame is largely based on courage'.[58] While the Athenians view good courage (εὐψυχία) as both the natural product and insurer of freedom, Archidamus can only conceptualize it as contingent upon self-restraint, which, he reminds us, is externally reinforced by a rigorous state education.

Thucydides further underlines the differences between Spartan and Athenian attitudes towards discipline in his account of Phormio's two naval victories against Peloponnesian forces near Naupactus in 429/28.[59] Before the second encounter, he provides the Peloponnesians and Phormio with speeches that construct a polarity between unreflecting obedience and the compliance that arises from reasoned deliberation. After continuously rating Spartan courage as more efficacious than Athenian technical skill and experience at sea, the Peloponnesian generals not only exhort their steersmen and sailors to remain at their posts with confidence but also threaten to punish anyone who plays the coward (2.87).[60] Phormio, too, attempts to

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[56] For a similar comparison, see Edmunds (1975) 84–5.

[57] Thuc. 2.43.4: οὓς νῦν ὑμεῖς ζηλώσαντες καὶ τὸ εὔδαιμον τὸ ἐλεύθερον, τὸ δ' ἐλεύθερον τὸ εὔψυχον κρίναντες μὴ περιορᾶσθε τοὺς πολεμικοὺς κινδύνους.

[58] Thuc. 1.84.3: πολεμικοί τε καὶ εὔβουλοι διὰ τὸ εὔκοσμον γιγνόμεθα, τὸ μὲν ὅτι αἰδὼς σωφροσύνης πλεῖστον μετέχει, αἰσχύνης δὲ εὐψυχία. . . . For the parallels between the two passages, see Finley (1963) 149; Rusten (1989) 171. For alternative readings of Thuc 1.84.3, see Hornblower (1991) *ad loc.*; Crane (1998) 106–7.

[59] See Gomme (1945–81) 2.15; Westlake (1968) 43–8. Crane ((1998) 225–9) discusses Thucydides' use of Phormio's encounter with the Peloponnesians to question the Spartans' supposed internal consistency.

[60] Thucydides stresses the Spartans' focus on courage through the proliferation of terms such as κακίαν (2.87.3), ἀνδρείους (2.87.3), ἀνδρείου (2.87.3), κακοὺς (2.87.3), ἀνδρείαν (2.87.4), εὐψυχίας (2.87.4), ἀλκῆς (2.87.4), θαρσοῦντες (2.87.8), and κακῷ (2.87.9). On the Spartans' questionable belief in the superiority of their courage to Athenian skill in this account, see Edmunds (1975) 96–9; Crane (1998) 226–9.

encourage his men, and he offers a speech that concludes on a note that is reminiscent of Archidamus' earlier advice to his subordinates before the first Peloponnesian invasion of Attica (2.89; cf. 2.11.9). In addition to exhorting his men to remain at their posts by their ships, he orders them to give prompt obedience to orders and to consider discipline and silence of the utmost importance (2.89.9).[61]

Phormio's speech, however, reveals the weaknesses of a system that relies on a form of courage produced by external discipline instead of the bravery that arises from tactical expertise and sound deliberation. He claims, for example, that most of the Lacedaemonians' forces are being led into danger against their will and should accordingly show little audacity (2.89.4–5; cf. 2.87.9). Adopting a wholly different approach, Phormio encourages the Athenians to maintain confidence, discipline and order without the threat of punishment for any lapses from such desired conduct (2.89.9). Phormio, in addition, views courage and discipline not as ends in themselves but as necessary components of a successful naval strategy that must take account of cramped fighting conditions and the proximity of the two fleets. It is only after he has described in detail his plans to his men that he brings up the issues of discipline and order, which he treats as aids to, rather than replacements for, Athenian naval 'skill' (τέχνη, 2.89.8–9).

The Spartans, it should be noted, later exhibited alacrity in their attack upon the twenty Athenian ships that Phormio led out to protect Naupactus (2.90). Although the Peloponnesians' sudden turning movement apparently undercut Phormio's criticism of Spartan compulsion, Thucydides' description of the Athenians' ensuing victory over the disorganized Peloponnesian naval forces fully demonstrates the limitations of Sparta's ultimate dependence upon discipline. Having cut off almost half of the Athenian squadron, the Peloponnesian fleet enjoyed a tremendous numerical advantage (77:11) and had a real opportunity to demonstrate the superiority of Spartan courage over Athenian *technê*. The Athenians, however, revealing the same energy and adaptability that so disconcerted their enemies (cf. 1.70), managed to beat the odds after a single Athenian ship boldly and unexpectedly

[61] The parallels between the two passages are striking:

Thuc. 2.89.9:. . . . τά τε παραγγελλόμενα ὀξέως δέχεσθε . . . καὶ ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ κόσμον καὶ σιγὴν περὶ πλείστου ἡγεῖσθε. . . .

Thuc. 2.11.9: . . . κόσμον καὶ φυλακὴν περὶ παντὸς ποιούμενοι καὶ τὰ παραγγελλόμενα ὀξέως δεχόμενοι.

circled around a merchantman anchored offshore and rammed the Leucadian ship sailing in its pursuit. Unable to cope with this sudden setback, the Peloponnesian fleet succumbed to the same 'panic' (φόβος) and disorder that had earlier disrupted the Spartan battle order before the battle of Plataea in 479 (2.91–2; cf. 2.84). Thucydides also records that the Spartan commander of the Leucadian ship, Timocrates, responded to this change of events by committing suicide (2.92.3). It would seem that Athenian courage, arising from both experience and *technê*, again proved more capable of dealing with changes in circumstances than the Spartans' discipline and compelled bravery.[62]

At several points in the *History*, Thucydides further exposes the fragility of the Spartan system by focusing on its greatest defect, namely, the inability of Sparta's lifelong cultivation of bravery to produce citizens who remain responsible and law-abiding when freed from the state's discipline. This flaw in the Spartan order first receives attention in the speech delivered by the Athenian envoys at Sparta in 432. In this oration the Athenians twice insinuate that if the Spartans had taken an active part in the continuing struggle against Persia and retained the leadership of the Greeks, they would have exercised at least as harsh a form of hegemony over the allies as that exercised by the Athenians (1.76.1, 77.6). After alluding to the Spartans' lack of moderation in their handling of power during their leadership of the Hellenes against the Persians (1.76.4, 77.6; cf. 77.2), the Athenian envoys then go on to claim that the Spartans observe neither their own 'customs' (νόμιμα)—which are apparently 'incompatible' (ἄμεικτα) with those of others—nor those prevailing in the rest of Greece when abroad (1.77.6). The Athenians again hint at the Spartans' failure to abide by others' *nomima* in their disdainful criticism of the Melians' ill-founded trust in the Lacedaemonians (5.105.4):

> In dealing with their own affairs and local institutions, the Lacedaemonians are the greatest practitioners of virtue. As for their relations with others, one could say a great deal about their conduct but summarize it just as clearly by stating that of all people we know they most conspicuously regard what is pleasurable as noble and what is expedient as just.[63]

[62] Crane ((1998) 228–31) focuses on the Spartans' inability to cope with reverses of fortune.

[63] Thuc. 5.105.4: Λακεδαιμόνιοι γὰρ πρὸς σφᾶς μὲν αὐτοὺς καὶ τὰ ἐπιχώρια νόμιμα πλεῖστα ἀρετῇ χρῶνται· πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ἄλλους πολλὰ ἄν τις ἔχων εἰπεῖν ὡς προσφέρονται, ξυνελὼν μάλιστ' ἂν δηλώσειεν ὅτι ἐπιφανέστατα ὧν ἴσμεν τὰ μὲν ἡδέα καλὰ νομίζουσι, τὰ δὲ ξυμφέροντα δίκαια.

Thucydides' account of the tragic end of the Spartan regent Pausanias illustrates this weakness of the Spartan *politeia* particularly well. Once released from Sparta's strict oversight, the victor of Plataea purportedly abandoned all moderation, aimed at the rule of Greece, and displayed tyrannical *hybris* (1.95.1–6, 128.3–134).[64] Herodotus' tantalizingly brief account of the Spartan Euryleon's earlier attempt at tyranny in Selinus would seem to suggest that Pausanias was not the only Lacedaemonian unable to resist the corrupting force of power after leaving Spartan territory (5.46). According to Thucydides, the Spartan authorities themselves recognized the danger of corruption that faced all officers sent abroad and therefore gladly relinquished to Athens their command in the continuing struggle against Persia (1.95.7).

Thucydides' depictions of other Spartans' harsh, lawless, and often brutal exercise of power while abroad during the course of the Peloponnesian War similarly demonstrate the inherent defects in Sparta's repressive *politeia* and its dependence on external discipline. In his account of the Spartans' foundation of Heraclea in Trachis, Thucydides claims that this colony declined and suffered a drop in population through the harsh and often unjust administration exercised by the governors sent out from Sparta (3.93.2). Thucydides also provides two specific examples of such brutality and lawlessness in his descriptions of the admiral Alcidas' massacre of the prisoners taken during his voyage (3.32) and the later admiral Astyochus' arrogant and violent response to the Peloponnesian force's demands for pay (8.84.1–2). Like Thucydides' Pausanias and Herodotus' Euryleon, these Spartiates revealed an inability to exercise self-discipline once they had left the state's boundaries and were no longer subject to the Spartans' externally-imposed *nomos*.[65]

Through these accounts of Spartan violence and lawlessness while abroad and the Athenians' allusions to the Lacedaemonians' non-Greek *nomima* at 1.77.6 and 5.105.4, Thucydides constructs a conceptual boundary between Sparta and the rest of the Hellenes that is delineated by *nomos*. When they leave Sparta, Thucydides' undisciplined Spartans cross an important frontier into another world

[64] See Tigerstedt (1965–78) 1.135.

[65] See also the later accounts of Thibron (Xen., *Hellenica* 3.1.8), Gylippus (Diod. Sic. 13.106.8–10; Plut., *Lysander* 16), Clearchus (Diod. Sic. 13.66.6, 14.12.2–9), and Herippidas (Diod. Sic. 14.38.4–5). On these Spartans abroad, see Cawkwell (1993) 524–5.

bounded by different laws and values. By violating the Hellenes' *nomima*, these Lacedaemonians cross yet another boundary from lawfulness to illegality. Herodotus' Spartans often make the same move across this ideational space from lawfulness to illegality in their corrupt dealings with the Delphic oracle, Ionian tyrants, various Athenians, and a host of other Greek peoples. Both the *nomos*-defined boundary separating the Spartans from the other Hellenes and the Lacedaemonians' symbolic transgression of Hellenic *nomima* particularly distance the Spartans from their inherently law-abiding democratic rivals, the Athenians. More importantly, their lawless and violent transgression of Hellenic *nomos* further tightens the link between the Spartans and the barbarian enemies of Hellas that Herodotus earlier forged in his account of Demaratus' description of the Spartans' despotic *nomos*.[66]

Thucydides, of course, does not associate the Spartans' compelled and fearful obedience to the law with the barbarian world as clearly as Herodotus does throughout his *Histories* and rather focuses on the antithesis between the Athenian democracy's promotion of natural courage and lawfulness on the one hand and Spartan state-induced bravery and obedience on the other. Nevertheless, the close structural and thematic correspondences between the two authors' treatments of Spartan courage and legality reveal that they were equally influenced by late-fifth-century Athenian democratic ideology and, more specifically, the opposition between democracy and despotism that occupied a central position in Athenian political thought.[67] Autocratic government plays a far more important and obvious role in Herodotus' work than it does in Thucydides' *History*, in which democracy is primarily opposed to oligarchy.[68] Both works, however, clearly demonstrate that despotism 'kept its prominence in political thought on democ-

[66] On the barbarians', and especially the Persians', transgression of boundaries, including that of *nomos*, see Lateiner (1989) 126–33, 140–4.

[67] For a recent discussion of Herodotus' intellectual and cultural milieu, see Thomas (2000), who rightly views the *Histories* as part of the major intellectual developments of the mid and late fifth century. See also Millender ((1996) 363–73), who considers the date of Herodotus' composition and particularly the important influence which the Peloponnesian War exerted on Herodotus' text.

[68] Scholars have long recognized that autocratic government plays a central role in Herodotus' organization of his *Histories*, in which the polarization of Greek and barbarian operates around the factor of political difference. See, e.g., Hartog (1988) 323–39; Lateiner (1989) 170–86; Munson (1993) 39–41; Millender (1996) 139–45 and (2002).

racy because it served the useful function of representing a system which radically denied all the values and the achievements of the democracy'.[69] The same powerful nexus of tyranny, illegality, and compulsion in Athenian democratic thought that enabled Herodotus to locate the Spartans in the conceptualized world of barbarian autocracy also underpinned Thucydides' construction of Sparta as the diametrical opposite of an idealized version of democratic Athens.

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[69] Raaflaub (1983) 522–3. On the central position which the opposition between despotism and democracy occupied in Athenian democratic ideology, see also Lanza (1977); Bleiken (1979) 157; Gorgini (1993) 16–38, 142–86; Millender (1996); (2002); Forsdyke (2001).

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LEAD PLATES AND THE CASE FOR DEMOCRACY IN FIFTH-CENTURY BC CAMARINA

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In 1987 archaeologists discovered a cache of around 150 inscribed lead strips or tablets in the territory of the ancient Greek city of Camarina in southwestern Sicily. Published by Federica Cordano in 1992, these lead *tesserae* have been taken by her and others to be clear physical indications of the operation of democratic institutions in mid-fifth century Camarina, likely used for the allotment of officials and/or payment for attendance at public assembly meetings.[1] This exciting discovery could have importance well beyond Camarina itself. Though we know many democracies existed outside Athens in the fifth and fourth centuries, literary testimony is scanty and direct physical evidence even more so. It would be valuable for our understanding of ancient Greek democracy, therefore, if the lead tablets detailed some of its workings at Camarina. Furthermore, the mid-fifth century in Sicily was a time of great political ferment: in the 460s tyranny was swept out of the Greek cities and replaced by political 'freedom' lasting decades. Did this 'freedom' result in widespread democracy, as Diodorus claims, or less radical governments, as some scholars have argued? The inscribed tablet of Camarina might help resolve this issue too.

None of these important contributions, however, can be realized unless we can assert with some confidence that the tablets were indeed employed for democratic processes in Camarina. This paper investigates the potential purposes of the tablets with an eye toward constitutional ramifications. Though the hypotheses advanced thus far are not unreasonable, they must be carefully scrutinized, and other possibilities need to be explored before definite conclusions can be reached. In particular, one aspect that has not yet been addressed is the significance of the use of lead for the tablets, as opposed to bronze or other materials. This paper will contend that lead is at

[1] Cordano (1992), Manganaro (1995) 101–9, Wilson (1996) 70.

best a curious choice for the democratic purposes suggested and would better suit employment in some form of official archive for citizens or soldiers.

The lead strips were found in the area around the temple of Athena on a hill in the heart of the ancient city of Camarina. Most were grouped together in a pit around the northern wall of the *pronaos*, prompting Cordano and the excavator, Giovanni di Stefano, to conclude they had been stored near the find spot in the temple itself, perhaps in a closet. The presence of small bronze studs among them suggest that they had been kept in a wooden box or another container that has degraded with the passing centuries. The tablets were rolled up or folded, often with multiple folds. With only a couple of exceptions, the original tablets were of generally uniform size and shape: rectangular, roughly 6–13 cm long, 2–4 cm high, and .05–.25 cm thick.[2]

Cordano dates the tablets to the first half of the fifth century BC based on letter forms. To narrow it down further, she specifies that because of their content they must have originated after 461. Syracuse had destroyed Camarina in the sixth century, but then in 492 the tyrant Hippocrates of Gela refounded it. Depopulated once again by Syracuse in 485, it reappeared in ca. 461 as a result of the post-tyrannical *koinon dogma* ('common agreement') among Sicilian cities to remove mercenary populations and resettle citizen exiles; as part of this activity Gela repopulated Camarina. Diodorus, our fullest source for the events of this era, reports that democracies replaced tyranny generally in Sicily at this time.[3] Cordano argues that a city run by a tyrant would have no use for civic lottery devices, which she takes the lead tablets to be; therefore they must date from ca. 461 and later, the democratic period, rather than from 492–485.[4]

As for the inscriptions, the general pattern is for one side of each tablet to have a name in the nominative and patronymic in the genitive, and the other side to have an ordinal numeral, sometimes accompanied with the word *phratra* or *phatra*, indicating the citizen's phratry. The first and last phratries are indicated not with ordinals

[2] Cordano (1992) 29–31; G. di Stefano, in the appendix to Cordano (1992) 113–17.

[3] Diod. Sic. 11.68, 72, 76; Hdt. 7.154–6; Thuc. 6.5; Timaeus (*FGH* 566 F 19 = scholia ad Pind., *Olympian* 5.19).

[4] Cordano (1992) 77–9, 93–4.

but with the words *hupata* ('highest') and *neta* ('lowest'), borrowed, Cordano contends, from musical language. In thirteen cases phratries are omitted, perhaps due to some urgency of writing or the person's notoriety. The quality of writing is excellent but not uniform, possibly suggesting a *grammateus* ('secretary') for each phratry. Erasure of names and reuse of the tablets is not infrequent. Several have additional writing of particular note: on two, *tethnake* ('he has died') has been inscribed along with the name; this word can be restored with varying degrees of confidence on four other tablets.[5] Additionally, one strip has the word *dekalitron* and another *deka litrai* (ten *litrai*, Sicilian coins), and seven others have one or more deltas or an omicron written as symbols, possibly indicating monetary amounts or some other numerical value.[6]

The scant literary testimony about fifth-century Camarina has nothing to say about lead tablets or like devices. Nevertheless, Cordano offers some fairly definite ideas about how they were used. By listing a citizen's name, patronymic, and phratry membership on each tablet, complete identification and/or registration of a community member was made possible. Cordano suggests that the tablets were used for sortition of high state magistracies and on other occasions in which a civic lottery was needed. She notes finds from other parts of the Greek world that could offer parallels, including the bronze *pinakia* ('small tablets' or 'tickets') employed for the selection of jurors and some offices in fourth-century Athens, similar Rhodian bronze jury tickets from the third century BC or later, and the ca. 200 clay tokens of the late fifth to third centuries BC found in the area of the theater at Mantinea and possibly used for attendance at public assemblies held there. The Athenian *pinakia* seem to her especially instructive as a comparison because they list name, patronymic, and Cleisthenic deme—the last a civic organization which, when introduced, marked a significant new stage in the political life of the community, just as one might surmise about the Camarinan numbered phratry. We know that the Athenian *pinakia* were used both for jury selection and also for non-dikastic purposes such as the allotment of the members of the boule or other annual offices. Cordano remarks

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[5] On one of these four (Cordano (1992) no. 112) the restoration of *tethnake* has been rendered virtually certain by L. del Monaco's (forthcoming) skillful rearrangement of the fragments and improved reading.

[6] Cordano (1992) 81–5.

upon the accentuated curvature of the short sides of six of the Camarinan tablets, noting that this could be consistent with use of the plates in some kind of sortition machine like the *kleroterion* into which the *pinakia* were inserted at Athens. In all, Cordano sees the tablets as key evidence for the post-461 civic order in a refounded and probably democratic Camarina. She notes that the Argive democracy of the fifth century also instituted a new phratry system, and that Camarinan legislators could have been inspired in their work by the experience of the Athenians in the post-Cleisthenic era.[7]

Giacomo Manganaro has a different take on the use of the tablets, but does not dispute that they were part of a democratic system—indeed, his theory would seem to require democracy even more than Cordano's. He considers the finds at Camarina in light of the *ekklesiastikon* ('payment for assembly attendance') described in an inscription from Iasos recently reexamined and reinterpreted. This document depicts an intricate procedure according to which money was distributed to financial officials prior to each public meeting, water-clocks established the time limit for citizens to register their attendance, and receptacles of precise dimensions, arranged by tribe, accepted the individualized *pessa* ('tokens') of the citizens.[8] With this example in mind, Manganaro believes that the Camarina '*pinakia*' were accumulated in a state archive near the Athena temple as documentation of the payment citizens received for attending meetings of the public assembly. Those inscribed with *tethnake* indicate citizens who died, those with letters inscribed as symbols record arrears that were owed (up to five *dekalitrai* if we reckon correctly the five deltas inscribed on one of the tablets). He guesses that the payment for any one meeting would have amounted to no more than two *litrai*, and he ingeniously makes the connection to the fact that Camarina began to mint *litrai*, and no other coins as far as we know, upon its refoundation in the 460s—we now have a specific public purpose for such currency. Manganaro is vague, however, about the mechanics of the system he imagines. Despite his interest in the *pessos*-handling procedure described in the Iasos *ekklesiastikon* decree, he does not think

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[7] Cordano (1992) 30, 85–99; cf. Cordano (1994) and Helly (1997) for further discussion of the phratry organization as evidenced by the tablets. Athenian *pinakia*: Kroll (1972). Rhodian jury tickets: Fraser (1972), with further examples at Touchais (1981) 862–3 and possibly Bingen (1982) 184. Mantinean tokens: *IG* 5.2.323.

[8] Gauthier (1990).

that the Camarina tablets were inserted into urns arranged by phratry or tribe; yet how they accumulated in the archive is not discussed, nor does Manganaro describe the payment procedure or state if/when the *pinakia* went back to citizens for reuse.[9]

Since payment for attendance at assembly meetings was thought to be a characteristic of extreme democracies,[10] Manganaro's solution (whatever the details) would presume a democratic system as much as or more than Cordano's. Both can take indirect support from the literary evidence that suggests democracy existed in Camarina at this time. There are Diodorus' general statements about democracy coming to Sicily after the overthrow of tyrants and the *koinon dogma* among the Greek cities.[11] The lateness of Diodorus and the sweeping nature of his claim give one pause, even if his words are vindicated in the case of Syracuse, where democracy did indeed arise.[12] The most suggestive bit of evidence for Camarina itself comes from Thucydides. He describes at 6.75–88 a *syllogos* ('public assembly meeting') of the Camarinans during Athens' Sicilian expedition at which ambassadors from Athens and Syracuse made their pleas for alliance.[13] Thucydides implies that a decision about choosing sides was made at this same gathering: immediately following the speeches, we read about the feelings of the Camarinans as they deliberated (*bouleusamenoi*), after which they give answer to the ambassadors. All this is indicative of democratic practice, with an apparently sovereign assembly hearing speeches, deliberating, and then coming to a decision.

But can the tablets really confirm the operation of democracy at Camarina? To answer this question we must consider in greater detail the extent to which the plates as discovered truly fit the uses Cordano and Manganaro propose, and what other possible uses there might be. Oswyn Murray has already questioned Cordano's ideas in certain respects. The fact that the tablets were found collected together,

[9] Manganaro (1995) 101–9. On the coins, see Westermark and Jenkins (1980).

[10] Aristotle, *Politica* 1293a1–10, 1294a37–41, 1297a35–8, 1298b14–19.

[11] See above, n. 3.

[12] Although some scholars contend that Syracuse was not fully democratic, distrusting Diodorus' use of the term and referring to certain episodes in the city's history, their case is not convincing: see Robinson (2000).

[13] *Syllogos* seems to have had a range of meanings in Thucydides, from formal assembly to informal public meeting to assembly of soldiers, and it has been a subject of some scholarly dispute: see comments and bibliography in Gomme (1945–81) and Hornblower (1991–96), at 2.22.1. But a formal assembly meeting appears to be the usual meaning and is surely indicated for the Camarina event at 6.75–88.

seemingly stored in the chief sanctuary of the city, constitutes a major difference from the Athenian *pinakia* that Cordano relies on to provide a working parallel, since the Athenian tablets were mostly recovered from individual graves. The store of lead plates found near an altar at Styra in Euboea, inscribed with name and occasionally patronymic and dating to around the same time as the ones at Camarina, would make a better parallel (though unfortunately practically nothing is known about their use).[14] Murray concludes that given the find spot of the Camarina tablets they probably represented something more enduring and important to the community than mere allotment tokens, perhaps signifying each citizen's right to land or membership in the newly founded community.[15]

Domenico Musti makes the contrasting proposition that the tablets served a military purpose. Cordano already noted that one of the lead strips found near the temple was of a unique character, being shaped and inscribed differently and containing verse lines seeming to celebrate the success of one Thrasus in a singing contest. Musti, following a new reading and interpretation of these lines, proposes that the plate celebrated success in a martial contest, quite possibly in an actual battle or series of battles. This leads him to suggest a military context for *all* the tablets: they were found, after all, in the temple of Athena, the city's protector and a goddess often depicted as a sort of female hoplite; the fact that several of them have *tethnake* inscribed makes perfect sense if deaths in battle are being recorded; and the phratries themselves, along with *hikas* ('group of twenty') and *triakas* ('group of thirty')—sub-groups that are mentioned on a few of the strips—could easily have been military organizations. He concludes, then, that this collection of *tesserae* could amount to a 'small hoplite catalogue' for military registration and possibly with a votive purpose.[16]

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[14] *IG* 12.9.56; Audollent (1904) 107–32, no. 80; Masson (1992). Audollent thought the Styra tablets were curse tablets, going against the opinions of earlier scholars. Cordano is not the only current scholar to go back to the older view: David Jordan also considers them to have had a civic rather than private magical purpose. Jordan (1980) 226–8.

[15] Murray (1997). Democracy is not Murray's subject, but rather the characteristically Greek rationality evident in Camarina's phratry system as revealed by the tablets. But it has been suggested that such systems held political overtones: N.F. Jones writes that the use of number systems to designate sub-tribal public organizations in Western Greek city-states could represent 'the tendency towards schematism characteristic of the democratization of the archaic organizations'. Jones (1987) 155.

[16] Musti (1994), building on Cassio (1994).

To assess properly the various opinions about the purpose of the tablets, we must consider a matter hardly touched upon in any of the previous treatments: the properties of lead, how it was used in antiquity, and why, therefore, the ancient Camarinans may have used it to make their plates. Let us start with some basic facts. Lead is a very soft, malleable metal with a relatively low melting temperature, making it easy to shape, cut, and fold. It will not hold its form nearly as stiffly as bronze, but it preserves written text adequately and with greater permanency than waxen tablets. Inscribing it with a stylus requires a minimum of skill and effort, and it can be erased and reinscribed. Lead was also cheap and easily obtainable in the ancient world.[17] At least as early as the sixth century BC lead was being made into sheets, cut into strips, and employed as a medium for certain kinds of written documents.

Judging from the frequency of archaeological finds, the most common epigraphic use of lead by far was for the so-called 'curse tablets', or *defixiones* (Greek *katadesmoi*), found throughout the ancient Mediterranean world from Greek classical to Roman imperial times. Some of the earliest examples of these leaden *defixiones* happen to come from Sicily, demonstrating the early availability and use of lead on the island: some from Selinus date to ca. 500 BC or even before; Camarina also has its share, including a few dating to the mid-fifth century.[18] Despite the enormous geographical and chronological span of their use, *defixiones* show a fair consistency in the pattern of their production and handling: they are almost always written on lead strips, which are subsequently folded up (sometimes nailed as well) and deposited in a place where spirits are thought to dwell or in a venue appropriate to the spell—for example, a cemetery, a spring, a well, the sanctuary of a particular god (especially chthonic deities), or a stadium floor. One imagines lead became the material of choice for this kind of document in large part because of its cheapness and general availability, but its physical qualities may also have played a role: the way one can easily fold it up to hide or seal one's words; its reassuring weight; and its coldness, which is sometimes referred to in curses.[19]

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[17] In the late fifth century at Athens a talent of lead cost only five drachmas, making a ton of lead worth only .835 kg of silver; the value ranged from 1.5 to 3 drachmas per talent in the fourth century. Meier (1995) 239; Kroll (1977a) 95 n. 29.

[18] For Sicilian texts and commentary see Dubois (1989) esp. 39–54, 124–31; Gager (1992) 138–42.

[19] On lead and *defixiones*: Gager (1992) 3–20; Tomlin (1988) 59–86; Jordan (1985)

Though less common than the ubiquitous *defixiones*,[20] other kinds of ancient Greek lead inscriptions exist as well. They include private sale or loan documents from Camarina and Corcyra from the sixth to the second centuries BC, numerous oracular texts from Dodona of the sixth to third centuries BC, Athenian cavalry tablets from the fourth and third centuries BC, plus the tablets from Styra in Euboea already mentioned.[21] Making the most useful comparison to the Camarina tablets are the strips used at Athens to record the annual evaluation of the horses of the state's cavalrymen. Literary and epigraphic evidence for this regular procedure helps identify the tablets with certainty, and the utility of lead for the job becomes clear. This was an annual record of the monetary value (expressed in minas on the rolled or folded interior of the strips) of the horse maintained by each cavalryman. The exterior of the always folded/rolled strip bore the name of the Athenian man, and somewhere, usually inside, there would be a description of the horse's coloring or markings. The 'archive' thus created could be consulted if a horse was lost and its value for compensation needed to be determined, but normally the collection of strips would be inscribed, folded up and stored away, not to be referred to with any frequency. Lead, with its ease of acquisition, inscription, and folding (probably done for secure and efficient storage rather than secrecy) made a perfect material to use, and the fact that individual plates were made for each man's horse meant that if a mount was lost the relevant plate, once consulted, could simply be discarded or reused—much more convenient than a list written out on papyrus or wood (or worse, bronze or stone) to which the introduction of changes, additions, and deletions could prove difficult or messy.[22]

151–2; Audollent (1904) xlvii–xlix. On lead more generally: Schwerteck (1997); Meier (1995); Healy (1978). For a good comparison of various materials used for record keeping, see Bucher (1995).

[20] Something on the order of 1500 ancient curse tablets have been discovered according to Tomlin (1988) 59. Collections include: Wünsch (1897); Audollent (1904); Jordan (1985). However, it is promised that as many as 1400 lead oracular tablets from Dodona will soon be published (see following note).

[21] Corcyra and Camarina texts: Calligas (1971); Dubois (1989) 131–9; Cordano (1997). Dodona: Christidis (1997); (1999); Park (1967) 100–113, 259–73. Athenian cavalry tablets: Kroll (1977a). Styra: see above, n. 14. For brief surveys of these and other kinds of lead documents that have been unearthed, see Jordan (1980) 226–8; Kroll (1977a) 94–5 with n. 29.

[22] Kroll (1977a) 83–6, 92–5, 97–100.

Finally, lead strips were also put to use for private letters, examples of which from various parts of the Greek world have been turning up in increasing numbers in recent decades. Several of them are roughly contemporary with the Camarina tablets under discussion. Some come from the Black Sea region and date from the sixth to the mid-fifth centuries; another unearthed in Spain dates to the early fifth century. Most of these discuss business transactions involving the transport and payment for slaves or other merchandise; others, more obscurely given their incompleteness, refer to domestic matters, one having instructions to a household member about basic purchases, another involving an apparent dispute over kinship, and another containing a boy's complaint to his mother and someone else about his mistreatment at a foundry where he worked as an apprentice. Significantly, all of these letters, like lead documents generally, had been rolled or folded up.[23]

Let us now reconsider the proposals of Cordano and Manganaro for the use of the Camarina tablets. They are no doubt correct in assuming a civic purpose, as opposed to judging the documents to be private letters, contracts, or curse tablets. The last, which represent such a large percentage of extant lead inscriptions from the Greco-Roman world, do not seem to fit the circumstances, given the Camarina tablets' accumulation at the chief sanctuary of the city (dedicated to a non-chthonic deity), the consistently applied phratry numbers to go along with the names, and the absence of language, symbolic writing or nailing often associated with *defixiones*. Though it is true that some curses tablets simply list names and lack magical language or markings, in such cases the multiple names most often appear together on a single tablet.[24]

While the tablets therefore seem to involve a public purpose and not curses or other private affairs, their leaden nature militates against Cordano's and Manganaro's proposal that they were used as tokens

[23] Vinogradov (1998); Jordan (2000). Vinogradov says that to his knowledge a total of nineteen examples of lead private letters from the Greek world have come to light (pp. 153–4, n. 4). For the Emporion tablets from Spain, see Sanmarti and Santiago (1987); (1988); (1989).

[24] This distinction is borne out in the Attic examples in Wünsch (1897) and also in Sicilian lead documents. Camarina, Selinus, and other Sicilian cities provide some of the best examples of early Greek curse tablets (see above, n. 18), and the contrast between them and the tablets under discussion seems clear. From elsewhere, only the Styra documents present a good parallel, and their identification as curse tablets is highly questionable (above, n. 14).

to be inserted in machines, dropped in urns, or repeatedly distributed, handled, passed back, and redistributed as would occur in democratic sortition or assembly payment procedures. The softness of lead coupled with the thinness of the plates (ranging from less than a millimeter to a quarter of a centimeter thick in the Camarina examples) would render them wholly unsuitable to this kind of handling over any period of time: they would break apart or wear away far too easily.[25] One could suppose, possibly, that new strips were fashioned and inscribed for all citizens before every meeting or occasion of sortition, or that individual ones were constantly remade as they broke, but either procedure would be extremely cumbersome and inefficient if the mass gatherings were at all common. Bronze or wood would stand up far better to the rigors of frequent use for sortition and/or assembly pay—it is thus no surprise that these are precisely the materials the Athenians employed for their *kleroteria*, as evidenced by the surviving bronze plates and the literary testimony about wooden *pinakia*; lead seems never to have played any role.[26] Cordano's assertion that six of the Camarina tablets show a curvature of the short side consistent with insertion into some sort of allotment device hardly convinces: why would only a very few of the 'tokens' show this accentuation? For all of these reasons, regular use for sortition seems highly unlikely.

Furthermore, the lead Camarina tablets were discovered folded or rolled up, or in pieces therefrom. Cordano seems to consider this a feature of their having been discarded—they were 'rendered unusable' by the folding/rolling. But this interpretation surely gets things backwards, as it ignores one of the key features of lead that recommends it for written documents. As we have seen, *defixiones* were almost always folded up after their inscribing and then deposited in that state. Private letters on lead sent from one person to another were also folded. The Athenian cavalry tablets were kept folded up

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[25] The only other proposal known to me for drawing lead strips from a device as part of a sortition procedure comes in the context of the lead tablets used to record queries for the god at the oracular shrine at Dodona. H.W. Parke ((1967) 100–113) speculates that the priestess giving a response may have picked a folded lead tablet from a jar simultaneously with a lot of some kind. Even if Parke is correct, this would mean that each lead strip gets deposited and redrawn just once before being discarded or reinscribed; individual inscribed strips would not be subjected to repeated rough handling.

[26] Arist., *Athenaion Politeia* 63–5; Kroll (1972) 1–7. Bronze also was the metal of choice for the jury tickets at Rhodes: Fraser (1972).

as well. It is reasonable, therefore, to assume that the folding of the Camarina strips was not done to ruin them, but rather as the normal procedure for sealing them.

Manganaro's theory—that the strips were connected to an *ekklesiastikon* procedure and represented certificates of state payment to citizens for attending the assembly—remains an intriguing idea but has little concrete support. Manganaro doubts that the strips were inserted into urns like the *pessa* at Iasos. One wonders, then, just how they could have functioned as documentation for payment. Did the citizens turn in their strips some other way to an official when they received their one or two *litrai*, after which the strips were accumulated in the temple as proof of payment to be returned at some later point? If so, urns or not, over time there would be physical stress placed on the tablets for which, as has been argued, lead would prove a poor choice of material, especially as they would have to be repeatedly folded and unfolded. If, on the other hand, citizens did *not* turn in strips themselves, one wonders how officials came to know who attended the assembly or was owed payment. (One could imagine a *second* set of tokens, but this seems a clumsy solution and one for which no evidence exists.) Once one decides that the lead tablets likely did not themselves serve as tokens, the reason for associating them with an *ekklesiastikon*—and the Iasos model—disappears.

If they were not assembly tokens or sortition devices, what civic purpose, then, might the Camarina tablets have served? Since one cannot expect lead tablets to stand up to endlessly repeated foldings and unfoldings—*defixiones* were folded once and not to be unfolded again; private letters presumably were folded and unfolded just once—we may surmise that the Camarina tablets, folded up, were meant to preserve their information, to be available for checking a time or two if needed, but were not expected to be reread again and again. The lead cavalry archive at Athens, consultable but only rarely needing to be consulted, seems an obvious parallel.[27] But the Camarina documents were no cavalry archive, for they recorded information about citizens, not horse descriptions and values.

[27] One is reminded of the way Roman wax tablets (*cerae*) could be sealed together to form a *scriptura interior*, to be unsealed only if the contents needed verification. There are also the inked wooden Vindolanda tablets which were folded together to form a sort of sealable two-page book, presumably to be opened and used only once. Bucher ((1995) 24–7) describes these kinds of storage devices and discusses their strengths and weaknesses for record keeping.

A number of possible purposes present themselves. Proceeding along the lines suggested by Murray, one might well suppose that the tablets were created to allow each citizen to maintain publicly a lasting, weighty, verifiable symbol of his membership in the community. Affirming one's citizenship might have been the goal, or staking a claim to a *kleros* ('allotment') of redistributed land, or both—we know the two must have been key issues and the subject of some anxiety among the new inhabitants and holders of *kleroi* in the early months of Camarina's rebirth after years of mass exile and turmoil in Greek Sicily. Having the lead tablets manufactured and inscribed with full identification and civic affiliation of each citizen and deposited in the sanctuary of the city's protector and chief deity[28] would have served an important symbolic purpose, and also a practical one: the tablets could be retrieved and consulted if a legal dispute arose over citizenship or land ownership. Hence also the need for the *tethnake* inscriptions and the retention of those tablets after citizens died. Consultation would not be necessary at all frequently, for it would have been common knowledge who the original settlers and land owners were, and the tablets had nothing to say about actual property boundaries or other details which could have been bones of contention. Nevertheless, all knew the tablets were there in the goddess' keeping, a measure of security for the citizens and a deterrent to potential false claimants.

Such a 'lead citizenship record' hypothesis is a reasonable one and may approach the truth, but there is one important weakness. If a fixed record of original citizens was desired, why not inscribe the names on a more permanent surface, like a single large stone or bronze tablet? This would have the added advantage of being easily displayed for all to see, making a much more effective public record of community belonging. Some of the benefits of using individualized lead tablets—ease of addition to and subtraction from the archive and (within limits) manipulability—are properties that would be for the most part wasted in a straightforward, permanent, public record of original citizens. Unless it was simply the cheapness of lead that appealed, bronze or stone would seem to make superior media. For this reason, then, one is encouraged to go beyond the

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[28] On the evidence that Athena was the guardian and chief deity of the city (primarily the reference to '*poliaochos Pallas*' in Pind., *Olympian* 5, plus representations on coins), see Cordano (1992) 8; Westermark and Jenkins (1980) 12 (with n. 7), 26–7.

symbolic communitarian value the tablets may have held and look for an additional, more specific purpose that takes careful account of the physical nature of tablets.

One possibility is that the tablets represented a list of contributors for some public monument or cult activity. The find-spot of the tablets in or near the Athena temple suits such a purpose well. Anyone who contributed a standard amount would have had a tablet made for him. Extra contributions could be noted on one's strip, which would explain the occasional, apparently numerical notations (references to *litrai*, repeated deltas) on several of the tablets. It would also be sensible for the official(s) in charge to record if a contributor had died and yet to retain the tablet marking the contribution: hence the *tethnake* inscriptions. Religio-financial contribution lists are not uncommon in Attica in the later Classical period, and some of them record patronymics, demes, or other information about the contributors similar in spirit to what has been found at Camarina. *IG* 2^2.2345, for example, is a fourth-century Attic list of voluntary contributions by *thiasoi* (members of a phratry-based cultic group).[29] Less than half of the contributors had numbers next to their names, showing that such lists could involve a standard contribution with only occasional notations of extra donations. However, *IG* 2^2.2345 and other documents like it do not make good parallels in terms of the material used or visibility: they are inscribed as long lists of names on single marble stones. Given that one of the purposes of such lists is public display of the generosity of the contributors, stone slabs would seem to make better sense than a lead archive for recording contributions to a public cause. On the other hand, individual lead strips would allow for convenient updating. Analyzing *IG* 2^2.2345, S.D. Lambert comments that 'it is easier to envisage lists of this sort, inscribed on a permanent medium, representing a one-off payment than periodic contributions (what happens otherwise when men die or new men join?)'.[30] What indeed—unless one's list is kept on lead strips. Perhaps the archive at Camarina functioned precisely as a list for some periodic religious (or other civic) contributions from its citizens, a function for which individual lead tablets would be well suited.

Musti's hoplite catalogue remains another strong possibility for a more specific purpose for the tablets. Unlike the last two hypotheses,

[29] Lambert (1999).
[30] Lambert (1999) 120.

there would be no particular reason to have such a register on public display, so folded lead strips stored away somewhere would serve very well. Placement in a back room of the city's main sanctuary would be logical, especially the sanctuary of a deity with the martial associations of Athena. And though Musti does not mention it, the cavalry archive at Athens represents a strong potential parallel, for there we have a clear example of individual, folded lead strips used to keep an efficient, updateable list of names for the purposes of military registration. The additional *tethnake* inscriptions and the apparent numerical notations on some of the Camarina tablets could be consistent with a military register, though they require a bit of explanation. Musti is right to think a military context generally appropriate to the *tethnake* inscriptions—casualties incurred after a battle, for example, would need to be recorded—and yet if the strips are meant to be an accurate measure of the available soldiers of the city's hoplite force, records of the dead would not be kept there. One would think that a deceased individual's marker would simply be thrown away or erased and reused, as with the cavalry tablets at Athens, not marked 'dead' and kept in the catalogue indefinitely. Could the several tablets with *tethnake* written just have been temporary markers retained until the dead were memorialized? Such is not impossible, but remains a bit puzzling. The numerical notations also require explanation. That they represented regular payment seems dubious, for relatively few tablets have notations. Perhaps they represent arrears of pay to certain soldiers. Alternatively, they might indicate money owed by soldiers for equipment of some kind. The Athenians, it might be noted, used simpler, coin-like lead tokens for state armor subsidies, a number of which tokens have been excavated.[31]

One note of caution about the tablets as an archive: in the Athenian cavalry archive the names of the citizens always appear on the outside of the rolled/folded tablets so as to be immediately recognizable and thus easier to sort; at Camarina, however, the multiple folds break the names into small bits, rendering recognition without unfolding more difficult. Furthermore, it is unclear from the photographs whether *tethnake* and the other additional letters came after the initial inscription (by a different hand, say) or at the same time. Handwriting analysis and closer examination of the writing around the folds might

[31] Kroll (1977b).

shed further light on the use of the strips as continuously updated records.[32]

Though our understanding of the lead tablets discovered at the Athena temple remains incomplete, the analysis presented here allows us to come to some valuable conclusions. Camarina in the mid-fifth century may indeed have been democratic, as the literary testimony implies, but the tablets do not prove it. While they are suggestive of a constitution with a highly rational civic structure and one which valued individual citizen registration and/or contributions, such traits could apply to a broad spectrum of Greek *polis* governments, including democracy, to be sure, but also including Aristotelian *politeia*, constitutional oligarchy, or—if we think specifically of military registration—even monarchy.[33] What is more certain is that the leaden nature of the strips makes them very poor candidates for allotment tokens employed in such trademark democratic institutions as sortition for magistracies, councils, and jury panels or for public payment for assembly attendance, given that democracies tended to engage in these procedures frequently. Bronze, wood, or other materials would serve far better, and, unlike lead, are known to have been so used.

More likely purposes for the Camarina tablets involve the maintenance of a semi-permanent record of citizenship, land ownership, public contributions, or military registration for members of the refounded community, an archive that carried symbolic importance but which also offered the practical benefits of modifications and updating. The details of the record and its purposes defy certainty at present and further study of the tablets or new discoveries may prompt a more refined hypothesis. But however they proceed, in formulating answers any future analyses must take into account the physical properties of the tablets and the actual uses to which lead was put in the ancient world.

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[32] Manganaro ((1995) 102) also wonders about handwriting issues. I have not been able to examine the tablets first hand.

[33] In this context it must be noted that, according to Cordano's letterform dating, the Camarina tablets chronologically could fit the resettlement of 492 to 485—accomplished under tyranny—as easily as the post-461 community. It is only Cordano's ideas about the democratic uses of the tablets, disputed here, that ties them to the later, more populist refoundation (see n. 4).

I would like to thank John Graham for inspiring me with his teaching and scholarship. More specifically, I owe him a debt for bringing the Camarina tablets to my attention, together with some thoughtful observations. Additional thanks belong to the following people for helpful comments on or criticisms of this paper (of course, none is to be held responsible for remaining weaknesses): Vanessa Gorman, Jack Kroll, Elizabeth Meyer, Ernst Badian, Nino Luraghi, Zeph Stewart, Kathleen Winston, and Lavinio Del Monaco.

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REREADING THE *SENATUS CONSULTUM DE BACCHANALIBUS* OF 186 BC: GENDER ROLES IN THE ROMAN MIDDLE REPUBLIC

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Bacas vir nequis adiese velet ceivis Romanus neve nominus Latini neve socium quisquam.

'Let no man at all, either a Roman citizen or a Latin or an ally, consent to entering a meeting of Bacchic women'.

The suppression of the Bacchanalian cult by the consuls and by the Roman senate in 186 BC is one of the most-discussed episodes in the history of the second century BC.[1] These events offer a rare opportunity to combine a detailed treatment in Livy (39.8–19) with the so-called *Senatus Consultum de Bacchanalibus*, as well as with a growing body of archaeological evidence that illustrates both the extent of the cult and its suppression.[2] However, the relative wealth of information

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[1] The bibliography on the Bacchanalian conspiracy is now vast. The most recent compilation is in Paillier (1988). I have found the following to be most helpful. Méautis (1940); Tierney (1947); Bruhl (1953) 82–116; Festugière (1954); Herrmann (1964) 68–79; Turcan (1972); North (1979); Rousselle (1982); Voisin (1984); Paillier (1986); (1988); Cantarella (1987) 126–8; Montanari (1988) 103–36; Scafuro (1989); Gruen (1990); Bauman (1990); Walsh (1996); Cancik-Lindemaier (1996); Dubourdieu and Lemine (1997); Nippel (1997); Beard, North and Price (1998); Linke (2000) esp. 269–73.

[2] Archaeological evidence is conveniently collected and discussed by Paillier (1988). The discovery at Volsinii of an underground chamber with a Bacchic 'throne', which was destroyed in the second century BC, has been adduced as direct evidence for the suppression of public cult sites; cf. Massa-Pairault and Paillier (1979) and Massa-Pairault (1981). There is also a (contemporary?) destruction layer near where the *S. C. de Bacchanalibus* itself was found; see Paillier (1988) 292. See Menichetti (1995) for the complex Dionysiac imagery on many *ciste* from Praeneste of the fourth and third centuries BC. Note in particular Smith (1998) 842: 'At the same time, the *ciste* give us an insight into the significance of the Dionysiac rites to an élite upper class: not just an excuse to drink and go wild, but a key to a whole complex of ideas that embrace both the entry of men and women into their rightful civic place, and also the ordering of that civic body within the divine ordering. When Rome attacked the Bacchanalia in 186 BC, it struck at more than just a few conspiratorial matrons'. See also now Torelli (1999) 140–4.

about what happened has only served to create controversy over the nature of our sources and over the real meaning of the senate's violent reprisals against cult members throughout Italy. The following brief discussion will focus on the roles both of women and of men in the cult, with particular emphasis on how those roles were defined and targeted by authorities in Rome. My primary goal is to use the *Senatus Consultum de Bacchanalibus* to recover some of the concerns and attitudes of contemporary Romans.[3]

In what follows, gender appears both as a useful category of historical and social analysis for the modern historian and as a prism employed by Romans to view what seemed to them to be the pressing issues of their own day.[4] No previous study has offered a thorough examination of gender roles in the *Senatus Consultum de Bacchanalibus*, although these appear to have been of central concern.[5] The Bacchanalian crisis illustrates transgressions of traditional gender roles and how these roles were viewed and came to be (re)enforced by the consuls and by the senate. My discussion aims at a new appreciation of how gender roles and gender ideology can elucidate the crisis of 186 BC and consequently also various aspects of Roman society during the middle Republic.

The Nature of the Sources

The general character and tendency of our sources for 186 BC can be described in the following way. We have not only a fine example of an original document, but also a historical narrative that is based on documents and on a variety of traditions recorded in earlier his-

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[3] *CIL* 1^2.581 = *ILLRP* 511 = *ILS* 18, discovered at Tiriolo in Bruttium in 1640. Wachter (1987) 289–98 discusses the archaic language and the mistakes that were made in transcribing the text. See also Martina (1998) for an attempt to recreate the oral aspects of the original letter as it would have been read aloud.

[4] For gender as a tool of historical and social analysis, see especially MacCormack and Strathern (1980) and Scott (1996). For gender and the Romans, see now Cornell and Lomas (1997) with full bibliography.

[5] Herrmann (1964) 68–79 sees the Bacchic cult as an attempt by women to seize power as part of a larger feminist movement. North (1979) views the introduction of men as a key issue but does not elaborate. The closest to a true analysis based on gender is Cancik-Lindemaier (1996), whose discussion focuses almost exclusively on women in leadership roles rather than as cult members. Her conclusion that a cult led by women could have no real significance in Roman society is not directly supported by any ancient evidence.

torians; both these sources, however, reflect the 'official' version of what happened in 186 BC. Livy's narrative seems to be based on sources close to Sp. Postumius Albinus, the consul of 186 BC, that is to senatorial decrees passed as he presided and also to his propaganda against the cult that did not find its way into any official documents.[6] The senate's letter containing extracts from various decisions (commonly referred to as the *Senatus Consultum de Bacchanalibus*) is clearly the most valuable source because it is contemporary. Yet it obviously tells us only what the senate wanted the locals in Bruttium to find out, either by hearing it read aloud at a market day or by reading it themselves in a conspicuous public location (lines 23, 26–8). The text is short and does not contain a detailed exposition of most of its provisions. We have no source which represents the views of other participants in the drama, let alone the attitudes of any cult members.

Consequently, the search for 'the facts of the case' has been and continues to be a tortuous one. Reconstructions have varied widely, from seeing the cult as a complex network of allied discontent threatening Rome's leadership of Italy, to nothing more than a convenient excuse for the senate to arrogate more power to itself.[7] A few issues seem to stand out, but the rest remain shrouded in mystery. The worship of Dionysus was widespread and ancient in Italy: aspects of initiation are also attested from an early period, especially in Southern Italy and in Campania.[8] The rich archaeological material relating to

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[6] Decrees of the senate are cited by Livy at: 39.14.5–9; 9–10; 17.1–3; 18.7–9; 19. Livy seems to have consulted a dossier of decrees (see Paillier (1988) 162–9). It has long been suspected that Livy's ultimate source is the historian A. Postumius Albinus, consul of 151 BC (cousin of the consul of 186 BC). Note especially the tendency to highlight the role of the consul Postumius at the expense of his colleague Marcius, whose subsequent defeat by the Apuani is made much of at 39.20. For Postumius the annalist (*RE* 31), see Peter (1914) cxxiv–cxxvi and 53–4; van Son (1960) 109–10; Rousselle (1982) 16–19; and Paillier (1988) 146–9 and 597–612. Livy's account will not be discussed in detail here. Rousselle ((1982) 11–15) notes that most of the named characters came from families only important in the early second century BC.

[7] See Pugliese-Caratelli (1965) 24 (quoted with approval by Paillier (1988) 278): 'il culto di Bakchos—come ben videro i patres—rappresentò una forma di resistenza all'egemonia romana e un estremo tentativo di organizzare le forze antiromane in Italia'. Contra Gruen (1990) and Nippel (1997). Cf. Paillier (1988) 455–6: 'Dans la lutte de symboles qui s'était engagée, il faut reconnaître à Postumius et à son entourage une lucidité et une maîtrise exemplaires'.

[8] For the cult of Dionysus in Italy, see Jeanmaire (1951) 453–65; Bruhl (1953); Nilsson (1957); (1975); Rousselle (1982) 20–50. Evidence for an initiation cult is provided especially by a fifth-century graveyard inscription from Cumae (Turcan (1986)).

cults of Dionysus shows that both men and women were involved in Etruria and in the South of Italy.[9] It is, therefore, impossible to accept that the consul Postumius suddenly 'discovered' the cult in Rome in 186 BC.[10] Moreover, Livy's own narrative makes clear that the consuls were assigned this task at the start of the year while other business, including a campaign against the Ligurians, was delayed.[11] This unusual situation in itself demonstrates beyond any reasonable doubt the serious view that the senate adopted towards the issue.

Further confirmation comes from the presence of both consuls in Rome, especially for the drawing up of the final composite document, which we have, by the senate in the Temple of Bellona, and from the reputation and character of the three senior consular witnesses to it.[12] The find-spot of this inscription at Tiriolo, an obscure place in Bruttium, indicates the widespread authority the senate was arrogating to itself in this matter. The employment of a capital charge as the only procedure against future dissenters is striking.[13] Although the *senatus consultum* is prescriptive rather than descriptive, it does

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[9] At Tarentum the whole city participated in the cult (Plato, *De Legibus* 637b; Dio fr. 39.5). For the cult in Etruria, see Bruhl (1953) 70–81; Pairault-Massa (1987); Paillier (1988) 467–521; esp. Colonna (1991).

[10] Note also the frequent and negative stereotyped references to the Bacchic cult in contemporary theatre (see Rousselle (1982) 98–101; Massa-Pairault (1986); Paillier (1988) 229–45; Flower (2000)). The consul Postumius was related to the man who had vowed the Aventine temple of Ceres, Liber, and Libera in the fifth century BC (A. Postumius Albus Regillensis, dict. 496 BC: Livy 2.42.5; Dion. Hal. 6.17.2–4, 94.3; Tac., *Annales* 2.49; *II* 13.3.10 with Bruhl (1953) 30–45). For the Greek style Aventine temple, see now Coarelli in Steinby (1993–2000) 1.260–1 with full references.

[11] Livy 39.20.1–2: the consuls received the armies of their predecessors as well as instructions to levy two new legions and allied reinforcements. Nevertheless, both consuls were in Rome for the passing of the *S. C. de Bacchanalibus* on 7th October (= 11th June of the pre-Julian calendar according to Derow (1973) 350).

[12] On the three consular witnesses to the drawing up of the text, see Rousselle (1982) 52–63 and Bauman (1990).

[13] For the meaning of *res capitalis*, see Plaut., *Mercator* 184; *Trinummus* 962; Afric., *Digesta* 37.1.13. For the legal use of the death penalty, see Mommsen (1899/1955) 911–44, esp. 939; Levy (1963) 331–2; esp. Nippel (1997). Ungern-Sternberg von Pürkel ((1970) 34–6) points out that the death penalty mentioned in the decree applied to future cult members who defied the senate's ban, as opposed to the victims of 186 who were often punished under existing laws. It is unclear what formal or legal right the Roman senate had to impose or to require a capital charge against any cult member throughout Italy at this date. Yet, in practice it is hard to see how inhabitants of Italy, especially humbler ones, could escape a death penalty. According to Livy 39.18.4–6 there were many executions, as well as suicides. For further suppression of cult members by the Roman army in South Italy, see Livy 39.19.1; 23.1–4; 29.8–9; 41.6–7 (184 BC); 40.19.9–11 (182 BC).

reveal the issues that were of central concern to the senate and to the consuls, as well as some of what they hoped to achieve in their bid to control Bacchic religious groups. How successful these measures were is not clear.[14] Consequently, my analysis will concentrate on a close reading of the senate's injunctions against the Bacchic cult.[15]

Gender Roles in the Senatus Consultum de Bacchanalibus

The text that has come down to us does not represent the transcription of a single senatorial decree. Rather, it is a letter, addressed to the allies (*foideratei*), that includes extracts of various decisions made by the senate about the Bacchanalian cult.[16] The last paragraph then gives specific instructions about reading and inscribing the text, about punishing anyone who disobeys its instructions, and about dismantling any Bacchanalian cult site within ten days of receiving the letter. The items listed in the main body of the document probably reflect decisions taken at various previous senatorial meetings. The senate meeting of the Nones of October 186 BC in the Temple of Bellona when both consuls presided may, therefore, have been specially called to draw up this document for circulation in Italy. The document consists of extracted rulings on separate issues without any articulation between them. There is no title, no *relatio*, nor is there a record of the senate's rationale for these several actions.[17] Consequently, there has been considerable debate both about the logical connection between the various sections and about the precise meaning of individual clauses.[18]

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[14] The Bacchic cult clearly flourished at Rome later in the Empire, as is demonstrated by the great inscription of Torre Nova, see Scheid (1986).

[15] See attached text and translation.

[16] Contra Galsterer ((1976) 169), who takes *foideratei* as a reference to the cult members themselves as a group, rather than to Rome's allies. However, allies and Latins clearly do appear in line 7.

[17] A comparison can now be made between the *S. C. de Bacchanalibus* and the newly discovered *S. C. de Cn. Pisone patre* (Eck, Caballos, and Fernández (1996)). The latter presents extracts from a number of senatorial decrees put together for circulation to the provinces. The difference in tone reveals a striking contrast between the simplicity of the second century BC as opposed to the volubility of language and thought to be found in the Tiberian senate. The *S. C. de Cn. Pisone patre* can also suggest something of the character of the thanks voted to Postumius (Livy 39.14.5).

[18] Tierney (1947) remains the closest reading of the text.

It is notable that the term *Bacanal*, as used here, refers on three occasions specifically to the cult sites, which were presumably used by the sect for rituals and for initiations.[19] Perhaps, therefore, the introductory rubric also refers to cult sites rather than to specific rites. The Bacchic cult sites appear prominently at the beginning and end of the document in a striking pattern akin to ring composition. It is these locales that are the special target of the senate, and which serve as symbols for the activities that take place in them. The reason for this apparent repetition is that the first clause includes possible future sites, whereas the last one gives precise instructions about what to do with existing cult buildings.

Another striking feature of the rulings is that elaborate exceptions are presented to a number of injunctions. This inevitably creates a surprising effect, especially through the fourfold repetition, within the short text, of the same conditions for seeking an exception. On the one hand, the limitations imposed on cult activities were stringent, wide ranging, and were enforced by capital sanctions; on the other hand, exceptions were available in many cases. The impression is of a mixed message. The precise import of the exceptions is hard for us to grasp, but they were probably designed for ancient cults under the direction of local élites who would be in a position, partly through ties of patronage, to present a case for an exception to the senate through the urban praetor.[20] Meanwhile, the exceptions do not affect every clause. Rather, they seem to apply only to the ban immediately adjacent to each exception.[21] This explains why the exception clauses are repeated, rather than simply having one general exception clause that applies to the whole text.

It has been suggested that the clauses appear in a specific order that relates to the order in which exceptions would be applied for by a person who wished to continue maintaining a Bacchic cult.[22]

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[19] Lls. 3, 4 and 28, cf. Paillier (1986).

[20] One may assume, for example, that someone like Laris Pulenas of Tarquinii, who was a priest of Bacchus, would have been in a good position to apply for such an exception, since he was a local magistrate. See also the monumental sarcophagus of a Bacchic priestess from Tarquinia, now in the British Museum (Bruhl (1953) 70–81; Paillier (1988) 467–521; Colonna (1991) 121–2 date these Etruscan tombs to very different periods from the mid-fourth century to the 180s BC). A temple of Dionysus and Ariadne escaped destruction and was discovered at S. Abbondio near Pompeii; see Elia and Pugliese Carratelli (1975).

[21] So Tierney (1947) 92.

[22] So Paillier (1986).

In other words, first permission would be sought for the maintenance of a cult site (*Bacanal*), next for a man to approach a meeting of Bacchic women (*Bacae*), etc. Such an explanation does not seem compelling, particularly in light of the fact that some items are subject to an absolute ban while others are open to exceptions. Rather, I would argue that what permeates the decree is a concern for particular, sometimes local cult forms and a preoccupation with gender roles, as some cult activities are suppressed, others allowed under certain circumstances, and still others are tolerated or even sanctioned, albeit without being openly endorsed. It is essential to gain a clear idea of what was still permissable and what was not legal under any circumstances.

The following six items appear subject to an absolute ban under the terms of this decree:

No man is to be a priest in the cult (line 10).
No man or woman is to be an official (*magister*) (lines 10–11).
No funds are to be held in common (line 11).
No person is to appoint either a man or a woman as an official or to act in place of an official (*pro magistratu*) (lines 12–13).
No oaths or promises are to be exchanged (lines. 13–14).
No secret rituals are to be performed (line 15).

Consequently, the absolute bans apply to men as priests, to secret rituals, and to the formal structure of cult groups that appear to have been organized somewhat like *collegia* or like priestly colleges of the state religion.[23]

Meanwhile, the following four things *could* happen if special permission from the senate had first been obtained by the urban praetor, at a meeting where at least a hundred senators were present:

A place of worship can be maintained (lines 3–4).
A man can enter a meeting of Bacchic women (*Bacae*) (lines 7–9).
Some cult activities can take place (lines 15–18).
Mixed groups of men and women with more than five participants can meet (lines 19–22).

What the decree does not enunciate, but which is equally interesting for us, are the practices still allowed *without* asking for special permission. Here again opinions have differed, although most modern

[23] For *collegia* in general, see de Robertis (1955) and (1971) and Linderski (1995). See Linke (2000) 272–3 for the political significance of cult structures.

commentators have not addressed this issue at all.[24] It seems clear that women could still be priests (*sacerdos*), while men could not under any circumstances. Similarly, the limitation on the size and composition of cult groups only applies to groups that are composed of both men and women meeting together. Such mixed groups are envisaged as being small (5) and as consisting of a majority of women (3), while presumably also being led by a female priest. In other words, a priestess in charge of a mixed group could, without obtaining special permission, have up to two men and two women in her group. This leaves open the question of what, if any, restrictions were placed on groups exclusively composed of women.

That such groups of women were known to the senate is made evident by the second clause of the text whereby a man is forbidden to enter a meeting of the 'Bacchic women' (*Bacae*) without special permission from Rome.[25] The text itself, therefore, presupposes that groups of women, led by a female priest, will indeed continue to meet, although perhaps not often at a formal cult site (*Bacanal*), since most of these will have been destroyed. Such female groups call to mind the Bacchae of Greece, whose rites were associated with open spaces and especially with mountains.[26] The senate's decree, in fact, recognizes and confirms traditional cultic roles for women both as priestesses and also as worshippers of Bacchus.[27]

In this context it is relevant to consider what previous contact Romans had had with initiation cults. The Bacchic cult might be mistaken for the first initiation cult to reach Rome were it not for the scattered evidence we have for an initiation cult of Demeter and

[24] Cancik-Lindemaier (1996) is the only treatment to address the issue of women as a separate question, but she concentrates on the priestesses. Paillier (1988) at 166–7 assumes a return to an original all female cult, but at 189 sees the new cult as reduced to tightly controlled small groups and as only existing outside the city of Rome. Beard, North, and Price (1998) 96 and 213 seem unclear about whether women are specially targeted or not.

[25] Lines 7–10. Tierney ((1947) 93) simply raises the question of all female cult groups but does not pursue it.

[26] For female cults of Dionysus in the Greek world, see: des Bouvrie (1977); Henrichs (1978); (1984); Kraemer (1979); (1992); Zeitlin (1982); Chirassi Colombo (1991) esp. 349–52.

[27] Note other roles for women in the cult of Dionysus/Liber: see Varro, *De Lingua Latina* 6.14 for the old women who sold cakes at the *Liberalia* and *Antiquitates rerum humanarum et divinarum* 16.42 for the month long rites of Liber involving married women at Lavinium.

Persephone/Kore that is attested during the Second Punic War.[28] It is relevant to note that this cult was exclusively for women and was organized by a Greek priestess from Campania according to Greek rituals. The priestess was summoned from Campania and became a Roman citizen; she was actually the only professional female priest of a public cult in Rome except for the Vestal Virgins. It seems, therefore, that the Romans had accepted an initiation cult led by a female priest as part of their state religion at some point during the third century BC.[29] This cult was associated with two members of the Aventine triad (Ceres, Liber, Libera) and was restricted to women. The exact nature of the cult is not directly attested, but it seems to have been analogous, at least in part, to Thesmophoric rites common for women in many Greek cities.[30] These rites traditionally took place in the public spaces of the city. They included ceremonies with torches at night, which reenacted Demeter's search for her daughter Persephone who had been abducted by Dis, lord of the Underworld. The conclusion of the rituals was concerned with the reuniting of mother and daughter, the acceptance by both of the marriage, and the attendant return of fertility to the earth.[31]

Such rituals reenacted and symbolized a variety of meanings for a *polis*, notably invocations of the fertility of the earth and of marriage. At the same time, such women's rituals have often been interpreted as reinforcing traditional roles for women in society, namely, the roles of married woman (*matrona*) or of maiden (*virgo*).[32] The myth of Demeter and Kore represents the transition between these two

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[28] Cic., *De Legibus* 2.21; *Pro Balbo* 55; *In Verrem* 4.114–5, 5.187; Livy 22.56.4–5; Festus 86L and 268L; Val. Max. 1.1.1, 1.1.15; Plut., *Fabius Maximus* 18.1–2; Serv., *In Vergilium Commentarius* 4.609; Arnob., *Adversus Nationes* 2.73; *ILS* 3342, 3343. Cf. le Bonniec (1958) 379–455; Paillier (1988) 409–65; Spaeth (1996) 11–16, 59–62, 103–13; Beard, North, and Price (1998) 70.

[29] The cult is first mentioned in 216 BC in connection with the Roman defeat at Cannae, but it seemed well established as part of the state religion at the time. Le Bonniec ((1958) 389–92) dates the introduction of the cult to the period of Livy's lost second decade (293–219) and suggests 226 BC as a plausible context. However, it is also possible that the cult is much older, perhaps even as old as the Aventine temple itself.

[30] See le Bonniec (1958) 379, 396, 400–23; Spaeth (1996) 13–16 with plate 13, which depicts a painting from Pompeii showing Ceres perhaps dressed as an initiate.

[31] Le Bonniec (1958) 408–9 sees the Roman *sacrum anniversarium Cereris* as a festival associated with the first fruits of the new harvest in the mid-summer.

[32] See especially Zeitlin (1982) and Spaeth (1996) 13 and 113. Ceres appears as both liminal and normative.

states as a traumatic one, while at the same time promising ultimate reconciliation between mother and daughter, wife and husband, and women and society as a whole. It is possible that the senate viewed these rites as integral to the maintenance of proper roles for women in their society. Innovations, especially unauthorized ones, that might undermine or compete with such public rites could have been interpreted as threatening and sinister.

The connection, if any, between the initiation cult of Ceres and that of Bacchus in Rome at this period remains obscure. However, the acceptance of an initiation cult of Demeter/Kore as part of Rome's state religion before the events of 186 BC can help to suggest some of what happened then. The new initiation cult of Bacchus, which had been introduced to Rome without official sanction, could be seen as a threat not only to the traditional cult of Liber (the Roman Dionysus), but also to the rites of the other two members of the Aventine triad.[33] One especially visible aspect of this threat seems to have been the introduction of men into the initiation cult, a type of cult that the Romans and many Greeks had previously associated with women only.[34]

In the senate's letter men are treated very differently from women. It is notable that they are banned from any leadership role, whether as a priest or as a *magister*, without any possible exceptions. Consequently, the spheres of men and of women were specifically defined by the senate as being separate. Where cult groups continued to exist, they were envisaged as either all or mostly female and as organized by women. The entrance of men into these female spheres was now carefully controlled and circumscribed by new laws. The circumstances and ways in which men and women met appear to have been especially charged and controversial. We may imagine that such a situation arose partly because of fears and rumors that surrounded the secret

[33] See especially Rousselle (1982) 104–8.

[34] Specifically Cic., *De Legibus* 2.37: *Ad nostra igitur revertor quibus profecto diligentissime sanciendum est, ut mulierum famam multorum oculis lux clara custodiet. initienturque eo ritu Cereri quo Romae initiantur quo in genere severitatem maiorum senatus vetus auctoritas de Bacchanalibus et consulum exercitu adhibito quaestio animadversioque declarat* ('Therefore I return to our own laws. It is certainly necessary to take the greatest care (by means of the laws) so that a clear light and the eyes of many should guard the reputation of our women. Initiations should be performed with those rites of Ceres which are used for initiations at Rome. The strict standards of our ancestors in this kind of matter is revealed by the ancient decree about the Bacchanalia and by the investigation and punitive expedition of the consuls with their specially commissioned military forces').

initiation rites of the Bacchic cult. However, the senate's decisions also reflect traditional Roman thinking about how and when unrelated men and women should interact, especially in a cult setting.

To sum up, the senate targeted two areas that seemed to them to be unacceptable, namely: men in women's spheres or roles *and (at the same time)* formal organizations that endowed private cult associations with some of the trappings of the priestly colleges of the state religion. Yet both these areas are treated in the same document in sections that interlock with each other. In 186 BC the issues were not separated, perhaps because they were not perceived as being clearly distinct. Male was being defined in relation to female at the same time as public cult was being defined in relation to private religious groups. Meanwhile the decree begins and ends with a focus on the Bacchic cult locations, which emerge as secret spaces where men and women have been meeting and interacting in unacceptable ways.

Many discussions of women's roles in 186 BC have concluded that women's growing influence was being curbed by the senate.[35] The interpretation offered here argues against such a view. Rather, a close reading of the senate's words suggests that it was men who were being targeted as they entered spheres traditionally associated with women, took leadership roles there, and introduced organizational structures that were adapted from public cults and from other organizations overseen by men. Women's traditional roles of leadership were not questioned by the senate. New leadership roles for women within the evolving structure of cells were legislated against, so that a woman could not be a *magister* or act *pro magistratu*. These very injunctions suggest that women's agency and authority were in evidence and were, at least to some extent, taken for granted. In other words, the senate did not appear concerned with women's power as such, but with occasions when women were sharing power with men in non-traditional mixed groups, or when such power was manifested in forms that were traditionally male (*magister, magistratus*).

It has become a truism of contemporary historical analysis that gender identity and gender roles are 'constructed' categories, which is to say that they are artificially created by each society to meet its own needs.[36] The *Senatus Consultum de Bacchanalibus* offers a rare glimpse

[35] Paillier ((1988) 523–96) summarizes the views of many earlier scholars, on the growing influence of mothers. Most recently, see Hänninen (1998).

[36] For definitions of gender roles see, e.g.: Scott (1996); Ortner (1996); Hays-Gilpin and Whitley (1998) xv; Conkey and Spector (1998).

of an instance where one can actually observe a society, in this case Rome of the second century BC, enforcing and (re)constructing traditional gender roles for both sexes at a time of great social and cultural change. Similarly, it has become a truism of recent discussions that the events of 186 BC really concerned the evolving powers of the senate as it arrogated extraordinary and extralegal rights to arrest, to question, and to execute both Roman citizens and others.[37] Yet this expansion of the senate's political and judicial role was explicitly cast in terms of the regulation of gender roles in society. The senate boosted its own power by putting men and women 'in their proper places'. In this context, traditional gender roles were equated with social stability and were associated closely with the senate's expanding authority in Italy.

Meanwhile, Livy's account suggests that gender intersects here, as so often, with concerns about ethnicity.[38] The Bacchic cult groups represented a foreign influence which had been introduced to Rome, and several of the principal leaders arrested by the authorities were not Romans.[39] The *Senatus Consultum de Bacchanalibus* also makes reference to persons of varying ethnic backgrounds, namely, Roman citizens, Latins, and allies. No man in any of these three categories is to enter a meeting of Bacchic women without permission from the senate (lines 7–8). Other clauses do not specify citizenship status or ethnic origin. Slaves are not explicitly included in any clauses, nor are foreigners who are not allies (e.g., visiting merchants from outside Italy). It seems evident that the *urbs* mentioned in line 16 is primarily a reference to the city of Rome, which presumably demonstrates that many clauses were originally addressed to its inhabitants.

There can be little doubt that Roman society in general was undergoing changes in the second century BC that led to increased stratification between rich and poor, as well as to many more foreigners living in Rome.[40] Traditional Romans feared the changes

[37] See especially Gruen (1990) 72–5 for the expanding powers of the senate and Nippel (1997) for the possible reasons behind the violent suppression of the cult.

[38] Much has been made of the mixing of social classes in modern scholarship (e.g., Bruhl (1953) 107; Gallini (1970); Beard, North, and Price (1998) 94). The ancient sources do not stress this aspect.

[39] See Beard, North, and Price (1998) 91, on the importance of the boundary between Roman and foreign in the religious developments of the third and second centuries BC.

[40] See Livy 39.3.4–5 for the expulsion of allies from Rome in 187 BC with Paillier (1988) 247–8.

that were the inevitable result of a vast increase in wealth from war booty and of new and sustained contact with the sophisticated Hellenistic cultures of the East. Consequently, it is all the more interesting that in 186 BC, anxieties should have expressed themselves publicly in terms of a desire to (re)enforce traditional Roman gender roles. Such roles were apparently regarded as encapsulating Rome's own values and her particular way of life.

Conclusions

The growth of the Bacchanalian cult in Rome and its violent suppression throughout Italy during the 180s present a variety of complex phenomena that we are not in a position to understand fully. For reasons that remain obscure, the senate chose this moment to suppress the mixed form of the Bacchic initiation cult, apparently with the result of significant loss of life. The sources we have tell us more about the fears, prejudices, and aspirations of Rome's senatorial élite than about 'what actually happened'. However, the detailed information in the *Senatus Consultum de Bacchanalibus* also provides a wealth of evidence about gender roles and gender expectations in the second century BC. As at other times in Roman history, great social changes, especially in material resources and in the political and cultural aspirations of the propertied classes, led to corresponding changes in the way men and women interacted with each other. The leaders of Roman society saw the role of women as central to the way their society functioned. Women's cults had been areas of significant innovation for over a generation before 186.[41] The prospect of an even faster rate of change, and the evidence that radical departures from traditional practices were being privately introduced by outsiders, led to a serious crisis.

The background to the events of 186 BC can provide new insights into the way Romans were expected to behave. In our ancient sources we can detect a concern for the socially acceptable behavior of both sexes. In Roman society, well-established roles and expectations for

[41] Livy 25.1.6–12 records the suppression of new women's cults in 213 BC. Beard, North, and Price ((1998) 91) are surely incorrect in claiming that this was an early example of the Bacchanalian cult. Palmer ((1997) 120–9) gives a much more convincing account of the third century context here.

men and women created safe spaces for them to meet and to interact. The Bacchanalian cult re-articulated the rules of the game and the gendered function of space by setting up new and potentially dangerous areas of interaction and hierarchies. Yet no ancient source speaks of this danger as being specific for women; both sexes took risks when they abandoned traditional behavior patterns, and it was the new role of men that appeared to have been especially controversial in the eyes of the senate. Women's influence and agency were not openly questioned in 186 BC as they had been in other years.[42] Rather, women appeared as natural leaders of and participants in all female cult groups.

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[42] For example, the debate in 195 BC over the repeal of the *lex Oppia*, which limited displays of wealth by Roman women (Livy 34.1ff.; Val. Max. 9.1.13; *de viris illustribus* 47; Oros. 4.20.5; Zon. 9.17.1). Contra Paillier ((1988) 595–6), who sees the Bacchants of 186 BC as confirming the worst fears of conservatives like Cato that women would gain too much power. But note also the words about secret societies ascribed to Cato by Livy (34.2.4): *ab nullo genere non summum periculum est si coetus et concilia et secretas consultationes esse sinas* ('There is no group (of people) which does not pose the greatest danger if you allow them meetings and associations and secret consultations').

Appendix: Senatus consultum de Bacchanalibus

[Q.] Marcius L. f., S(p). Postumius L. f. cos. senatum consoluerunt n(onis) Octob. apud aedem

Duelonai. Sc(ribendo) arf(uerunt) M. Claudi(us) M. f., L. Valeri(us) P. f., Q. Minuci(us) C. f. De Bacanalibus, quei foideratei

esent, ita exdeicendum censuere: 'Neiquis eorum [B]acanal habuise velet; sei ques

esent, quei sibei deicerent necesus ese Bacanal habere, eeis utei ad pr. urbanum

Romam venirent, deque eeis rebus, ubei eorum v[e]r[b]a audita esent, utei senatus

noster decerneret, dum ne minus senatoribus C adesent [quom e]a res cosoleretur.

Bacas vir nequis adiese velet ceivis Romanus neve nominus Latini neve socium

quisquam, nisei pr. urbanum adiesent, isque [d]e senatuos sententiad, dum ne

minus senatoribus C adesent quom ea res cosoleretur, iousiset. Ce[n]suere.

Sacerdos nequis vir eset; magister neque vir neque mulier quisquam eset;

neve pecuniam quisquam eorum comoine[m h]abuise ve[l]et; neve magistratum,

neve pro magistratu[d], neque virum [neque mul]ierem quiquam fecise velet;

neve post hac inter sed conioura [se nev]e comvovise neve conspondise

neve conpromesise velet, neve quisquam fidem inter sed dedise velet.

Sacra in [o]quoltod ne quisquam fecise velet; neve in poplicod neve in

preivatod neve extrad urbem sacra quisquam fecise velet, nisei

pr. urbanum adieset, isque de senatuos sententiad, dum ne minus

senatoribus C adesent quom ea res cosoleretur, iousiset. Censuere.

Homines plous V oinvorsei virei atque mulieres sacra ne quisquam
fecise velet, neve inter ibei virei plous duobus, mulieribus plous tribus
arfuise velent, nisei de pr. urbani senatuosque sententiad, utei suprad
scriptum est. Haice utei in coventionid exdeicatis ne minus trinum
noundinum, senatuosque sententiam utei scientes esetis,—eorum
sententia ita fuit: 'sei ques esent, quei arvorsum ead fecisent, quam suprad
scriptum est, eeis rem caputalem faciendam censuere'—atque utei
hoce in tabolam ahenam inceideretis, ita senatus aiquom censuit,
uteique eam figier ioubeatis, ubei facilumed gnoscier potisit; atque
utei ea Bacanalia, sei qua sunt, exstrad quam sei quid ibei sacri est,
ita utei suprad scriptum est, in diebus X, quibus vobeis tabelai datai
erunt, faciatis utei dismota sient. In agro Teurano.

Senatorial Recommendation about the Bacchic Cult Sites (Rites?)

The consuls Quintus Marcius, son of Lucius, (and) Spurius Postumius, son of Lucius, consulted the senate on the 7th of October in the Temple of Bellona. Marcus Claudius, son of Marcus, Lucius Valerius, son of Publius, Quintus Minucius, son of Gaius, were present at the drafting (of this text). Concerning the Bacchic cult sites (rites?) it was their considered opinion that the following should be declared to those who were allies (of Rome):

Let none of them be disposed to maintain a Bacchic cult site. If there are some who declare that it is necessary for them to have a Bacchic cult site, let them come to Rome to the urban praetor, and when their arguments about these matters have been heard, let our senate decide, as long as no fewer than 100 senators are present when this matter is discussed.

Let no man at all, either a Roman citizen, or a Latin, or any ally, consent to entering a meeting of Bacchic women, unless he approaches the urban praetor and the latter gives permission on the basis of the senate's recommendation, as long as no fewer than 100 senators are present when this issue is debated. They declared (their approval).

Let no man be a priest, let no man or woman whatsoever be an official, let none of them consent to having money in a common fund, let no one consent to appointing either a man or a woman as an official or an acting official, henceforth let them not be disposed to exchange oaths or pledges or pacts or promises amongst each other, nor let anyone consent to make a contract amongst themselves.

Let no one consent to performing cult rituals in secret. Let no one consent to performing cult rituals either in public or in private or outside the city unless he approaches the urban praetor and the latter gives permission on the basis of the senate's recommendation, as long as no fewer than 100 senators are present when this issue is debated. They declared (their approval).

Let no more than a total of 5 individuals, men and women, consent to perform cult rituals, nor should there be more than two men or more than three women present, unless by authority of the urban praetor and by decision of the senate, as is written above.

You should read this (document) aloud at a public meeting on at least three market days, so that you may know about the senate's judgment. This was their declared judgment: If there are any who act against that which is written above, they judge that these people

should be subject to a capital penalty. And the senate considered it right and proper that you should inscribe this on a bronze tablet and that you should order it to be posted where it can most easily be read, and that those Bacchic cult sites, excepting if there are any in which there is something sacred, in accordance with what is written above, should be dismantled within 10 days of these tablets being delivered to you. In the Teuranian territory.

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DATING AND ARRANGING THE ROMAN HISTORY OF VALERIUS ANTIAS[1]

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One of Livy's most curious annalistic predecessors is Valerius Antias. Despite a relative abundance of fragments (66 in Peter) modern scholarship has failed to offer definitive answers to two fundamental questions concerning this writer of Roman history: when did he write, and what was the book arrangement of his work.[2]

Antias' last datable fragment (F 64 = Pliny, *Naturalis historia* 34.14) concerns the death of the orator L. Licinius Crassus in 91 BC. Velleius Paterculus (2.9.6) groups together as contemporaries the historians Valerius Antias, L. Cornelius Sisenna (died 67 BC), and Claudius Quadrigarius. Consequently, many scholars have concluded that Antias wrote during and following Sulla's dictatorship ca. 85–60 BC.[3] Antias is therefore often termed a 'Sullan annalist'. On the other hand, by pointing out Velleius' demonstrable inaccuracy in matters of literary history, as well as Cicero's failure to mention Antias among other Roman historians in *De Legibus* 1.6–7 (published in 52 BC), J.D. Cloud and T.P. Wiseman have dated Antias' historical writing to the late 50s and 40s BC.[4] To be sure, Velleius' testimony is of little use in supporting an earlier date for Antias' literary activity. Similarly, although plausible, the Ciceronian *argumentum e silentio* is by no means watertight in establishing a later *floruit*. In my view a passage in Livy allows us to determine the relative chronology of Licinius Macer, Valerius Antias, and Aelius Tubero; and by using other ancient

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[1] This essay originated in an oral presentation in ancient history and classical studies at the University of Pennsylvania in April of 1985. Since John Graham at that time was chairman of the Department of Classical Studies, was interested in having me present this work, and was responsible for making the arrangements for the presentation, I am very pleased to be offering this particular essay to his Festschrift. All fragments refer to those in Peter (1914).

[2] Two early attempts to solve the problem of the book arrangement are Münzer (1897) and Holzapfel (1900); cf. Volkmann (1943).

[3] E.g., Ogilvie (1965) 12–13; Drews (1988) 294; Oakley (1997) 89 n. 250.

[4] Cloud (1977) 225–7; Wiseman (1979) 113ff.

evidence concerning the literary activity of Macer and Tubero we can arrive at a better approximation as to when Antias wrote.

Concerning the names and status of the eponymous magistrates for 434 BC, Livy (4.23.1–3) writes:

> I find in Licinius Macer that the same consuls were reelected for the following year, Julius for the third time and Verginius for the second time. Valerius Antias and Q. Tubero give M. Manlius and Q. Sulpicius as the consuls for that year. But in such a discrepant report both Tubero and Macer cite the Linen Books as their authorities. Neither hides the fact that it was recorded by ancient writers that there were military tribunes in that year. Licinius without a doubt prefers to follow the Linen Books. Tubero is unsure of the truth. Among other things shrouded by the passage of time let this also lie in uncertainty.[5]

With the aid of two other data we can unravel the complex Roman historiography surrounding the eponymous magistrates of 434 BC so tersely summarized here by Livy. First, for the same year Diodorus (12.53.1) records three military tribunes with consular power: M. Manlius, Q. Sulpicius Praetextatus, and Ser. Cornelius Cossus. Second, Licinius Macer appears to have been the only ancient author to discover and make direct use of linen books in the temple of Juno Moneta that recorded the names of early magistrates (see Livy 4.7.12). Thus, Tubero would have known of the Linen Books only through his use of Macer.

It seems likely that before Macer used information from the Linen Books to revise the names and status of the eponymous magistrates of 434 BC, the ancient tradition was unanimous in recording the three consular tribunes as found in Diodorus. Macer, however, replaced these three officials with the consuls of the previous year who, he asserted, had been reelected. Both Antias and Tubero accepted Macer's revision in having consuls rather than military tribunes for this year, but instead of naming the consuls of the previous year, they asserted that the consuls of 434 BC had been M. Manlius and Q. Sulpicius. Since these latter names are the first two of the

[5] Livy 4.23.1–3: Eosdem consules insequenti anno refectos, Iulium tertium, Verginium iterum, apud Macrum Licinium invenio. Valerius Antias et Q. Tubero M. Manlium et Q. Sulpicium consules in eum annum edunt. (2) Ceterum in tam discrepanti editione et Tubero et Macer Libros Linteos auctores profitentur. Neuter tribunos militum eo anno fuisse traditum a scriptoribus antiquis dissimulat. (3) Licinio Libros haud dubie sequi Linteos placet. Tubero incertus veri est. Sit inter cetera vetustate cooperta hoc quoque in incerto positum.

three military tribunes recorded by Diodorus, it is obvious that either Antias or Tubero combined the older historical tradition of three military tribunes together with Macer's revision involving consuls. Moreover, since Tubero agreed with Antias in this matter but also invoked the Linen Books together with Macer while still remaining unsure of the truth, it is reasonable to suppose that Antias was responsible for conflating the older tradition together with Macer's revision to form a new 'compromise' position, and that Tubero, writing after Antias, attempted to side with both Macer and Antias. Thus, this passage tells us that Antias wrote his account of the year 434 BC after that of Macer and before that of Tubero.

Licinius Macer was plebeian tribune in 73 and praetor in 68 BC. After governing a province in 67, he returned to Rome in 66 and was prosecuted for maladministration, but before a verdict was reached, Macer committed suicide (Val. Max. 9.12.7, cf. Plut., *Cicero* 9.2).[6] Since Livy cites Macer only throughout his first decade, it seems likely that Macer's history was never completed due to his sudden death. Consequently, the work was probably published either in stages beginning not much before his death in 66 BC or posthumously in its entirety shortly thereafter. We may therefore regard 66 BC as an approximate *terminus post quem* for Antias' account of the year 434 BC.

A passage of the *Roman Antiquities* of Dionysius of Halicarnassus offers an approximate *terminus post quem* for the historical writing of Aelius Tubero. In setting forth the traditional story of Rome's foundation, Dionysius (1.80.1–2) records Tubero's account of how Remus was captured by the royal herdsmen of Alba Longa. According to Tubero, while Romulus and Remus and their associates were celebrating the Lupercalia, the Alban herdsmen laid an ambush for them as they ran about the Palatine in three bands. During republican times the *luperci* consisted of two groups, the Fabiani and Quinctiales, who took their names from the patrician clans of the Fabii and Quinctii (Ovid, *Fasti* 2.359–80, Festus 78L, and 308L). But in 45/44 BC the senate instituted a third band, the *luperci Iuliani* to honor Julius Caesar (Suet., *Divus Iulius* 76.1). It therefore seems likely that Tubero's account of Rome's foundation was not written any earlier than the last year of Caesar's autocracy. Moreover, as is evident

[6] For Macer's public career, including his political oratory as preserved by Sallust, see Walt (1997) 1–31.

from Livy's citation of Tubero in 10.9.10, Tubero was Livy's predecessor at least with respect to the early republic; and since Livy seems to have begun writing shortly after the battle of Actium in 31 BC,[7] Tubero's historical writing on the early republic is likely to have been completed before about 30 BC. Thus, the approximate chronological limits for Antias' account of the year 434 BC are after 66 but before 45 BC. Nevertheless, since we cannot be sure about the precise publication and composition dates respectively of Macer's and Tubero's accounts, these limits should perhaps be slightly extended back to ca. 70 and down to ca. 40 BC. Consequently, rather than classifying Antias as a Sullan annalist, he may be more correctly termed a writer of the Ciceronian age, and Tubero can be regarded as a historian who wrote primarily during the triumviral period.

These observations roughly agree with conclusions recently reached by T.P. Wiseman concerning Antias' literary activity.[8] Wiseman has argued plausibly that P. Valerius Publicola's role in uncovering the conspiracy of the Vitellii and Aquillii in the first year of the republic as recorded by Dionysius (5.7) and Plutarch (*Publicola* 4–6) has been influenced by Cicero's apprehension of the Catilinarian conspirators in early December of 63 BC and derives from Valerius Antias. Similarly, Wiseman conjectures that Cicero's allusion (*Brutus* 54, published in 46 BC) to the first secession of the plebs involving M'. Valerius Maximus rather than Agrippa Menenius as the peacemaker was a variant concocted by Valerius Antias. If so, Antias' account of the first few years of the republic would have been written at some time after December of 63 but before 46 BC.

One final consideration needs to be adduced regarding Antias' *floruit*. F's 61 and 62 of Antias are brief enigmatic verbatim quotations respectively from his 74th and 75th books. Since these two fragments with their book citations are not preserved by a single author in a single passage but come to us from two different ancient writers, Priscian and Aulus Gellius, we may be confident in concluding that these numerals are accurate and testify to the great length of Antias' historical narrative. Indeed, as will emerge from the remainder of this essay, at least in terms of book numbers Antias' account of Roman affairs down through the Hannibalic War was

[7] On this point see Luce (1965) 209–40.
[8] Wiseman (1998) 75–89.

significantly longer than Livy's narrative. As a result, in considering the date of Antias' literary activity we should probably allow 25–30 years for the completion of the entire work, which might not have gone beyond the Social War or Sulla's dictatorship.

Having established the approximate date of Antias' literary activity, we may now turn to the book arrangement of his work. Of his 66 surviving fragments, only eleven (5–6, 8, 14–16, 57–8, and 60–2) contain book citations. Since modern scholars have not always agreed about the historical contexts of some of these fragments or have regarded some book numbers as corrupt, different hypotheses have been proposed to explain Antias' book arrangement, but none has been satisfactory. All these attempts have failed because they have been based upon an erroneous assumption concerning one particular fragment whose context seems obvious but is not actually so. When this is realized and the proper context is understood, all pieces of the puzzle fall neatly into place. But before taking up this issue, we will first examine the more certain fragments and then proceed to the less certain ones.

Three fragments (5–6 and 8) contain citations of Book 2 and concern Numa Pompilius, thus indicating that Antias' second book dealt with at least part of the regal period. The *Origo Gentis Romanae* 19.1–4 cites his first book concerning the Alban royal brothers Amulius and Numitor. Given the expansive scale of Antias' treatment, his first two books might have resembled those of Dionysius: the first one ending with the story of Romulus and Remus, and the second one describing the reigns of Romulus and Numa. F 60 (= Gell. 6.9.9) reads as follows:

> Valerius Antias also in the 45th book of his annals has written *peposci* rather than *poposci*: 'Finally, the plebeian tribune Licinius announced the day of his trial for *perduellio* and requested from the praetor M. Marcius a day for the assembly'.[9]

All manuscripts agree on the reading 'XLV' for the book number. The Marcii were quite prominent during republican times but rarely used the *praenomen* Marcus. In fact, the only known praetor named M. Marcius was M. Marcius Ralla, the urban praetor of 204 BC

[9] 'Peposci' quoque, non 'poposci', Valerius Antias libro annalium XLV scriptum reliquit: 'denique Licinius tribunus plebi perduellionis ei diem dixit et comitiis diem a M. Marcio praetore peposcit'.

(Livy 29.11.11+13.2). From Livy 29.22.7–9 we learn that in 204 BC certain unnamed plebeian tribunes brought before the people the criminal case involving Q. Pleminius, who as Scipio Africanus' prefect of Locri in southern Italy had committed atrocities against the Greek community. Livy says that several assemblies were held to consider the case, but before a verdict was reached, Pleminius died in prison. Livy does not specify with what crime Pleminius was charged, but given the gravity of his offenses committed during wartime he certainly could have been accused of *perduellio* as in F 60 of Antias. We may therefore conclude that Antias treated the year 204 BC in his 45th book. F 62 of Antias (= Gell 6.9.17) reads as follows:

> Valerius Antias has written the following words in the 75th book of his histories: 'then after arranging the funeral he came down to the Forum'.[10]

Since Gellius is here simply interested in Antias' use of the verb form *descendidit* in place of *descendit*, he has given us a highly abbreviated fragment whose context is difficult to ascertain. Peter assigned the fragment to 118 BC and suggested that it pertained to an event recorded by Valerius Maximus in 5.10.3 concerning how the consul Q. Marcius Rex conducted his only son's funeral and then proceeded straight to the curia to preside over the senate. Although the correspondence between F 62 of Antias and Val. Max. 5.10.3 is not entirely certain, Peter's conjecture is plausible, and the notion that Antias covered 118 BC in his 75th book accords well with other evidence. For one thing, F 61 of Antias, preserved by the late grammarian Priscian and citing Book 74, simply reads: 'All sacrificial victims, twenty-seven calves, were procured there, and they all thus matured'.[11] Although the precise context of this fragment is difficult to determine, these twenty-seven sacrificial victims should be associated with a ritual for purifying the city of Rome following civil bloodshed or inauspicious death and involving a procession and chorus of twenty-seven maidens. In his *Book of Prodigies*, Julius Obsequens records the performance of this purificatory ceremony only for the years 133, 120, 117, 99, 97, and 92 BC. Thus, Books 74 and 75 of Antias could have contained the events of 120 and 118 BC respectively.

We now come to the most problematic fragment. F 57 of Antias (= Gell. 6.9.12) reads as follows:

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[10] Valerius Antias in libro historiarum LXXV verba haec scripsit: 'deinde funere locato ad Forum descendidit'.

[11] 'Eo omnes hostiae, vituli viginti et septem, coniecti; et ita omnia adulta sunt'.

> The same Probus (a grammarian of the early empire) has noted that Valerius Antias in the 22nd book of his Histories has written *spepon-derant*, and he has recorded his words as follows: 'Tiberius Gracchus who had been quaestor for C. Mancinus in Spain, and the others who had guaranteed the peace'.[12]

Once again Gellius is simply interested in a peculiar verb form and has thus given us a quotation of an incomplete sentence, but the historical context appears to be obvious: the conclusion of a peace between C. Hostilius Mancinus and the Numantines in Spain in 137 BC or its political fallout in Rome in the next year. Modern scholars have assumed so but have been puzzled by the citation of Antias' 22nd book. In fact, it is this particular fragment that has made the book arrangement of Antias' history a hitherto unsolved problem. Although the fragment's context seems obvious, its wording and resemblance to Livy 9.5.4 may suggest otherwise. If the quotation had been taken from Antias' account of 137 BC, the first relative clause or at least the phrase 'in Hispania' would be unnecessary since Antias should have already mentioned Gracchus as Mancinus' quaestor. Moreover, if for some reason Antias had not yet mentioned Gracchus, he would not have needed to specify 'in Hispania' since his readers should have known that. Yet, Antias' wording could result from the fact that it derives from his narrative of 136 BC concerning the debate in Rome over the validity or wisdom of the agreement. This could account for Antias' use of the pluperfect rather than the perfect tense in 'speponderant'. On the other hand, since we have already seen that other book citations indicate that Antias treated 204 BC in his 45th book and 120 and 118 BC in his 74th and 75th books, the citation of his 22nd book should point to a context of the late fourth or early third century BC. If so, the pleonastic wording 'in Hispania' might suggest that this quotation does not derive from the presumed context of 137/36 BC but from an excursus.

There is only one obvious possibility for such a context: the Caudine peace of 321 BC, almost 200 years before the Mancinus affair. Thus, the fragment's book number 'XXII' should be accepted as accurate, but the context should be taken as 321 rather than 137/36 BC. Antias' reference to Gracchus and others who had sworn to uphold the agreement with the Numantines in connection with the Caudine

[12] Idem Probus Valerium Antiatem libro historiarum XXII 'speponderant' scripsisse adnotavit verbaque eius haec posuit: 'Tiberius Gracchus, qui quaestor C. Mancino in Hispania fuerat, et ceteri qui pacem speponderant'.

peace of 321 BC is perfectly intelligible as soon as one realizes how closely interrelated these two treaties were in the ancient historical tradition. The two events were supposed to have been identical in that they involved the entrapment of a Roman army, the conclusion of a treaty with the enemy by the Roman commander(s) in the field, the senate's or Roman people's repudiation of the agreement, and the ceremonial handing-over of a former consul to the enemy in order to absolve the Roman state from the legal and/or religious guilt of bad faith.[13] Indeed, the two events are so closely parallel that it is virtually certain that the Caudine peace was a later fabrication patterned after the Mancinus affair. Livy's account of the Caudine peace in 9.5 clearly indicates that ancient authors disagreed concerning the repudiation. He notes that according to Claudius Quadrigarius and popular belief the Romans did indeed make a binding truce or treaty with the Samnites, but then Livy argues against this view in favor of the repudiation. To prove this point he comments, 'the consuls, legates, quaestors, and military tribunes pledged, and the names of all who pledged are extant; they would not be extant there except for those of the two fetials if the issue had been transacted in accordance with a treaty'.[14] Livy's remark so closely resembles the gist of F 57 of Antias that we may suppose that in his own polemical defense of the Caudine peace's repudiation (probably directed against his immediate predecessor Claudius Quadrigarius) Antias adduced the later parallel of the Mancinus affair. Thus, F 57 reveals that Antias covered 321 BC in his 22nd book.

In his discussion of papyrus, Pliny (*Naturalis historia* 13.84–7) adduces the discovery in 181 BC of Numa's books buried in a chest on the Janiculum as evidence of papyrus' durability and that the Romans were familiar with this writing material from very early times. Pliny regarded these books of Numa as authentic, but they were clearly forgeries and probably had been deliberately buried and then 'discovered' by members of the recently suppressed Bacchanalian cult in Rome in an attempt to have their religious literature validated

[13] Ancient passages which group these two events together are Cic., *De Officiis* 3.109; Vell. Pat. 2.1.15; Plut., *Tiberius Gracchus* 7.2; Appian, *Iberica* 83. For the numismatic evidence of the late second century BC bearing on these two interrelated events, see Crawford (1973). For the Mancinus affair itself, see Rosenstein (1986).

[14] Livy 9.5.4: spoponderunt consules, legati, quaestores, tribuni militum, nominaque omnium qui spoponderunt exstant; ubi, si ex foedere acta res esset, praeterquam duorum fetialium non exstarent.

through association with the pontifical law of Rome's pious king. In any case, Pliny first quotes and paraphrases Cassius Hemina's account of the books' discovery in 181 BC, after which he gives other variants as follows:

> In the first book of his commentaries the former censor Piso records the same thing, but he says that there were seven books of pontifical law and an equal number of Pythagorean books. Tuditanus says that there were fourteen books of Numa's decrees. Varro himself in the— book of his *Human Antiquities*... seven books. In his second book Antias says that there were twelve pontifical books in Latin and an equal number of Greek books containing philosophical precepts. In his third book he even quotes the senate's decree in which it was decided that they be burned.[15]

Cassius Hemina treated this curious incident under 181 BC, whereas Piso recorded it in his account of the regal period in reference to Numa's death and burial. The latter obviously applies to Pliny's first citation of Antias and his second book: for, as indicated by two other fragments (5 = Macrob., *Saturnalia* 1.13.7; 6 = Arnobius 5.1), Antias narrated Numa's reign in his second book. But Pliny also cites Antias' third book for the senatorial decree ordering Numa's alleged books to be burned. It seems unlikely that Antias would have divided his treatment of this episode over two books. Given the heavy concentration of numbers in this short passage and the fact that the Varronian citation is lacunose for this very reason, we are justified in suspecting that the 'tertio' in Pliny's second citation of Antias is likewise defective. I wish to propose that the correct citation was to Antias' 53d book; that the book number 'LIII' was first misread and miscopied as 'l. III = libro III' and then was simply written as 'tertio'; and that Antias recorded the discovery and burning of Numa's books in his 53d book under 181 BC. Antias' double treatment of this matter in reference to both Numa's death and 181 BC is borne out by two other fragments. Plutarch (*Numa* 22.2–5 = F 7) cites Antias concerning Numa's death and burial with his alleged books, whereas

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[15] Pliny, *Naturalis historia* 13.87: Hoc idem tradit Piso Censorius primo commentariorum, sed libros septem iuris pontificii, totidem Pythagoricos fuisse; Tuditanus XIIII Numae decretorum fuisse; ipse Varro Humanarum Antiquitatum . . . VII, Antias secundo libros fuisse XII pontificales Latinos, totidem Graecos praecepta philosophiae continentes; idem tertio et s. c. ponit quo comburi eos placuerit. For further discussion of this passage, including the interpretation of book numbers and citations, see Forsythe (1994) 207–15 and 456–8.

Livy (40.29.8 = F 9) cites Antias for the books' Pythagorean character in the context of 181 BC and the books' burning on order of the senate as mentioned in Pliny's second reference to Antias.

The preceding analysis has produced seven book citations with probable historical contexts. They are set out below in a short table along with the corresponding Livian book numbers and the difference between the book numbers of these two authors.

Date	*Antias*	*Livy*	*Difference*
Amulius	*1*	*1*	*0*
Numa	*2*	*1*	*1*
321	*22*	*9*	*13*
204	*45*	*29*	*16*
181	*53*	*40*	*13*
120	*74*	*61*	*13*
118	*75*	*62*	*13*

These figures offer interesting data concerning the literary expansion of Roman history during the late republic. Down through the Hannibalic War Antias filled significantly more books than Livy, and most of this difference apparently came in reference to early Rome. By 321 BC Antias had written 22 books as opposed to only nine for Livy. Then for the years 321–204 BC Antias used only three more books than Livy. Their scale of treatment for the second century BC was apparently roughly equivalent in terms of books written. Moreover, Antias' book arrangement seems to have resembled that of Cn. Gellius, the first Roman historian who wrote a greatly expanded history of early Rome. According to Macrobius (*Saturnalia* 1.16.21), he described 389 BC in his 15th book, whereas Livy did so at the beginning of his sixth book, a difference of nine books. F 26 shows that an incident of 216 BC was covered in Cn. Gellius' 33d book as opposed to Livy's 23d book, a difference of ten books. For the sake of argument, if Gellius' treatment of the period 389–216 BC had been uniform, he would have described the Caudine peace of 321 BC in his 21st or 22nd book, which agrees exactly with my postulated context of Antias F 57 and his 22nd book. The literary expansion of early Roman history as indicated by the book citations

in the fragments of Cn. Gellius and Valerius Antias is likely to have been achieved through fictitious speeches and battle narratives. In fact, the *Roman Antiquities* of Dionysius of Halicarnassus, which treats early Roman history far more expansively than Livy's first decade, probably reflects this historiographical phenomenon.

Two episodes, one the product of Cn. Gellius and the other of Valerius Antias, may serve to illustrate how these writers succeeded in composing such expansive narratives on early Rome. Livy (1.12–3) and Plutarch (*Romulus* 18–19) give roughly the same account of the battle in the Forum between the Romans under Romulus and the Sabines commanded by T. Tatius, and how the captured Sabine women intervened on their own accord to end the fighting; but Dionysius' account (2.41–47) is far longer and very different. Rather than recording a single battle and the women's intercession as occurring on a single day, Dionysius describes a series of skirmishes and battles spread over a period of about three days, which includes how the Sabine women first appealed to the senate for permission to send a peace delegation to the Sabine army in order to negotiate a settlement, and how they were allowed to choose some of their group to go to their kinsmen to plead their case before King T. Tatius. There can be no doubt but that these chapters of Dionysius are well padded with his own professional rhetoric, but the basic scheme of events is not the work of Dionysius but of his source, Cn. Gellius. F's 12–15 of the latter show that he treated this episode at the end of his second and the beginning of his third books, and that the Sabine Hersilia was portrayed as addressing King T. Tatius. The peculiar arrangement of splitting these events between two different books only makes sense if Cn. Gellius, like Dionysius, spread this episode over several days rather than confining it into one as found in Livy and Plutarch. F's 12–13 come from Gellius' second book. F 13 clearly concerns this event: 'there was now a large number of children from the carried-off women (= *multitudo puerorum iam erat ex raptabus*)'. F 12, the two-word, verbatim quotation 'deabus supplicans', as Peter supposed, probably comes from Hersilia's speech to the senate. F's 14–15 derive from Gellius' third book, and F 15 is taken from Hersilia's address to T. Tatius. F 14, a verbatim quotation taken from some speech concerned with women, must derive from the same passage: 'in other respects take counsel for the few women (= *capite in aliis paucabus consilium*)'. Thus, Gellius' second book must have ended with the Sabine women making their appeal to

the senate, and the third book opened with Hersilia's speech before T. Tatius (cf. Dion. Hal. 2.45). This elaborate scheme replete with several battles and speeches was doubtless the creation of Cn. Gellius himself and accords well with what we can surmise concerning the expansive nature of his historical writing.

Livy cites Valerius Antias for the very first time at 3.5.12–13 concerning exaggerated and overly precise military losses of the Romans and Aequians resulting from two battles fought in 464 BC. Since Livy's account of this year in 3.4–5 involves the appointment of a L. Valerius as prefect of the city in the absence of both consuls and gives a prominent role to Antium, Antias' presumed hometown, we are well justified in suspecting that Antias was Livy's principal source for this portion of his narrative. Despite Livy's characteristic verbal economy (cf. Dion. Hal. 9.62–6), his recording of numerous fictitious circumstantial details offers us a glimpse into how Antias further developed and embellished the work of his predecessors. While L. Valerius watches over Rome, the consul Postumius guards Roman territory from Aequian raids, and the other consul Furius encounters the enemy among the Hernicans. But when Furius is besieged in his camp by the far more numerous forces of the Aequians and their allies, the senate declares a state of emergency by passing a *senatus consultum ultimum*, and one of the consuls of the previous year, T. Quinctius Capitolinus, has his *imperium* prorogued and is given the task of rescuing Furius and his army. Both the s.c.u. and the prorogation are obvious anachronistic fictions, which would have given a writer such as Antias an opportunity to compose deliberative speeches appropriate for a debate in the senate. Moreover, the motif of a Quinctius coming to the rescue of a besieged consul and his army is clearly a fictitious duplication of the more famous tale of the dictator Quinctius Cincinnatus rescuing L. Minucius and his army besieged in their camp by the Aequians six years later in 458 BC (Livy 3.26–9). This motif's application to the events of 464 BC would have permitted Antias to engage in a dramatic and detailed narration of military operations. Livy (3.5.12–13) ends his account of the campaigning of this year as follows:

> In such an ancient matter it is difficult to assert credibly with precise numbers how many fought and fell. Yet Valerius Antias dares to imagine the sums: 5800 Romans fell in Hernican territory, and of the Aequian raiders who roamed about plundering in Roman territory 2400 were slain by the consul A. Postumius; and that another force, while driving

> off plunder, encountered Quinctius and was destroyed in a quite uneven slaughter, resulting in the deaths of four thousand and (by pursuing his computation with subtlety) he says, two hundred and thirty.[16]

Three chapters later at 3.8.10 for the year 462 BC, Livy cites unnamed sources ('in quibusdam annalibus') for even more precise figures involving a supposed Roman crushing defeat of the Volscians: 13,470 enemy dead, 1750 taken alive, and 27 military standards captured from the enemy.

In conclusion, although modern scholars have long recognized the outrageous mendacity of Valerius Antias, the evidence for this trait has come almost entirely from Livy's later books concerning the much better documented events of the middle republic. In contrast, the foregoing analysis of Antias' book arrangement offers new and important information about Antias' expansive narrative of early Roman history. The evidence resulting from this new interpretation agrees with and nicely complements our limited information concerning the historical writing of Cn. Gellius and thus sheds new and interesting light on the literary expansion of early Roman history by these two authors of the late republic. This in turn should make even more essential a critical approach to Livy's first decade and to the *Roman Antiquities* of Dionysius of Halicarnassus.

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[16] Livy 3.5.12–13: Difficile ad fidem est in tam antiqua re quot pugnaverint ceciderintque exacto adfirmare numero. Audet tamen Antias Valerius concipere summas: (13) Romanos cecidisse in Hernico quinque milia octingentos; ex praedatoribus Aequorum qui populabundi in finibus Romanis vagabantur ab A. Postumio consule duo milia et quadringentos caesos; ceteram multitudinem praedam agentem quae inciderit in Quinctium nequaquam pari defunctam esse caede; interfecta inde quattuor milia et, exsequendo subtiliter numerum, ducentos ait et triginta.

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THE REGULATION OF INTER-COMMUNITY RELATIONS IN THE PROVINCES AND THE POLITICAL INTEGRATION OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE (27 BC–AD 238)

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Introduction

The Roman empire comprised a territory of ca. 5 million sq. kilometres and a population conventionally estimated at ca. 60 million inhabitants. The most striking feature of its history from the first emperor down to 238 was its long-term stability. Explanation of this stability is the primordial question that all historians of the empire have to confront. Many interlocking answers can be, and have been, given to this question. For example, emphasis can be placed on the long-term economic integration of the Mediterranean basin under Roman rule or on the symbolic integration of the empire as expressed in the imperial cult or on the social integration of provincial elites through the spread of Roman citizenship and the upward mobility of those elites into the imperial aristocracy constituted by the senatorial and equestrian orders.

At the level of political explanation, three sets of institutional arrangements are normally emphasized as factors that served both to underpin the stability of the imperial state and to integrate its constituent communities. First, and no doubt most importantly, the Roman state operated a relatively sophisticated and successful system of taxation that funded the empire's massive standing armies. The regular payment of taxes was the most obvious and routine expression of provincial subjects' subjection to the imperial state.[1] The specific procedures whereby taxes were assessed and collected were dependent on the active cooperation of local elites and consequently also served to integrate them into the wider imperial system of rule. Second, social order was underpinned by mechanisms of criminal and civil jurisdiction

[1] On this central topic see the excellent accounts of Brunt (1990) esp. chs. 7, 15, and 17, and Eck (1995–98) 2.132–45.

that also depended on the active cooperation of local elites with the agents of Roman power. Third, although the Roman state devolved to each civic community the political regulation of their inhabitants and territory, this regulation was exercised under the discretionary power and, for some purposes, the normative control of provincial governors.[2]

Within the realm of political explanation, this essay constitutes an attempt to emphasise a fourth aspect, namely, the authoritative regulation in the provinces of relations between civic communities. Such powers of authoritative regulation lay solely in the hands of the imperial state and its agents, normally the provincial governor. Provincial governors acted as the routine source of legitimate authority for the resolution of disputes (e.g., over territorial boundaries) and sometimes as the source of specific corporate privileges (e.g., the right to hold markets). They also operated as the legitimate forum of adjudication when privileges allocated by the political center (the emperor and senate) were contested.

The essay is divided into two parts. The first part examines the regulation of inter-community relations by provincial governors via the resolution of disputes that arose primarily out of the circumstances of the routine of everyday political and material existence. The second part examines the regulation and enforcement by provincial governors of a variety of corporate privileges allocated to provincial communities by the imperial state.

The Resolution of Disputes

The routine circumstances of the political and material life of provincial cities entailed the possibility of both cooperation and conflict. By definition, provincial cities, especially neighboring ones, possessed mutual interests and close socio-economic links that were grounded, for example, in local trade and commerce, ties of marriage and friendship, grants of local citizenship to individual outsiders, the distribution of property ownership across civic boundaries and shared religious customs and festivals. Some provincial notables possessed interests and influence that extended well beyond their home cities.[3]

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[2] See now Burton (1998) 7–24.

[3] For a *locus classicus*, see *TAM* 2.905 for the honours voted to the Lycian mag-

If there was a lack of suitable persons in any city to act as *tutores*, local magistrates had the duty to discover suitable candidates in neighboring cities and to send their names to the provincial governor who possessed the power of appointment.[4] In the eastern provinces, especially in Asia Minor, harmonious relations or their restoration were publicly advertised by claims of concord (*homonoia*), especially via the medium of civic coinage.[5] We can safely assume that in general relations of cooperation rather than conflict were the norm, since the provinces of the empire did not collapse into a state of endemic *anomie*. However when conflicts occurred which could not be resolved by informal negotiation between the parties, the provincial governor acted as the authoritative mechanism for their resolution.[6]

The most significant type of tension between communities was constituted by conflicts over their territorial boundaries.[7] Within a province each civic community possessed fixed and publicly recognized territorial boundaries. Imperial estates and extra-territorial private estates also had formal boundaries that demarcated them from the territories of civic communities. This system of territorially based attribution of land and people had far reaching consequences. First, it underpinned the exercise of public authority by the imperial state, above all in the fiscal sphere. For example provincial subjects in their census returns were expected to define their taxable property by stating the *civitas* and *pagus* in which it was situated.[8] Similarly the requisitioning of transport and supplies (*vehiculatio*) for the use of accredited imperial officials and soldiers was predicated on the allocation of responsibilities to individual communities within the boundaries of their territories; or, again, the tax law for the portoria of

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nate Opramoas during the reigns of Hadrian and Antoninus Pius; compare now how leading notables of Perge were honoured there with statues erected by other cities (*IvPerge* 40–3 and 179).

[4] Digest 26.5.24; cf. 27.8.1.10.

[5] On *homonoia*, see best the lucid exposition of Jones (1978) 83–94.

[6] Very little is directly known about informal negotiation intended either to prevent open conflict or to preempt recourse to the Roman authorities except in the civic speeches of Dio Chrysostom, especially *Orationes* 34 (Tarsus and Mallus) and 40–1 (Prusa and Apamea).

[7] See Jacques and Scheid (1990) 161–7; Eck (1995–98) 1.355–63. My discussion in the text summarizes some of the main points of Burton (2000) 195–215, which also includes a *catalogue raisonné* of known adjudications of territorial disputes by provincial governors and/or other officials.

[8] Digest 50.15.4.pr.; also cf. *P. Yadin* no. 16 (a copy of the census return of Babatha in Arabia in 127).

Asia takes it as given that each civic community was territorially delimited.[9] Second, the routine exercise of public authority by the executives of each civic community was geographically limited to their territory and inhabitants. So the municipal charter of Irni defined the jurisdictional powers of its local magistrates as valid 'within its boundaries'.[10] Analogously the ability of civic authorities to levy local indirect taxes on the import and export of goods presupposed the existence of recognized boundaries. Third, the extent and demarcation of territory carried social and economic consequences. Praise of a city's territory was a stock ingredient of contemporary panegyric. As one orator noted, there could be no better index of the power of the city of Apamea in Phrygia than the size of its tax burden, a corollary of the extent and fertility of its territory.[11] Economically the territory of a city was a key factor in the establishment of a regular food supply for the urban center and in its overall prosperity.

Given the far-reaching ramifications of territorial disputes for both the imperial state and the provincial communities, the resolution of those disputes constitutes the best attested type of authoritative decision made in the provinces by agents of the imperial state.[12] Such resolution normally entailed formal hearings before the provincial governor and the attendance of representatives of the relevant communities. The decisions of governors included detailed topographical descriptions of boundaries, copies of which were deposited in civic archives and, sometimes, publicly inscribed. On occasion provincial governors personally inspected the disputed territory and sometimes—perhaps frequently—they enlisted the aid of soldiers or surveyors in the implementation of their decisions (probably especially for the erection of boundary markers).[13] The combination of the intrinsic political importance of these disputes, of the possible outbreak of violence, and of the complex and time-consuming procedures for their resolution help to explain another unusual characteristic, namely, the appointment of special imperial legates of senatorial rank as alternative agents of authoritative adjudication.[14]

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[9] For requisitioning, see esp. *AE* (1976) 653 with the rich commentary of Mitchell (1976) 106–31; *portoria* of Asia: *SEG* 39.1180 lines 35, 42 and 93–5.

[10] *Lex Irnitana*, ch. 84; cf. chs. 29, 76, and 83 (*AE* (1986) 333).

[11] Dio Chrysostom, *Oratio* 35.13–14 with the comments of Jones (1978) 65ff.

[12] At least 88 such decisions are attested from 21 provinces.

[13] For all these procedural aspects see Burton (2000) 212–15.

[14] Violence: *ILS* 5947 (Sardinia, 67–9); Josephus, *Antiquitates Judaicae* 20.2–4 (Judaea,

Finally, what did not happen is instructive. For example, provincial councils are never recorded as having any autonomous adjudicatory role in the resolution of territorial disputes.[15] Similarly the practice of third-party interstate arbitration, so well known in the Greek east in the Hellenistic period, completely disappears in the principate.[16] In short, the imperial state and its agents maintained a monopoly of the authoritative resolution of territorial disputes.

The precise origins of the majority of territorial disputes are not known, since the surviving testimony often merely records the formal act of delimitation. However, when some indication survives, the material interests (such as material responsibilities to the imperial state, the levying of local indirect taxes, rights of pasturage) of the rival communities frequently surface as the proximate causes of dispute.[17] Analogously most of our other, again often exiguous, evidence for the resolution of inter-community disputes by provincial governors concerns conflict over the access to and the control over material resources. Thus during the reign of Severus Alexander, a governor of Thrace was honored at Perinthus for establishing good relations (*homonoia*) between Perinthus and Cyzicus (in the province of Asia). Since the statue in honor of the governor was erected at Perinthus by a magistrate of Cyzicus who was responsible for its corn supply, it is almost certain that the governor had resolved problems pertaining to the export of grain from Perinthus to Cyzicus.[18] Analogous problems concerning the marketing and supply of grain were probably adjudicated in two imperial letters, one of Severus and Caracalla and one of Caracalla alone, to the island of Syros which refer to earlier instructions of proconsuls of Asia.[19] In Lycia-Pamphylia in the course of the second century a long-running dispute

44). Special legates: see, e.g., the decisions of C. Avidius Nigrinus who during the reign of Trajan adjudicated the boundaries of Delphi (*FD* 3.4, 3.290–5). In Roman administrative practice the appointment of special imperial legates of senatorial rank to perform specified tasks in the provinces was generally rare; Thomasson (1991) 73–84.

[15] The only example of the active involvement of a provincial council occurs in a dispute between Cierium and Metropolis (*IG* 9.2.261) in which the legitimacy of its decision depended on the prior delegation of the dispute by the provincial governor and on his subsequent confirmation.

[16] For this phenomenon, see the overview of Marshall (1980) 626–61.

[17] E.g., Dunant and Pouilloux no. 186 (Philippi and Thasos; responsibilities for *vehiculatio*); *SEG* 37.124 (Kaunos and Kalynda; customs duties); Oliver (1989) nos. 113–14 (Orchomenos and Thisbe; rights of pasturage).

[18] *IGRom* 1 797 with the percipient commentary of Robert (1969–90) 6.291ff.

[19] Oliver (1989) nos. 258–9.

between the cities of Kaunos and Kalynda over the issues of access to harbor facilities and the levying of local taxes had led to a series of rulings by provincial governors.[20] Material disputes over the right to levy local taxes, in this case indirect taxes on the right to pasture in another city's territory, also surface in the dossier of imperial letters (of Hadrian and Antoninus Pius) concerning long-running rivalries between Coronea on the one hand and Orchomenos and Thisbe on the other. On two occasions the emperors note that the proconsuls of Achaea will enforce their relevant decisions. Very similar material issues, crops and cattle, underlay the violent dispute between Oea and Lepcis that was finally resolved in 70 by the legate of III Augusta.[21]

At a lower social level, even village communities could attempt to bring their grievances to the governor's tribunal for resolution, especially if they were able to mobilize the help of socially influential intermediaries. A rare example from a western province, Gallia Narbonensis, concerns the village of Lucretius in the territory (*fines*) of Arles. The villagers honored a freedman and *sevir* of Arles who had for many years pursued their grievances with successive governors and, finally, taken their case at his own expense to Antoninus Pius at Rome. His persistence was successful, since the emperor confirmed the village's privileges (*beneficia*), among which was the free use of baths that they had enjoyed for more than forty years until recently being deprived.[22] From the eastern half of the empire the petition of the villagers of Scaptopara, in the territory of the city of Pautalia in western Thrace, to the emperor Gordian III in 238 provides a *locus classicus*.[23] The village was both endowed with hot springs, which made it a popular resort because of their recuperative powers, and also situated within two miles of the site of regular fairs, of which the most important was held for fifteen days in early October and possessed tax-exempt status. Because of these factors, soldiers and private visitors to the fairs, so the villagers claimed, often descended

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[20] *SEG* 37.1234. Compare the dispute between Myra and the Lycian league over the attribution of local customs duties (Oliver (1989) no. 125), though the adjudicatory official letter is acephalous and may have emanated either from an emperor or a provincial governor.

[21] Coronea: Oliver (1989) nos. 108–18; Oea and Lepcis: Tacitus, *Histories* 4.50. This dispute may provide the background to the subsequent delimitation of their boundaries in 74 (*AE* (1979) 648–9).

[22] *ILS* 6988; perhaps compare *TAM* 5.2 974: two villages in the territory of Thyateira honour a local notable who had successfully represented them before an unspecified authority.

[23] *AE* (1994) 1552 (an improved version of *IGBulg* 4 2236).

on the village and demanded lodgings and other services from the villagers without recompense. Or, as the representative of Pautalia claimed on their behalf before the governor of Thrace, the apparent assets of the village had been converted into liabilities. Although the villagers grudgingly accepted that they were obliged to tolerate visits, presumably prompted by the recuperative properties of the springs, by the holders of power such as the governor and provincial procurator, they had frequently appealed to previous governors to prevent the depredations of passing soldiers and private visitors from the fairs. Although these governors had issued instructions, in accordance with their imperial *mandata*, to protect the village from such depredations, these instructions had had only a temporary effect. Consequently the villagers appealed to the emperor for protection. Unfortunately for the villagers, but illuminatingly for us, the brief imperial prescript merely referred them back to the incumbent governor on the grounds that 'this kind of complaint you ought to bring before the governor's court and to seek there a settlement about the matters you allege'.

The presumption that provincial governors should normally adjudicate disputes of this character also surfaces in the account of proceedings brought before Caracalla by peasants, described as the Gohareni, who were associated with the village of Thelsea.[24] A famous temple of Zeus Hypsistos, which attracted large numbers of visitors from neighboring areas, was located in the territory of Thelsea, some forty kilometers east of Damascus. The Gohareni were in dispute with an individual whom they claimed usurped the priesthood of the temple and its attendant privileges, such as immunity from taxation and liturgies. The fortuitous presence of the emperor in Syria had allowed the villagers to present various petitions to him at Antioch in May 216. Although the substance and context of the dispute remain in detail unclear, the record of the preliminary procedural discussion before the emperor is particularly pertinent. The defendant's advocate claimed that the case should be heard in the first instance by the provincial governor; the case should only come to the emperor on appeal from the governor's decision.[25]

[24] *SEG* 17.759; for recent discussion, see: Millar (1993) 318–19; Crook (1995) 91–5 with literature.

[25] A second lacunose inscription from the same temple probably records an analogous dispute heard before a Roman official; see *SEG* 43.1028 with Millar (1993) 319–20.

Given the relative paucity of the documentation set out in the preceding paragraphs, strongly grounded inferences are necessarily hard to make.[26] However, two reasonably clear aspects of this documentation deserve emphasis. First, as in the example of territorial disputes, there are no extant contrary examples of institutional mechanisms other than the provincial governor (such as the provincial council or third-party arbitration) employed to resolve disputes that arose out of competition for and conflict over locally generated resources. Second, not only civic communities but even lower ranking village communities had recourse to the governor's tribunal which, as the examples of Scaptopara and Goharia show, was explicitly assumed to be the proper legitimate institution for the resolution of such disputes in the first instance.

The final type of regulatory decision that needs discussion in this section concerns the establishment of periodic markets.[27] Despite the relatively wide-ranging autonomy of provincial communities in making decisions and regulations that were binding on their own inhabitants and territory, the power to establish new periodic markets in the provinces lay with the provincial governor.[28] A variety of possible consequences of the establishment of new markets helps to explain the regulatory role of provincial governors. Markets encouraged influxes of visitors (customers, itinerant tradesmen), had fiscal consequences for the local community and the imperial state (via the grant of tax-exemptions), and, above all, impinged on and modified pre-existing patterns of economic and social relations.[29]

These possibilities and the role of provincial governors as regulators of inter-community relations are very clearly expressed in two documents that recount the procedural stages whereby new rural markets were formally established in the province of Asia. For exam-

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[26] I have discussed all the relevant cases known to me. Note also *ILabraunda* no. 61: an acephalous inscription of the early third century which records the decision of either an emperor or proconsul in response to a petition of tenants of sacred lands who had complained about infringements of their rights by unspecified individuals/groups.

[27] See in general Nollé (1982) which includes the *editio princeps* of *SEG* 32.1149; now compare Nollé (1999) 93–113.

[28] The only exception is a request to the senate in 138 to allow a Lucilius Africanus to establish a twice-monthly market on his estates in Africa Proconsularis (*CIL* 8.23246), which is best explained by his status as a senator.

[29] For influxes of visitors see for example the petition of Scaptopara (above, note 23) or *SEG* 4.707 (Cyzicus); cf. the comments of Agennius Urbicus, *De controversiis agrorum* 48.13 (Thulin).

ple, in 209 the villagers of Mandragoreis in the territory of Magnesia on the Maeander petitioned the proconsul of Asia as follows:

> Whereas other villages likewise have already petitioned from you and your predecessors the right to hold a market-day. Among these villages the Attukleis, our neighboring village, also have the right three days a month to hold a day-long market namely on the 8th, 18th and 29th of each month. From Attukleis the traders move on to the city itself, the most eminent Magnesia. One day intervenes between the market-day in Attukleis and the civic market-day; and the route of the traders leads necessarily through the village of Mandragoreis. I request, my master, that these intervening and still vacant days, between the market-days in Attukleis and the civic gathering, be given as market-days to Mandragoreis, namely the 9th, 19th and 30th of each month, with no disadvantage accruing either to the city or the most sacred treasury.[30]

In reply the proconsul issued an edict of authorization which emphasized that the petitioners had assured him that their request 'would harm nobody and not interfere with the existing schedule of such periodic markets as were held by others'.[31] A copy of this edict was deposited in the civic archives of Magnesia and the inauguration of the new market was overseen by one of the proconsul's legates.[32]

The Regulation of Centrally Allocated Privileges

The imperial state, in the person of the emperor and to a lesser extent the senate, had at its disposal a wide array of privileges that it allocated to provincial cities and, thereby, profoundly shaped their mutual relations.[33] Besides such fundamental privileges as civic status itself or promotion to the rank of colony or of Latin *municipium*,

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[30] *SEG* 32.1149.1–19. Note that this petition assumes that the granting of market-days was a normal function of proconsuls.

[31] *SEG* 32.1149, lines 30–2; compare the remarks of a proconsul of Asia of 253/54 who granted a monthly market to the village of Tetraprygia 'above all because none of the Maeonian cities holds a market on that day' (*TAM* 5.1 no. 230.13–15).

[32] Compare *SEG* 44.977 (a proconsular edict of 135 in response to a request from a village in the territory of Sardis) for analogous procedural details; for other examples of the authorization of markets by governors, see: *ILS* 6868 (Numidia); *ILAlg* 2.1 3604 (Numidia); *TAM* 5.1 230 (Asia).

[33] For the emperor's role both as a source of privileges and as adjudicator of consequent disputes, see the classic presentation of Millar (1977) 375–456, with which the material in my text can usefully be compared.

the spectrum of available resources ranged from the purely material, such as gifts of money or corn, to the purely ideal, such as the titular rank of first city of a province or the grant of territorial inviolability (*asylia*) to religious sanctuaries. The majority of privileged statuses, of which the most noteworthy were those associated with the imperial cult and the assize-system, had both ideal and material consequences. The grant of the rank of metropolis or temple-warden did not solely enhance the prestige of a city. A metropolis was also the recipient of financial contributions from other cities; these contributions helped to finance the costs of the games and celebrations associated with the imperial cult. In turn these games and celebrations entailed the presence of large numbers of visitors, of representative delegates from other cities and of participants in the games and contests. This periodic influx of visitors had profound effects in the short term on commercial activity and local public finance in the host city.[34] Similarly the status of assize-center entailed the periodic influx of visitors, especially litigants.[35] In short, the institutional arrangements associated with the imperial cult and the assize-system created relations of subordination and superordination among provincial cities. These unequal relations extended to the differential allocation of votes in the provincial council that had overall responsibility for the organization of the imperial cult and to the hierarchical order followed by delegates in processions at provincial festivals.[36]

The mere existence of a wide array of centrally allocated privileges by definition implied competition and rivalry between provincial cities. Not every city could acquire gifts of money or attain the status of assize-center or metropolis.[37] Furthermore the allocation of these resources was not regulated, as far as we know, by systematic and publicly recognized rules; instead, allocation occurred on an *ad*

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[34] In general see the fine account of Price (1984) 126–32; also compare Ligt (1993) 229–34.

[35] See Burton (1975) 92–106, with Dio Chrysostom, *Orationes* 35.15 and 48.11.

[36] E.g., *AE* (1979) 624: the city of Bubon in Lycia is elevated from the category of one-vote city to that of three-votes by a proposal of the Lycian *koinon* approved and confirmed by Commodus; cf. Robert (1977) 64ff. for the claims of Nysa and Magnesia on the Maeander on their civic coinage to be ranked as the 'sixth' and 'seventh' cities of Asia (presumably excluding cities with the status of metropolis or assize-center).

[37] Explicit allusions to failed requests are rare, but note Augustus' refusal of exemption from tribute for Samos (Oliver (1989) no. 1) and Antoninus Pius' negative response to a petition of Berenice to alter the assize-system in Cyrenaica (Oliver (1989) no. 123).

hoc and particularistic basis as cities competed by petitioning the central power via letters, embassies and the intercession of high status intermediaries. Rights and privileges were also precarious. What the central power gave, it could take away. So the *damnatio memoriae* of Heliogabalus caused the revocation of the grant of the status of metropolis to Philadelphia and of the title of temple-warden for the fourth time to Ephesus.[38] Also cities or individuals, especially if they perceived their own interests as adversely affected, might challenge the validity or existence of other cities' privileges. The inherently precarious character of civic privileges helps to explain why cities often petitioned newly elevated emperors for confirmation of existing privileges, even when the new incumbent had issued general edicts that had confirmed the privileges granted by their predecessors.[39] Authenticated copies of favorable imperial decisions were stored in civic archives as evidence in case any privilege was challenged. So, also, the common practice of inscribing favorable imperial decisions on major civic buildings was not only a mechanism for self-advertisement, but also functionally another means of proleptically guaranteeing a city's privileges.[40]

What role then did provincial governors play in the processes whereby such resources and privileges were allocated and regulated? All our evidence shows that all the corporate privileges associated with the imperial cult, such as the status of metropolis or temple-warden, were only in the gift of the central power; even lower-level privileges, such as the voting power of individual communities in the provincial councils, also appear to have been centrally determined. Similarly such privileges as the status of assize-center, the creation of legal associations (*collegia*) or an increase in the numerical size of local councils were also centrally allocated, although the preliminary negotiations involved in these decisions, which are normally hidden from view in our sources, might at some stage have involved the provincial governor.[41] However, once corporate privileges had been

[38] Philadelphia: Oliver (1989) no. 285; Ephesus: Robert (1969–90) 5.388–9.
[39] Millar (1977) 410–20.
[40] On the matrix of motives that might determine the decision to inscribe publicly official documents, now see the valuable discussion of Eck (1995–98) 2.359–81, esp. 365ff.
[41] See Dio Chrysostom, *Oratio*, 45.6, for an allusive reference to the involvement of an unnamed governor in previous attempts by Prusa ad Olympum to gain the status of assize-center.

allocated, the provincial governor had potentially a double regulatory role to play. First, if these privileges were contested or infringed, governors had the formal power of adjudication, whether directly in response to a complaint or indirectly at the behest of the emperor. Second, governors were sometimes petitioned, like emperors, to confirm proleptically pre-existing rights and privileges. Each of these roles can be briefly illustrated, if not particularly adequately or systematically given the lacunose nature of our data.

Both Caesar and Augustus had formally granted to Jewish communities a series of privileges that primarily concerned their right to collect sacred moneys to be remitted to Jerusalem and the legal status, as *collegia*, of synagogues.[42] Thanks to the testimony of Philo and Josephus, a relatively homogeneous set of examples survive of Augustan governors taking measures, normally in response to instructions from Agrippa or Augustus, to protect the rights of Jewish communities of the Diaspora. In 14 BC Agrippa was petitioned by leaders of the Jewish communities of Asia about infringements of their rights. Agrippa issued a general reaffirmation of them; in particular, we know that he wrote a letter to the magistrates of Ephesus that included a reference to another letter to a Roman magistrate that forbade the practice of compelling individual Jews to provide securities to appear at legal hearings on the Sabbath.[43] At a similar date, Agrippa was also petitioned about attempts by the civic authorities of Cyrene to prevent the transmission of sacred moneys to Jerusalem. Agrippa's response quoted an earlier letter of Augustus to the proconsul of Cyrenaica, which had protected Jewish rights in that province.[44] Soon after Agrippa's death further embassies from Jewish communities in Asia and Cyrenaica complained to Augustus about renewed harassment. These complaints triggered another set of instructions to the relevant Roman governors. In consequence the proconsul of Asia, C. Norbanus Flaccus, wrote admonitory letters to the magistrates of Ephesus and Sardis.[45] In the last decade of the first century BC a proconsul of Asia, Iullus Antonius, was petitioned during assize-hearings at Ephesus

[42] On the basic historicity of the privileges recorded by Josephus, see Pucci ben Zeev (1991) 71–91, with earlier literature; also compare the sharp comments of Baltruch ((1998) 218). For general context the lucid account of Smallwood ((1976) 138–43) remains valuable.

[43] General ruling: Josephus, *Antiquitates Judaicae* 16.60–1 and 12.126; Ephesus: *Antiquitates Judaicae* 16.167–8.

[44] Josephus, *Antiquitates Judaicae* 16.169–70.

[45] General instructions: Philo, *Legatio* 40.311ff.; and Josephus, *Antiquitates Judaicae* 16.160–1. Ephesus: Philo, *Legatio* 40.315. Sardis: Josephus, *Antiquitates Judaicae* 16.171.

by Jewish representatives; in response he informed the local authorities of Ephesus of his wish that Jewish rights be respected.[46]

Besides these well-known and unusually well documented examples, a smattering of analogous cases survive, although even the nature of the privileges at issue is sometimes obscure. For example, in 90 Domitian responded favorably to an embassy from Delphi that had complained about a proposal by the Amphictyonic League to alter the traditional arrangements for the celebration of the Pythian games. He also wrote to the proconsul of Achaea who, on Domitian's instructions, wrote a letter of confirmation to Delphi to which was appended a letter to the Amphictyonic League emphasizing the need to respect traditional customs.[47] Similarly in 100/101 Delphi honored a proconsul of Achaea who had carried out decisions of Trajan concerning the rights of Delphi and its sanctuary.[48] In Asia during the reign of Augustus, proconsuls are attested confirming, without prior direction by the emperor, the centrally allocated, but contested, rights of Aezani and Chios.[49] The city of Side at some time in the second century honored a governor of Lycia-Pamphylia as benefactor 'of the city and the sacred *gerousia*' because he had protected the rights of the *gerousia*, as two of his predecessors had done.[50]

The rich epigraphy of Ephesus provides the clearest examples of the diplomatic role of governors as proleptic guarantors of pre-existing privileges. Thus the *gerousia* of Ephesus had acquired from perhaps Caesar and certainly Augustus an impressive array of privileges that included the exemption of members of the *gerousia* from the duty of quartering officials and soldiers, from the liturgy of collecting taxes and the corporate right of the *gerousia* to use its own legal rules in disputes with its debtors.[51] During the reign of Tiberius on three successive years—29/30, 30/31 and 31/32—the *gerousia*, or influential

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[46] Josephus, *Antiquitates Judaicae* 16.172–3. The cause of this petition is not known; it was perhaps an example of the kind of proleptic request discussed below.

[47] Syll.³ 821a (letter of Domitian); 821b and 821c (letters of the proconsul to Delphi and to the Amphictyons).

[48] *FD* 3.4.47.

[49] Aezani: *MAMA* 9.13 (rights, probably of asylum, granted by Augustus); Chios: Sherk (1969) no. 70 (judicial rights based on a *S.C.* of 80 BC and a letter of Augustus); also perhaps see *CIL* 3.282 of 145: a governor of Galatia confirms to a village some advantageous decisions, whose content is unclear, of his predecessors.

[50] Mufid Mansel, Bean and Inan (1956) no. 51 with the elucidation of Robert (1969–90) 5.165–71; since the governor was also, very unusually, described as *ekdikos* of the rights of the *gerousia*, it is probable that these rights had been challenged.

[51] *SEG* 43.757–62 (a series of letters from members of the first imperial family).

individuals acting on its behalf, petitioned the proconsul, P. Petronius, to confirm these privileges.[52] In his replies Petronius noted that these privileges had been granted or confirmed by Augustus and earlier proconsuls. Since this whole dossier of imperial and proconsular correspondence was only publicly inscribed in the second century, it is probable that this diplomatic convention of annual confirmation continued through the first and into the second century.[53] A petition of 88/89 reveals an analogous pattern of annual proconsular confirmation of the rights of those who performed the mysteries and sacrifices for Demeter; in the second century, proconsuls routinely confirmed that certain days were deemed holy.[54] Finally, from a different milieu, the long dossier concerning the fishing rights and revenues of Histria included two letters of provincial governors (issued in response to petitions or embassies from the city) that proleptically guaranteed their rights.[55]

Although the direct evidence we have considered for the provincial governor's role in the regulation of centrally allocated privileges is particularly limited, some reasonably plausible inferences can be drawn. The allocation of ideal and material privileges by the central power always had the potential to create tensions and disputes between civic communities or other corporate groups. Aggrieved parties often, of course, petitioned the emperor for redress; however, petitions to the provincial governor offered an alternative avenue of dispute resolution. Similarly, just as the accession of a new emperor occasioned a flood of diplomatic embassies designed in part to gain confirmation of pre-existing privileges, so provincial communities might petition each new governor to confirm and, thereby, entrench their rights and status.

However, what cannot be inferred is the frequency and incidence of the practices of resolution and regulation outlined in either sec-

[52] *SEG* 43.765–7. These letters are preceded by a brief rubric stating that all governors had 'successively' confirmed the privileges.

[53] The corporate legal rights of the *gerousia* form the context of a letter of Hadrian of 120 (Oliver (1989) no. 71).

[54] Demeter: *IvEphesos* 2.213 (the ceremonies are described as 'preserved over many years by kings, emperors and proconsuls'); holy days: *IvEphesos* 1.24 of 162/63; for closely analogous documentation from Miletus and Sardis, see *IvMilet* no. 360 (of 80/81) and Malay (1999) no. 131 (of 188/89).

[55] *IvScythia Minor* 1.45–6. A final example of proleptic confirmation probably subsists in a letter of a procuratorial governor of Thrace which, in reply to an embassy, confirmed the unspecified rights of Thasos that had been granted by Augustus and confirmed by Claudius (Dunant and Pouilloux (1958) no. 179 and 182).

tion of this essay. Nevertheless, two final evidentiary observations can be made which add some weight to the extant explicit testimony. First, the roles of legal representative (*ekdikos*) and of ambassador to the provincial governor are frequently attested in honorary inscriptions recording the careers of civic notables. Although, almost without exception, the circumstantial detail of these roles is not recorded, some at least of these roles must have concerned inter-community relations.[56] Second, provincial governors were often honored as benefactors by individual cities. Although the nature of their benefactions was frequently left unspoken, some of these undefined services surely concerned either the favorable resolution of inter-community disputes or the formal protection of privileges, which otherwise are unattested in our surviving sources.[57]

Concluding Remarks

The political procedures and decisions surveyed in this essay constituted clear manifestations of the authoritative regulation by agents of the imperial state, routinely the provincial governor, of the material and political relations between the constituent communities of the empire. The frequency and incidence of these procedures and decisions are impossible to recover. However, they represent an aspect of the imperial state's control over its provinces and subjects that is analytically distinct from the political processes normally considered to form the three core aspects of Roman rule, namely, the extraction of surplus resources via taxation in money and kind, the repression of inter-personal conflict, and the devolution of routine local political and administrative functions to individual communities and their local elites. If viewed in the context of the long-term stability of imperial rule, the authoritative regulation of inter-community relations both served to shape and modify the lives of Rome's subjects and to integrate them into the wider system of imperial rule.[58]

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[56] In general, see the overview of Quass (1993) 168–77; for a rare explicit example see *ILS* 9471 in honor of a notable of Alabanda who had acted as its representative 'concerning the restoration of boundaries'.

[57] Compare above, notes 18 and 55.

[58] *Per contra*, note the serious outbreaks of inter-community violence that occurred in 68–9 and 193–7 when the routine authority of the imperial state broke down; on this phenomenon, see Brunt (1990) 79.

It is a pleasure to have been invited to contribute an essay in honor of John Graham who taught me, as an undergraduate, so much about the history of the Roman Empire. I wish to thank the Arts & Humanities Research Board for funding the leave during which this essay was written.

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SECTION TWO

COLONIZATION AND CULT

MYTH INTO CULT: ALEXANDRA/KASSANDRA IN LAKONIA

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It has recently been pointed out that analyzing and discovering the nature and significance of heroines is a difficult task because of the range of functions and roles they are involved in.[1] The fluidity and variability of their identity is reflected even in their names, which often take multiple forms and can change over time.[2] It is particularly difficult to reconcile the mythological with the cultic tradition related to a heroine (as also to a hero) because of the wide range of sources involved and their diverse and often contradictory nature.[3] This contribution focuses on Kassandra, a heroic figure of complex nature, who is both the subject of myth and object of cult in Lakonia. Through a combination of sources, it will be shown that Kassandra constitutes a rare example of a heroic figure whose nature and organization of cult reflected, or even was determined by, her mythical biography.[4] Her name, personality, and cult in Lakonia were based on the panhellenic, epic character of the Trojan princess, the captive and consort of Agamemnon murdered with him.

In the late nineteenth century, an honorary decree was discovered in a garden near the church of Ayia Paraskevi in the modern village of Amyklai in Lakonia (fig. 1).[5] It consists of a marble stele topped with pediment and akroteria and ending at the bottom in a projection for insertion in a socket. The well-preserved stele is divided

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[1] Kearns (1998); Lyons (1997).

[2] Lyons (1997) 51–8; Lyons (1998) 227, 235–6.

[3] Lyons (1997) 29.

[4] Cf. Larson (1995) 61. Kassandra bridges both meanings of the word hero, the 'epic' and the 'cultic' as defined by Nagy ((1979) 114–17, 151–73) and West ((1978) 370–3); cf. Salapata (1997) 257. Whitley ((1995) esp. 52), on the other hand, argues for a range of variation in the nature of heroes between the two extremes of panhellenic figures celebrated in poetry and anonymous figures restricted to certain localities.

[5] Sparta Museum no. 441; height: 1.39 m.; width: 0.84 m.; thickness: 0.15 m.: *IG* 5.1.26; *SIG*[3] 932; Löschcke (1878); Tod and Wace (1906) 5, 65–6, 177, and fig. 54; Stiglitz (1953) 75–7, and fig. 21; Davreux (1942) pl. L, fig. 111; Jones (1987) 122.

into two parts: on the bottom is a long inscription, while on the top there is a relief scene. On the basis of the letters and the relief the stele has been dated to the second or first century BC.[6] The inscription is as follows:

Δογματογράφων Λυσινίκου τοῦ Σωτηρίδα, Νηκλέος | τοῦ Ἀριστοκράτεος, Πασικράτεος τοῦ Πασικλέος | τὸ δοχθὲν ὑπὸ Ἀμυκλαιέων· ἐπεὶ κα[τ]ασταθέντες ἔφοροι εἰς τὸν ἐπὶ Νικέα ἐνιαυτὸν Πασιτέλης || [5] Τετάρτου, Εὔθυμος Λυσικράτεος, Δαμιάδας Δαμιάδα ἀξίως | ἀνεστρέφησαν αὐτῶν τε καὶ τᾶς ἐνχειρισθείσας αὐτοῖς πίσ|τεως ἐμ πᾶσιν ἀκερδῶς καὶ ἡμέρως τὸν ἐνιαυτὸν διεξα|γαγόντες, δεδόχθαι τοῖς Ἀμυκλαιέοις ἐπαινέσαι ἐφόρους | τοὺς περὶ Πασιτέλη ἐπὶ τῷ καλῶς τὰν ἀρχὰν διεξαγνηκέναι· || [10] ποιούντω δὲ αὐτοῖς καὶ ἐπὶ τᾶι προστροπᾶι ἀεὶ μερίδα, ἕως | ἂν ζῶσι, ὅπως ἀ(ε)[ὶ] ἁ ὠβὰ μναμονεύουσα τῶν γεγότων φιλανθρώπων εἰς αὐτὰν ἀποδιδοῦσα φαίνηται τὰς καταξίους | τιμάς· ἐγδόμεν δὲ τοὺς κατασταθέντας στάλαν λιθίναν | εἰς ἂν ἀναγραφήσεται τὸ δόγμα καὶ στᾶσαι εἰς (τ)ὸ ἱερὸν τᾶς || [15] Ἀλεξάνδρας· τὰν δὲ εἰς ταύταν δαπάναν δότω ἁ ὠβὰ καὶ λόγον | ἐνεγκόντω περὶ τᾶς γεγενημένας δαπάνας τοὺς ἐπὶ ταῦτα | κατασταθέντας· ἐπαινέσαι δὲ καὶ τὸν γραμματῆ αὐτῶν | Καλλικλῆ.

When Lysinikos, son of Soteridas, Nekles, son of Aristokrates, Pasikrates, son of Pasikles, were *dogmatographoi* (drafters of decrees), the Amyklaians decided:

Since the *ephors* appointed for the year under Nikias, Pasiteles, (5) son of Tetartos, Euthymos, son of Lysikrates, Damiadas, son of Damiadas, conducted themselves in a worthy manner, fulfilling the trust put in their charge, in all things mildly and without personal gain throughout the year, it was decided by the Amyklaians to praise Pasiteles and his fellow *ephors*, because they have carried out the office well; (10) to make also for them a portion at the *prostropa* on each occasion, for as long as they live, so that always the *oba* may be seen giving in return worthy honors, in remembering those who have done her good services; and let also those appointed publish a stone stele on which the decree will be written and set it up in the sanctuary of (15) Alexandra; let the expenses for that be given by the *oba* and let those who are appointed for that give account of the expenses incurred; praise also Kallikles, their secretary.

The inscription is an honorary decree by the *oba*[7] of the Amyklaians, one of the five territorial subdivisions of the polis of Sparta, for a

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[6] Löschcke (1878) 165; Tod and Wace (1906) 5, 65; Stiglitz (1953) 77.

[7] On *obai*, see Lévy (1977) 91–4; Negri (1978); Jones (1987) 118–23. By Hellenistic times, if not earlier, the *oba* of Amyklai coincided with the homonymous *kome*: Löschcke (1878) 167; Kiechle (1963) 122–4; Jones (1987) 119; eventually the *obai* lost their territorial reference and merged with the *phylai*: Jones (1987) 119–20.

collegium of three local magistrates,[8] who served in a civilized and conscientious manner. The decree proclaims that the honorands would receive the grant for life of a share in the *prostropa* ceremony. The meaning of this ceremony will be the focus of the discussion further on.

According to the provision in its inscription, the decree was set up in the sanctuary of Alexandra.[9] Indeed, in the account of his visit to the town of Amyklai,[10] Pausanias (3.19.6) mentioned as worth visiting the sanctuary of Alexandra, which contained her image, undoubtedly the cult statue of Alexandra, a representation of Klytaimnestra, and a grave, which was regarded as that of Agamemnon. He added that the local people believed Alexandra to be Kassandra, the daughter of Priam. At another sanctuary, at Leuktra, on the east coast of the Messenian gulf, worshipers subscribed to the same belief (Paus. 3.26.5).[11] Pausanias' reports regarding the identification of Alexandra with Kassandra accord with Hesychios' reference to Kassandra (s.v.) as 'Alexandra in Lakedaimon' and Lykophron's Hellenistic poem on the Trojan princess, entitled *Alexandra*.[12]

Before discussing the implications for the Amyklaian cult of this association, a review of the evidence about the mythical Kassandra would be apposite.[13] Central to the story of the beautiful Trojan princess was her relation with Apollo for whom she served as a priestess. Although she had originally agreed to accept the god's sexual advances, for which she had been given the gift of prophecy,[14]

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[8] The honored *ephors* are not of the Spartan polis but local magistrates, because their tenure is dated by that of the eponymous *patronomos* of the Spartan state: Löschcke (1878) 168–9; Jones (1987) 122. Their number may imply that each represented one of the three phylai. *Ephors* existed also in several Eleutherolakonian cities during the Hellenistic and Roman period: Tod and Wace (1906) 5 n. 2; Kennell (1999) 196. The *dogmatographoi* and *grammateus* appear to have been local officers as well: Tod and Wace (1906) 65–6; Jones (1987) 122.

[9] For other decrees found in the same area, apparently *in situ*, see Löschcke (1878) 169–70.

[10] In historical times Amyklai was most likely situated in the area of its modern namesake: Fiechter (1918) 123–4; Stiglitz (1953) 73; Salapata (1992) 60–1; contra Cartledge (1979) 107–8.

[11] It is likely that the cult at Leuktra was transplanted from the main one at Amyklai. Mason (1959) 93 wrongly states that Kassandra was worshiped in Sparta.

[12] Momigliano (1945) 52. The date of Lykophron's poem is disputed between the early third and the early second century BC. See most recently Kosmetatou ((2000) 32–5), who argues for the later date.

[13] On Kassandra in general see Paoletti (1994), Neblung (1997); Mason (1959); Davreux (1942).

[14] Apollo is associated with other prophetesses of whom he is the father, e.g., the first Pythia, Phemonoe: Pliny, *Naturalis Historia* 10.3.7; Lyons (1997) 93 n. 88. Davreux

she then changed her mind and rejected him.[15] In his wrath for this grave insult, Apollo allowed her to retain her position as priestess and prophetess, but took away her gift of persuasion so that her powers would be held in vain.[16] During the sack of Troy Kassandra was pursued and assaulted by the Lokrian Ajax in the sanctuary of Athena.[17] Whether this episode was an attempted or actual rape is not entirely clear in the sources, but since she was subsequently allotted to Agamemnon as his war prize it can be argued that she was most likely still a virgin.[18] Kassandra was apparently much loved by Agamemnon for her beauty and charm,[19] but the love affair was doomed since on their return to Greece they were both brutally murdered by Klytaimnestra.[20]

Since it comes from later authors,[21] the equation of Alexandra with Kassandra has not carried much weight in most scholarly literature. For many years the usual assumption had been that two originally distinct figures—a local Lakonian goddess, Alexandra, and the epic heroine Kassandra—were eventually merged; or, alternatively, that a local goddess was demoted to the rank of a famous heroine. Opinions diverged on whether the identification was the result or the cause of the localization of Kassandra's (and Agamemnon's) death in Lakonia (see discussion below); in either case, it was assumed that the similarity of the name of the goddess with Alexandros, the alternative name of the brother of the heroine, would have contributed to the assimilation of the two figures.[22]

((1942) 66) argues, on the basis of Eur., *Hecuba* 88–90, that Kassandra was originally an interpreter of dreams rather than a prophetess. On prophetic heroines in general, see Lyons (1998).

[15] In fact, Apollo was rarely successful in his erotic encounters with mortal women, since several of them had rejected his advances: Lyons (1997) 93.

[16] There is no certain evidence of Kassandra's prophetic qualities in Homer (Schol. ad Hom., *Iliad* 24.699; Mason (1959) 81), but she is clearly referred to as a prophetess in the *Kypria* (in Proklos' epitome: Davies (1988) 31, 15–16) and Pindar (*Pythian* 11.33). Kassandra's punishment for refusing the god's advances was actually a mild one, by comparison, for example, with Daphne who paid with her life.

[17] *Ilioupersis* in Proklos' epitome: Davies (1988) 62, 23–90; Alkaios frg. 298 Campbell. On the iconography of this scene, see most recently Mangold (2000) 34–62 with references.

[18] Mason (1959) 81. The *Ilioupersis* refers only to her attempted rape, while later, Hellenistic, tradition made this an actual rape: Mason (1959) 82; Cohen (1993) 37; Connely (1993) 95, 107–9; contra Davreux (1942) 12–14, 52–3.

[19] Hom., *Iliad* 13.365–6; Mason (1959) 81.

[20] Hom., *Odyssey* 11.419–26; Pind., *Pythian* 11.33.

[21] See, however, Habicht (1985) for Pausanias as a reliable reporter on local traditions.

[22] Farnell (1921) 321, 330–2; Davreux (1942) 89–92; Wide (1893) 12, 336; Deneken

There is no indication, however, that the status of Alexandra at Amyklai was ever higher than heroic, as for example was the case with Helen. Indeed the epic 'femme fatale' was most likely an old vegetation goddess since she was associated with a tree cult and was worshiped with Menelaos as a goddess.[23] On the contrary, there is strong literary, iconographical, and archaeological evidence, as will be shown below, that Alexandra received from the beginning a heroic cult, together with Agamemnon. Furthermore, the notion that an original, local, chthonic divinity was later assimilated to a panhellenic figure and demoted to heroic rank[24] has been discredited in more recent years.[25] It is generally accepted today that most heroes were once living persons, worshiped after their death because of their exceptional achievements or experiences. In particular, it has been shown that the theory of the 'faded gods' applied especially to heroines, all of whom were once considered to have been indistinguishable from goddesses, since supposedly no woman could naturally become a heroine. The reality is, however, that goddesses and heroines are indeed distinct supernatural beings.[26]

There is no need therefore to discredit or disregard the ancient reports and suppose the existence of a local goddess who merged with the unrelated epic heroine because of a similarity in their names. In fact, most recent scholarship (but still not all) accepts that Alexandra

(1886–90) 2449; Stiglitz (1953) 76–7, 81; Belger (1891) 36 n. 2; and more recently: Paoletti (1994) 956; Larson (1995) 79, 83–4, 147; Hall (1995) 602; Antonaccio (1995) 165–6, 182; Musti and Torelli (1991) 247.

[23] Larson (1995) 81; Lyons (1997) 8–9; Kahil (1988) 555; Clader (1976) esp. 69; contra Farnell (1921) 323–5. Tree-connection (in Sparta and Rhodes): Paus. 3.19.9–10; 3.15.3; Theocr., *Idyll* 18.48. Divine worship: Hdt. 6.61; Isocr. 10.63; Alkaios frg. 7 *PMG*. Study of the figure of Helen in the epic has also revealed traces of her earlier existence as a divinity: Clader (1976). Thus it seems reasonable to assume that the Menelaion was originally a sanctuary to Helen, sister of the Dioskouroi, while Menelaos was eventually drawn into her sphere, perhaps because of Homer: Hall (1995) 602.

[24] Usener (1948) 171, 248–52; Deneken (1886–90); Pfister (1912) esp. 377–97; Wide (1893) 345; Harrie (1925) 365–7. The theory was founded on ancient reports that Agamemnon was worshiped in Lakonia as Zeus-Agamemnon: Lyk., *Alexandra* 1123–5, 1369–70 and scholion ad 335 and 1123; Clem. Al., *Protrepticus* 2.38.2; Athen., *Legatio de Christianis* 1; Harrie (1925); Malkin (1994) 31–2. I will explore this case, which is almost certainly a development of the Hellenistic period, in a future study.

[25] E.g., Foucart (1922); Farnell (1921) 280–3, 321–2; Nilsson (1955) 171–2, 184–91; Harrie (1925); Hooker (1980) 67–8; Brelich (1958) esp. 13–14; Malkin (1994) 31. Larson ((1995) 79 and n. 13), although she does not believe that the theory of the faded gods can explain heroic cult, still accepts it in the case of heroines associated with Dionysos, like Ino and Ariadne.

[26] Lyons (1997) 5–6.

was simply a local alternative name for Kassandra,[27] since variations in mythical names, especially those of heroic females, have been shown to be quite common.[28] The implications, however, of the alternative name have not been researched. It will be argued here that this name was a very appropriate one for Kassandra, and not only because it was an obvious alternative name for the sister of Alexandros-Paris or because of the coincidence of the last segment of the two names—*andra*.[29] Rather, the meaning of Alexandra's name was intrinsic to her nature and qualities in the epic and myth in general.[30]

The name Alexandra, spelled out as *a-re-ka-sa-da-ra*, appears for the first time on a Linear B tablet from Mycenae in a list of female names.[31] It is a compound name, consisting of two elements: the verb ἀλέξω ('keep off', 'turn away', or 'defend')[32] and the noun ἀνήρ ('man').[33] The name as a whole is commonly translated as 'she who averts (hostile) men', and therefore, as 'protector of her men'.[34] From this perspective, Alexandra would appear to have been conceived of as a protector of the city and its inhabitants.[35] The meaning of her

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[27] E.g., Lyons (1998).

[28] Lyons (1997) 51–2: e.g., Oidipous' mother Iokaste-Epikaste (Hom., *Odyssey* 11.271). On the variations of Iphigeneia's name see Lyons (1997) 139–43. Iphigeneia's name has an early form, Iphimede (Hes., *Catalogue of Women* 23); she is also very likely the Homeric Iphianassa (Hom., *Iliad* 9.145).

[29] See, e.g., Hooker (1980) 66.

[30] Kassandra was known in Phrygia as Phoibas (Eur., *Hecuba* 827), a name obviously referring to her association with Apollo; the sibyl Phrygia was called by some people Kassandra: *Suda* s.v.; Stiglitz (1953) 79. On naming patterns in Homer and the reflection of biographical details in Homeric names, see Higbie (1995) 24–6. Brelich ((1958) 156) is cautious about deriving all characteristics of superhuman beings from their name, which may express only one aspect of them.

[31] *MY* V659. See Marinatos (1958) 168; Chadwick (1963) 64–5; Harmatta (1968) 402. Cf. *i-pe-me-de-ja* on a Pylos tablet (*PY* Tn 316v): Lyons (1997) 141 n. 23. If the name of the historical figure in Linear B was inspired by the mythopoeic theme of Alexandra, the alternative name of the heroine would have gone quite back in time: cf. Nagy (1979) 71.

[32] The heroine Alexida, daughter of Amphiaraos, was considered the ancestor of *elasioi* (averters) who could avert epileptic attacks (Plut., *Quaestiones Graecae* 23.296): Lyons (1997) 50 n. 47.

[33] On the etymology of Alexandra and Alexandros, see Davreux (1942) 90–2 and n. 2; Harmatta (1968) 402. Burkert ((1985) 3, n. 12) considers the similarity with the Hittite *Alakšanduš* coincidental. Names of heroines commonly consist of two elements, which can be recombined and produce other names: *Eury-dike, Eury-anassa; Kass-andra, Tim-andra*: Lyons (1997) 54.

[34] Chantraine (1968) 58 s.v. 'ἀλέξω' = défendre, repousser; Davreux (1942) 88 n. 3.

[35] The equivalent of *Hera Alexandros* in Sikyon (Schol. ad Pind., *Nemean* 9.30) and other goddesses, whose names or epithets show them to have been city-protecting

name, however, could be translated in a slightly different way. Alexandra would be the 'repeller of men', 'man' taken here as the male gender; she would thus be one who defends herself from men. Such an interpretation accords well with the name of an Amazon, Alexandre, painted on a fifth-century BC kantharos,[36] a very appropriate name, indeed, for one of the legendary female warriors who opposed men both in daily life and war. This suggestion of hostility towards the male gender makes the name Alexandra a suitable alternative name for the committed virgin Kassandra, the victim of repeated abuse by men.[37] It also accords with the Daunian cult offered posthumously to her by maidens who rejected marriage, as prophesied by Kassandra herself in Lykophron's poem.[38] Significantly, her name is explained by the scholiast as παρὰ τὸ ἀλέξειν τοὺς ἄνδρας ('because she averts the men').[39]

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deities (e.g., Sosipolis): Löschcke (1878) 171; Kiechle (1963) 44 n. 5; Davreux (1942) 88 n. 3; Wide (1893) 12, 337; Harrie (1925) 365.

[36] Brit. Mus. E157; Beazley (1963) 1213.2; Lezzi-Hafter (1976) 112, pl. 142c.

[37] Cf. West (1984) 147. The etymology of the name *Kassandra* is not so clear, even though it also seems to appear on Linear B as *ke-sa-da-ra* (PY Ea828, Fg368): Chadwick and Baumback (1963) 170 (s.v. 'ἀνήρ'). Although some believe that the name could be prehellenic (Von Kamptz (1982) 95–6, 203), others associate it with Indoeuropean roots, usually that found in *kednos, kosmos, kekasmai*, and thus meaning 'prized', 'surpassing', 'distinguished' (Chantraine (1968) 503, s.v. 'Κασσάνδρα'; Heubeck (1957) 272–6). García-Ramón ((1992) esp. 245–8), assuming that the original form was *Kessandra*, relates it to the root **kens-* meaning 'announce' or 'speak emphatically'; the meaning of the heroine's name, therefore, 'she who speaks in emphatic tone in front of men', would accord well with her gift of prophecy. According to García-Ramón ((1992) 250–5), the original form, *Kessandra*, was absorbed by the form *Kassandra*, which although had a different origin (meaning 'distinguished among men') would accord with her exceptional beauty. See, however, the cautionary remarks of Suárez de la Torre (1994) 189–90 n. 40. Von Blumenthal (1932) 286–7, on the other hand, has suggested that *Alexandra* would be a translation of *Kassandra* (the element *Kass-* being of Illyrian origin), both meaning 'she who averts the men'.

[38] *Alexandra* 1126–40; Momigliano (1945). It is likely that Lykophron knew of the Amyklaian cult and this influenced his nomenclature of the prophetess: West (1984) 136 n. 44. Stiglitz' argument ((1953) 76–7; cf. Davreux (1942) 94; Kiechle (1963) 44 n. 5), that the Amyklaian and Apulian Alexandra were two totally different individuals, and that the identification of Alexandra with Kassandra in the West was made independently of Amyklai, is weakened in view of the similar qualities of the two figures.

[39] Schol. ad Lyk., *Alexandra* 30. The special association of Lykophron's protagonist with virgins goes back to an old legend, according to which young girls taken as captive after the sack of Troy landed in Daunia and ended up at the sanctuary of Athena Achaia. It would be natural for the mythographers to associate these Trojan girls with Kassandra, since the rite practiced at Daunia—the embracing of the statue of Kassandra by the maidens—resembles Kassandra's supplication for the protection of her virginity at Athena's statue when pursued by Ajax: Davreux (1942) 93–6.

Iconographic and archaeological evidence confirms the ancient authors' reports that Alexandra is the same figure as the Trojan Kassandra. On the relief scene on the top of the Amyklai stele are portrayed the three honored magistrates paying homage to a female figure, undoubtedly Alexandra herself, since the stele is to be set up in her sanctuary. They are shown in three-quarter view, all wearing a chiton and a himation. The first one is bearded and holds in his lowered hand a libation bowl, while the other two are unbearded and raise their right hands in a gesture of adoration. Between the *ephors* and the heroine is a round altar on a square base. Alexandra is depicted as a young woman seated on a rock facing to the right. She is dressed in a long girt chiton and a himation that envelops her lower body and passes over her left shoulder. She wears sandals and has her long hair gathered in a topknot. With her left hand she holds an eight-stringed kithara of an elongated shape, characteristic of the Hellenistic period, while with her right she strikes with a plektron.[40]

Because of the supposed original disassociation of Alexandra from Kassandra, scholars have encountered difficulties in defining the qualities of the 'original goddess' and in detecting any explicit correlation between her and the kithara-player of the stele.[41] There have been several, unconvincing attempts at an interpretation of this relationship. In one of them, for example, Alexandra, a protective deity, by playing the kithara expresses the importance given by the Spartans to music and song in war.[42]

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[40] The image of Alexandra seen by Pausanias in the sanctuary may have provided the model for this representation: Stiglitz (1953) 80. But see also below for another iconographic type of Kassandra, holding a scepter. It has been suggested that the statue of a woman holding a lyre under a tripod, seen by Pausanias (3.18.8) at the nearby Amyklaion and supposedly identified by the locals as the local nymph Sparta, was in fact Alexandra. If so, this would have been an appropriate dedication at Apollo's sanctuary, since she was his priestess. But even if the tripod woman was indeed Sparta, it is quite likely that her artistic form had been borrowed from the Amyklaian figure: Löschcke (1878) 170; Farnell (1921) 330; Stiglitz (1953) 80 (on this tripod monument and its companions, see Borbein (1973) 199–204). If this were correct, the iconographic type of the kithara-playing Alexandra would go back at least to the late fifth century BC: Stiglitz (1953) 81. On another possible representation of Sparta on local coins of the Roman period, see Grunauer-von Hoerschalmann (1978) 98, pl. 32 nos. 10 11.

[41] Davreux (1942) 89; Farnell (1921) 331.

[42] Usener (1948) 177; the Spartans used in particular lyra, kithara, and aulos: Paus. 3.17.5. Davreux ((1942) 88) prefers to associate her with the education of youths. Stiglitz (1953) 78–83 attempted to establish an intermediate link between the personalities of Alexandra and Kassandra by bridging their supposed analogues, nymphs and sibyls respectively.

The iconographic type of the woman playing the kithara is clearly very appropriate for Kassandra for two reasons. Firstly, this Apolline instrument, rarely played by women,[43] highlights her mythical and ritual association with Apollo as his priestess. The relationship between the two figures is further accentuated by the proximity of their sanctuaries, since the sanctuary of Apollo Amyklaios was located just one kilometer to the northeast of Amyklai.[44] Secondly, the kithara indicates Kassandra's prophetic abilities given to her by the oracular god, since prophecies in Greece were delivered by singing.[45] Admittedly, Kassandra is nowhere else represented as playing the kithara,[46] but it should be stressed that the context here is cultic rather than mythological, as in all her other representations. Her depiction as a prophetess would have been very useful to identify her outside a mythological narrative framework. Therefore, this unique representation of Kassandra, representing a local rather than panhellenic creation,[47] should be added to the corpus of her iconography.

It is interesting to note that, although Kassandra is associated with Apollo in both myth and cult and depicted on the Amyklaian stele with the accoutrements of a prophetess, there is no indication that her cult at Amyklai was of an oracular nature. She may have had an incubation oracle in another Lakonian sanctuary, at Thalamai,

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[43] Maas and McIntosh Snyder (1989) 56, 82, 202. Almost all other women who play the kithara are again somehow associated with Apollo: e.g., the Muses and his sister Artemis (*LIMC* 2 (1984) 675, s.v. 'Artemis' nos. 714, 716–18).

[44] For the history of the Amyklaion sanctuary and the excavations conducted there, see most recently Calligas (1995). Cf. also the location of the *xoana* of Apollo Karneios in or near Kassandra's sanctuary at Leuktra (Paus. 3.26.5).

[45] E.g., Aisch., *Agamemnon* 1150–61; Paus. 10.12.1; Lyk., *Alexandra* 1451; cf. the sibyl Herophile (Paus. 10.12.1) and Orpheus as reconstructed by Dietrich (1990) 173; Crippa (1998) 163–4. Cf. Stiglitz (1953) 80–1, fig. 22: a woman seated on a rock and playing the kithara on a fourth-century BC gem.

[46] In order to overcome this difficulty, Belger ((1891) 36 n. 2, following Deneken (1886–90) 2449–50) and Stiglitz ((1953) 78) have argued that the two female types, of Alexandra and Kassandra, were originally distinct from an artistic point of view. The reason the Amyklaians considered the cult statue of Alexandra as the priestess of the kithara-playing god Apollo was that the goddess Alexandra herself was originally perceived as playing the kithara. Therefore, the common characteristics of Kassandra with the pre-existing iconographic type at Amyklai led to a local fusion that was not adopted anywhere else. Such an interpretation, however, leaves unanswered the reason why Alexandra was originally playing an instrument at all, and why specifically the kithara.

[47] On the need to distinguish between the local and panhellenic personalities of divinities and give priority to the definition of the former, see Sourvinou-Inwood (1978) 101–3.

if indeed she was worshiped there under the epithet Pasiphae, but there was no consensus among the ancients on the exact identity of the owner of the oracle.[48]

As mentioned earlier, the decree includes a provision for its setting up at the sanctuary of Alexandra, which, as Pausanias reports (3.19.6), also contained the reputed tomb of Agamemnon.[49] Pausanias' reservation about Agamemnon's grave is understandable since he had already mentioned another grave of his in the section about Mycenae (2.16.6–7):

> There is a grave of Atreus, along with the graves of those who, having come back with Agamemnon from Ilion, were murdered by Aigisthos after having been entertained with a banquet. As for the *mnema* of Kassandra, it is claimed by the Lakedaimonians who dwell in the area of Amyklai. There is also another tomb of Agamemnon and that of Eurymedon . . .

The dispute between the people of Amyklai and Mycenae about Kassandra's *mnema* (i.e., grave)[50] clearly implies that there was also an alleged grave of Kassandra at the Amyklai sanctuary,[51] as there was another of her consort (unless the two shared one grave). The foundation legend of the Amyklaian cult, therefore, must have involved the murder of Agamemnon and Kassandra, which according to a

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[48] Ino-Pasiphae at Thalamai was identified with Kassandra, Daphne, or a daughter of Atlas: Paus. 3.26.1; Plut., *Cleomenes* 7.2; *Agis* 9.2; Cic., *de Divinatione* 1.43.96; *IG* 5.1.1316 and 1317; Lyons (1997) 98, 232–6; Larson (1995) 123–5; Cartledge and Spawforth (1989) 44, 196. The identification with Pasiphae may be late and can be explained on the basis of the prophetic qualities of both: Davreux (1942) 93; the proximity of the sanctuary at Leuktra, a little to the north of Thalamai, may have encouraged the assimilation with Pasiphae.

[49] . . . καὶ ἄγαλμα Ἀγαμέμνονος νομιζόμενον μνῆμα: the usual interpretation is that *agalma* is an interpolation explaining *eikon* and should be deleted: Davreux (1942) 92 n. 2.

[50] A survey of Pausanias' usage of the terms *mnema* and *taphos* has shown that the traveler uses them interchangeably to denote a grave or tomb. *Mnema*, therefore, although in Classical Greek usually means memorial, in Pausanias' language means an actual or believed place of burial (but not a cenotaph that is clearly designated as such): Dunn (1995); Larson (1995) 12–13. The same applies to the disputed *mnema* of Agamemnon, which cannot be translated as memorial or cenotaph, since several such could be erected for a person but only one grave could have been constructed: Dunn (1995) 349.

[51] Note the scholiast's comment in Eur., *Troades* 448–50, where Kassandra prophesies that wild animals will eat her body as it lies unburied by Agamemnon's tomb, that 'no source records that Kassandra failed to secure burial'. It is possible that Pausanias' use of the term *hieron* rather than *heroon* indicates his uncertainty about the existence of tomb(s): cf. Larson (1995) 11–12. The claims by different towns to the grave of a hero reflect the emphasis on the local quality of hero cult.

variant local tradition had taken place not in the Argolid but in Lakonia, and specifically at Amyklai.[52] This version of the myth and the cult associated with it may have been promoted by the Spartans when they aspired to become the sovereigns of the Peloponnese: by appropriating the most famous epic king, traditionally affiliated with Argos, they could have placed a claim on the hegemony of the Peloponnese and appeared superior to their rival city.[53]

The existence of the graves of Kassandra and Agamemnon at Amyklai, whether real or fictional, implies that the cult practiced at that sanctuary had a heroic character.[54] While not one of Sparta's major sanctuaries, like the Menelaion and the Amyklaion, Alexandra's sanctuary was an important center, at least for the Amyklaians, as indicated by Pausanias' recommendation for visiting the sanctuary, and its use as a repository for official documents. Archaeological evidence strongly suggests that the sanctuary was located in the vicinity of the stele's findspot. Although the sanctuary structures have not been located, a large votive deposit securely associated with it was excavated about 40 years ago near the church of Ayia Paraskevi. More than 10,000 objects ranging in date from the early seventh to the late fourth century BC were found in the deposit: vases of regular and miniature size, terracotta figurines and plaques, a disk akroterion, and a few metal objects.[55] In 1998 a second deposit, containing again

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[52] Stesichoros in Schol. ad Eurip., *Orestes* 46 (*PMG* 216); Pind., *Pythian* 11.31–3; possibly *Nemean* 11.34; 8.12; traces in Hom., *Iliad* 2.108, 2.574–5, 9.149–53; *Odyssey* 4.514–21. Schwartz (1901); West (1969) 148–9; Salapata (1992); Malkin (1994) 31–3 (who plays down the propagandistic use of Agamemnon and his cult); Robertson (1996) 458–9; Hall (1995) 580 and n. 19, 602; (1997) 91–3. For the cult of Agamemnon at Mycenae, which may have begun only in the fifth or fourth century BC, after the sack of the city by Argos in 468 BC, see Antonaccio (1995) 147–55; Hdt. 7.159. Cf. Snodgrass' ((1998) x) recent conclusion based on artistic depictions that there were several versions of mythical stories current at the time of Homer.

[53] Cf. Malkin (1994) 28. See, however, Hall ((1995) 580 and n. 19, 602), who argues that the Lakonian tradition was the earlier one and that the association of Agamemnon with the Argolid would have been caused by the spread of the Homeric epic, with the cult at Mycenae established in the early seventh century BC. If that were the case, the institution of the cult at Amyklai would have even less of an overt political and hegemonic purpose.

[54] The heroic cult of Agamemnon and his consort is corroborated by Pausanias' reference to other Amyklaian cults just after he had mentioned the sanctuary of Alexandra: his θεῶν δὲ . . . implies that the previously mentioned figures were heroes. Furthermore, the couple's cult, like most heroic cults, is locally confined.

[55] Christou (1956); (1960); (1961); (1962) 102–3; Stibbe (1991); Salapata (1993). The earliest pottery is of the first quarter of the seventh century BC: Margreiter (1988) 17, 57.

thousands of similar offerings, was excavated in a field near the first deposit.[56] The joint worship of Alexandra and Agamemnon is confirmed by fifth-century vases inscribed with their names.[57]

Of the hundreds of terracotta relief plaques discovered in the two deposits, several appear to represent the honored figures and are iconographically and stylistically related to the Lakonian stone reliefs,[58] which were most likely dedicated to various local heroes.[59] The Amyklai plaques, ranging in date from the late sixth to the fourth century BC, depict a bearded man in a dignified pose, seated and holding a drinking cup and occasionally a staff (fig. 2). The same iconographic formula is repeated on other artifacts found in the first deposit, such as painted pottery and figurines.[60] This is an image that conforms well to that of the epic king Agamemnon, who is clearly also identified as warrior on examples that depict a shield hanging in the background.[61] The snake that often accompanies him referred to and emphasized his heroic status.[62]

In a few plaques of the later fifth century BC, a woman is seated next to Agamemnon (fig. 3), certainly assuming the role of his consort, Alexandra/Kassandra, and confirming their joint cult.[63] Facing them is a female attendant who holds a tray of offerings. Significantly, on a few other plaques Kassandra appears by herself (fig. 4), indicating her equal status to her consort.[64] She is shown in a dignified pose, seated and accompanied again by a snake. She holds a phiale and a scepter with a mushroom-shaped top, as on the depictions with Agamemnon. The scepter can be considered an emblem of her prophetic qualities, since it was carried by prophets as a proof of

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[56] I thank the excavator N. Themos for this information.

[57] Christou (1960) 230, pl. 171β–γ; (1962) 102, pl. 81β.

[58] Andronikos (1956); Stibbe (1991); Hibler (1993); Salapata (1993). The best-known example is that found near Chrysapha: Berlin, Staat. Mus. 731: Stibbe (1991) fig. 5; Salapata (1993) fig. 1.

[59] Salapata (1993) with full bibliography. Richer ((1999) 95) and Lyons ((1997) 47) wrongly refer to the figures on the Lakonian hero reliefs as having been identified by me with Agamemnon and Kassandra. Only the plaques found at the Amyklai sanctuary depict these two heroes; in other sanctuaries the seated figures would have been identified with the resident heroes: see Salapata (1993) 194; (1997) 256.

[60] Vase painting: Sparta Museum no. 6116; Stibbe (1976) 13, 16 n. 58 and pl. 5.1; figurine: Sparta Museum, unnumbered; Salapata (1992) pl. 91g.

[61] Salapata (1993) 194 and fig. 5.

[62] Salapata (1997) 250–2.

[63] Sparta Museum no. 6231/2; Salapata (1993) 190.

[64] Sparta Museum no. 6233/1+6149/1; Salapata (1993) 192.

their mission to announce the message of the gods.[65] Indeed Kassandra carries a scepter in Aischylos, *Agamemnon* 1265 and is depicted with an elaborate one in South Italian vase paintings of the fourth century BC.[66]

Another offering associated with Alexandra and originally placed in her sanctuary was discovered again at Amyklai, incorporated into the walls of another church. It is a marble throne without armrests but with a footstool represented in relief (fig. 5).[67] Under the pedimental ending of the backrest[68] is an inscribed dedication to Alexandra by Banaxeus, a member of the *gerousia*.[69] The throne, dated between the first century BC and the first century AD, bridges the gap between the decree and Pausanias' visit, confirming that the cult of Alexandra continued uninterrupted through the Hellenistic period and into Roman times.

It is clear, therefore, that Agamemnon and Alexandra/Kassandra received a joint cult at Amyklai, instituted as early as the beginning of the seventh century BC, as the finds from the deposits indicate, and lasting until at least the second century AD, according to Pausanias' report. The literary and iconographical evidence suggests that their cult was of a heroic nature, centered on their alleged graves. The claims of Agamemnon to heroization follow a well-trodden path of other epic male heroes, like Odysseus and Menelaos. What, however, entitled Kassandra to heroic status and cult? Was the cult *aition* simply her being the male hero's consort?[70]

The cult at its establishment appears indeed to have conformed to the customary pattern involving heroic couples. According to this,

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[65] On the scepter held by prophets, see de Waele (1927) 145–53; Roth (1982) 129–50.

[66] See two vases by the Baltimore Painter of the end of the fourth century BC: Paoletti (1994) 969, no. 137 (volute krater in Zurich: Trendall and Cambitoglou (1983–92) Suppl. 1, 151, 21a, pl. 29.4) and no. 141 (amphora in Melbourne, Coll. Geddes A 5:2; Suppl. 2/2, 278, 40c, pl. 73,1) (possibly also no. 142). It is reported that a historic prophetess, the priestess of Branchidae, also held a staff (*rhabdos*): Jambl, *De mysteriis liber* p. 127 (Parthey); de Waele (1927) 153.

[67] Delivorrias (1968) 44–5, fig. 8; *BCH* 92 (1968) 816–17, figs. 10–11; *SEG* 24 (1969) no. 281. Height: 0.81m. On empty thrones, see Picard (1954).

[68] For which cf. the first-century BC marble triple seat dedicated by Soixiadas to Orthia: Dawkins (1929) 36, 355, figs. 20, 141. The inscription says: '. . . Soixiadas of Arikrates having being a *geron* thrice and *presbys* twice . . . dedicated to Orthia'. I owe this reference to Stella Raftopoulou.

[69] Cf. another earlier fragmentary throne found in Sparta inscribed with a dedication to Athena Alea by another member of the *gerousia*: Kourinou (2000) 156–63.

[70] As in the case of Hippodameia and Pelops: Larson (1995) 82–3.

heroines were defined through their relationships with male heroes, as their wives, daughters, or mothers. Their cult, being articulated around a family relationship, thus reaffirmed and reflected societal values.[71] Heroic cults, therefore, conformed to Greek gender expectations, with the female consort being subordinate and of secondary importance to the male.[72] It is then surprising to note that, although Kassandra was defined in myth by her relationship to Agamemnon as his consort and shared the Amyklai sanctuary with him,[73] she appears to have maintained a relative independence in cult, shown in the plaques, where she appears by herself, in the ancient authors' reports regarding the name of the sanctuary, and in the later dedications that were directed to her alone.[74] Could this relative independence in cult have arisen from reasons other than her immediate partnership with Agamemnon? Could these reasons have made her a candidate for heroic honors in her own right?

Kassandra was indeed a good candidate for receiving heroic honors because she belonged to a marginal category. She was in several respects a very anomalous figure, an embodiment of the Other. She was marginal first in relation to her status as a woman, for, although she was a virgin and determined to remain one, she was obliged to submit to Agamemnon. Thus her transition from the status of *parthenos* to that of adult woman was made in an irregular and disgraceful way;[75] or, one can say, that she in fact failed to make this transition properly, since normal female adulthood meant becoming a wedded mother and she was only Agamemnon's concubine.

[71] Lyons (1997) 10–13, 15; Larson (1995) 5–6, 24–5, 43, 76, 83–4.

[72] Kearns (1998) 98–9, 108; Larson (1995) 4–6, 79, 144.

[73] Even though Kassandra was not Agamemnon's legal wife, her union to him was presented as a wedding by Euripides (*Troades* 310). The report in the *Odyssey* (11.422) that she was killed over Agamemnon's body may indicate (or have caused?) their close relationship in cult.

[74] This independence in cult is one of the reasons that several scholars have suggested that Alexandra, like Helen, was an old Lakonian goddess identified later, as a result of the spread of Homeric poetry, with the epic figure and inevitably attracting Agamemnon to her sphere (like Helen had attracted Menelaos) (see above, n. 23). We have seen, however, that although the divine nature of Helen is very likely, there is nothing to suggest that Kassandra was ever anything greater than a heroine. In fact it appears that her cult, at least at its establishment, depended on that of Agamemnon rather than the other way around, though it should be stressed that it was on more equal terms than in other cases involving heroic couples. Larson ((1995) 60, 124) attributes this independence from, and equality with, her partner to Alexandra/Kassandra's supposed partly divine nature.

[75] On the heroines' failure to make a proper transition to womanhood, see Kearns (1998) 101–2; Larson (1995) 116–21.

In addition to being a committed *parthenos*, Kassandra was of alien, in fact enemy, status,[76] even though she had not arrived in Greece with hostile intentions. She had instead been forced from her homeland,[77] having been turned into a slave. As a victim of death in a foreign land, and thus buried far from home,[78] she resembles the Amazons, who also received heroic cult in several Greek cities, both individually and as a group.[79] But rather than receiving an independent cult, like the female warriors or other foreign male heroes, she was placed in a familial context, worshiped together with her consort.

Her marginal status notwithstanding, it was her destiny—the manner and circumstances of her death—that set her apart from other mortals and must have become fundamental to her essence as cult heroine at Amyklai.[80] A reminder of her (and Agamemnon's) violent and wrongful death was the representation of Klytaimnestra mentioned by Pausanias in the sanctuary,[81] the mythical antagonism having been turned to a cultic symbiosis.[82]

People, and especially heroes, who died an untimely, violent, and wrongful death became dangerously restless and were greatly feared in Greece because they were capable of causing a lot of harm, from famine and sterility to plague and insanity.[83] Those who died dishonorably were even more ready to harm the living than others who died by violence; they sought vengeance not just for retribution but in particular to restore their honor and respect among the other dead so that they could properly be included within the new society

[76] She belongs to Pfister's ((1909) 106–87) second category of foreign heroes. On the enemy (or even someone behaving as an enemy) worshiped as a hero protector, see Visser (1982). Worship of a dead enemy was motivated less by their enemy status and more by their marginality: Larson (1995) 111. Kassandra is not the only case of a Trojan figure being worshiped in Greece; a cult of Hektor existed in Thebes: Farnell (1921) 328–9.

[77] Cf. Larson (1995) 17.

[78] Pindar, *Pythian* 4.160–5; cf. Larson (1995) 114; Pfister (1909) 106–87.

[79] Plut., *Theseus* 27; *Demosthenes* 19; Steph. Byz., s.v. '*Amazoneion*'; Paus. 1.2.1; 1.41.7; Larson (1995) 111–13. On killed invaders receiving heroic cult because they were buried in foreign land, see Visser (1982) 424. On the Amazons, see most recently Blok (1995).

[80] Cf. Lyons (1997) 57–8; Larson (1995) 132. Unlike the case of male heroes, the death of a heroine is typically the focus of her mythical story: Kearns (1998) 98.

[81] Larson (1995) 84.

[82] Cf. Nagy (1979) 121. The presence of Klytaimnestra's image parallels the situation of 'ritual antagonism', where a heroine exists in close cultic proximity with a divinity that caused her death: see Lyons (1997) 71–2.

[83] Larson (1995) 133; Visser (1982) 416–17; Johnston (1999) chapter 4.

of the dead.[84] Their anger extended beyond those immediately responsible for their death and thus needed continually to be appeased by the community through special measures and complex remedies.[85]

Kassandra had indeed suffered a violent and ignoble death and, since as a priestess she was especially dear to the gods, her murder must have caused grave pollution and may have been accompanied by a calamity.[86] But as long as she received regular and appropriate cult, her anger and power to destroy would be converted into a source of blessings, a benevolence acting on the side of the worshipers.[87] Even if her death was not caused by the Amyklaians themselves, by offering her cult, they would have access to her power and, therefore, protection.[88]

We may now turn to the puzzling privilege awarded to the Amyklaian *ephors*, the sharing in the *prostropa*. The usual interpretation for this word is supplication or solemn invocation.[89] Literary evidence indicates that the epithet *prostropaios* applied both to a victim, who turned with supplications to a divinity seeking vengeance through divine assistance, and a polluted murderer, who turned to a god supplicating for protection and purification.[90] This word, then, applied to humans who had been murdered and sought punishment of their

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[84] Johnston (1999) 149–51.

[85] Johnston (1999) 155–6; Parker (1983) 10. On the need for heroic rites to extend over a long time in order for the heroes' blessings to achieve continual efficacy, see Visser (1982) 416–17, 422–3.

[86] Cf. Parker (1983) 130; Larson (1995) 16. On plague, barrenness, and other calamities (including mental disturbances) suffered by people who wronged a person, especially an enemy, see Visser (1982); Larson (1995) 131–2; Johnston (1999) 145, 154. Pollution had also been caused by Kassandra's violation of her supplication at the sanctuary of Athena, for which the Locrian Ajax and the Greeks were punished: Parker (1983) 146.

[87] Cf. Visser (1982) 403–5; Parker (1983) 10. A similar case is that of the Erinyes who become Eumenides: Aisch., *Eumenides* 890–1; Visser (1982) esp. 416–17. On the Erinyes, see most recently Heath (1999) esp. 33–6. Another example of an angry heroine who required expiatory sacrifices is Iodama: Lyons (1997) 46. Cf. Erigone, whose suicide was followed by a plague, averted through the institution of the Aiora ritual: Lyons (1997) 111; Larson (1995) 140–1.

[88] Cf. Visser (1982) 418.

[89] *LSJ* s.v.; Aisch., *Choephoroi* esp. 25 (libations for supplication); *Suppliants* 362; *Agamemnon* 1587; Soph., *Ajax* 1173; *Philoktetes* 930; *Oedipus Tyrannus* 41; *Oedipus Colonus* 50, 1309. The term *prostropa(-e)* is attested only once more epigraphically, as part of a list of Thasian festivals on an inscription of the end of the fourth century BC: Sokolowski (1962) 126–9 no. 69.

[90] Victim: Aisch., *Choephoroi* 287; Antiphon 119.6; or even the victim's blood: Eur., *Ion* 1260. Murderer: Aisch., *Eumenides* 41, 176; Eur., *Heracles* 1015; Hesychios s.v. '*prostropaios*'. Parker (1983) 108–9, 268; Moulinier (1952) 267–8; Rudhardt (1958) 53–4, 121; Lawson (1964) 479–83; Jameson (1993) 118–20; Johnston (1999) 142–3.

murderers, but also to supernatural agents, like the Erinyes and other more vague avenging spirits, seeking vengeance on the murdered person's behalf.[91] The same term could also be applied to a divine being, like Zeus who was invoked under the cultic title *Prostropaios*;[92] such a god would be an avenger, since he turned against the murderers the pollution and presumably also the punishment deriving from their deed.[93] It has rightly been observed that the multiple applications of the word *prostropaios* reflect the central position of the polluting act that set in motion a chain of other violent actions carried out by different individuals (murderer, murdered/ghost, divine agent).[94]

In a general sense, then, a *prostropaios* is an avenger, the murdered person himself/herself or a divine agent, pursuing in order to punish the guilty. Kassandra, having suffered a violent and ignoble death, was indeed a *prostropaios*; therefore, an expiatory ceremony would have been very appropriate to placate her and remedy pollution. It can be plausibly suggested, then, that the *prostropa* of the inscription refers to such a ceremony performed at her sanctuary at Amyklai and instituted to propitiate her murder that was never properly avenged.[95]

The ceremony most likely took the form of a periodic sacrifice of official character at the level of the *oba*,[96] with a portion of the animal

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[91] Antiphon 125.32, 126.39; Polyb. 24.8.2; Clem. Al., *Protrepticus* 22. In particular, Pollux (*Onomasticon* 5.131) attributes it to 'daimones who fulfil the curses'. Johnston (1999) 139–44; Lawson (1964) 463, 481. The application of this term to the agents is a later development, according to Lawson (1964) 463. Larson (1995) 134–5, 143 observed that, unlike male heroes, most of the wrongfully dead heroines do not express their anger directly but through substitute avengers either human or divine.

[92] Photios s.v. '*palamnaios*'; Clem. Al.,*Protrepticus* 31. There was also a month *poitropios* or *prostropaios* at Delphi: *SIG*[3] no. 932, commentary on line 6.

[93] Lawson (1964) 479, 481; Johnston (1999) 143. Radke (1957) identifed *prostropaios* as a propitiation god, since one turned to him as suppliant. As Lawson ((1964) 462, 479–80) rightly remarked, however, *prostropaios* derives from the active, not passive, form of the verb; rather than the being who was 'turned to' by the murdered man or the murderer, *prostropaios* is an active avenger who is turning something (misfortune, punishment, vengeance) upon someone.

[94] Parker (1983) 108–9.

[95] Cf. Salviat (1958) 250, who interprets the Thasian *Prostrope* festival as a purification or supplication ceremony during the Thesmophoria. Cf. Parker (1983) 10; Jameson (1993) 73–5 (on the connection between sacrifice and purification). It can be argued, of course, that Orestes took revenge by killing Klytaimnestra and Aigisthos, but this act was primarily to bring about atonement for his father's murder, not for Kassandra's. Cf. Aisch., *Agamemnon* 1279–81, where Kassandra foresees that the pair's death will be avenged but immediately adds that the avenger will exact atonement for his father alone. At 1324–5 she prays that her death may be avenged together with that of Agamemnon.

[96] Cf. the case of Attica, where most of the heroine cults were administered at the deme level: Larson (1995) 26.

granted to the magistrates as a sign of great honor. It was not uncommon for heroic figures to receive annual sacrifices in which the meat of the sacrificed animal would be consumed by a wider or a more restricted circle of participants rather than burnt wholly in a holocaust. In fact banqueting was an activity closely associated with heroes.[97] On the other hand, the throne dedicated to Alexandra may imply a different sort of ceremony, during which the supernatural beings themselves, most commonly heroes and heroines, were summoned to dine. This ritual, known as *xenia* or *theoxenia*, was combined with or substituted for a sacrifice, and involved the preparation of couches (for males) or thrones (for females) and an invitation to gods and heroes to be entertained as guests with a meal placed on a table. The cult personnel had rights over the food deposited on the table, which could include both meat from a sacrifice and other foodstuff. In cases where the preparation of couch and table was the focus of a festival, portions from the food could be awarded to specific people.[98]

As with sacrifice, hospitality offered to Kassandra could have been seen as a means of reconciliation with her unavenged spirit and a way of securing her goodwill.[99] The sharing of the meal with Kassandra, however, which consists of the same type of food that humans consume, would have established an even stronger reciprocal relationship than a regular sacrifice during which the offering to the superhuman being was transformed through burning.[100]

There is one last question to be addressed about the cult of Alexandra/Kassandra. How do we account for the disparity between the predominance of Agamemnon and the male figure in general in

[97] Nock (1944); Burkert (1985) 63–4; Jameson (1993) 73–5; Larson (1995) 14, 36; Ekroth (1998) 127–9 and (1999) who, however, argues that according to Pausanias' usage of terms sacrifices to heroes aiming at propitiation and expiation did not include ritual dining. Cf. Plut., *Theseus* 14 for a special banquet in honor of Hekale in the eponymous deme of Athens.

[98] Jameson (1994); Neils (1999) 14; Gill (1974); cf. Athen. 9.372a. I owe these references to Jenifer Neils. *Meris* normally refers to shares of sacrificial meat but the combination of the verb *poiein* with *meris* is very unusual (cf. *SIG*[3] 1044.42): M.H. Jameson, personal communication, November 2000. It may perhaps here suggest the making of a serving, as in *xenia*. Cf. the sacred law from Selinous where *xenia* seems to have played a part in the rites for similar figures: Jameson (1993). The throne could of course have been dedicated for a different purpose: see, for example, the throne from Sparta (above, n. 69), whose inscription specifies that it was dedicated so that Alea would sit and watch (presumably ceremonies of some sort).

[99] Cf. Jameson (1994) 44.

[100] Bruit (1990) 170–2.

the iconography of the plaques from the deposits and the much greater emphasis placed on the heroine in the later literary and epigraphical sources? Why was the sanctuary consistently termed the sanctuary of Alexandra (with no mention of Agamemnon) and the major dedications, the decree and the inscribed throne, referred to her alone?[101]

It appears that the emphasis on Alexandra/Kassandra in the later sources was the result of the evolution of the joint cult at Amyklai. The male figure depicted on the majority of the plaques from the votive deposits starting in the late sixth century BC speaks strongly for the predominance of Agamemnon in the earlier phases of the cult. On the other hand, it is certain that the sanctuary was dedicated to both Alexandra and Agamemnon, as indicated by the occurrence of both names in the dedicatory inscriptions on fifth-century vases and the depiction of Kassandra on some plaques next to her consort and also by herself, in a dignified and formal pose. Therefore, although Agamemnon may have enjoyed more honor, Kassandra had a prominent and relatively independent role in the cult by the fifth century, if not earlier. Literary and epigraphical evidence indicates that during the Hellenistic period, and after the deposits were sealed, the focus of the cult shifted towards Kassandra, and eventually the sanctuary ended up being attributed to her alone.

It could be argued that the prophetic abilities of Kassandra brought her to the fore and eventually differentiated her from her partner. Kassandra's prophetic aspect, however, though prominent in myth and influencing her iconographic types, does not appear to have featured in her cult at Amyklai,[102] as it may have at Thalamai, if indeed she was the real owner of that oracle. This accords with the case of several mythical seers who had a heroic but not necessarily oracular cult.[103]

The lack of appropriate written sources inevitably allows only for the formation of hypotheses that may explain this situation and at

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[101] Larson (1995) 79, 83–4, 147 explains Alexandra's primary role in the cult, which diverges from the customary pattern of heroic couples, on the basis of her earlier existence and importance as a goddess, an assumption that, as we have seen, is unjustifiable.

[102] Cf. Lyons (1997) 98, 231.

[103] Brelich (1958) 109, who argues for a divergence between the cult and myth of prophetic heroes. If, however, Ino-Pasiphae were indeed identified with Kassandra, there would be a case of convergence of the prophetic mythical and cultic figure.

the same time accommodate all facts. I would suggest that this cultic development might have been related to political developments, like other better-attested cases.[104] In particular, the shift towards Kassandra may have been a result of the loss of power and reduced influence of Sparta from the time the deposits were sealed in the fourth century onwards. Indeed, after a series of territorial losses that began in 370/369 BC and culminated in the early second century BC at the hands of the Romans, Sparta ceased to be one of the great powers and was unable to exercise an aggressive policy.[105] With the reduction of her political and territorial claims and ambitions—claims that very likely were earlier expressed through the cult of Agamemnon, as with that of Menelaos—greater space may have been left for the development of the cult of his partner. Kassandra's cult was independent of policy-making and was focused on the propitiation of the wronged heroine who also belonged to a marginal category. This development would be compatible with the increase in the standing and political influence of Spartan women during early Hellenistic times.[106]

In conclusion, following a pattern common all over the Greek world, and maybe associated with the spread of Homeric poetry, two figures from the heroic past, Agamemnon and Kassandra, received a hero cult at Amyklai, at least since the seventh century BC, according to the finds from the votive deposits.[107] The power of the heroine, who was known locally as Alexandra, was not restricted at Amyklai but extended to another Lakonian site, Leuktra, and perhaps also to Thalamai. Although Kassandra was worshiped only in Lakonia, her cult contained traits derived from panhellenic myth:[108] her alternative local name speaks of her aversion towards men; her mythical association with Apollo is reflected in her iconographic types, which are based on her prophetic qualities, and the vicinity of their sanctuaries; and the institution of her cult was motivated by

[104] See, e.g., the transfer of the bones of Orestes: Hdt. 1.67–8; Paus. 3.3.6; 3.11.10; Cartledge (1979) 139; Malkin (1994) 26–30.

[105] Toynbee (1969) 405–9; Cartledge and Spawforth (1989) passim; cf. Malkin (1994) 33.

[106] On female assertiveness and power in Hellenistic Sparta, see Powell (1999); Hodkinson (2000) 439–40.

[107] Cf. Antonaccio (1994) 103; Whitley (1995) 54; Hall (1995) 602: they argue that true hero cult was a seventh- rather than an eighth-century phenomenon.

[108] Contra Parker (1989) 167 n. 31.

her relation to Agamemnon which led to her murder, an event that formed the most important aspect of her cult.

The focus of the heroic cult at Amyklai, which began as a joint one between the consorts, shifted with time and because of the changing political situation in favor of Kassandra. By the late Hellenistic period, if not earlier, she took on a more prominent role and was considered the main owner of the sanctuary. Her cult was of considerable civic importance since her sanctuary was used as a repository of public documents. As implied in the honorary decree, associated with the cult was a propitiatory ceremony instituted to atone for her murder and remedy the pollution arising from it. Through the reenactment of this ceremony the goodwill of the wronged heroine would have been secured for the Amyklaians in perpetuity.

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Figure 1. An honorary decree originally set up in the sanctuary of Alexandra at Amyklai in Lakonia [Sparta Museum no. 441]

Figure 2. A terracotta plaque from Amyklai depicting Agamemnon holding a drinking cup and accompanied by a snake [Sparta Museum no. 6221/1]

Figure 3. Plaque from Amyklai from the late fifth century BC, in which a woman (Alexandra/Kassandra) is seated next to Agamemnon [Sparta Museum no. 6231/2]

Figure 4. Kassandra on a plaque from Amyklai [Sparta Museum no. 6233/1 + 6149/1]



Figure 5. Marble throne from Amyklai with a dedication to Alexandra [Sparta Museum no. 10994]. Photo after Delivorrias (1968) 44 fig. 8

INTERPRETING THE BEREZAN BONE GRAFFITO

LADA ONYSHKEVYCH
Walters Art Gallery, Baltimore

At the Greek colonial sites of the northern Black Sea region, excavations have yielded numerous finds over the years. Many of them reflect a fairly typical Greek culture adapting to the conditions and advantages of the area, and others are unique in their contributions to our overall picture of the Greek world in antiquity. Among such finds are numerous graffiti, informal inscriptions scratched on pottery sherds, or on other small objects like bone plaques, with texts on a variety of topics ranging from the monetary to the religious, and varying in length from one or two letters to several lines of text. Among the most interesting and unique items in the large body of graffiti from this region are some lengthy inscriptions with clear allusions to cult themes. It is to this subcategory that the Berezan Bone plaque belongs.[1]

This graffito was inscribed on a small piece of polished animal bone, and it appears to refer to Apollo, as well as to Berezan's mother city of Miletus and its neighboring sanctuary at Didyma. The text of this graffito is difficult to read and perhaps even more difficult to interpret. The first editor of the graffito, A.S. Rusiaeva, understood it to be the text of a Didymaian oracle referring to the increasing population of the Berezan-Olbia region in the early colonial years, as well as to changes in Apollo's cult aspects in that area;[2] more recently, Burkert has supported the interpretation of the text as an early Didymaian oracle.[3] Other scholars, such as Ehrhardt and Dubois, have instead suggested Orphic connections, or have otherwise questioned the oracular interpretation.[4] The graffito is unlikely to be a record of an oracular reply, and it may instead be a hymn or prayer connected to an Apollonian hebdomadic group.

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[1] For a study of five such inscriptions, including a fuller examination of the Berezan Bone Plaque, see Onyshkevych (1998).

[2] Rusiaeva (1986).

[3] Burkert (1990); (1994).

[4] Ehrhardt (1987) 116–17; Dubois (1996) 146–54. Cf. *SEG* 36 (1986) 694; *Bull. Ep.* (1990) no. 549; Vinogradov (1992) 78–80; Rusiaeva (1992) 14–16; Graham (1993) 196.

The bone plaque on which the graffito is incised provides no chronological evidence in itself; apparently no laboratory tests were performed on this piece.[5] The item also lacks archaeological context, as it was found in the private archives of the excavator, V.V. Lapin, after his death, with only a partial inventory number (AB, for Ancient Berezan [in Russian]) and no recorded provenience;[6] this factor, of course, also eliminates more dating evidence.[7] Thus the only information available for determining the date of the texts consists of the letter forms of the texts themselves. Overall, the letter forms should be placed towards the end of the archaic period, the end of the sixth to the beginning of the fifth century BC.[8]

The plaque is made of a shaped and polished fragment of an animal bone, identified by Rusiaeva as the shinbone of a bull or a horse.[9] This fragment is roughly rectangular, with maximum dimensions of 4.8 × 3.5 cm (see figs. 6–7), and a thickness of 3–4 mm.[10] Both the front and back are inscribed with multiple texts, some scratched between the lines of other texts. The letters are shallowly incised, measuring 0.15–0.6 cm in height. Some of the surface scratches on the front face appear to form roughly elongated shapes (see figs. 6–7), which Rusiaeva sees as two dolphins and possibly a bow, for unclear reasons.[11] The text is very difficult to read; extended

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[5] Rusiaeva (1986) 26.

[6] Rusiaeva (1986) 25–6, nn. 3–4. In a personal communication from June 1994, Rusiaeva mentioned that she heard that the excavator found seven bone plaques, but only two, including this one, remain in the archives. She described the other plaque remaining in the archives as almost blank, with only random scratches on its surface.

[7] The plaque's authenticity may reasonably be questioned as well; for the purposes of this discussion, however, the plaque will be assumed to be authentic, and to have a provenience in the excavations of the early colony of Berezan. Excavations from Berezan have yielded material from the second half of the seventh century BC, when Berezan first began to function as an emporium after its foundation by Miletus, continuing into the Hellenistic period; Berezan and the neighboring Milesian colony of Olbia are considered to have coexisted with close economic and other ties throughout that time. For an English-language review of recent work in Berezan, see Treister and Vinogradov (1993). Another recent English-language treatment of Berezan may be found in Solovyov (1999). For the relationship between Berezan and Olbia, cf. Graham (1982) 126–7; (1958).

[8] Cf. *LSAG* 325; Onyshkevych (1998) 76–8.

[9] Rusiaeva (1986) 26.

[10] The front face of the plaque is polished, as are the edges; on the reverse, the upper and lower zones are polished, while the middle zone is left rough. This object was made available to me for personal examination in the storerooms of the Archaeological Institute of Ukraine in Kiev, June 1994. Cf. Rusiaeva (1986) 25.

[11] Rusiaeva (1986) 28.

personal examinations, however, revealed that Rusiaeva's reading is most likely correct in every case.[12]

The first of the seven texts, A (as designated by Rusiaeva), is inscribed on the front (see fig. 6), with the first line placed along the upper edge. Text A should be restored thus:

Ἑπτά· Λύκος ἀσθενής· Ἑβδο-
μήκοντα· Λέων δεινός·Ἑπτ(α)-
κόσιοι· Τοξοφόρος φίλι(ο)ς δ(ω)ρε-
ῆ δυνάμι (ἰ)ητῆ(ρ)ος· Ἑπτακι(σ)χί-
λι(οι)· Δελφὶς φρόνιμος· Εἰρή-
νη Ὀλβίη(ι) πόλι· Μακαρίζω ἐκεί(νην)·
Μέμνημαι Λη-
(τ)ό·

Seven. A weak wolf.
Seventy. A fierce lion.
Seven hundred. A friendly archer—a gift
to the power of the physician.
Seven thousand. A wise dolphin.
Peace to the Olbian polis. I bless her.
I remember Leto.[13]

Texts B, C, D, and E of this graffito (as designated by Rusiaeva) are written in an orientation opposite to that of Text A, beginning at the lower edge and continuing between the lines of Text A (see fig. 6, turned upside down); this was probably done simply to maximize the very limited space available on such a small object. Texts B–E should read thus:

{E}Ἑπτὰ·
Ἀπόλλωνι
Διδυμ(εῖ)
Μιλησίωι·
Μητρὸ(ς) ὀλβοφόρος·
Νικηφόρος Βορέω·
Διδυμ[εῖ or εῦς]·

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[12] The exception is the *tau* in the last line of Text A, which Rusiaeva depicts as if clear in her drawing, although in her printed reading she properly treats it as absent and needing to be supplied. Rusiaeva (1986) 26, vs. her drawing on 27, fig. 1.

[13] Because of space restrictions in this volume, the reader is directed to Onyshkevych ((1998) ch. 2) for a full exploration of possible readings, restorations, and interpretations of the graffito's texts. Also cf. Rusiaeva (1986) 26; Dubois (1996) no. 93, 147; Burkert (1990) 156; Burkert (1994) 53–4.

Seven.
To Apollo,
the Didymaian,
the Milesian.
Bringer of fortune of the mother (or motherland).
Victor of the north (or northern wind).
To the Didymaian/The Didymaian.

On the reverse side (see fig. 7), Text F appears along the edge of the upper polished band, corresponding in orientation with Text A. The letters ΕΒΔΜΒΟΥΔΙΔΑΑΑ appear here, with another line of what appear to be approximately nine *alphas* below. Rusiaeva restores the first line to read ἑβδ(ο)μ(ήκοντα) Βοῦ(ς) Διδ(υμαίωι) or 'seventy oxen to Didymaian (Apollo)'.[14] If the general idea behind Rusiaeva's interpretation of Text F is accepted, this phrase, like Text B on the other side of the plaque, appears to be dedicatory in nature, recording the sacrifice, or the intention or promise of sacrifice, of a number of bulls to Didymaian Apollo. As Dubois points out, however, a sacrifice of seventy bulls is enormous;[15] other multiples of the number seven cannot be restored here easily.[16] Any reading of this text requires fairly extensive expansions, however, and thus none can be entirely convincing.

The three *alphas* at the end of this line, as well as the approximately nine *alphas* in the next line, do not have an easily discerned significance here. Their number does not coincide easily with the symbolism of the number seven found elsewhere on this graffito, but the incision of the letters here is faint and somewhat difficult to make out. Numerous theories could be constructed about the significance of these letters, and Rusiaeva suggests the initials of Apollo and of

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[14] Rusiaeva (1986) 26, 61. On p. 61, she accents the second word differently: βοὺ(ς). The circumflex, however, is the correct accent. Cf. *LSJ*, where βοῦς appears as the nominative singular form but can also be the rare contraction of the nominative plural form βόες or the accusative plural βόας. A secondary meaning is a shield covered with ox-hide, which is also a possibility here. The restoration of the last word should be changed to Διδ(υμεῖ), in keeping with the normal early form of the word, as discussed above.

As Rusiaeva (1986) 61 with n. 160 notes, sacrifices of bulls to Apollo are well known and appropriate. Cf. Fontenrose (1988) 63–5; *IvDidyma* 424.21–5, 61–2 and 217.1; *Milet* 1.3.133.19–20 and 145.69–71; Dubois (1996) no. 93, 153. *Bothroi* from Olbia's 'second temenos', where the sanctuary of Apollo Ietros was located, have been found to contain numerous bones, including horns, identified as those of bulls. Rusiaeva also notes the possibility that the bone plaque itself may be made from the bone of a bull.

[15] Dubois (1996) no. 93, 153.

[16] Cf. Szemerényi (1964) 130 1, on ἑβδομο- and ἑπτά.

his mother Leto and sister Artemis;[17] such ideas are mere speculation, however, with nothing to substantiate them.[18]

The final line of text, Text G, appears in the lower polished band on the reverse side (cf. fig. 7). This text repeats a phrase from the front side, from Text D, νικηφόρος βορέω, and can be assumed to have the same significance.

Text A contains a number of elements which may be linked with varying degrees of security to epithets or aspects of Apollo: λύκος in line 1 may be connected to the epithet Lykeios; λέων in line 2 refers to the lion, often connected with Apollo's cult in Miletus, Didyma, and elsewhere, τοξοφόρος in line 3 may refer to Apollo's frequent depiction as an archer in both art and literature; φίλι(ο)ς in the same line can also be connected to Apollo at Didyma; (ἰ)ητῆ(ρ)ος in line 4 is a known epithet of Apollo in the Black Sea region; and δελφὶς in the following line may be linked to the epithet Delphinios, also popular in the region. The word Ἀπόλλωνι in Text B confirms the connection of these texts to Apollo, and is reinforced by the mention of the deity's mother Leto at the end of Text A, as well as the epithets Διδυμ(εῖ) and Μιλησίωι in Texts B–E. Furthermore, the number seven, ἑπτά, as well as its multiples of 70, 700, and 7000 in Text A, is significant in connection with Apollo's cult.[19] Thus it seems clear that the various texts of the Berezan Bone Plaque should be understood to refer to Apollo.

The multiples of the number seven in Text A, as Rusiaeva argues,[20] should be seen as symbolic or 'rhetorical', and not as precise quantifiers: the usage of these four multiples of that number—7, 70, 700, and 7000—is known elsewhere.[21] But Rusiaeva also attributes another symbolic significance to the usage of the number seven here, stating that it may refer to the number of Milesian citizens or families who first settled the Lower Buh River region, specifically Berezan, possibly as representatives of each of six Milesian filials plus one

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[17] Rusiaeva (1986) 58.

[18] Cf. Lang (1976) 1, who refers to 'many broken inscriptions consisting of only a few letters which admit of so many possible restorations that nothing certain can be learned from them'.

[19] For a full discussion, see Onyshkevych (1998) ch. 2.

[20] Rusiaeva (1986) 50. Cf. Dreizehnter (1978).

[21] Polyaenus 8.33, ἑπτακισχιλίους ἑπτακοσίους ἑβδομήκοντα ἑπτά. Plutarch, *De mulierum virtutibus* 245D33 [*FGH* 310 F 6], ἑπτὰ καὶ ἑβδομήκοντα καὶ ἑπτακόσιοι πρὸς ἑπτακισχιλίους. Cf. Dubois (1996) no. 93, 149 and n. 117.

oikist. The other multiples of the number in Text A, in her view, allude to successive waves of settlement increasing the size of the colonies of Berezan and Olbia, leading to a conflict between old settlers and new, and between proponents of the Apollo Ietros cult and the Apollo Delphinios cult. This conflict, she argues, lead to an appeal to the oracle of Apollo at Didyma, to bolster the solidarity of the citizenry as a whole, and to ensure the future peaceful existence of Greeks in the region; the oracular reply is recorded in the bone plaque, according to her argument.[22] This connection to the region's demographics and to a hypothetical conflict has no real support, however, and it is difficult to interpret this text as a resolution to such a purely hypothetical situation.[23]

Burkert also objects to Rusiaeva's interpretation of the increasing numbers of text A as representing the growing demographic situation of the colonies of Berezan and Olbia. Instead, he compares Text A's numeric progression to numbers found in religio-mantic texts with prophetic or magical significance.[24] In this connection, Burkert sees the progression of the number seven as a 'mathematical matrix for prophecies'. The 'oracular response', in his view, foretells the future development of the colony of Olbia, in a framework of numbers with magical significance or appeal. Overall, Burkert interprets the text of this bone plaque to be a Didymaian oracle, as Rusiaeva does. He focuses to a considerable extent on a single line of hexameter that he identifies in this text, line three, and he argues that it supports the idea that this is an oracular text. In his view, the stylistic imperfections of the hexameter of this line reinforce the authenticity of the oracular response, as such responses were improvised with no reworking.[25]

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[22] Rusiaeva (1986) 34–6, n. 44, and 51–2.

[23] Objections to Rusiaeva's arguments on this point can also be supported by the juxtaposed uses of these two epithets of Apollo, Ietros (or Iatros) and Delphinios, in such texts as the Olbian 'Calendar Inscription' graffito ('Απόλλ(ωνι) Δηλφινί(ωι) 'Ιατρôι, Θαργηλί(ωι), Λυκεί(ωι) 'Ανδοκίδος), which Rusiaeva herself published (Vinogradov and Rusiaeva (1980); cf. Onyshkevych (1998) ch. 1). Another inscription from Olbia, of the third century BC, also uses both of these epithets: 'Ιητρο(ῦ) Δελφινίο(υ) ξυνή (*IosPE* 1^2, 106). Cf. Tolstoi (1905); Dubois (1996) no. 65, 115–16.

[24] Burkert (1990) 157. Cf. Diels (1965); Burkert (1994) 56–8. Cf. *Revelations* 13:18, on the number 666, or the doxographic note in the so-called *Aetion*, 'others consider that "the big year" continued 7777 years' (*Aetion* 2.35.5 = Plut. p. 364 Dox.). Cf. Verg., *Aeneid* 1.261–82 for the numerical progression of 3–30–300–infinity.

[25] Burkert (1990) 156; (1994) 54. Cf. Rossi (1981).

But a number of objections can be raised to this argument. First, line three of text A is difficult to fit into a hexameter pattern, even with Burkert's allowances of taking δωρεῆ(ει) as two syllables, and δυνάμ(ι) as elided,[26] so that even the 'improvised' character seems rather tenuous. Second, even if this line is accepted as an imperfect hexameter, it is unclear why only a single line of this text should be in hexameter if this is an oracular response, and why a single line of hexameter should make the whole text oracular in nature.

Furthermore, early Didymaian oracular responses did not use hexameter, so the argument seems spurious. Only three securely identified oracular responses are known from the period before the Persian destruction of Didyma in 494 BC, or from Archaic Greece in general: *Milet* 1.3.178, 132a, and *IvDidyma* 11.[27] None of these three examples uses hexameter; Fontenrose tentatively identifies the text of *Milet* 1.3.132a as iambic trimeter, but confirms that the texts of the other two inscriptions are prose.[28] Parke considers *Milet* 1.3.132a to be prose as well, stating that 'there is no inscriptional evidence that the oracle of the Branchidae in the archaic period ever spoke in verse'.[29] Two of these texts are introduced by the formula θεὸς ἔ̂πεν, which makes the oracular nature clear, and the other includes the first person εἶπον.[30] The lack of such a formula, or anything resembling it, in the graffito from Berezan, does not necessarily preclude its identity as an oracular response, yet its absence calls further into question why Rusiaeva and Burkert identify the text as oracular.

Finally, the nature of the three authentic archaic Didymaian oracular texts differs from that of the Berezan graffito. All three of the Didymaian texts concern laws, usually cult laws: the first (*Milet* 1.3.178) refers to the consequences of disobeying a law; the second (*IvDidyma* 11) answers a question of legality by referring to ancestral custom; and the third (*Milet* 1.3.132a) outlines laws for a cult of Herakles.

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[26] Burkert (1990) 156, n. 8; (1994) 54.

[27] Cf. Dubois (1996) no. 93, 152, n. 132; Fontenrose (1978) 233–4; Parke (1985) 29 and 203; Crahay (1956); Fontenrose (1988) 179–81. *Milet* 1.3.178: (---ἀπ) | ομυθέομ(αι·τ)ῆ(ι)αρ--- | ---τεως τῆι προτέρηι | νυκτὶ εἶπον· καὶ (τῶι μὲν πειθομέ|νωι λῶιον καὶ ἄ)μεινον ἔσται· τῶι | δὲ μὴ πειθομένω(ι τοὐναντίον.)· *IvDidyma* 11:---σοι(σι) | ληιστοί· θε(ὸς) δὲ ἔ̂πεν· Δίκ|αιον ποιεῖν | ὡς πατέρες· Milet 1.3.132a: (Περ)ὶ τὠρακλέ(ος---) | θεὸς ἔ̂πεν· Γυν|(α)ῖκας ἐς τὠρακ(λέος---) | λαχάνων (ο)ὐ (β|ρ)ῶσις· γυναι---|ων ἐσιν--- | (γ)υνη---.

[28] Fontenrose (1978) 419.

[29] Parke (1985) 29.

[30] Cf. Rodríguez Somolinos (1991) on *Milet* 1.3.178.

In contrast, the Berezan graffito's Text A makes no discernible allusions to any laws. Thus nothing supports Rusiaeva and Burkert's identification of Text A of this graffito as an 'oracular response' from Didyma, and that theory must be discarded.

Rusiaeva admits that Text B seems to be a dedication, which gives the whole bone plaque a dedicatory character; she suggests that it is possible that the plaque was intended to be a votive gift, with the text of the 'oracular response' written on it.[31] The only interpretation that can be safely applied here, however, is that this text is dedicatory in nature, since it conforms to known dedicatory formulae.[32]

Ehrhardt, in his brief treatment of this graffito, proposes another interpretation that seems more reasonable than the theories proposed by either Rusiaeva or Burkert. He suggests that the bone plaque may have been connected to a religious sect, most likely the Orphics, who are known to have existed in Olbia from the fifth century BC. He correctly compares this bone plaque to three other, well-known bone plaques from Olbia that are incised with texts referring to the Orphic cult and to Dionysos, and which resemble the Berezan plaque in shape, size, and appearance.[33] Ehrhardt suggests that an early cult, similar to that of the Orphics, but worshipping Apollo instead of Dionysos, may have existed in the region, as for example the Hebdomastai, cult members whose worship practices involved the special significance of the number seven.[34] Orphism, however, should not be ruled out as a possibility in connection with this cult. Apollo was sometimes connected with Orphic worship, as is apparent in Orphic fragments concerning the story of Dionysos' death and rebirth,[35] as well as in the presence of Dionysos' tomb in Apollo's temple at Delphi.[36] Other

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[31] Rusiaeva (1986) 58.

[32] Cf. Lazzarini (1976) formula no. 6, pp. 120–1, nos. 421–43.

[33] Ehrhardt (1987) 116; cf. *SEG* 36 (1986) 659–61 for a similar view. Cf. Rusiaeva (1978); (1979) 73–5, figs. 37–8; Tinnefeld (1980) 67–71; West (1982); West (1983a) 17–18; *SEG* 28 (1978), 659–61; Dubois (1996) no. 94, 154–5. One of these Orphic bone plaques specifically alludes to Orphism, restored by Rusiaeva to read Βίος· Θάνατος· Βίος· Ἀλήθεια. Διό(νυσος) Ὀρφικοί. A second one refers only to Dionysos and not Orphism: Εἰρήνη· Πόλεμος. Ἀλήθεια· Ψεῦδος. Διόν(υσος). Similarly, the third text also refers only to Dionysos and not to Orphism, with the words Διό(νυσος) and Ἀλήθεια. On the reverse of the second plaque, there appears a rectangle divided into seven sections, with an oval drawn inside each of these sections. West ((1983a) 58) speculates that this drawing may represent 'a musical instrument, or a tray or table of offerings'.

[34] Ehrhardt (1987) 117.

[35] Cf. Kern (1922) frs. 35, 209, 211, 213, 240.

[36] Cf. West (1983a) 150–2.

links between Orpheus and Apollo are peripheral, as for example through the lyre,[37] but there also exist explicit links in Orpheus' worship of Apollo Helios instead of Dionysos, as in the *Bassarai*.[38] Thus Orphism may well be connected with an Apollonian cult here.

Dubois also makes the connection between the bone plaque from Berezan and the three Orphic plaques from Olbia.[39] He connects the progression of numbers to the mystique of the number seven, which, as he points out, was known within the theology of Pythagoreans,[40] and earlier of the Orphics.[41] Dubois further points out that the word εἰρήνη also appears on one of the Orphic tablets from Olbia, and he suggests that this word in the Berezan plaque be considered as part of the 'Orphic vocabulary'. Furthermore, he comments on the use of both 'Ὀλβίῃ and μακαρίζω, connecting it with an Orphic tablet from Thurii that refers to the spirit of the initiate who is reborn after death: ὄλβιε καὶ μακαριστέ, θεὸς δ' | ἔσῃι ἀντὶ βροτοῖο.[42]

While Ehrhardt and Dubois agree that the Berezan plaque has Orphic elements, West points out that 'Orphic' must be defined as that which makes specific reference to Orpheus or has a connection to an Orphic poem.[43] In the absence of any specific reference to Orpheus in the Berezan bone plaque, unlike in the Olbian bone plaques, and in the absence of any apparent connection to any known Orphic poems, it must be concluded that this bone plaque from Berezan cannot, strictly speaking, be called Orphic. Still, some connection with the Orphic plaques from Olbia seems very likely.

Ehrhardt's suggestion that a Hebdomadic cult may have been involved here, however, is intriguing and promising.[44] Hebdomadism was clearly connected with Orphism in the Hellenistic period, as known, for example, through Linus' poems of the second century

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[37] Cf. Savage (1925).

[38] Cf. West (1983a) 227; (1983b); Linforth (1931) 11–17. Kern ((1922) fr. 62) begins with a prayer to Apollo Helios, and mentions Orpheus' twelfth revelation as regarding worship of Apollo Helios.

[39] Dubois (1996) no. 93, 148.

[40] Roscher (1913) 1–80. Cf. Thesleff (1965) 154–5, on Proros' poem 'On the Hebdomad'; West (1983a) 61 n. 86; (1971).

[41] Cf. Kern (1922) no. 47.9, and no. 309; de Falco (1975) 67, 2–6; Roscher (1906); West (1983a) 61; Nock (1927).

[42] Dubois (1996) no. 93, 152–3. Cf. Pugliese Carratelli and Foti (1974) 108–26, 116.9.

[43] West (1983a) 3.

[44] Ehrhardt (1987) 117.

BC.[45] This graffito may represent an early phase of a Hebdomadic cult in the region of Berezan and Olbia. It is possible, although not at all definite, that such a cult was the predecessor of the Orphic cult that is known a century later in Olbia through the three bone plaques described above;[46] perhaps this cult continued and flourished in Olbia and took on the guise of Orphism, and left a trace of its activities in the Orphic bone plaques from Olbia in the fifth century BC. As Ehrhardt suggests, the seven compartments appearing on one of the three Olbian Orphic plaques may be connected to continuing Hebdomadism within that Orphic cult.[47] West points out that Orpheus often intruded into existing cults, and this may be a case in point; 'it is not safe to assume that Orpheus' role in the Olbian cult is as old as the cult itself'.[48]

The use of these polished bone pieces for the inscription of texts, in the case of the Olbian Orphic plaques as well as of the Berezan plaque, deserves some comment as well. Unlike inscribed pottery sherds, which functioned as a sort of 'scrap paper' of their time, these pieces of bone required a considerable amount of preparation, including cutting, shaping, and polishing, before they were used as writing surfaces. This suggests that the character of the texts inscribed on the bone plaques may be less casual than that of texts on pottery sherds. On the other hand, the material still seems less formal than that of stone inscriptions, because of its small size and probable low (or nonexistent) cost, and so a formal text like a Didymaian oracular response, as suggested by Rusiaeva and Burkert, seems inappropriate for a bone plaque. It is unclear, however, why bone, especially in such small pieces, was chosen as a writing surface in the case of the Olbian and Berezan plaques. West has suggested that the Orphic tablets may have served as 'membership tokens' for the local cult members, since many uninscribed bone tablets have been found in Olbia in addition to the three inscribed Orphic ones.[49] This idea has merit,

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[45] Cf. West (1983a) 58–61, 66; de Falco (1975) 67, 2–6; Nock (1927); Kern (1922) no. 309 and no. 47.9.

[46] Cf. Herodotus' description (4.79) of a Bacchic cult of Dionysos in Olbia, in which the Scythian king Scyles participated; no mention is made there of Orphism, however.

[47] Ehrhardt (1987) 117.

[48] West (1983a) 18.

[49] West ((1983a) 18 and n. 44) adds that these tokens may have functioned as 'bone slices symbolizing participation in common sacrifices', since 'the rite of omophagy is attested for the cult of Dionysos Baccheios at Olbia's mother city

as the texts inscribed on the Olbian plaques and the Berezan plaque do contain clear cultic allusions, such as the names and epithets of deities. West comments that the tablets' 'embellishment with words and symbols seems to have been left to the individual's discretion', but that cult members would be likely to write words related to cult elements, such as 'life' and 'truth' on the Olbian plaques.[50] West's idea for the function of the bone plaques holds definite possibilities, and may be extended to the Berezan plaque as well. No proof exists for this function, however, and so the idea must remain hypothetical.

Another hypothetical idea, suggested in passing by Dubois,[51] is that Text A is a prayer, or an incantation. In many literary records of prayers, such as in the *Iliad* (1.33–43, 16.220–56), *Odyssey* (4.759–67), and Euripides' *Hippolytus* (63–87), a certain basic format seems to be followed, beginning with references to epithets and aspects of the deity addressed, followed by a request, and also by references to gifts or votive actions, now or previously, as exchanges for the deity's favor, and sometimes by claims to earlier ties with the deity.[52] Prayers in stone inscriptions, such as those on some dedications on the Athenian Acropolis (e.g., Raubitschek (1949) no. 40 = *IG* 1^3.728), are briefer and more direct than the literary prayers, doubtless because of the greater difficulty and expense associated with the medium, but also seem to include the basic elements of this pattern in this or another order.[53]

Miletus in the early third century BC'. Cf. *LSAM* 48, on a rite of omophagy in Dionysos Baccheios' cult in Miletus in the early third century BC. But from such small pieces of bone, which have been shaped and polished, it is impossible to obtain evidence that would clearly connect the bone to sacrificial practice, and specifically to omophagy; even cut marks or tooth marks on the bone surface would not make clear if the animal from which the bone fragment came was sacrificed in a cultic ritual, or was simply cooked for dinner after normal home preparation.

[50] West (1983a) 18. Ehrhardt ((1987) 117) follows this idea, and suggests that the Berezan bone plaque may have also served as an 'identity card'.

[51] Dubois (1996) no. 93, 148.

[52] Burkert ((1985) 73–5) refers to 'a basic prayer form with variations', which he describes thus: 'At the beginning, underlined by the request "Hear!" comes the name of the deity. Great importance is attached to finding the right name, especially appropriate epithets; as much as possible, epithets are heaped one upon another'. Then 'this is followed by a justification for calling on the god, in which earlier proofs of friendship are invoked by way of precedent: if ever the god has come to the aid of the suppliant, or if the suppliant has performed works pleasing to the god . . .', and finally the request is made of the deity, 'usually accompanied by the promise for the future, the vow'. Cf. von Fritz (1945–46); des Places (1959); Corlu (1966); Kirk (1985) 57.

[53] Cf. Versnel (1981) 63. Other inscriptions that may be called prayers, in the

In the Berezan graffito, we may find some features which fit this basic prayer pattern. Text A begins with references to many of Apollo's epithets and aspects, connected with the wolf, lion, archer, physician, and dolphin, although these references are oblique. Texts B–E and G contain words that are explicitly epithets, however, Διδυμ(εῖ), Μιλησίωι, μητρὸ(ς) ὀλβοφόρος, νικηφόρος Βορέω. Another phrase in Text A, εἰρήνη Ὀλβίη(ι) πόλι, may represent the favor requested from Apollo. In the seemingly dedicatory Text F, a reference to a gift to the deity, in exchange for the favor requested, may be found.[54] The possibility also exists that the multiples of seven in Text A are also an oblique reference to gifts intended or previously given to the deity in his various aspects; this idea is very tenuous, however. The last phrase in text A, μέμνημαι Λη(τ)ό, may be either a promise to provide worship to the deity's mother, or a reference to her previous worship;[55] the phrase preceding it, μακαρίζω ἐκεί(νην), might also represent an 'earlier proof of friendship' with the deity or his family. Finally, the phrase δ(ω)ρεὴ δυνάμι (ἰ)ητῆ(ρ)ος may allude to a votive gift made or promised specifically to Apollo's 'Ietros' aspect, although the use of δυνάμι here remains obscure in meaning. Yet if these texts of the Berezan bone plaque do represent a prayer, that prayer appears here in a rather oblique form, in contrast with the very explicit prayer-like nature of the incantations or prayers mentioned above. Thus the interpretation of the bone plaque's texts as a prayer to Apollo must remain hypothetical, although it seems more plausible than Rusiaeva's and Burkert's interpretations, as discussed above.

Clearer similarities for elements of the Berezan bone plaque's text may be found among known ancient Greek hymns, however. Orphic hymns, for example, often follow the same basic pattern that is found in prayer; as Guthrie writes, 'each has as its main section a series of epithets or descriptive phrases addressed to the deity, and closes

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sense that they make a request of the deity together with a dedication, can be found in Lazzarini (1976) category 16 ('Dediche in cui si chiede alla divinità una ricompensa'), nos. 786–807.

[54] Cf. Versnel (1981) 63; Lazzarini (1976) nos. 786–807.

[55] Philipp ((1978) 157–9) suggests that the words μνήμη and μιμνήσκεσθαι in prayers signify gratitude. Versnel ((1981) 59) writes that he is 'reluctant to go so far as to decide on a simple identity of μνήμη = "thanks"', but concedes that 'in this whole complex of gratitude these terms do indeed play a very central rôle'. Cf. also Raubitschek (1949) 295 (= *IG* I[3].776): hερμεῖλαι: τόδε] | ἄγαλμα [: διδος] χάριν : μ[νεμ]οσύνες : hέ[νεκα.

in the last line or two with a prayer . . . for general blessings, plenty, peace and health'.[56] These characteristics are also found in Text A. In the reference to 'remembering' in the last line of its text, furthermore, another similarity to known hymns may be found. Many Homeric hymns, such as those to Demeter, Apollo, Hermes, Aphrodite, Dionysos, Pan, and other deities, end with a formulaic reference to 'remembering' the deity, αὐτὰρ ἐγὼ καὶ σεῖο καὶ ἄλλης μνήσομ' ἀοιδῆς, 'I shall remember you and another song too'.[57] This aspect of the Homeric hymns bears a strong resemblance to the final words of the bone plaque's Text A, μέμνημαι Λη(τ)ό. This phrase, together with the preceding one, μακαρίζω ἐκεί(νην), may function in the bone plaque in a way similar to the concluding 'I shall remember you' of the Homeric hymns.[58] Thus, although distinctions between hymns and prayers may not always be clear, the text's lack of a clearly articulated request to the deity, of the sort found in the prayers referred to above, suggests that this text is more likely to be a hymn, rather than a prayer, closing with a general request for well-being, and a reference to 'remembering' Leto.[59]

If the texts do represent a hymn or a prayer, then the person who inscribed them is still likely to have been a member of a hebdomadic cult. The hymn or prayer, then, may include references to the progression of the mystical number seven in a sort of 'mathematical matrix', as suggested by Burkert.[60] Instead of being used for

[56] Guthrie (1993) 257. Cf. Athanassakis (1977) no. 35, to Leto: 'Dark-veiled Leto, revered goddess and mother of twins, great-souled daughter of Koios, queen to whom many pray', 'Hear, lady goddess, and with favor in your heart come to this all-holy rite and bring sweet end', or no. 34, to Apollo, 'Come, O blessed Paian, O slayer of Tityos, O Phoibos, O Lykoreus', 'Grynean, Sminthian, slayer of Pytho, Delphic diviner . . . O holy one, you are Bacchos, Didymeus, and Loxias too'. 'Hear me with kindly heart as I pray for people . . . O blessed one, hear the suppliant voice of the initiates and save them'.

[57] This formulaic phrase is found in the last lines of *Homeric Hymn* 2 (*to Demeter*), 3 (*to Apollo*), 4 (*to Hermes*), 6 (*to Aphrodite*), 19 (*to Pan*), and others. Also cf. *Hymn* 7 (*to Dionysos*), lines 1–2: 'Αμφὶ Διώνυσον, Σεμέλης ἐρικυδέος υἱόν | μνήσομαι, ὡς ἐφανη. Cf. Allen and Sikes (1904); Athanassakis (1976).

[58] Cf. Dubois (1996) no. 93, 148.

[59] The similarity between the bone plaque's text, with its repeated multiples of seven in combination with the wolf and the lion, and the 'Philinna Papyrus' (Maas (1942) 37), which includes a reference to ἑπτὰ λύκων κρῆνας, ἑπτ' ἄρκτων, ἑπτὰ λεόντων: | ἑπτὰ δὲ παρθενικαί, and which is usually understood as derived from a hymn, may provide further, albeit tentative, support for the idea that the Berezan bone plaque contains the text of a hymn. Cf. Koenen (1962); Henrichs (1970) 204–9; O'Neil (1992) 258; Faraone (1997) 49.

[60] Burkert (1990) 157–8.

prophecy, however, this 'matrix' may function here as a way to strengthen the power of the hymn or prayer; possibly, the deity was thought to be more likely to pay attention and bestow favor upon the individual performing the hymn or prayer.

The bone plaque itself may be a 'membership token' as well, serving to remind the cult member to include certain key words or phrases in the hymn or prayer, or else serving as a perpetual form of prayer. Another possibility is that the act of inscribing the plaque was the focus, and that the tablet was not meant to be read; the shallowness of the inscribed letters, as well as the placement of text in between the lines of other texts for maximization of the space available, would seem to be factors supporting that idea. Again, no solid proof exists for these ideas, however, and they must remain hypothetical. Without further evidence concerning the cult practices of Berezan and Olbia in this early period, the true purpose of the plaque and the full significance of its texts necessarily continue to be obscure.

The elements which do emerge as clear in this examination of the Berezan plaque result from the repetition of certain elements within the plaque's various texts. Apollo is unmistakably referred to in his various aspects in all of the texts, and the repetition of the name of Didyma suggests that Apollo's Didymaian aspect was intended to receive the most emphasis here. Of equal note, the continual use of multiples of the number seven throughout Text A strongly suggests a connection to a Hebdomadic cult, linked to Apollo. Furthermore, the inclusion of some apparently dedicatory formulae in Texts B and F suggests that the plaque's purpose was at least partially votive in nature. Finally, the presence of certain elements in the texts, such as the reference to various epithets of Apollo, the request for peace, the reference to the 'remembering' of Apollo's mother Leto, and a reference to a dedicatory or votive action perhaps in exchange for the favor requested, suggest that a hymn or prayer may be represented here. Whether the bone plaque also served as a 'membership token' remains unclear.

Thus the bone plaque from Berezan was not likely to have been an oracular text from Didyma, as Rusiaeva and Burkert suggest, nor a complicated reference to the changing demographic and cultic situation in the region, as Rusiaeva argues. The plaque bears elements of resemblance to the three Olbian Orphic plaques, and as Ehrhardt and Dubois suggest, seems to have Orphic connections itself. While

the exact meaning of the various texts on this plaque cannot be completely ascertained, many aspects strongly suggest that the texts here should be linked to an Apollonian Hebdomadic cult in the Berezan-Olbia region, possibly connected to the later Orphic cult known in Olbia. The plaque's purpose was most likely votive at least in part, and its texts may represent a hymn or prayer as well, written within the context of that Apollonian Hebdomadic cult. The plaque and its texts, in any case, offer an intriguing view of cult matters in Berezan in an early colonial period.

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

Figure 6. Drawing of the Berezan bone plaque, front



Figure 7. Drawing of the Berezan bone plaque, reverse

MILESIAN DECREES OF *ISOPOLITEIA* AND THE REFOUNDATION OF THE CITY, CA. 479 BCE

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During the course of the Ionian Revolt, when the outcome still lay in the balance, the Persians swore a horrible vengeance upon the disloyal Greeks. They promised to burn the houses and temples of the Greeks in revolt, castrate their sons, abduct their daughters, and give their land away to loyal subjects (Hdt. 6.9.4). Once the Battle of Lade in 494 BCE proved the supremacy of the Persians, their anger abated somewhat. While they did burn most cities, they left the land in possession of the Greeks, and they generally castrated only the handsomest youths and abducted only the prettiest virgins. Miletos, the instigator of the revolt, received their harshest treatment. Herodotos describes it (6.19.2–22.1), beginning with an oracle:

> καὶ τότε δή, Μίλητε, κακῶν ἐπιμήχανε ἔργων,
> πολλοῖσιν δεῖπνόν τε καὶ ἀγλαὰ δῶρα γενήσῃ,
> σαὶ δ' ἄλοχοι πολλοῖσι πόδας νίψουσι κομήταις,
> νηοῦ δ' ἡμετέρου Διδύμοις ἄλλοισι μελήσει.
>
> (19.3) τότε δὴ ταῦτα τοὺς Μιλησίους κατελάμβανε, ὅτε γε ἄνδρες μὲν οἱ πλεῦνες ἐκτείνοντο ὑπὸ τῶν Περσέων ἐόντων κομητέων, γυναῖκες δὲ καὶ τέκνα ἐν ἀνδραπόδων λόγῳ ἐγίνοντο, ἱρὸν δὲ τὸ ἐν Διδύμοισι, ὁ νηός τε καὶ τὸ χρηστήριον, συληθέντα ἐνεπίμπρατο. . . . (20) ἐνθεῦτεν οἱ ζωγρηθέντες τῶν Μιλησίων ἤγοντο ἐς Σοῦσα. βασιλεὺς δέ σφεας Δαρεῖος κακὸν οὐδὲν ἄλλο ποιήσας κατοίκισε ἐπὶ τῇ Ἐρυθρῇ καλεομένῃ θαλάσσῃ ἐν Ἄμπῃ πόλι, παρ' ἣν Τίγρης ποταμὸς παραρρέων ἐς θάλασσαν ἐξίει. τῆς δὲ Μιλησίων χώρης αὐτοὶ μὲν οἱ Πέρσαι εἶχον τὰ περὶ τὴν πόλιν καὶ τὸ πεδίον, τὰ δὲ ὑπεράκρια ἔδοσαν Καρσὶ Πηδασεῦσι ἐκτῆσθαι.
>
> . . . (22.1) Μίλητος μέν νυν Μιλησίων ἠρήμωτο·
>
> (19.2) And then, Miletos, contriver of evil deeds,
> you will be a feast for many and a shining gift,
> your wives will wash the feet of many long-haired men,
> and my temple at Didyma will be a concern to others.
>
> (19.3) And thus these things happened to the Milesians: many of the men were killed by the long-haired Persians, and the women and

> children were made into slaves. The sanctuary at Didyma—both the temple and the Oracle—was plundered and burned . . . (20) Then the survivors of the Milesians were taken to Susa. But King Dareios did no further harm to them, but rather he settled them on what is called the Red Sea, in the city of Ampe, near where the Tigris River flows as it empties into the sea. Of the Milesian land, the Persians themselves took possession of the areas around the city and the plain, while they gave the heights to the Karians from Pedasa to have as their own.
>
> . . . (22.1) Thus Miletos was emptied of Milesians.

Some fifteen years later, after the Battle of Mykale in 479 BCE, the Milesians rejoined the historical record, appearing regularly in the literature of the fifth century. Many historians make no comment upon this oddity of a city that is wiped out of existence and then reappears and returns to relative prosperity within fifty years. Other scholars, in particular the commentators on Herodotos, note a problem. At 9.99, a contingent of Milesians appears in the Persian army at the Battle of Mykale and wreaks havoc upon the fleeing Persians. The commentators hesitate to reconcile this passage with the story of the destruction. How and Wells state a commonly held view that Miletos never really lost all of its population: 'The expatriation of the Milesians can hardly have been complete, since the Milesians destroy the fugitive Persians after Mycale'.[1] In other words, one passage in Herodotos, about the Battle of Mykale, is arbitrarily used to reject another passage, about the depopulation of Miletos.[2] However, upon examination, the archaeological evidence from Miletos confirms the broad outline of Herodotos' report, so that, in the absence of strong arguments for preferring the second passage over the first, both should be accepted and rendered into a plausible historical chronicle. Thus, a better question is not whether Miletos was depopulated, but rather how it was repopulated to such an extent that it returned quickly to its status as one of the richest cities in Ionia.

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[1] *Ad* 6.20; cf. Macan *ad* 9.99; Tozzi (1978) 205. An older theory is that the inhabitants of Miletos were indeed transplanted and the city was not restored until at least the mid-fifth century (Wilamowitz (1914) 81; Mayer (1932) 1633–5), but it has been disproved by archaeological finds.

[2] The argument from silence—that no refoundation is mentioned anywhere—is a weak one, especially since Graham ((1992) 70) notes that Eretria, Kamarina, and Priene were destroyed in one historical account, but appear again as functioning polities soon afterwards, without any reference to a refoundation in any of our extant sources.

The answer lies in the Milesian colonies and the special treaties of *isopoliteia* that some of them shared with their mother city.

The sack of Miletos and its subsequent depopulation can be supported on several grounds. The fact of the destruction of the city is an unmistakable conclusion derived from the archaeological record. A layer of ash and debris, several meters deep in places, has been found between the classical and archaic levels throughout the city. For example, it is in evidence at the shrines of Apollo Delphinios (the patron god of Miletos) and Dionysos inside the city and at the Temple of Aphrodite at Zeytintepe, west of the city proper.[3] The classical residential areas on the Theater Hill, the Stadium Hill, and Kalabaktepe (a kind of acropolis just south of the city proper), as well as on the plain near the Hellenistic cross-wall, are all built upon terraces constructed by leveling out the debris layer.[4] Finally, the archaic ring-wall was destroyed at the end of the sixth century and not rebuilt until late in the fifth.[5] In sum, this destruction layer has been discovered in every part of the city where the excavation extends deeply enough to include the archaic level. Not a single structure is known to have withstood the sack, and the rubble was often terraced to form a level foundation for later constructions. One must conclude that Miletos was burned to the ground.

Whether or not the city continued to be occupied by Milesians during the years between 494 and 479 is a more difficult question. While it is impossible to use physical remains to prove that a city was not inhabited for such a short period, because the lack of evidence can never be conclusive, one may at least note a complete absence of any building or sherd on the city peninsula of Miletos that can be accurately dated to that time. In addition, Herodotos dwells at length on the depopulation itself, describing it in detail and

[3] Delphinios and Dionysos: Mellink (1974) 114. Dionysos: Müller-Wiener (1977) 135–7; (1977/78) 95; (1988) 35–6. Aphrodite: Gans (1991); Hölbl (1999).

[4] Theater Hill: Kleiner (1961) 47; Mellink (1984) 454; Müller-Wiener and Weber (1985), 31–4. Stadium Hill: Kleiner (1960) 40; Mellink (1974) 114. Kalabaktepe: Graeve (1986) 38–43; (1987); (1990); Müller-Wiener (1986) 100–4; (1988) 32–5; Mellink (1987); Mitchell (1989/90) 103; Brinkmann (1990); Graeve and Senff (1990); (1991); Heinrich and Senff (1992); Kerschner (1995); Senff (1995); (1997); Senff et al. (1997); Kerschner and Senff (1997). Near the south cross-wall: *Milet* 1.8, 39–40; Graeve (1975) 38.

[5] Esp. Müller-Wiener (1986); Cobet (1997). See also: *Milet* 1.8, 26–38, 116–17; 2.3, 9–11, 51–2, 91ff., 118–20; Kleiner (1961); (1966) 18–21; (1968) 23–32; Stümpel et al. (1997); Schneider (1997).

strongly emphasizing it both by comparing it to Sybaris, another luxurious city famous for its utter destruction, and by including the story about Phrynichos and his ill-fated play (Hdt. 6.21). To argue that Herodotos is simply wrong here or grossly exaggerating an event from his own lifetime that would have been familiar to his audience is to cast doubt upon the reliability of his entire work. It is especially telling that, in recounting the horror inflicted on the citizenry, he completely omits mention of the physical damage to the edifices of the city, perhaps judging it to be minor in comparison (he does report the burning of nearby Didyma). The story he tells is extreme but entirely plausible when seen in light of the Persian treatment of the other Ionian cities that were held less accountable for the revolt: Miletos was made an example and 'emptied of Milesians'.

Further, shifting the surviving population of Miletos to Ampe is an action entirely consistent with a long-standing Near Eastern policy of resettlement. The King would occasionally cause the population of an entire city to migrate to a distant part of the empire. The purposes for this policy varied, but certainly included the need to resettle a fertile area depopulated by other events, to fortify weak border areas, to resettle people displaced in war, and to break up local power bases and so eliminate potential rivals.[6] Herodotos offers instances when this policy is employed, first to settle the Barkans taken prisoner from Libya in Bactria (4.204) and later to settle the defeated Eretrians at Ardericca in Cissia, near Susa (6.119). He also mentions plans to move the entire Paionian nation from Europe to Asia (5.12–15) and allegedly to exchange the populations of Phoenicia and Ionia (6.3). Finally, in the listing of Persian tribute districts, Herodotos includes people resettled on islands in the Persian Gulf (3.93.2). Thus, it is perfectly reasonable to accept that, after demolishing the city, the King would have resettled its inhabitants in order to remove potential trouble-makers from the region of Ionia while at the same time dispensing a lesson to the other Persian subjects.[7]

Once we accept Herodotos' account of the depopulation, we must consider the problem of the resettlement. A significant reduction in

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[6] Oded (1979); cf. Demand (1990) 34–44.

[7] Ambaglio (1975) argues that deportations in Herodotos were never done to exterminate the people, but to destroy their political unity and every possibility of rebellion. The deportees were themselves left with relative autonomy and were free to maintain their customs and language.

population is to be expected in a city being rebuilt, and Miletos shrunk from a city perhaps as large as 64,000 in the archaic period to only about 15–20,000 at the most by the late fifth century.[8] This reduction is reflected among the archaeological finds: they show that the city peninsula was less widely and less densely populated in the fifth century than it had been before the Revolt. Yet as many as 20,000 new settlers cannot be derived from the survivors of the sack and deportation or from the Milesians living abroad. Though never again a major power, constrained first by the Athenian empire and later by the Persians, still the fifth-century city regained much of its former prosperity. This fact is evidenced by the *Athenian Tribute Lists* where, in the first year where the Milesian payment is extant, 450/49, the Milesians are paying 10 talents (*ATL* 1.342 no. 5.v.18), a figure known to be matched or bettered by only six other allies out of eighty-seven extant entries.[9] So where did the new settlers originate?

According to the archaeologists, the people returning to Miletos were originally relatively few in number, since they settled first in the highest and safest location, the hill of Kalabaktepe, south of the city proper. New buildings were erected on layers of Persian debris used to terrace the two plateaus with considerable care and at great expense, indicating that the people who did this work probably intended it to be their permanent home. Probably these people straggled back to the site during the interim period after the sack. Before too many years, however, the number of citizens gathered there grew larger than the one hill could house, no matter how thoroughly it was terraced. At this point, they mapped out a new city on the peninsula to the north using the strict orthogonal grid for which Miletos would become famous, but they omitted a city wall. Heavy construction took place in the second quarter of the fifth century, and at about the mid-century mark, once the initial streets and homes were put in place, the settlement on Kalabaktepe was permanently abandoned.[10]

As far as we can tell, the restored city was inhabited by people culturally indistinguishable from the original population. We have

[8] Roebuck (1984) 21–3 (archaic figure); Hoepfner and Schwandner (1994) 21 (classical figure). Pounds ((1973) 60; cf. Renfrew (1982) 277) makes a much smaller population calculation for the middle of the fifth century—only 7,500, based on an estimate of 750 people per talent of tribute.

[9] If we include figures in *lacunae* that are filled in from other lists, of the 125 entries only seven pay as much or more than the Milesians.

[10] Graeve (1986) 42–3; Kerschner (1995) 218.

direct confirmation in the first half of the fifth century for four of the six archaic Milesian tribes, which is in itself evidence only that the new settlers were Ionian.[11] However, the known archaic cult sites at Miletos universally continue in their function during the fifth century, as does the North Marketplace. In addition, Miletos is the only Greek state known to have eponymous *aisymnetai*, and a list of these officials (*Milet* 1.3 nos. 122–9) extends back to at least 525 BCE (if one does not accept a gap of fifteen years caused by the destruction), and perhaps to about 540 (with a gap).[12] A related inscription, known as the Molpoi Decree (*Milet* 1.3 no. 133), gives instructions for the formal inauguration of the new *aisymnetes* and recounts sacrifices and procedures included in the annual Sacred Procession from the Shrine of Apollo Delphinios, along the Sacred Way, and down to the Temple of Apollo at Didyma. This proclamation is pertinent because it is actually an amalgam of several decrees from different times, the chief sections of which date to before 479/78 and to 450/49 BCE (the whole was reengraved ca. 100 BCE). This inscription guarantees that the procession and the inauguration of the eponym bridge the gap between the archaic and classical city. Therefore, lacking any evidence of a change in institutions, nomenclature, or customs of any sort, we must assume that the new settlers had Milesian cultural roots.

The problem remains that the potential sources for these settlers were few. Certainly some would have come from the Milesian refugees who escaped the Battle of Lade and the destruction of Miletos (Hdt. 6.22.3). Others may have been Milesians who made their way back from Ampe. (Either of these groups could have supplied the small army contingent at the Battle of Mykale.) However, while these refugees may have been the first ones back on the site, and they undoubtedly contributed to the refoundation of the city, it is unlikely that their total number was large enough to explain the magnitude of the restored city. Instead, the likely source for many of the new Milesians must have been the citizens of the many Milesian colonies of the Pontos and Propontis. Miletos was probably most famous in the ancient world as the mother city of numerous colonies in the north-

[11] Milet 1.3.277–79 no. 133.1–5; Wiegand (1904) 85 = Milet Inv. no. 451. These tribes are confirmed at Ephesos, Samos, and Teos, and four occur in pre-Kleisthenic Athens: Roebuck (1961) 495–507; Ehrhardt (1983) 98–103; Jones (1987) 320–7 passim as well. A government reorganization in the middle of the fifth century included a change in tribes, and so rendered later evidence obsolete: see Gorman (2001) ch. 6.

[12] For this office, see Busolt and Swoboda (1920) 1.373–4; Romer (1982).

east Aegean and Black Sea. Ancients put the total as high as ninety, while modern estimates run to half of that number.[13] Thus, many colonies would have provided an ample reserve for any number of settlers with the same ancestry and heritage as the original Milesians.

Evidence for this source of citizens may be contained in certain Milesian inscriptions from the fourth century. The first is a treaty with Olbia, an important colony on the north shore of the Black Sea founded in the last half of the seventh century BCE.[14] Occupying a resource-rich area at the mouth of the Borysthenes or Berezan (Dneper) River (Hdt. 4.53.1–3), the Olbians supplemented their agricultural income by acting as intermediaries in the extensive and profitable trade between the Skythians and the Greeks in Ionia and elsewhere.[15] Thus, the colony prospered in the sixth and fifth centuries especially. It had a special relationship with its mother city in the late classical era, as witnessed by the treaty from Miletos, dating before 323 and possibly to 330, and which is discussed thoroughly by Graham.[16] The treaty reads:

> τάδε πάτρια Ὀλβιοπολίταις καὶ Μιλησ[ί-]
> οις· τὸμ Μιλήσιον ἐν Ὀλβίη(ι) πόλει ὡς Ὀλ-
> βιοπολίτην θύειν ἐπὶ τῶν αὐτῶμ βω-
> μῶν καὶ εἰς τὰ ἱερὰ τὰ αὐτὰ φοιτᾶν τὰ
> δημόσια κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ Ὀλβιοπολί-
> τας· εἶναι δὲ καὶ ἀτελείας Μιλησίοις κα-
> θάσσα καὶ πρότερον ἦσαν· ἐὰν δὲ θέλῃ
> τιμουχιῶμ μετέχειν, ἐπὶ βουλὴν ἐπίτω
> καὶ ἀπογραφεὶς μετεχέτω καὶ ἔστω
> ἐντελής, καθότι καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πολῖται
> εἰσίν· εἶναι δὲ καὶ προεδρίαγ καὶ εἰσκη-
> ρύσσεσθαι εἰς τοὺς ἀγῶνας καὶ ἐπα-

[13] Pliny, *Naturalis Historia* 5.112 (ninety colonies); Seneca, *Ad Helviam* 7 (seventy-five colonies). Cf. Strabo 14.1.6; Ps.-Skymnos 734–7; *Milet* 1.7 nos. 233–6, 239, 240. Bilabel (1920) 13–60 (forty-five colonies); Graham (1982) 160–2 (thirty colonies); Ehrhardt (1983) 96 and passim (forty primary and thirty secondary colonies).

[14] Eusebios (95b Helm) assigns the date 647 to Berezan, and archaeological evidence from both sites dates to this same period. There is great debate as to whether Berezan was a separate colony from Olbia. Ps. Skymnos 804–9 = 809–14 Diller; Mela 2.1.6; Hdt. 4.78.3. Certainly Olbia/Berezan is the most thoroughly excavated Greek city in the Black Sea. Modern reports include: Vinogradov (1981); Vinogradov-Kryzickij (1995); Solovyov (1999).

[15] For Skythian art and trade, see Jacobson (1995) 41–5.

[16] *Milet* 1.3 no. 136 (Tod 2.270–2 no. 195); Graham (1983) ch. 6; Ehrhardt (1983) 233–41. The translation given here is from Graham 100, except that the spelling of 'Miletos' has been changed.

ρᾶσθαι ταῖς τριακάσιγ, καθάσσα καὶ
ἐμ Μιλήτωι ἐπαρῶνται· ἐὰν δέ τι συμβό-
λαιον ἦ(ι) τῶι Μιλησίωι ἐν Ὀλβίαι, ἰσχέτω δί-
κηγ καὶ ὑπεχέτω ἐμ πένθ' ἡμέραις ἐπὶ
τοῦ δημοτικοῦ δικαστηρίου· εἶναι δὲ
(ἀ)τελεῖς πάντας Μιλησίους, πλὴν ὅσοι
ἐν ἄλλη(ι) πόλει πολιτεύονται καὶ ἀρχείω(μ)
μετέχουσιγ καὶ δικαστηρίων. κατὰ ταὐ-
τὰ δὲ καὶ Ὀλβιοπολίτας ἐμ Μιλήτωι ἀτε-
λεῖς εἶναι, καὶ τὰ ἄλλα κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν
τρόπον Ὀλβιοπολίταις ἐμ Μιλήτωι ὑπάρ-
χειγ καθότι καὶ Μιλησίοις ἐν Ὀλβίη(ι) πόλει.

The following are traditional arrangements for the Olbiopolitans and Milesians. That the Milesian in the city of Olbia sacrifice like an Olbiopolitan on the same altars, and partake (5) in the same public cults under the same conditions as the Olbiopolitans. That the Milesian have exemption from taxation at it was formerly. That, if he wish to become eligible for office, he is to come before the Council and be entered on the rolls and be liable to (10) taxation as other citizens are. That they (i.e. the Milesians) have the right of privileged seats at public gatherings, of being announced at athletic contests and of praying at the festival of the *triakades*, as they pray at Miletos. And that, if the Milesian have a law suit (15) arising from a legal contract, the case shall be tried within five days at the public court. That all Milesians be exempt from taxation except those who in another city exercise citizenship, (20) hold magistracies and take part in the courts. That, on the same terms, the Olbiopolitan be exempt from taxes, and the other arrangements apply in the same way to the Olbiopolitan in Miletos as to the Milesians in the city of Olbia.

This inscription establishes equal citizenship or *isopoliteia* between the two cities, Miletos and Olbia. Citizens from either city could go to the other and enjoy a privileged status: exemption from taxation, the right to sacrifice in the public cults, special seats at public gatherings, and the right to argue law suits in the public court that was reserved for citizens. Also, any citizen of the one city who wanted to obtain full citizenship—especially eligibility for public office—in the other city need only declare himself liable to taxation. This relationship was very unusual, for, while it was common for mother cities to reserve the right to send later settlers to a colony as full citizens, the colonists' right of return was usually strictly limited (cf. Hdt. 4.156.3).

The second significant point is the abrupt beginning that establishes the fact that this decree is a restatement of 'traditional practices' (τάδε πάτρια). This relationship must have been in effect in the past and then lapsed for some reason before it was reestablished

in this treaty. Thus Graham says, 'It may be assumed that the treaty was necessary because these arrangements had been in abeyance. The most obvious reason for this would be the Persian control of Miletus'.[17] Since Miletos was in Persian hands from ca. 540 to 479, and again from 412 to 334, the earlier treaty must have dated either between 479 and 412 or to before 540: Graham thinks most probably the second half of the fifth century, after Miletos had returned to prosperity, or the early sixth century, before the Persian conquest of Ionia.

However, a more likely date for the original treaty of *isopoliteia* is when the city of Miletos was being refounded, probably immediately after the Battle of Mykale. The returning Milesian refugees would have naturally looked to the colonies for additional settlers, and the lure of citizenship in the mother city would have been an effective enticement to bring sufficient numbers of citizens from the colonies—many of them prosperous cities in their own right—back to the ruins of Miletos. A parallel for this action can be found at Teos, which was abandoned to the Persians but then resettled around the second half of the sixth century by settlers from just one colony, Abdera. Afterwards, the two cities may have been very closely linked, sharing not just *isopoliteia*, but *sympoliteia* (one unified government for the two). Furthermore, Graham argues that attempts to refound Sybaris after its destruction ca. 510 were probably undertaken by its colonies, Skidros, Laus, and Posidonia.[18]

If Miletos shared *isopoliteia* with just one colony, this theory would be weak. The case of Teos aside, one single city was not likely to provide the thousands of settlers needed for classical Miletos. However, this relationship of *isopoliteia* existed with Kyzikos as well, a very wealthy city and, according to Eusebios (88b Helm), the earliest colony in the Propontis, dating back to 756 BCE. A treaty between Miletos and Kyzikos (*Milet* 1.3 no. 137) dates to much the same time as the treaty with Olbia, before 323 BCE, and is very fragmentary, breaking off after only 16 lines. After a sudden beginning consisting only of a listing of the people who are swearing the treaty, the remaining extant text reads (ll. 11–16):

[17] Graham (1983) 105.

[18] Graham (1992) esp. 53, 69–70; Demand (1990) 39–43. Graham argues for the colonies as a major source for settlers at Miletos, but does not directly connect the treaties of *isopoliteia* to this incident.

. . . τὰς μὲν πόλεις φίλας εἶ-
ναι ἐς τὸν ἅπαντα χρόνον
κατὰ τὰ πάτρια· εἶναι δὲ τὸν
Κυζικηνὸν ἐμ Μιλήτωι Μι-
λήσιον καὶ τὸν Μιλήσιον ἐν
Κυζίκωι Κυζικηνόν, καθότ[ι]
[καὶ πρότερον ἦσαν -----]

. . . the cities be friends for all time according to the traditional arrangements, and the Kyzikene at Miletos (15) be Milesian and the Milesian at Kyzikos be Kyzikene, just as (it was formerly)[19]

Again there is a bald beginning and a reference to traditional arrangements. These are followed by the clear statement of *isopoliteia*: any citizen of the one city who comes to the other may be a citizen there.

What we know about Milesian *isopoliteia* is dependent upon the chance survival of later inscriptions: we have two treaties that are clearly examples of that relationship. Another inscription containing a treaty with Istros may have included similar provisions, but the text is too broken for certainty.[20] One between Miletos and Kios from ca. 228 BCE (*Milet* 1.3 no. 141) also contains some elements of *isopoliteia*, while the fact that Miletos and Amisos issued the same coinage in the third century might also be a sign of such a relationship there.[21] If two or three such inscriptions survive, many more may have been lost. Certainly the original decrees—the ones to which the two inscriptions cited above refer—have not been found. The fact remains that, out of all the Greek mother cities, only Miletos had such a relationship with at least some of its colonies. These treaties of *isopoliteia* may serve as the most important witness to the source of the new population of fifth-century Miletos: any colonist who would return to the mother city would be given full citizenship in exchange for his participation in the rebuilding of Miletos.

In summary, the events described in Hdt. 6.19.2–22.1 are not only plausible, but entirely consistent with the physical and epigraphic evidence from Miletos. Persia sacked the city and killed or relocated the entire population. For the next fifteen years, while Persia still clung to Ionia, some settlers may have returned from among those

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[19] Graham (1983) 107–8. The restoration is formulaic (cf. line 6 of the Treaty with Olbia).

[20] Lambrino (1927–32) 398; restored by Robert (1928) 171–2 as a treaty of *isopoliteia*.

[21] Ehrhardt (1983) 235, 238.

who fled the sack or were absent abroad at the time. They settled cautiously on Kalabaktepe, awaiting events. When the Battle of Mykale and subsequent events pushed the Persian authority out of Ionia, the settlers looked to restore their once-famous city to something of its former size and status. They planned out a new, orthogonal city on the ruins of the old, rebuilt on an ambitious scale, and then peopled the site by enticing colonists to join them as full-citizens in the mother city. Economic prosperity recurred quickly, probably in large part because the Milesians were able to exploit their extensive colonial ties and reestablish former trading patterns with alacrity. Thus, in a remarkably short time, Miletos was able to regain much of its former standing in Ionia.

Dedicated to A.J. Graham, the finest example of a teacher-scholar that I have ever known.

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EXPLORING THE VALIDITY OF THE CONCEPT OF 'FOUNDATION': A VISIT TO MEGARA HYBLAIA

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Colony and mother city in ancient Greece, John Graham's first major topic of research, was influenced by scholarly concerns shaped in a world that knew great colonial empires. This was not, however, the immediate context of Graham's academic development. Scholarly interests also tend to change their focus: some twenty years after the publication of Graham's *Colony and Mother City* in 1964, Jean-Paul Morel noted that questions regarding the role of mother cities had been set aside.[1] No one actually came out and said that mother cities were irrelevant, but the topic was quietly dropped in the course of a general shift of interests from political to more sociologically oriented questions. Now, another twenty years later, we have reached a new stage: some historians and archaeologists have come to reject the very notion of 'foundation', thus eliminating altogether the relevance of the mother city, especially as the initiator of colonization. 'A proper understanding of Archaic Greek history', writes Robin Osborne, 'can only come when chapters on 'Colonization' are eradicated from books on early Greece'.[2]

The rejection of 'foundation' seems to me to stem from two sometimes opposing intellectual trends: first, the legacy of the *Annales* school and Fernand Braudel's dismissal of the 'history of events' in favor of 'regions', 'networks', and questions of the *longue durée*, and second, the rise of a general anti-essentialist attitude often articulated by postmodernist thinkers as a denial of both 'hierarchy' and 'subject'. The first of these makes any claim to a singular, well-defined 'event' (such as is implied by a 'foundation') suspect *a priori*. Diffusion and fluid processes are more congenial to such a mind-set than distinct mother cities, dates of foundations, homogeneous groups of settlers,

[1] Morel (1983).
[2] Osborne (1998) 269.

and identifiable named leaders of colonial foundations ('oikists'). The second trend is more specifically expressed in the (especially British-associated) historiography of 'colonization', an awkward though consensual term unfortunately applied to the ancient Greek world. Since ancient city foundations were obviously different from modern colonialism[3] and since modern colonialism was effected 'from above', implying intention, causes, and direction from a metropolis, ancient 'colonization' must have been different—not really directed from mother cities and lacking any 'modernist' intentions, such as 'safeguarding trade routes'. In other words, a foundational colonial discourse is simply anachronistic.

It is claimed that our sources for Archaic Greek colonization, mostly from the Classical period, project late notions of dominant mother-city foundations into the history of early Greek settlements (mostly in the eighth and seventh centuries). These sources are viewed as collapsing processes and creating a kind of tunnel vision, thus providing colonies with neat and precise dates of foundation, names of founders, and the cohesive identities of mother cities. But in fact, it is argued, none of the above is correct: 'colonization' was a process, not an 'event',[4] involving a mixed bag of people who later invented for themselves precise origins, dates, and names of founders. This point of view implies that the foundation of a colony (or, in more neutral terms, 'the establishment of a settlement') had no collective agenda either on the part of the sending community (whose existence as such is also denied), or on the part of settlers as a group (whose cohesiveness is also disputed). At best new settlements appear as initiatives of private individuals and their followers, perhaps analogous to Viking lords and their retainers. According to this approach, the literary evidence is seen as anachronistic and the archaeological is explained very differently, avoiding any implication of organized foundation. Pottery evidence is regarded as too varied for comfort, and territorial planning (town and countryside), which for most people implies a collective grasp of a foundational situation with religious and social elements that require concrete and simultaneous expression on the land, is also serialized and fragmented into 'contextualized' and open-ended units.

[3] Bérard (1960).
[4] Cf. Purcell (1990); Braund (1998) 287–96.

Megara Hyblaia: Basic Parameters

A test case capable of refuting all of these claims is the Sicilian polis of Megara Hyblaia, established (according to modern calculations relying on Thucydides) in 728 BC, to which John Graham devoted a paper entitled 'Megara Hyblaia and the Sicels'.[5] The Megarians, according to Thucydides (6.4.1), settled a flat plain in a completely indefensible position under the protection and at the invitation of the Sikel King Hyblon. Megara Hyblaia was later overshadowed by Syracuse, its close neighbor and eventual destroyer two hundred and forty five years after its foundation. Unlike other Sicilian cities, the site remained basically uninhabited, a joy to the French archaeologists, who were able to excavate an undisturbed site, and to historians, who could readily believe—because of its lack of defenses—the story of this 'colonization by invitation' (as John Graham labels it) at an undesirable and uncharacteristic colonial site.[6]

What makes Megara Hyblaia special is its unique archaeological situation: modern excavations have revealed comprehensive conceptual planning, with roads, housing blocks, precise median divisions (house plots back to back), and public and sacred spaces in the center (the 'agora') and at the extremities. Houses dating to the first generation of settlers (last third of the eighth century) have been found, and the rest (including built temples) adhered to the original layout of the settlement. Among many others, I have supported the idea that the town planning of Megara Hyblaia shows a high degree of sophistication, a firm grasp of the situation, and a bold and concentrated effort—in other words, a 'foundation'.[7]

Sanctuaries and Foundation

Let us begin with the gods: they, too, were colonists and needed their equivalent of *kleroi*, reserved plots of land, in the form of *temene* ('sacred precincts'). We find these in the central areas of habitation ('urban' sanctuaries), on the periphery, and at some considerable

[5] The main literary sources for Megara Hyblaia's foundation are Thuc. 6.4; Ephoros *FGH* 70 F 137; Polyaenus, *Strategemata* 5.5; Strabo 6.267; Ps.-Scymnus 270–82; see Graham (1988).

[6] Vallet (1968); Vallet, Villard, and Auberson (1976).

[7] Malkin (1987) 174.

distance from the center ('extra-urban' sanctuaries). In *Religion and Colonization in Ancient Greece* (1987), I asked how the Greeks knew where to give their gods new homes in their new lands. The question, fundamental in terms of the history of both Greek religion and society, quickly found itself situated in a discourse of the history of urbanism and spatial organization. This is because, aside from some explicit statements in Greek sources (mostly late, except for Homer) and some Classical inscriptions, there is no evidence of explicit criteria for the new cities of the eighth and seventh centuries. I wanted to be able to observe the relationship of the sacred areas to the other material expressions of the new societies: houses, streets, *necropoleis*, and public areas. My claim was that in observable urban contexts we might avoid the arbitrary or impressionistic speculations of historians of Greek religion about epiphanies, inherent sacredness, natural ambiance, memories of Mycenaean presence, and so on. From the study of urban spatial arrangements, especially those of the time of foundation, I hoped to show that the same criteria were operative for all the elements just mentioned (both sacred and not) and that these criteria appear both rational and functional. I argued that we needed to examine the first sacred precincts at the time of foundation because these would answer needs that we must recognize as *a priori*: the anchoring of the gods in the new land and its religious expression in terms of divine presence and cult in the form of *temenos* ('sacred precinct') and *bomos* ('altar'). These precincts (not built temples) were necessary for worship. I was content to see that the earliest colony for which we have significant archaeological evidence for comprehensive planning, Megara Hyblaia, seemed to confirm my hypothesis: the layout of streets and houses and the reserved public space (the agora) were there at the outset.

I have never claimed that these urban sanctuaries had any necessary priority over peripheral ones. The kind of investigation I was suggesting for the generation of the founders was, however, impossible for peripheral and extra-urban sanctuaries because we could not assess their surroundings (houses, roads, etc.), and therefore I set aside peripheral religious and territorial criteria that seemed to me unverifiable and impossible to assess.

As for the extra-urban sanctuaries (at a distance of at least a few miles), David Asheri has shown that in some cases what looks to us like a sanctuary distant from some center was in fact a central sanctuary for a late group of immigrants who were permitted to reside only on the periphery. Thus a verifiable historical context rather

than an imagined spatial symbolism may provide a reasonable explanation.[8] I have suggested other reasons, both religious and mundane, for extra-urban siting: *temene* were needed not just for worship but also for revenue, implying the need for large 'estates' (also a common meaning of *temenos* in Homer). The new settlers, I argued, provided the gods with immediately operative cultic *temene* both on the periphery and at the centers of their habitation because these were necessary for worship. These larger areas were established very far out; hence they appear 'extra-urban'. In other words, settlers did not wish to 'waste' large tracts of land near home; the nearer and better agricultural land went to the human settlers, whereas the gods could wait until the larger areas (less secure and more distant) could be routinely occupied. Much must have depended on security, and the gods could be expected to fend for themselves in the initial stages.[9] This suggestion has the advantage of looking at the siting of sacred precincts in terms of Greek religious and economic practices while avoiding the application of our own constructed territorial symbolism. This symbolism, heavily influenced by the discourse of boundaries of the late twentieth century, has little if any explicit articulation in ancient practices.

François de Polignac, emphasizing the 'bipolar' aspect of the ancient city, with central and extra-urban sanctuaries that provided the community with a symbolic, 'bounded' territory, has brilliantly employed such symbolism. I was troubled by various aspects of this approach, mostly because of the impossibility of providing criteria for either proof or refutation of the claimed symbolic value.[10] Moreover, that a Greek colony knew, right from the start, the extent of its own future territory seemed unlikely. A city such as Megara Nisaia, in mainland Greece, was sandwiched between Corinth and Athens, but Greek colonies had natural 'borders', mostly in the form of coastlines, and open-ended 'frontiers' towards the hinterland. For example, rather than having any finite, *a priori*, territorial conception, it appears that the founders of Gela started their aggressive expansion immediately, as an anecdote about the oikist Antiphemos and the village of Omphake indicates.[11] Surely its borders were considered temporary

[8] Asheri (1988).
[9] Malkin (1996).
[10] Malkin (1987b).
[11] Paus. 8.46.2; 9.40.4. For the notions of 'frontier' and 'border' see Daverio Rocchi (1988) with Sartre (1979).

frontiers awaiting the opportunity for expansion. Finally, the positive evidence for the lateness of some of the extra-urban sanctuaries was also troubling. Some of these indicate religious activity no earlier than two or three generations (i.e., a whole century) after initial settlement. How could they have conveyed a bipolar, foundational territorial symbolism from the beginning? To retain such a notion one must either extend the idea of 'foundation' to the point of meaninglessness or reject 'foundation' completely (but at the risk of abandoning much of the significance of foundational bipolarity).

What is meant by 'foundation' in a Greek colonial context? My definition rests on the general notion that all activities within the first generation of a colony's life are foundational.[12] Greek colonies signified the end of the process when they accorded cult to dead founders and buried them in the agora. It is no accident, for example, that the posterity of oikists did not enjoy special privileges (the royal houses of Cyrene are an obvious exception). Heroization elevated the oikist while simultaneously appropriating him for the whole community rather than just dynastic aristocracy.[13] The cult probably played a role similar to a modern 'Independence Day', helping to anchor a narrative of foundation, a date, and a pivotal figure in the community's collective memory and identity for generations to come. It was also, by definition, an idiosyncratic cult that could truly belong only to the new city, since it could not have been imported from any mother city. Thus a 'foundation' may have lasted as many as forty years (the reputed, schematic figure for Battos) but certainly not an entire century.

What, then, is the significance of foundation dates? What does it mean to say that Syracuse was founded in 733 if the foundational acts lasted an entire generation—until, say, the death of its founder, Archias? Foundation dates are equivalent to ceremonial cornerstones: when such a stone is placed in the ground there is as yet no building above it. However, the ritualized act seems significant and histories of buildings usually do not fail to mention the precise date on which the cornerstone was laid, even though one might have begun, alternatively, with the purchase of the land, the approval of the archi-

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[12] Cf. de Polignac (1995) 99: '(i)n general, all the religious sites of the city, both urban and nonurban, were established simultaneously or within the space of a single generation'.

[13] Malkin (1987) ch. 7.

tectural plans, and so on. There is no argument among modern historians that at some point Greeks started counting foundation dates and that they did so in a very different way from the mythical dating of primordial cities such as Thebes, Athens, or even pre-Dorian Sparta. By contrast, the 'new cities', as Thucydides calls them,[14] were new not just because they were now right by the sea instead of inland but because they were perceived as having had a beginning in human memory, founded not by a mythic hero such as Kadmos but by an Archias, a familiar, historical Bacchiad and a Corinthian. City beginnings have a symbolic dimension. Should one be surprised that people claimed to remember a foundation and transmit that memory to posterity?

At the international congress 'Greek Colonists and Native Populations' in Australia in 1985, A. di Vita compared the foundation dates of Greek colonies with the various, contradictory foundation dates of Melbourne and concluded that foundation dates had no real historical value.[15] The controversy points to the importance that has come to be attached to Melbourne's foundation date. These contradictory dates, similarly to those for the Greek colonies, both are within human memory and claim precision. However, the discourse and interests of a Greek colonist such as a citizen of Syracuse were very different from those of a Melbourne resident. Melbourne did not start off as an independent political community with social, cohesive forces operating at once and in need of quick, unifying articulation and symbolization. Moreover, for most Greek colonies the foundation was an 'event' in concrete and sometimes traumatic ways: conquest, violent destruction and expulsion, and appropriation. The capture of Ortygia by Archias is reported as such an event, and here the archaeological evidence for the destruction of native houses and the superimposition of Ortygia's early Greek houses and sanctuaries seems to confirm this. Why is it so hard to conceive of the memorialization of such a glorious/traumatic event, pinpointed to a particular year? Even those with a distaste for *histoire évenémentielle* acknowledge that some 'events' are bounded, recognizable phenomena, especially when their participants so perceive them.

De Polignac, one of the most fertile and original historians of Archaic Greece, has come some way in his continuing reassessment of ancient

[14] Thuc. 1.7.1.

[15] Di Vita (1990) 345.

sanctuaries. At some point he suggested extending the notion of 'foundation' quite significantly, and recently he has proposed an excellent emphasis on intra-community and inter-individual 'mediation' as the salient aspect of extra-urban sanctuaries.[16] However, in a paper directly addressing Megara Hyblaia, his opinion of its early urbanism explicitly confronts my own evaluation of the criteria for the placement of its sanctuaries and, especially, prefers the vaguer terms of 'birth' or 'coming into being' (*genèse*) to the defined, intentional, event-oriented, historical term 'foundation'.[17] 'To think of "foundation"', says Marcel Detienne, 'is for us to think of the singularity of one space in comparison with an entire space, through the name, the specific characteristics, the borders which one assigns to it; it is also to think of the beginning in the invocation of an event which is initial, isolated, recognized; finally, it is to think of a subject, individual or collective, in connection with an act, an intervention'.[18]

The guiding principle of de Polignac's refutation of my approach, assuming that sanctuaries were set aside according to the same rational and functional criteria that were applied to the rest of the elements of Megara Hyblaia (streets, agora, houses), is a charge of teleological thinking. By pushing the thesis of intentional planning, division of the space, and reservation of demarcated areas to a logical extreme—as if eighth-century colonists had had a fully developed Aristotelian polis in their heads when they established Megara Hyblaia—the foundational argument becomes either bad history or, to be kinder, ingenuous. A medieval copyist, he says by way of analogy, leaving blank pages for more text to be inserted later, could not have foreseen that an illuminator (not a scribe) would apply his art to these, yet had we not known about the copyist's practice we might have drawn precisely that inference. The blank pages, says de Polignac, are equivalent to the reserved area at Megara Hyblaia that only later came to function as an agora or a site for a temple. Hence the foundational claims become a teleological fallacy.

And yet, the illuminator painted neither canvas nor frescoes but pages in a book and would have worked in the same medium as the copyist. One cannot, of course, point to the cult instituted by Cleisthenes in the Athenian agora for the ten eponymous heroes and claim that the entire Athenian agora had initially been reserved for

[16] de Polignac (1994).
[17] de Polignac (1999).
[18] Detienne (2000) 46.

this specific purpose. The agora had, however, been reserved for the general purpose of public affairs and cults, the details of which might vary considerably, just like writing or illuminating on the pages of a book. As Roland Martin reminds us, a Greek agora would have been regarded as a sacred precinct.[19] The area of the agora at eighth-century Megara Hyblaia was reserved at the outset (no one seriously denies that), and I agree that it was probably not reserved for its specialized seventh-century functions: differentiated areas of altars, dining hall and/or *heroon*,[20] 'proper' agora, sacred precincts, and temples. Hence I fail to see teleology here: in my view the area we know as the agora of Megara Hyblaia was reserved at the outset for public and religious rather than private use. Its specialized functions were developed and refined later. Just as the spaces for houses and roads were laid out initially and future development consisted of 'filling in', similarly, reserved (intentionally unbuilt) areas were set aside at the outset and dutifully respected by future generations. It was within them that further functional specialization took place. None of this means that Greek colonists in the eighth century planned to set up Plato's Cretan City or Hippodamus's Piraeus.

There are also two serious methodological issues to consider. The first concerns *a priori* arguments from Greek religious practices that may not be avoided: it is safe to assume that Greek settlers feared their gods and wished them to 'hold the land' (*echein ten gen*) they were settling. If we accept that they did, the question is not whether they worshipped their gods but where and how. Initially, sacred objects of cult were probably kept not in temples but in the hands of aristocratic families, as the Deinomenids of Gela seem to indicate.[21] However, community worship took place not in aristocratic homes but in public spaces such as the precincts of Ortygia at Syracuse (although on a cramped and smaller scale than at Megara Hyblaia), or that of the acropolis at Cumae (see below). *Community* worship at an altar within a sacred precinct was not a novelty of the seventh century but something that needed actualization right from the start. But where? In Homer we find both undemarcated sites of worship (Nestor's public sacrifice to Poseidon at Pylos) but more often the formula 'precinct and fragrant altar'.

[19] Martin (1951) ch. 2.
[20] Bergquist (1992) 141–2.
[21] Hdt. 7.153.

Some kind of *temenos*, therefore, was essential, but it is not always easy for us to spot one. Although in cultic terms they were always more important than the built temples, *temene* are notoriously difficult to identify except when they have an observable *peribolos* wall and a built altar (altars, especially ash altars, can also be difficult).[22] What this means for Megara Hyblaia is first, that we are entitled to look for its *temene* and, second, that reserved sacred areas surrounded by contemporary urban elements that define them as 'reserved' may be more significant for drawing inferences about the foundational context than peripheral or extra-urban sanctuaries.

The second problem is one of historiographical approach to colonial situations: are developments in a 'new world' to be regarded as slow, evolutionary processes or as abrupt changes? Following di Vita's reassessment of colonization and urbanism, de Polignac prefers to see the initial phases of colonies as copies of what such settlers had known at home: clusters of families or Dark Age villages or towns. Megara Hyblaia's remarkable planned aspects accordingly represent the culmination of a long process that had begun long before the last third of the eighth century, although, admittedly, there is no evidence for this. This approach implies that people are constrained by familiar urban 'models'. Developed urbanization, however, must be a later phenomenon of reorganization. In Megara Hyblaia this would be the last third of the seventh century. This also seems to be the view of Robin Osborne (below).

What seems to underlie such views is an evolutionary, processual conception of human action. This approach is suspicious of abruptness and the sudden appearance of new paradigms. One will, I suppose, write differently about Greek colonization in Paris, Oxford, or Tel Aviv. In a post-empire, precedent-oriented country like England—where 'constitution' has been a matter of agglomeration, where no 'Independence Day' is celebrated, where philosophical empiricism reigned for generations, where some of the colleges are centuries old—one tends, perhaps, to be more open to 'fluidity' and less trustful of abrupt foundational claims. By contrast, writing in a university that is barely forty years old in a country that is just over fifty—where the national *lieux de mémoire* are either two millennia or just a few decades old, with very little in between, where almost every city or kibbutz has a remembered history of the specific day of its 'foun-

[22] Bergquist (1992); Etienne (1992). Cf. Etienne and le Dinahet (1991).

dation'—one adopts a very different outlook. Moreover, whereas European historiography is accustomed to viewing 'colonization' as something 'from above' (hence, rightly, the uneasiness with regard to applying the concept to Archaic Greek history) Israeli historiography of ancient Greek colonization (especially David Asheri's writings and my own) is probably conditioned by a mindset of foundation 'from below', with no sense of belonging to a metropolis and a strong emphasis on the small community. In terms of their active life and self-perception, Kibbutz-settlers (especially between the 1920s and the 1950s) were on their own, serving no interest of a 'mother country'.

My own *lieux de mémoire* are therefore neither centuries-old Oxbridge colleges nor the Sorbonne nor memories of a Jewel in the Crown, nor even postcolonial, 'hybrid' literatures resulting from decolonization. Rather, they are Degania, Nahallal, and Tel Aviv—a *kibbutz* (a socialist commune), a *moshav* (corporate or private village), and the newly founded city (perhaps the only major city in modern Israel that has little archaeological past) in which I now reside. With no metropolis and with Diaspora origins, it is the convergence in an 'Altneuland' that gives settlement its character 'from below'. Israelis, especially in kibbutzim, are keenly aware of *the day* on which they (or their parents) 'mounted the land', (*aliya la'karka*), when the founders allocated kibbutz space for a communal dining room, children's quarters, residence areas, and fields, areas that were gradually filled up as time went by (see fig. 8). The numbers of settlers and the sizes of settlements are comparable to those of an ancient Greek *apoikia* rather than those of a modern Melbourne. The notion of 'foundation' is valid here beyond a reasonable doubt, even without any official founder or mother city. This is clearly the situation both on the ground and in terms of social institutions such as the Members' Assembly, which functioned right from the start as a kind of sovereign direct democracy. One day, perhaps, a comparative study of kibbutzim, *moshavim* and *apoikiai* should be conducted. At the moment all I can do is to point to the difference between my own *Zeitgeist* and that of those who consider early Greek colonization as having taken place 'from above' and, (rightly) finding little evidence for that, deny the very existence of 'foundation'. I am fully aware that my own conditioning may be as misguided as the one I am trying to confront here, but such is the nature of the changing perspectives of historians.

Let us observe some of the relevant elements at Megara Hyblaia (fig. 9): Block 6 includes house 23.5, aligned with the agora and

belonging to its initial phase of the last third of the eighth century. To its north, between the house and the crossroads, the space was not filled until the third quarter of the seventh century, when a house (d) was built that is identified by the excavators as a *heroon* or, in B. Bergquist's opinion, an official dining hall. Immediately to the south of house 23.5 is temple C, the structure of which probably belongs to the late seventh century. It is set back, leaving an open space between it and the agora, and in this open space was found an isolated block that the excavators convincingly interpret as an altar.[23] Embedded in the earth around it were found sherds of Protocorinthian pottery, S-O-S amphorae of the second and third quarters of the seventh century—much earlier than ca. 630, when Megara Hyblaia experienced an urban re-organization. The exceptional situation of the building of temple C, disregarding the median block and built at the expense of former dwellings to the west, indicates that a special effort was made not to encroach on the open area in front of it, facing the agora, obviously reserved earlier and precisely where the altar was found. It thus seems that this site had a specialized sacred function from the beginning. De Polignac mentions Temple C, but the altar plays no part in his argument.[24] But there were probably other altars, impossible to find. If we consider that 'deposit' or 'ash altars' continue in Greek practice down to the Classical period, any argument from silence ('none were discovered') for the reserved areas of Megara Hyblaia is questionable.[25]

Let us also remember that sacred precincts would often contain more than one cult or temple. Thus a claim of teleological fallacy—inferring that a sacred precinct was reserved for a particular deity (that we know was established late)—is irrelevant. What matters is the reservation of the area and its designation as public *and* sacred; within that area the 'public' and the 'sacred' would be further refined and differentiated. If the altar within the *temenos* of temple C was there in the eighth century, which is quite probable, then we might say that we have identified such a function at the very beginning of the colony's history within the reserved area of Megara Hyblaia's agora.

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[23] de Polignac (1999) 216, where the altar is omitted.

[24] de Polignac (1999) 221: 'Aucune autre trace de culte n'est connue dans l'espace urbain dans cette première phase'.

[25] Rupp (1983).

To the north, temple J, built in the third quarter of the seventh century, is also situated in the same (or extended) reserved area of the agora. It maintains the same relation to the agora as temple C; there is an open, reserved area between it and the agora (here no earlier altar has been found). This is again, in my view, a case of later specification within the reserved space and its general, sacred aspect. Other temples would also be built 'inside' the agora during the third and fourth quarters of the seventh century (g, 650–625, and h, ca. 625–600). That such temples are late should cause us no difficulty: again, it is often the case that temple buildings were constructed later in sacred areas that had been reserved earlier.

Aside from this, I am happy to accept de Polignac's perspicacious observation about the peripheral sanctuaries[26] and his conclusion that eventually a 'belt' of sanctuaries was formed with special attention to temple A and its equivalent (g) in the center of Megara Hyblaia—both built on *previously* reserved land. Again, one is in no position to claim that peripheral sanctuaries were not reserved *ab initio* or that they were less important than central ones; it is just that it is both possible and fruitful to assess the criteria for the siting of the central ones because of their observable, comparable context.

In sum, it seems that the archaeological evidence points to the foundational colonial situation as a new field of experimentation. Megara Hyblaia was not a copy of its home town, implying the presumed *synoikismos* that was taking place, about the same time, at Megara Nisaia. This experimentation was motivated not by any utopian ideology or prognosis but by the imperatives and conditions of the novel situation: new terrain, a new (and young) society, and the immediate needs for *kleros* division, *temene* for the gods, physical organization, and social, political, and religious co-optation. That Megara Hyblaia saw further integration and physical re-organization in the later seventh century is very probable. In fact, to de Polignac's arguments one may add those of d'Angelis, who convincingly claims that Megara Hyblaia knew a period of prosperity during the last third of the sixth century that resulted in its foundation of Selinous. But all this has little bearing on the intentional and planned reservation of sacred and public areas during the foundation. One would not like to find oneself arguing, teleologically, in reverse.

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[26] de Polignac (1999) 217.

Oikists

A major argument against the veracity of traditional accounts concerns the named founders (oikists) of Greek colonies.[27] The founder's name is representative of the larger issue of the role of founders in the Archaic period. In the Classical period founders and their powers were decided upon by the mother city (often with more than a single founder for a colony), yet allowing the oikist full powers. For example, the founder of the Athenian colony to Brea (446 BC)[28] was empowered as an *autokrator.* But was this the case in the early Archaic period? Can we even trust the names of founders, such as 'Lamis' for Megara Hyblaia? Or are they late inventions, responses to the need to identify momentous foundations with a person?

This claim is made explicitly by Robin Osborne in two fresh and bold revisions of the history of Archaic colonization:[29] our named founders may very well have been invented and their story reconstructed according to what he calls the 'Classical model'. It is not made clear who does the inventing or whether the issue is historiographical or the founders were invented in the colonies themselves. Nor is the founder's cult discussed, although if founders were invented their cults must have been late too. Still, it is claimed that foundational activities of oikists were constructed and projected into the remote past according to the later practices of the Classical model. A close look at the traditions regarding Megara Hyblaia's foundation, as well as that of the Classical model itself, should refute this position.

First, the term 'Classical model' is misleading, since that model actually reveals divergence from earlier customs:[30] for example, the Athenian Hagnon did not bother to stay in the colony he founded (Amphipolis) and dared to fill the colony with monuments bearing his own name (the Hagnoneia), thus foreshadowing Hellenistic practices.[31] Athens sent not one but ten founders to Thourioi, Sparta sent three to Herakleia Trachinia in 426,[32] all of whom returned home, and then sent governors in their stead. In other words, if one were to look for a 'model' according to which Archaic colonization

[27] Osborne (1996) 8–15.
[28] IG^3.46.9.
[29] Osborne (1996) 4–17: (1998).
[30] Graham (1983) ch. 3.
[31] Malkin (1987) 228–32.
[32] Malkin (1994) ch. 8.

and the role of founders were reconstructed, the fifth century provides rather poor examples.

More specifically, the account in Thucydides regarding the founder of Megara Hyblaia reveals nothing conventional or schematic. More conventional founders appear in relation to Corinth's foundation of Syracuse in 733 (Archias) and to oikists active in somewhat later periods. Let us observe how Thucydides and others present the Chalkidian and Megarian oikists.

Within just a few years in the last third of the eighth century (734–728 BC, according to Thucydides) Greeks were arriving on the shores of eastern Sicily, pushing the natives inland, settling, and quarreling with each other. Thucydides says (6.3.1) that 'some Chalkidians from Euboia sailed with Theokles as oikist', not specifying though probably implying that he himself was a Chalkidian. Hellanikos, in contrast, says straightforwardly that he was from Chalkis.[33] Ephoros makes him an Athenian, an obvious invention that may have emerged because of ambiguous traditions regarding this entrepreneur and Ephoros' own Athenian inclinations. Theokles was in fact the very opposite of a 'Classical model': from Naxos (734) he pushed southward and had the natives expelled from Leontinoi with the help of Megarian colonists whom he later expelled.[34] Not just his activity (founding more than one colony) but also the choice of the second site was exceptional: Leontinoi's site, inland, corresponds more to a pattern of secondary inland expansion, as Gela would illustrate in the following century. Theokles probably took over the native kingdom of Xuthia, just north of Hyblon's kingdom, whose capital was probably Pantalica. Leontinoi may have been taken also with a view to blocking Syracuse, established just about then (733, according to Thucydides's chronology). He then retraced his steps and founded a third colony, Catana, on the shore.

Theokles should not be judged according to later criteria of how oikists were supposed to function, namely, a single oikist per city. He is, rather, comparable to his Spartan contemporary Teleklos, who was busy with a series of short-distance colonizations and conquests in the Peleponnese.[35] In contrast to Theokles in Sicily, however, the Spartan worked closer to home, serving an expansionist

[33] *FGH* 4 F 82.
[34] Cf. Polyaenus, *Strategemata* 5.5.
[35] Malkin (1994) 82–9.

city and extending its authority more or less contiguously where he could. By contrast, the distant Sicilian situation had open frontiers. This may also explain how easy it had been to assert independence from Theokles, that apparently overbearing oikist: the Catanaians refused his exceptional status outright and chose for themselves as founder a certain Euarchos (Thuc. 6.3.3).

This is a good illustration of how colonial patterns were being formed and asserted. One does not have to wait for the fifth century for established patterns to sink in. It is no accident that after Theokles and throughout the entire Archaic period, we never hear of oikists (tyrants excepted) trying to found whole series of cities. We do not hear of this even in invented 'traditions'; what people do not bother to invent is a good indication of their world of expectations. If anything, the reverse is true: instead of a single oikist's founding several cities, several oikists could appear on the scene to found a single city, probably checking each other's authority.

I see the colonial situation as very dynamic, frontier-oriented, where the authority of a prominent individual could be easily shaken off by an evolving community conscious of itself and its deserts precisely because of the novelty of the situation. Colonization was a 'middle ground' of experimentation both in relation to the native world and politically, in the relation of individuals to their newly created, 'colonial' society.[36] Oikists apparently learnt their limits quickly: we do not hear (again—either in fabricated stories or in more reliable *ktiseis*) of dynasties or descendants of oikists enjoying special honors related to their ancestor.[37] Had there been any, a skeptical modern historian would have pounced on the opportunity to claim etiological inventions. In fact, the lack of prominent families of founders should argue against such inventions. The exceptions of King Battos at Cyrene and the cult-specific Deinomenid privileges at Gela[38] indicate the rule.

This oikist cult too is avoided in Osborne's discussion, although it is archaeologically attested, for example, for Battos at ca. 600, about the time of his death, which would have left hardly any time to 'invent' him.[39] In general, the hero cult elevated the oikist but at

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[36] Malkin (1998); (1998b).
[37] Malkin (1987) ch. 7.
[38] Hdt. 7.153 with de Polignac (1995) 118 27.
[39] Büsing (1978).

the same time ensured that he belonged to the entire polis and prevented anyone else from aspiring to such honors. The cult of oikists seems to have depended on the idea of collective beginnings, and, by definition, these were unique.

The name of an oikist, the date of foundation, and the identity of the mother city (or cities) are the basic three categories of Greek collective memory associated with colonization. Foundation stories may abound in folkloristic detail and legendary elaboration, but these three elements seem to be what colonies consistently cared to remember as facts. These categories of memory obviously condense historical process into a moment of 'birth' and 'foundation'. This approach, schematic and variable as it is bound to be, still has the advantage of adhering to what seems to have been an authentic colonial perspective. Also, this perspective did not develop with hindsight but actually belonged to the first generation of colonists, about thirty to forty years after arriving at a site.

Were specific names such as Theokles (leader of Chalkidians) and Lamis (leader of Megarians) fabricated in later periods when people are supposed to have invented foundation narratives? Or, to put the question in more general terms, did the Greeks invent founders? They certainly did, but usually not those associated with Archaic colonization in Italy and Sicily. To charge our sources with invention one might want to look at cases in which we can be relatively sure of them, and we do not lack examples. Surprisingly, however, one will find that this phenomenon truly belongs to the fifth century, when, for example, Kroton, Taras, or Abdera invented a founder's role for heroes such as Herakles (Kroton) or the eponymous 'Taras' and 'Abderos'.[40] And yet—and here is the crux—these colonies also had historical oikists, Myskellos of Rhypai and Phalanthos, about whom fifth-century Krotoniates or Tarentines apparently knew very little. The people of Abdera even accorded a cult to a certain Timesias, a genuinely historical figure, the leader of a failed Klazomenian foundation of about one hundred years before Abdera's actual settlement.[41] In other words, the 'Classical model' is the very opposite of the way Osborne represents it, because in the Classical period people reverted to mythological founders instead of their more obscure but historical ones.

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[40] Malkin (1987) 221–3; (1994) 133–9.

[41] Hdt. 1.168 with Malkin (1987) 221–3.

Paradoxically, it is the obscurity and non-legendary nature of the majority of named oikists, that seem to guarantee their authenticity. These names—associated neither with any foundation lore nor with any exciting etiology—can hardly be regarded as invented. Lamis, let us remember, was a miserable oikist who died en route. With more prominent oikists such as Antiphemos of Gela, we also have some anecdotes: an etiological consultation at an oracle (Gela explained as 'laughter', from *gelao*) and the inland conquest of Omphake, whence he brought a statue made by Daidalos.[42] Here the sceptic might raise an eyebrow, but the name 'Antiphemos' also happens to appear on a fifth-century cheap dedication, an Attic *kylix*, which bears the inscription 'Mnasithales dedicated me to Antiphemos'. This piece of evidence pertains to common cult, not to foundation folklore, and in my view authenticates the memory of Gela's founder.[43] In short, fifth-century sources may cloud the issue but not in the way that is suggested. By reporting alternative, contradictory, and lately invented founders, they actually confirm constitutive facts of earlier, Archaic history.

Let us return to Theokles with the Chalkidians and to Lamis with the Megarians. Contradictions between Thucydides and Ephoros seem so blatant that John Graham concludes that Ephoros' account is 'entirely worthless'.[44] This seems to me too extreme, since the contradictions are merely apparent. One tends to forget that Megara was not established in a day. The date of 728 indicates the end of a series of failures. It applies only to the site of Megara Hyblaia; the Megarians seem to have arrived in Sicily some five or six years earlier. This simple inference from the text of Thucydides is often overlooked. 'Naxos and Megara . . . were the first Greek cities to be founded in Sicily', says Ephoros. He goes on to tell of Theokles, who arrived in Sicily with a whole band of colonists, most of them Chalkidians but some of them Ionians and Dorians. The latter, he says, were the ones who founded Megara Hyblaia. This is John Graham's translation of Strabo's paraphrase of Ephoros:

> Naxos and Megara . . . Ephoros says that these were the first Greek cities to be founded in Sicily, in the tenth generation after the Trojan War, for, before that, the Greeks were afraid of the bands of Etruscan pirates and the savagery of the native peoples there, so that they did

[42] Paus. 8.46.2; 9.40.4.
[43] Malkin (1987) 259 and frontispiece for illustration; cf. Hornblower (1997).
[44] Graham (1988) 308.

> not even sail there for trade. But Theokles, an Athenian, being carried off his course and brought by winds to Sicily, perceived the weakness of the people and the quality of the land. When he returned, he could not persuade the Athenians, but he collected many of the Chalkidians in Euboia and some Ionians, and also some Dorians, of whom the majority was Megarians, and thus set sail. The Chalkidians founded Naxos, the Dorians Megara, which was formerly called Hybla.

Ephoros, of course, has his peculiarities and topoi:[45] his Theokles is an Athenian; he is active ten generations after the Trojan War (possibly in the mid-ninth century, if we understand this correctly, but there cannot be certainty with such obscure generations), and he is 'blown off course', a common motif. But otherwise the degree of agreement between him and Thucydides is in fact remarkable: as does Thucydides he clearly distinguishes this account from that of the Corinthian colonization of Syracuse, and he places the Megarians, just as Thucydides does, as contemporaries and collaborators of the Chalkidians. All this gives the impression of a 'rush' on Sicily, perhaps competing with the Corinthian enterprise that involved Corcyra on the way.[46] That Thucydides too sees the arrival of the Megarians as contemporary with that of the Chalkidians is evident from his text—'About the same time (*kata de ton auton chronon*) Lamis also came to Sicily with an *apoikia* of Megarians' (6.4.1)—except that he further distinguishes, chronologically, between arrival and final foundation.

The chronological point also illustrates the varieties of the colonial experience: Lamis's arrival directly relates to Theokles' activity. Lamis was 'leading an *apoikia* of Megarians', and Thucydides' Theokles was leading Chalkidians. Here *apoikia* is not a 'colony' but a group of people who had left home a more precise and literal sense of the word. To a later author such as Ephoros, perhaps the mention of such an *apoikia* may have been enough to create a chronography of foundation, thus confusing travel, arrival, and actual establishment at a site; hence his 'Megara and Naxos', rather than Thucydides' 'Megarians and Chalkidians'.

Again, Thucydides says neither that 'Megara (Nisaia) founded Megara Hyblaia' nor that 'Chalkis founded Naxos' but merely that Lamis was leading a group of Megarian settlers and that people

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[45] Graham (1988) 307. Graham's arguments concerning the archaeological date of Kyme (725–700) need updating, since recent finds point to Kyme's pottery as contemporary with that of Pithekoussai. See d'Agostirno and Soteriou (1998).

[46] Malkin (1998b).

'from Chalkis' sailed with Theokles. Related to this is Strabo's account[47] that the Corinthian Archias, having helped his fellow Bacchiad Chersikrates to found Corcyra, 'landed at Zephyrion (Cape Bruzzano), found there some Dorians who had quit the company of the founders of Megara and were on their way back home had arrived there from Sicily, took them up and in common with them founded Syracuse'. This is not, as Osborne suggests, an 'alternative version' to Thucydides but merely another illustration of the variety of groups trying to find a place for themselves. Thucydides (probably relying on Antiochus of Syracuse), Ephoros, and Strabo (also relying on Ephoros but probably not exclusively) all give the impression that two distinct historiographical traditions existed: one concerned with Syracuse, with its more precise chronology, the other with Naxos and Megara Hyblaia.

There follows in Thucydides the story of three failed Megarian attempts: one at Trotilon, another with the Chalkidians at Leontinoi (whence the Chalkidians expelled them), and yet another at Thapsos, where Lamis died.[48] Finally, the Megarians were expelled again (according to Graham's convincing reconstruction), by Syracuse from the sea, to be received at last by the Sikel Hyblon.[49] We see therefore that Thucydides too thinks that the Megarians must have been in Sicily before Leontinoi was founded (probably in 729), and he allows them enough time before that to have settled at Trotilon. The site is probably to be identified above the little bay of La Bruca on the southern gulf of Catania. It was safe but unpromising,[50] and therefore they accepted Theokles' invitation even though now it meant that they had to fight against the local people of Leontinoi. We are not told how long they lived at Trotilon; it was probably between two and four years, just the time it took Theokles to organize his further expansion against Xuthia and found Leontinoi with them. The time frame is therefore compatible with the Megarian arrival in Sicily (*kata de ton auton chronon*) 'about the same time' as the Chalkidians.[51] In other words, there is no temporal contradiction between Thucydides and Ephoros here.

We may also conclude that the initial colonial situation indicates ad hoc alliances of discrete groups loosely defined in terms of ori-

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[47] Strabo 6.269.

[48] For the site and the late Geometric burial there, the so-called 'tomb of Lamis', see Graham (1988) 309.

[49] Graham (1988) 312.

[50] Graham (1998) 309.

[51] Thuc. 6.4.1.

gins and as followers of prominent men. There were at least three: those around Theokles, Lamis, and probably Euarchos, who became oikist of Catana. Strabo's Megarians who joined Archias, the founder of Syracuse, may have been a fourth.

Did these Megarian settlers have a mother city? May one reject the foundational aspect of Megara Hyblaia's settlement on the formal ground that Megara Nisaia could not have functioned officially as an organizing mother city? None of the sources says it had been a mother city. Considering, too, that Megara Nisaia was undergoing its own consolidation (a *synoikismos* following defeats by Corinth?)[52] at the time, one should not be surprised that 'Megarians' are mentioned somewhat vaguely.[53] The lack of an express role for a fully developed *metropolis* is another contrast with Osborne's 'Classical model', perhaps lending more credibility (because of the difference) to the Archaic account.

Nicholas Purcell and Maurizio Giangiulio are quite right to insist on the remarkable availability of individuals—outside the framework of the polis—for mercenary, mercantile, proxenial, and colonial activities.[54] Just think of Archilochos (mid-seventh century), who visited Italian Siris and later settled at Thasos as a colonist of his mother city, Paros.[55] Consider also cases such as that of Menekrates of Oinantheia in Ozolian Lokris, who died in Corcyra in the late seventh century, or that of the Ionian mercenary returning home.[56] Archilochos also gives us a precious piece of evidence about a colonist who gambled away his expected plot of land while still aboard ship.[57] This is not fifth-century fabrication of a colonial tradition; rather, it is a seventh-century remark about colonial expectations. One expected an egalitarian *kleros* in a soon-to-be-established, new foundation, a *kleros* that would redefine one's personal economic and political status. The colonial middle ground, mediating between a person and his political and economic place in the world, functioned also on the individual level. Megara Hyblaia's remarkable egalitarian land division conforms precisely to this Archilochean image of the colonist's *kleros*. It also conforms to the formula 'fair and equal terms' that is attested in later periods and before Megara Hyblaia's excavation

[52] Legon (1981) 53–5.
[53] Malkin (1994b).
[54] Purcell (1990); Giangiulio (1996).
[55] Archilochus 18 (Tarditi); Graham (1978).
[56] ML 4; Yoyotte and Masson (1988).
[57] Archilochos *ap.* Athenaeus 167d.

must have seemed blatantly anachronistic when read in inscribed foundation decrees.[58] It is quite probable that it was an oikist—not Lamis, who had died in Thapsos—who was responsible for that remarkable planning and organization, perhaps in cooperation with king Hyblon (see below).

The assumption that settlers were amorphous groups somehow cooperating without leadership leads to unnecessary extremes, denying any role both to the oikist and to the mother city. Moreover, this is a narrow view, since the figure of the oikist is in fact integral to Archaic political culture. He occupies the position of the consensual social arbitrator, similarly occupied by formal 'arbitrators' and lawgivers such as Pittakos or Solon and emulated by tyrants. All of the above—oikists, lawgivers, and tyrants—also sought and usually received the same kind of approval from Delphi.[59] My own view is that the colonial situation was sufficiently open-ended that no Archaic oikist was an *autokrator* in a literal sense. Oikists were not tyrants but founders whose personal preeminence was constantly curtailed and negotiated in the fluctuating middle ground of the new social creation. But they did operate, they did receive cult, and at Megara Hyblaia the results of concentrated organization are plainly visible on the ground.

Megara Hyblaia: A Planned Territory

The common interpretation of the archaeological picture emerging from Megara Hyblaia is that it was laid out according to a regular, and quasi-grid plan, implying a concept of 'foundation' (fig. 9). Perhaps this was not a completed foundation, perhaps it had its *staseis* and lawgivers in later periods, but the major elements of a political and religious community were laid out at the outset. As elsewhere in the western colonial world, for example at Metapontion,[60] land division for private and public use was a matter for collective decision, organization, and allocation, and its generally egalitarian character is remarkable.

58 Dusanic (1978).
59 Malkin (1989).
60 Carter (1994).

Is there any reason not to see a 'foundation' in all this? Robin Osborne prefers to see in it nothing but 'evidence for co-operation'.[61] I admit that I do not quite understand what is meant here: if the evidence is sufficiently clear for cooperation that involves comprehensive civic and religious functions as well as public and private-egalitarian allocation of lands, and if all this took place within a relatively short time, how much more should one expect for the concept of 'foundation' to be valid and applicable? *Faut-il oublier la cité pour penser la société?* Here I join François de Polignac in a negative answer to that question.[62]

It has also been noted that, aside from its famous agora grid, there may be hints that Megara Hyblaia had other, possibly four more, grids (but so far only one agora). Some, like Jaspar Svenbro, see in this a reimplementation of Megara Nisaia's five villages.[63] Osborne takes it as evidence for possibly distinct groups. Perhaps; but does this mean, again, that no 'foundation' had taken place? Or does it simply imply that the Megarians were not such wonderful Hippodameian town planners as some would like them to be? The grids are interrelated (although their chronology is less secure) and they probably emphasize the ambitious aspect of Megara Hyblaia's territoriality. Let us be fair to these people: without the aid of aerial photography, with no wonderful charts at their disposal, they did a pretty good job. This may have been the first time that such an experiment—and I emphasize experiment—was conducted on such a scale.

But one could also reverse the argument, using the figure five as saliently Megarian. The 'five' element was prominent in Megara Nisaia not only in topographical terms (the five *komai*) but also in terms of *nomima* and social divisions: the archons and the strategoi were five in number.[64] The figure (different from the kinship terminology of the three Dorian tribes) probably reflects a situation analogous to that of Sparta, where the five 'villages' served as the basis for military reforms and, possibly, the creation of the ephorate. If Megara Hyblaia replicated a rudimentary five-division familiar from their place of origin, then the comprehensiveness of its plan is all the more striking.

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[61] Osborne (1998).
[62] de Polignac (1995b).
[63] Svenbro (1982).
[64] Legon (1981) 47.

Megara Hyblaia is not the first Greek site to indicate regular planning. Some planning is apparent about a century earlier in Zagora on Andros, about which Anthony Snodgrass is careful to say that it was much less grand than Megara Hyblaia.[65] Note his careful wording: 'Something of the same kind may have happened with the location of the sanctuary at a site like Zagora on Andros, a century or so earlier. But it is certain that none of the established cities of the Greek homeland can have faced such decisions, or enjoyed such opportunities'.

Osborne seems to consider 'colonization' only if 'state enterprise' is involved. This misses the point, I think. We cannot draw firm conclusions about the status of Megara Nisaia in relation to Megara Hyblaia; nor, if we could, would it be possible to generalize from it about the status of mother cities. Moreover, Greek colonization (again, no one, myself included, is happy with this term) was a dynamic movement. By sending away groups of settlers communities were really forming and homogenizing themselves as political entities. Once we drop the view underlying Osborne's criticism of 'colonization from above' we arrive at a far more complex situation—yet 'colonial' and foundational all the same.

'Cooperation', a term that seems to Osborne to be something entirely different from 'foundation', should be assessed very differently. In fact, it is this cooperation that defines what the foundation was all about. A 'recognized communal role from the beginning cannot be disputed', says Osborne,[66] and he is quite right. Accepting this communal role and assuming the hand of an oikist at work (Osborne seems to avoid the discussion of oikists), the examination of the reserved sacred spaces of Megara Hyblaia led me to what Osborne considers a *non sequitur* when I said that 'it was the Greek founders of colonies themselves who decided and acted according to . . . functional and rational criteria for the organization of the territory of both city and countryside'.[67] However, since oikists were not colonizing 'from above', I fail to see the illegitimacy of the inference. Granted that there was a 'communal effort' (Osborne) and that oikists were integral to it, does it really not follow that 'it was the Greek founders of colonies themselves who decided and acted'?

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[65] Snodgrass (1994) 9, with Osborne (1998) 261.
[66] Osborne (1998) 260.
[67] Malkin (1987) 183.

Pottery and Multiculturalism

What may we learn about the settlers of Megara Hyblaia from the pottery found at the site? No homogeneity emerges, but neither should it be expected. One remarkable characteristic of early colonial settlements is the variability of their pottery records, very different from those of much older cities such as Athens or Argos. In this respect, Megara Hyblaia is clearly different from its place of origin, Megara Nisaia, and its pottery implies a variety of contacts. This variable colonial situation, first apparent at Pithekoussai exemplifies, I think, a middle ground of commercial networking. However, from this observation Robin Osborne draws a different conclusion: concerning Pithekoussai, known as the earliest Greek settlement in the west, he infers that its population was 'multicultural'. He then compares Megara Hyblaia to Pithekoussai and draws the conclusion that the latter's population was not homogeneously 'Megarian'. One has become used to archaeologists' rightly protesting the 'pots = people' fallacy (e.g., Athenian pottery = Athenian settlers), but here we have the reverse: mixed pottery = mixed population. Why should the latter be any more valid than the former?

This issue is also connected to Megara Hyblaia's being a colony of Megara Nisaia: 'If mainland Megara did not determine the nature of the contacts (pottery is meant here) which the early settlement enjoyed', asks Osborne, 'then in what sense can that settlement be described as a Megarian "colony"?' However, this is taking the 'mixed pots = mixed population' notion to extreme. Pots were not coins. They did not signify ethnic or polis symbolism. Distant Megara could not have cared less about the pottery its miserable settlers were using, especially given their three failed attempts to establish themselves in different locations, over several years and their ultimate success only under the protection of Sikel and later Syracusan powers. Why should one be surprised that they did not use the same pottery as at Megara Nisaia? They were obviously using whatever was at hand in the region they were now living in. The *va-et-vient* of a 'new world' is sufficient to explain the variability of pottery at a colonial site. Moreover, in this case there are also the particular circumstances of Megara Hyblaia's foundation: whatever the settlers had brought with them originally was probably long since broken and discarded by the time their four Sicilian peregrinations ended. There is no reason to read ethnic or multicultural variability into the use of available

pots, especially at Megara Hyblaia. One can easily imagine a 'Corinthian' pot sold to a 'Megarian Hyblaian' by a peddler making the rounds from neighbouring Syracuse, just a few kilometers away.

One should also take into consideration that colonization was undertaken within pre-existing networks of commerce. Greek settlers could have bought Greek-made pottery that had been in native hands before they arrived. 'Precolonization' pottery was discovered, for example, in the valley of the River Marcellino, near Villasmundo, not far to the north-west of Megara Hyblaia,[68] indicating not only that Hyblon knew Greeks in this specific area before 728 but also that those commercial venues did not depend strictly on settlement.

We are reminded again of the role of individuals—those ubiquitous peddlers, whores, and hangers-on either of armies on the move or of 'Gold Rushes' of various types (the initial colonization in the west may have seemed such). Precisely what one would not find at home is what you should expect to find in such situations: a mish-mash of stuff, sold and resold at any opportunity, whether in local markets or from passing ships. Pots, after all, were not fabulously expensive *xenia* gifts but minor objects arriving in the 'new world' from all over. I therefore find Osborne's rhetorical question ill-advised. It does emphasize an aspect that is often neglected—a material middle ground, a variability of material evidence at colonial sites that implies varieties of contacts—but in relation to a 'metropolis' this variability implies no ethnic variability and is irrelevant to issues of political or economic control. To use a maritime analogy, the archaeological assemblage in a colony is analogous to the mixed cargo of a boat; that in a mother city is more similar to what we may discover when excavating a house.

King Hyblon and Megara Hyblaia

Specifically, Megara Hyblaia did not even have an oikist whose name is known to us, since Lamis died in Thapsos. One may even ask, quite legitimately, to what extent the Sikel Hyblon himself was responsible for helping the Greeks. Was he a kind of cofounder?

As Graham notes, Thucydides uses curious language to describe the colonial invitation: he uses the verb *prodidomi*, 'to betray'. Graham

[68] Graham (1988) 315.

argues that the colonization of eastern Sicily seemed to Thucydides a story of Greeks versus Sikels; hence for a Sikel king to hand over land to Greeks was, in a (fifth-century) sense, a 'betrayal'. The point could be strengthened by Thucydides' opening statement: once he has finished describing the settlement of Sicily by non-Greeks he says: 'But the first Greeks (*Hellenon de protoi*) were Chalkidians from Euboia'.[69] This 'but'-emphasis on Greekness is obviously a fifth-century view that should be isolated from the actual points of the account. Thucydides' matter-of-fact description of the king's action—that Hyblon 'guided them' (*kathegesamenou*)—seems plausible. It is also comparable to the Cyrenaean foundation story: there too the colonists, like the Megarians, having failed several times, were finally led by natives to the site of Cyrene.[70] Unlike Megara Hyblaia, Cyrene's position is topographically superior, but from the natives' point of view it had the advantage of being very far from themselves.

Hyblon's concerns are understandable: within a relatively short time Greeks were flooding the shores of eastern Sicily, pushing the natives and quarreling with each other. Theokles probably took over the native kingdom just north of Hyblon's. Leontinoi may have been taken also with a view to blocking Syracuse, established just about then (733, according to Thucydides' chronology). Only then did Theokles retrace his steps to found Catana on the shore. Hyblon probably felt threatened and wished to use some Greeks against others, an exercise that the Elymians of western Sicily came to perfect in later periods. Hence, argues Graham convincingly, the 'invitation'. But what does this imply for Megara Hyblaia's foundation? Did Hyblon help install the settlement? And did he perhaps help in the laying out of the site?

For anyone versed in the scholarly musings about the significance of Megara Hyblaia, such an 'un-Greek' idea regarding one of the most innovative aspects of the Greek colonial world may seem a heresy. But this may be precisely because we have gotten so used to thinking in polar opposites, of 'Greek colonists and native populations'.[71] Let us allow for a different possibility: the miserable Megarians failed at Trotilon and were expelled from Leontinoi by

[69] Thuc. 6.3.1.

[70] Hdt. 4.158.

[71] Descoeudres (1990). Note the editor's care not to apply the term 'barbarians' to non-Greeks.

the Chalkidians; their oikist Lamis died at Thapsos, whence, again, they were expelled, probably by other 'fellow-Greeks', the Syracusans. Finally they colonized 'by an invitation' of a Sikel king, and established an egalitarian planned city, the first known to us in Greek colonial history. Such could be the variability of the colonial experience.

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

Figure 8. Kibbutz Mishmar Ha Yam



Figure 9. Megara Hyblaia

SECTION THREE

MILITARY MATTERS

THE SOCIAL STATUS OF THE MERCENARY IN ARCHAIC GREECE

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The activity of Greek mercenaries in the Archaic period (ca. 750–500 BC) has only slowly come into focus. The comprehensive standard works on Greek mercenaries by Parke, Griffith, and Marinovich cast a backward glance at the Archaic and early Classical periods; but they take the start of the mercenary explosion to be the crisis of the polis in the late Classical period.[1] These scholars have taken the instability of the internal and external affairs of the Greek cities during and after the Peloponnesian War, the reemergence of tyrants in the west, and the increasing importance of independent generals in warfare, to be the conditions under which a true mercenary class emerged in the fourth century. To a certain extent this view is justified by the evidence. Both the first-hand account by Xenophon and contemporary references in the orators and later references in histories, military manuals, and biographies provide plentiful evidence for the substantial role played by mercenary generals and their armies in the late Classical and Hellenistic periods.[2]

An unfortunate corollary to this emphasis is the neglect of the earlier periods. There is tantalizing evidence for Greek mercenaries in the eighth through fifth centuries. But the scantiness of the data has discouraged attempts at synthesis or, worse, led to negative conclusions.[3] For an era in which reliable historical data in general are

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[1] See Parke (1933); Griffith (1935); Marinovich (1988). A more thorough study of mercenaries in the archaic and early Classical periods is now provided by Bettalli (1995). On mercenaries in the fifth and fourth centuries, see also Aymard (1959); Roy (1967); Miller (1984); Krasilnikoff (1992) and (1993).

[2] A useful collection of ancient references to mercenaries may be found in Rich and Shipley (1993); see also Sage (1996).

[3] So Pritchett ((1974) 27) states that 'In military economics, the concept of any pay except for sustenance was primarily a development of the period after the Peloponnesian War and of mercenary service'. Negative conclusions about the prominence of Greek mercenaries in the East in the Archaic period were reached by Helm (1980) 135–60. For more positive assessments of mercenaries at home and abroad, see Austin (1970) 15–19; and now Bettalli (1995).

scant, the few references to mercenaries assume a comparative prominence. A review of the references to mercenary activity in the Archaic period suggests that Greeks in mercenary service were an important feature of Archaic society. There is good reason to suspect that the unsettled conditions attendant on the emergence of the polis in its canonical form created a large group of displaced individuals who learned to survive outside of their home cities by engaging in mercenary service, as well as by recourse to brigandage and piracy. It is possible to trace this process in references in early Greek poetry, as well as in later prose writers and in the archaeological record. I hope to demonstrate that the mercenaries of the seventh and sixth centuries, while not as numerous as their successors in the fourth century, by virtue of their status played an important role as intermediaries between the growing city-states of Greece and the established powers of the eastern Mediterranean.

Terminology

The problem begins with a definition of terms.[4] While a mercenary is a professional soldier, not all professional soldiers are mercenaries, at least in modern contexts. In the modern world, a professional soldier can, and usually does, fight for his own country. In ancient Greece, a soldier was either a citizen of the city or state for which he fought, or he was a *xenos*. The citizen-soldier was motivated to fight for his polis by a sense of obligation; through the fifth century (and perhaps later in some places) the citizen-soldier was expected to provide his own livelihood on campaign.[5] He was usually supported by his polis while on campaign; for the most part citizens returned from fighting at the end of the campaign season to resume agricultural work and other livelihoods. Of *xenoi*, some might fight under obligation of a treaty of alliance or because of the subjection

[4] A good discussion of the meaning of 'mercenary' may be found in Aymard (1959) 16.

[5] Evidence for military pay outside of Athens is nonexistent: Sage (1996) 58. The orthodox view that pay for support on campaign was introduced by Pericles before the Peloponnesian War is argued in detail by Pritchett ((1974) 6–11). The question of whether mercenaries in the fourth century were expected to provide their own armor is debated by McKechnie ((1989) 80–5) and Whitehead (1991); see also Krasilnikoff (1993).

of their state to another; or they may freely hire out their services. As we shall see, these distinctions are not always clear in the ancient written sources.

By the fifth century the terminology for mercenaries is straightforward, even if it is not always applied with adequate precision. Thucydides is the first writer to use the term *misthophoros* (μισθοφόρος), which becomes common in the fourth century and later, to be joined by *stratiōtēs* (στρατιώτης) as a generic term for the professional soldier of the Hellenistic period. In the fifth century and later the term *misthōtos* (μισθωτός) is also employed, a term which, as Yvon Garlan has pointed out, was contemptuous even when applied to free wage labor.[6] But neither *misthophoros* nor *misthōtos* are found before the fifth century. The earliest term to be used for 'mercenary' is *epikouros* (ἐπίκουρος), whose meaning evolves throughout the Archaic period in revealing ways.

By the fifth century *epikouros* has clearly come to mean mercenary in certain contexts. Herodotus uses it as such, sometimes on its own, and sometimes with *misthōtos*, and Thucydides uses it frequently on its own.[7] But the word has a wider semantic range. Its root is cognate with the Latin *curro*, and it is possibly attested in Linear B.[8] *Epikouros* is found in a variety of contexts in early poetry. Its semantic range provides some indication of the status of mercenaries in this early period. Eva Stehle discusses the word in relation to its appearance in the newly discovered fragments of the proemium of Simonides' elegy on the battle of Plataea.[9] In her review of the uses of *epikouros*, Stehle sees its military meaning as primary, with the generalization of meaning to non-military contexts as a secondary development. I would suggest that a careful consideration of the uses of *epikouros* in earlier contexts sheds light on the manner in which the status of the mercenary evolved.

The word *epikouros* is common in Homer: it appears thirty-three times in the *Iliad*, but never in the *Odyssey*.[10] It almost always appears

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[6] Garlan (1988) 93.

[7] For discussion, see Lavelle (1986); (1989).

[8] So Chantraine (1970) s.v.; M. Schmidt in Snell (1993) 640–1.

[9] Stehle (1996) 208–10.

[10] All findings concerning the appearance of the various terms discussed in this paper are based on research conducted on *Thesaurae Linguae Graecae*. My thanks to the Library and staff of the Center for Judaic Studies and the Classical Studies Department at the University of Pennsylvania for allowing me to use their computer facilities.

in the plural, where it refers to the allies of the Trojans. The term here must be translated as 'foreign allies'. The distinction between the Trojans and the *epikouroi* is repeatedly emphasized: several times the allied forces are addressed Τρῶες καὶ Δάρδανοι ἠδ' ἐπίκουροι or the like (Hom., *Iliad* 3.456; 6.111, 227; 7.348, 368; 8.497; 12.61; 17.335). Sarpedon castigates Hector by saying that once he boasted that Troy could be held without the help of *epikouroi*, whereas now the *epikouroi* are doing all of the fighting (5.473, 477). Although the poet is famously unconcerned with ethnic distinctions, he does mention in one instance the fact that the *epikouroi* are a multilingual and far-flung crowd (2.803–4); elsewhere they are called πολυηγερέες (11.564), and Sarpedon refers to himself as an *epikouros* who has come from far away (5.478).

The *epikouroi* are foreign, but whether they are subject to the Trojans is not clear. Achilles speaks to Priam of the great domain the Trojan king once held, which has been reduced in the course of the war (24.543–6). The nearer allies in the Troad may have been summoned under obligation—so Hector implies in his speech to the 'countless tribes of *epikouroi* who live around us' (17.220ff.)—but the allies from farther away, and in particular the Lycians, came as equals, motivated only by the obligations of equal alliance and a desire for *kleos*.

The few instances in Homer where the term is not used of the Trojan allies show it to have the meaning of equal, not subordinate, allies. On one occasion Priam refers to himself as an *epikouros* of the Phrygians in their war with the Amazons (3.188). Agamemnon recalls that Tydeus came to Mycenae to ask for *epikouroi* in the war against Thebes (4.379). Athena refers to Aphrodite as an *epikouros* of Ares (21.431). This last context is military, although Athena is using the term ironically, since Aphrodite is merely leading the wounded Ares away from the battle.

The meaning of the term in Homer, then, is limited, if not entirely precise. It is a foreign ally, an auxiliary, possibly but not necessarily subordinate. There is not the slightest trace of the notion that these forces are paid for their service. Such an idea would indeed be alien to the heroic code of the epic. In heroic terms, the *epikouros* is a noble figure.

In post-Homeric usage the *epikouros* sometimes retains its usage as a synonym for *symmachos*. So in the *Hymn to Ares* (*Homeric Hymns* 8.9), the god is addressed as βροτῶν ἐπίκουρε. Its broadens, as Stehle suggests, to mean 'helper' in non-military contexts. Down to the time

of Thucydides it can be used to mean 'ally' without necessarily implying inferiority (Thuc. 1.105.3, 3.67.2 (metaphorically), 4.129.3ff.).[11] But on the whole the term took on ever more an undertone of subordination, both in divine contexts—Hesiod (*Theogony* 815) calls Kottos and Gyes the *epikouroi* of Zeus, and Heracleitos (F 94 Diels-Kranz) calls the Erinyes the *epikouroi* of Fate—and in human contexts, even when mercenaries were clearly not meant. The earliest and most significant examples of the use of *epikouros* to mean mercenary are by Archilochus. The first (fr. 216 West) is preserved in a scholion to Plato, *Laches* 187b. Plato says that 'you must consider that you are not "putting the danger on the Carian" but on your sons'. The scholiast suggests that the expression is proverbial for those who risk danger for others, and he goes on to explain that the Carians are believed to be the first to be mercenaries (μισθοφορῆσαι). In support of this assertion he quotes the line of Archilochus: Καὶ δὴ πίκουρος ὥστε Κὰρ κεκλήσομαι. The context suggests that we should read *epikouros* here as 'mercenary'. But before we do, I should like to note an ambiguity in the Archilochean line. It suggests that the term has not yet commonly come to be understood as 'mercenary': it is rather in a transitional state where it is a euphemism for a disagreeable condition. Archilochus is saying 'I shall be called an "auxiliary" like a Carian'. In other words, the word formally retains its Homeric meaning, but has acquired, by association with Carians, an unseemly overtone of one who is paid for his services.[12]

The transitional nature of the usage is reflected in Archilochus' other use of the term (fr. 15 West). Aristotle, discussing the friendship that is based on utility in the *Eudemian Ethics* (1236a33ff.), quotes a 'proverb' whose author can be inferred from its addressee: Γλαῦκ', ἐπίκουρος ἀνὴρ τόσσον φίλος ἔσκε μάχηται.[13] Taken in its older, Homeric sense, *epikouros* here fits Aristotle's point well enough: 'Glaucus, an ally is a friend as long as he fights'. The sentiment, though, borders on truistic. It adds piquancy to read it in connection with Archilochus' other statement, in which case it takes on another shade of meaning.

[11] In describing the allied forces in the Sicilian expedition he speaks of *epikouriai* (7.59.1).

[12] Note the parallel with the aristocratic term *hetaira*, which is applied, perhaps derisively, to the *pornai* who serve at symposia: Kurke (1999) 183.

[13] Edmonds (1931) F 14 translates the line as 'an *epikouros* is your friend until he comes to fight', which does not fit as well into the Aristotelian context.

'A mercenary is your friend as long as he fights'. Rendered thus, Archilochus is not merely being cynical about the nature of friendship, but he is also commenting on a condition that, to judge from Xenophon and the sorry history of Greece in the fourth century, is endemic wherever mercenaries are found. As long as they are hired they are friendly; when discharged, they may become freebooters, or worse, be hired by the enemy.

The Archaic Poets as Mercenaries

The early poets after Homer provide some primary evidence for attitudes towards mercenaries; but the evidence is hardly unambiguous. The later biographical traditions about Archilochus and the other poets doing mercenary service are not to be trusted, being based on the poetry itself. As Anne Burnett noted, in saying 'I will be called an *epikouros*' Archilochus is only stating what will occur; he is not telling us that it has happened.[14] In any event, the only securely attested venues for Archilochus' military activities are his home on Paros, and its colony on Thasos; in both cases he is fighting for his *polis*, and not as a mercenary.[15] The second of Archilochus' two references to mercenaries is, in fact, easier to interpret as a citizen-soldier's suspicion of hired help.

For the Lesbian poet Alcaeus the case for mercenary service is slightly stronger. Alcaeus wrote extensively about the civil discord between an aristocratic faction of which he was a part, and the Mytilenaean tyrants Myrsilus and Pittacus. In the course of the conflict Alcaeus was exiled, possibly twice, and he wrote about the misery of exile.[16] It is in this context that he may have entered mercenary service under the Lydians. A papyrus fragment attributed to him (F 69 Lobel-Page) states that the Lydians paid him two thousand staters to enter the 'holy city' (Hira, the city of that name on

[14] Burnett (1983) 27.

[15] See Graham (1978) 80. Some have had him fighting in the Lelantine War, based almost entirely on fragment 3: Podlecki (1969) 75–6.

[16] F 129, 130B, 131. The poet was in exile but still probably on Lesbos, since these fragments refer to a sanctuary established by the Lesbians, and a beauty contest for Lesbian women. Aristotle says specifically that Pittacus was elected *aisymnetes* in order to deal with the exiles led by Alcaeus and his brother Anteminidas (*Politics* 1285a).

Lesbos?).[17] Treu has made the case, based on a papyrus fragment containing a biography or commentary on Alcaeus (*P. Oxyrh.* 2506 fr. 77) that the poet met his death in Lydia fighting against a tribe called the Allienoi.[18]

Alcaeus' clearest reference to mercenary service is the poem in which he welcomes his brother back 'from the ends of the earth' (ἐκ περάτων γᾶς, Heph., *Enchiridion* 10.3) where he had been in service as an 'ally of the Babylonians' (Βαβυλωνίοις συμμαχοῦντα, Str. 13.2.3 C 617, F 350 LP) and where he had slain a warrior who stood one palm short of five cubits. Denys Page connects this reference with lines in a papyrus that refers to Babylon, Ashkelon and war (*P. Oxyrh.* 1233 fr. 11.6–20, F 48 LP). The incident described was most likely Nebuchadnezzar II's campaign in Palestine in 601, when Ashkelon was destroyed.[19] Notice here too, if Strabo is following Alcaeus closely, that Alcaeus calls his brother an 'ally', which, like *epikouros*, served as a poetic euphemism for the soldier of fortune he most certainly was.

For a poet such as Alcaeus who was involved in the political disputes that pitted factions of the aristocratic elite against one another, being on the losing side could result in the extremely unpleasant condition of exile. Clearly the early lyric poets reflected a condition that was widespread in their class. The aristocratic audience of this poetry was involved in the factional disputes that marked this stage in the development of the polis, and if they were forced into exile, their outlook was bleak and their options limited. If they did not have a share in a colonial foundation or some foreign holdings, they were limited to brigandage and mercenary service, through which they could at least deploy their military skills.

Mercenaries Abroad

Whom could Greek mercenaries serve? There were opportunities for service under other Greeks, at least in the later Archaic period. The connection between the establishment of tyrannies and the use of

[17] This fragment is frequently interpreted to indicate, not mercenary service, but Lydian support for Alcaeus' faction in the *stasis* that wracked Mytilene. If this were the case, the money would have been used to hire men.

[18] Cf. Treu (1966); Barner (1967).

[19] Ahlström (1993) 782.

mercenaries has long been known.[20] We will not review all of the evidence here, but we will note that the use of non-citizen troops by tyrants to maintain control seems to be a secondary phenomenon. Furthermore, although the sources are usually not explicit, the little evidence there is suggests that these hired troops are sometimes Greeks and sometimes not.

As Aristotle observed in the *Politics* (1286b28–40), kings, tyrants, and *aisymnetai* all require bodyguards. Mention of bodyguards (δορύφοροι) frequently occur in accounts of the early tyrants, but it is not usually said whether these are citizens. In the few cases where it is made clear, we can see that non-native soldiers supplemented or replaced a citizen force. The best-known example is that of Peisistratus, who in his first attempt at power was granted a force of citizen bodyguards, but he only secured power on the third try with men lent by Lygdamis of Naxos, as well as Argive mercenaries led by Hegesistratus (Hdt. 1.59–61; Arist., *Athenian Constitution* 17.4). Lavelle has attempted to show that Herodotus is wrong in stating that the Argives were mercenaries, because there is no other mention of Argive mercenaries this early.[21] This argument from silence is weak, however, given the scarcity of evidence for mercenaries in general. Nor do Herodotus and Aristotle contradict each other, since the latter does not say or imply that the troops under Hegesistratus were not hired. Once in power Peisistratus entrenched his rule with many mercenaries (ἐπικούροισί τε πολλοῖσι, Hdt. 1.64), presumably gathered from the same or similar sources. In addition, Herodotus tells us that Polycrates of Samos had a force of mercenaries and native archers (ἐπίκουροί τε μισθωτοὶ καὶ τοξόται οἰκήιοι, Hdt. 3.45, 54) supplementing his regular Samian troops, and ensuring the docility of the local population. Miltiades the Younger, we are told, held sway over the Athenians on the Chersonese by maintaining a force of 500 mercenaries, by which Herodotus means local Thracian troops (a strategy he must have learned from Peisistratus). It is fair to conclude that the use by tyrants of mercenaries was a somewhat later phenomenon, since the personal loyalty of a citizen

[20] Drews ((1972) 134) argues not only that the tyrants came to power with the aid of mercenaries, but that they learned the trick from Gyges and Psammetichos, both of whom seized power by means of Carian and Greek mercenaries. Bettalli (1995) 87, while accepting that mercenaries were used by the tyrants, rejects the conclusion that the tyrants were mercenary captains motivated by *philotimia*.

[21] Lavelle (1986).

bodyguard could not be relied upon. It is highly likely that by the second half of the sixth century a pool of mercenaries for would-be tyrants to draw upon already existed.

Since a supply for mercenaries already existed in the time of the tyrants in the early part of the sixth century BC, we must look outside of Greece for the demand. Here again the evidence is fragmentary but compelling.[22] There is some indirect evidence for the use of Greek mercenaries by Lydia, at least as far back as Gyges; and it is quite likely that the practice of hiring Greek and Carian mercenaries began here.[23] The suggestion of R.M. Cook that coinage was invented in Lydia or the cities of Ionia in the last quarter of the seventh century specifically in order to facilitate the payment of mercenaries has generated substantial controversy.[24] Ionia and Caria remained a promising hiring-ground for mercenaries through the sixth century: in the course of the revolt of the Lydian Pactyes against Cyrus and Tabalus, the newly appointed governor of Sardis, Pactyes went to the coast and hired mercenaries, eventually gaining support from a number of Greek cities (Hdt. 1.154).

The best attested instance of Greek mercenary service overseas is that of the Greeks and Carians who came to fight in Egypt under Psammetichos (Psamtek) I (664–610). The story of these mercenaries is told by Herodotus (2.151–4) and Diodorus (1.66.12). The sources are not in complete agreement about the circumstances of their arrival in Egypt. Herodotus says that they came as pirates and were welcomed on the strength of an oracle. Diodorus says that the Egyptian king sent for them to Ionia and Caria.[25] It is entirely likely that these troops were mercenaries of the Lydian king, who transferred them to the Pharaoh. Alan Lloyd has suggested that Herodotus' version of the story came from Egyptian priests.[26] Yet both versions

[22] The evidence for the presence of Greek mercenaries in Egypt and the Near East is reviewed by Austin (1970) 15–18; Lloyd (1975) 4–23; Helm (1980) 135.

[23] Helm, (1980) 151.

[24] Cook (1958) 257–62; supported by Kraay (1964) 76–9, and (1984) 3–18; criticized by Halle (1978) 259. Wallace ((1987) 385–97) argues that coinage was invented to stabilize the value of electrum. His explanation is not inconsistent with the idea that it was used to pay mercenaries, although it would be unlikely that mercenaries could spend their money outside of the domain of the issuer.

[25] This may be reflected in the mention on the Rassam cylinder of Ashurbanipal of troops sent by the Lydian king Gyges to Egypt: see the translation in Luckenbill (1927) II, 298, §785.

[26] Lloyd (1975) 15.

may be true. Even if the men were sent as paid mercenaries, they may have arrived with the intent of making their living one way or another, depending on the attitude of the pharaoh. It would provide a clear illustration of Archilochus' maxim that 'a mercenary is your friend as long as there is fighting to be done'.[27]

Herodotus reports (2.163) that there were 30,000 Ionians and Carians fighting under Apries against Amasis. They settled in Egypt in the Camps at Daphnai (probably Tell Defenneh), and Nebesheh, and intermarried with the locals. Later they were brought to Memphis to serve as guards for Apries and Amasis, but they were not absorbed into the local population. The hostility they faced under Apries is evidence of this. The sense of Greek identity among the Greek fighters was undoubtedly bolstered by the establishment of the trading center at Naucratis and increased contacts with their fellow Greeks in the sixth century. That they maintained a fierce *esprit de corps* is illustrated by the story told by Herodotus (3.4,11) of the mercenaries who killed the children of Phanes of Halikarnassos and drank their blood as punishment for his defection to the Persians. After the Persian conquest nothing is said of the Greek mercenaries; they were most likely kept on by the Persians to garrison border outposts, much like the mixed colony of Jews, Aramaeans, and others settled at Elephantine in the fifth century.[28]

Herodotus and Diodorus are supplemented by epigraphical evidence, which adds much to our understanding of the men who served as mercenaries under the Pharaoh. A recently published inscription from a private collection provides a valuable insight into the men who served Psammetichos.[29] The inscription is on a statue of a seated male figure of Egyptian origin; it is said to have been found in a cave near Priene. The text reads as follows: 'Pedon, son of Amphinnes, dedicated me, having brought me from Egypt. And to him the King of Egypt, Psammetichos, gave as a prize of valor, a gold bracelet

[27] Greeks also arrived in Egypt with hostile intent. Before the foundation of Alexandria, the Egyptians had fortified the spot at Rhakotis to protect against pirates, particularly from Greece (Str. 17.1.6); and in the time of Psammetichos II, Milesians had settled at the Bolbitine mouth of the Nile and built the Milesian Wall, before sailing up into the Saite nome to found Naucratis (Str. 17.1.18). See Boardman (1980) 117.

[28] See Kraeling (1953); Porten (1968); (1996).

[29] Shahin (1987) 1–2; Masson and Yoyotte (1988) 171–9; Lejeune in *CRAI* (1988) 593–4; Ampolo and Bresciani (1988) 237–43; *SEG* 37.994, 39.1266.

and a city, for the sake of his virtue'. Masson and Yoyotte, and Ampolo and Bresciani, put the statue and the letter forms in the reign of the first Psammetichos, 664–610. The text confirms a number of points that our other sources led us to infer. The dedicator had personal contact with the pharaoh, who rewarded him for his valor, with, in addition to this statue, a gold bracelet and a city, whatever that may mean.[30] Most importantly, Pedon, after serving the pharaoh, returned to what was probably his home with booty, an art object, which he dedicated at a local sanctuary. The need to return home with prestige tokens acquired either through gift exchange or as booty is as old as Homer: Menelaus wanders through the Eastern Mediterranean to amass wealth before returning home; Paris acquires *peploi pampoikiloi* from Sidon; and Odysseus receives gifts from the Phaiakians, and talks of collecting objects on his fictitious journeys around the Aegean (*Odyssey* 4.78–93, 6.290–1,13.120–4, 14.321–6, 18.241–3, 18.272–95).[31] This concern also applied to mercenaries: members of the Ten Thousand worried about returning home empty-handed (Xen., *Anabasis* 6.1.17).

Better known are the inscriptions that date to the campaign of Psammetichos II against Nubia in 593.[32] The best known of these are the Greek and Carian inscriptions on the leg of a statue of Rameses II at Abu Simbel.[33] The inscriptions at Abu Simbel provide the clearest first-hand evidence for the Greek mercenaries who served abroad. Seven Greek inscriptions on the leg of a statue of Rameses II at his temple at Abu Simbel were identified by Lepsius in the nineteenth century, along with several signatures in the Carian alphabet, and several in Phoenician. In addition, several Carian graffiti on the walls of a temple of Hatschepsut at Buhen south of Abu Simbel have been dated by Masson to the same expedition; and another Carian inscription on a rock several kilometers north

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30 Being given a city may mean that the king granted the revenue from a village in Egypt to Pedon, much as the Persian king rewarded Themistokles with (the revenues of) the cities of Magnesia, Lampsacus, Myus, Percote and Palaescepsis to provide his bread, wine, meat and clothing (Plut., *Themistokles* 29).

31 Proclus' summary of the *Kypria* relates that Paris sacked Sidon.

32 The expedition to Nubia is recorded on inscriptions at Abu Simbel, Karnak and Tanis. It took place in Regnal Year 3 of Psammetichos' reign, which is now dated to 593/92: Trigger (1983) 281. On the campaign of Psammetichos II to Nubia, see Sauneron and Yoyotte (1952); Redford (1992) 462–3.

33 Greek inscriptions: ML no. 7; Bernard and Masson (1957) 1–20. Carian inscriptions, Masson (1979); (1980).

of the site of the Temple of Dendur in Nubia may also date to this episode.[34] The inscriptions show that some of the Greeks accompanying Psammetichos were literate. Some of the Greeks give their homes, which are in the East, Ialysos, Teos, and Kolophon. Others give only their patronymic, or no identification at all: Psammetichos son of Theokles, Archon and Python sons of Amoibichos, and Pelekos son of Eudamos (although this last may be a very Homeric pun, since it is written as 'Pelekos son of a nobody': perhaps he is mocking the pretensions of his fellows?).[35] Five of the Greeks do not give a patronymic, however; Jeffery suggested that these were second and third generation Ionomemphites, but there is no reason to think that Greeks born in Egypt would be less proud of their parentage. We cannot guess at the origins and social standing of the mass of Greeks and Carians who did not inscribe their names on the monuments.[36] But we may be fairly certain that some of the officers at least were literate, well-born eastern Greeks.

Greeks continued to serve in a mercenary capacity in Egypt, as is shown by other inscriptions such as those at the funeral temple of Seti I at Abydos, which range from the sixth century to the Ptolemaic period. One of these, written by a Cretan, one Onesandros of Kydonia, proudly proclaims himself to be an *epikouros* of Amyrtaios, possibly the Egyptian prince who rebelled against the Persians in ca. 460.[37] Greeks were even able to secure local positions of authority: a papyrus from Hermopolis, dated to 575, is addressed to a district official named Ariston.[38] These Greeks had substantially more latitude to penetrate Egyptian society than the merchants who were confined to Naucratis.

The remaining evidence for Greeks in mercenary service abroad in the Archaic period does not add materially to the picture adumbrated here. The earliest Greek mercenaries seem to have been pro-

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[34] Masson (1978); Zaba (1974) no. 196. Ray (1982) lists and discusses most of the Carian inscriptions found in Egypt; for a more recent discussion of the Carians in Egypt, see Ray (1995).

[35] ΠΕΛΕϘΟΣ ΟΥΔΑΜΩΝ; Bernard and Masson (1957) 8–9. They prefer a Greek derivation for the name from πέλεκυς, 'battle-axe'. However, the name has turned up in Carian inscriptions in Egypt, Masson (1978) M 32; see also Schürr (1992) 143. Ray ((1982) 187) reads the name as *Pdto*. Alternately, the name may be Semitic; cf. the Biblical *Peleg*.

[36] Other literate Carians from the same expedition left their marks on walls at Buhen in Nubia; see Masson, (1978) 50–4.

[37] Perdrizet and Lefebvre (1919) no. 445. Jeffrey (1961) 314 prefers to identify this Amyrtaios with the Saite who revolted in ca. 400.

[38] Zaghloul (1985); Burstein (1996) 28.

duced as a result of the disorders in the Greek *poleis*, particularly those of the eastern Aegean, as early as the first half of the seventh century. Some number of Greeks, the losers in civil strife, were forced into exile. Denied the opportunity to participate in colonization, they had to live by whatever skills they could take with them. We cannot know how widespread this phenomenon was. If substantial numbers of illiterate and poor peasants were taking part in mercenary activity, the written record does not and cannot reflect it. But it seems unlikely. To be a soldier of fortune, one must not only be able to afford arms, one must also be trained to use them. In addition, one must have the education to function in a foreign society and to make contact, directly or through officers, with the sort of people who are likely to hire mercenaries. The evidence we have reviewed certainly suggests that it was a literate elite from eastern Greece that made contact, perhaps through the mediation of their Carian neighbors, with the powers of the Eastern Mediterranean. Embarrassed by their reduction to hired service, they adopted the euphemisms of *symmachos* or, more commonly, the Homeric *epikouros*. As the phenomenon became more common, the euphemism wore thin. By the fifth century, these men were branded with the terms *misthophoros* or *misthōtos*; any attempt to cloak their behavior in heroic terms was discarded.

Yet even if this group were not great in numbers, their influence may nonetheless have been substantial. We have already considered the possibility that Greeks, introduced to mercenary service abroad through contact with Carians, brought the practice back home, where mercenaries were employed by tyrants to gain and secure power. But the influence of mercenaries on Greek life may have been broader than this. Literate and probably polyglot, the Greeks engaged in mercenary service are likely agents for the transmission of Near Eastern culture into Greece. More so than colonists and even merchants, these individuals had to immerse themselves in alien environments. On those occasions when they were able to return to their home cities, they were undoubtedly able to bring back ideas and cultural forms. Greek mercenaries may have contributed to the appearance of imported objects in tombs at Athens, Crete, and Euboia, and as dedications at sanctuaries at Olympia, Argos, Samos, and elsewhere; and the appearance of Eastern motifs in Greek poetry, in the decorative arts, and in architecture. Whether or not we will ever be able to assess their role in the interactions between Greece

and its neighbors, the time has come to rescue these individuals from the obscurity into which they have been cast by their own fates and by modern prejudice.

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THUCYDIDES ON PLATAEA, THE BEGINNING OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR, AND THE 'ATTIC QUESTION'

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The Beginning of the Peloponnesian War

In history, especially the history of wars, the statement of the most elementary 'fact' often disguises a host of assumptions and prejudices. A description of the beginning of a war, declaring who 'fired the first shot', is clearly one of these interpretive cruxes. The prejudicial effects of a simple account are forgotten only after time and repetition, usually from the victor's point of view, have enabled the 'acceptable' version to win out.

The beginning of the Peloponnesian War as narrated by Thucydides is one such instance where time and repetition have surely established the accepted version. The war began, according to Thucydides, with the Theban attack on Plataea early in the year 431 BCE (by modern calendrics), a date that Thucydides 2.2.1 carefully identifies through five different methods of reckoning (seven, if we include his backwards reckonings from the Peace of Nicias in 5.20.1, and from the eventual fall of Athens in 5.26.3–4). The inaugural significance of the attack on Plataea as the first blow of the Peloponnesian War might be taken as part of the bedrock of history if Thucydides' judgment stood alone. As it happens, there are clear indications that many of Thucydides' contemporaries (non-Athenians as well as Athenians) originally looked to other events as the commencement of war.

Attentive readers have sometimes noticed that Thucydides himself actually identifies three beginnings of the war, each described as the commencement of an attack on Attica: the Theban attack on Plataea (which, in 5.20.1, is τὸ πρῶτον ἡ ἐσβολὴ ἡ ἐς τὴν Ἀττικήν, ['the first invasion into Attica']); the Peloponnesian attack on Oenoe (2.18.1, ἀφίκετο τῆς Ἀττικῆς ἐς Οἰνόην πρῶτον ['they invaded Oenoe in Attica first'), and the Peloponnesian invasion of the Eleusinian and Thriasian

plain (2.19.1, ἐσέβαλεν ἐς τὴν 'Αττικὴν ['they invaded Attica']). Since these events all transpired in the first half of the year 431, it is possible to regard them as marking stages in a progressively deepening commitment to war, with the Spartans becoming involved only after the Thebans had committed the first act of violence. Yet it is remarkable that Thucydides characterizes *all three* of these events as an 'invasion of Attica', and further, it is remarkable that he clearly regards the Spartans to be responsible for even the first of them (7.18.2, where Thucydides states that the Spartans themselves held this opinion).

In so describing the beginning of the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides has presented a unified explanation of a complicated sequence of events. Yet even his account does not embrace the full complexity of events, for popular opinion among his contemporaries looked to one or more *other* occasions as the beginning of the war. Aristophanes, in his *Peace* performed in spring 421, observes that Peace has not been seen by the Athenians for thirteen years (*Peace* 990), reflecting a prevalent view that 'the war' began years before the attacks of 431. Counting inclusively, thirteen years before 421 *could* refer to the clash of Athenian and Corinthian ships at the battle of Sybota in the archon-year 433/32. More likely he refers to some unknown incident in the archon-year 434/33, the thirteenth archonship, counting inclusively, before the production of *Peace*. This could have been some skirmish with the Megarians, since it was between them and the Athenians, according to Aristophanes elsewhere (*Acharnians* 528) that 'the beginnings of war erupted' (κἀντεῦθεν ἀρχὴ τοῦ πολέμου κατερράγη), *after which* Pericles passed his decrees against the Megarians.[1]

This testimony serves as a reminder that any statement of the 'facts' about the beginning of the Peloponnesian War is by no means a simple matter. We must recognize that Thucydides' own account, however subtle and comprehensive it appears to be, amounts to an interpretive assertion. It is the purpose of this essay to investigate the unstated assumptions that underlay the assertion Thucydides makes about the beginning of the war.

[1] Andocides (3.8) also says war began 'on account of the Megarians'.

Thucydides on Sparta and Attica

Thucydides' passion for accuracy in the description of events is the foundation of all criticism of his work. Accuracy in describing the events of war is bound to lead to interpretive ambiguity, since war, by definition, is a clash of irreconcilable viewpoints. Even within allied camps, events of the sort described by Thucydides are the product of the temporary unification, for the purposes of war, of parties with diverse goals and interests. Events occurring under such circumstances cannot conform neatly to a single, straightforward explanation. Any claim that they *do* is merely a πρόφασις, an assertion or a 'party line', which at best is an approximate description of the multiple interests at play, and at worst is itself a weapon in the war of one set of interests against others.[2] In the present instance, Thucydides' fidelity to events allows us to detect aspects of events that are not explained by his own judgmental assertions. Cumulatively, such subtle discrepancies provide clues to interests that, for one reason or another, Thucydides did not choose to bring to the fore in his account of the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War.

Over most of the first 170 chapters of his work, Thucydides is at pains to justify his major thesis, or ἀληθεστάτη πρόφασις, about the war (1.23.6, cf. 1.88): it was begun by the Spartans who, although provoked by circumstances not entirely of their own making, committed the decisive act of premeditated aggression.[3] Thucydides characterizes the war that began in 431 as part of a historical pattern of Spartan invasions of Attica. This was the strategy articulated by Archidamus in 432 (Thucydides 1.81–2), previously executed by Pleistoanax in 446 (1.114.2, 2.21.1), and reportedly discussed at Sparta during the Egyptian campaign of the 450s (1.109.2) and on the occasion of the revolt of Thasos in the 460s (1.101.1–2). All of these invasions, actual or merely contemplated, were intended to bend the Athenians to the will of Sparta. These occasions, moreover, extend

[2] My translation of πρόφασις is closely related to the subjective sense of the term used by Thucydides at 1.23.6, as argued by J. Richardson (1990), who cites earlier scholarship.

[3] I agree with both Ste. Croix ((1972) 50–63) and Badian ((1993) 125–62) that Thucydides has so arranged his testimony in order to highlight the responsibility of the Spartans for beginning the war. Hornblower ((1994), 143–8) cites additional examples of Thucydides' narrative strategy that work to this same effect.

a list of earlier 'Dorian' invasions of Attica given by Herodotus (5.76). Thucydides (2.54.2–3) attests that the Athenians, both in 431 and at the time when he was writing, regarded the present war as yet another in this series of 'Dorian wars'.

But in describing the commencement of war in 431, Thucydides records an anomalous event. The Theban attack on Plataea, a town 'of Boeotia, which was an ally of the Athenians' (2.2.1), does not fit the established pattern of Spartan invasions of Attica. For Thebes was certainly not Peloponnesian, nor Dorian, and Plataea, as it was known to posterity, was not exactly Athenian (although Thucydides 5.20.1 does refer to this attack as an 'invasion of Attica'). Archidamus' attack on Oenoe and his subsequent invasion of the Eleusinian and Thriasian plain, which followed within a few months of the attack on Plataea, do conform to the pattern set by Thucydides, and this is probably why these events are also described as the commencement of hostilities (although the fact that there are two such 'commencements' following Plataea is still an issue that requires consideration). But the relation of the Theban attack on Plataea to the circumstances that Thucydides has otherwise so carefully described is entirely unexplained at this point in his narrative.

In focusing on the culpability of the Spartans for beginning the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides has omitted any examination of the role of Attica's neighbors in bringing on the war. This is evident not only in the absence, at this point in his narrative, of any account of the Theban grievance against Plataea, but also in the minimal attention Thucydides gives to the dispute between Athens and Megara. The dispute with Megara is identified by nearly all contemporary and later sources as the issue that ignited the Peloponnesian War (Aristophanes, *Acharnians* 532–4; *Peace* 605–11; Andocides 3.8; Aeschines 2.175; Diodorus 12.39.4–5; Plutarch, *Pericles* 29.4–30, 32.3).[4] Thucydides himself admits that 'the chief point and the one that [the Spartans] made most clear was that war could be avoided if Athens would revoke the Megarian decree' (1.139.1, Warner translation). Yet he gives the barest account of this dispute, and he omits to mention that, as the war commenced, the Athenians regarded making war

[4] To my knowledge, only Justin 2.7.1–2 and Pausanias 3.7.10–11 follow Thucydides in assigning responsibility for the war to Sparta, making no mention of the Megarian dispute.

on Megara as a solemn obligation.[5] The disproportion here between the significance of events, as perceived at the time, and the explanation of the events given by Thucydides is enormous.

The issue common to all of these unresolved questions about original grievances and the commencement of hostilities is the nature and extent of Attic territory. The fact that Thucydides identifies three distinct events as the inaugural 'invasion of Attica' indicates that the nature of 'Attica' itself was, to him, an unresolved issue. When and where was 'Attica' first violated? Three times, in Book 5, Thucydides refers to the war that began in 431 as 'the Attic War' (5.28.2, 31.3, 5), and twice he refers to the Peace of Nicias as 'the Attic truce' (5.29.2, 36.1). This suggests that 'the Attic War' was fought, at least in part, in order to settle conflicting views of what constituted 'Attica'. We may term this conflict the 'Attic question'. Thucydides' account provides clear evidence of its importance, but it is a subject that he skirts, and for some reason chooses not to address.

The following sections of this essay examines the ambiguity of 'Attica' specifically in terms of the three points, Plataea, Oenoe, and the plain of Eleusis and Thria, at which Thucydides claims that the violation of Attica began in 431. In conclusion, we will consider *why* Thucydides would allow such ambiguity about the 'Attic question', and consequently, why he must allow, despite great efforts at precision, a certain level of ambiguity about the time and place at which the war began.

The Invasion of Attica: Eleusis

Our investigation of the assumptions that conditioned Thucydides' account of the beginning of the Peloponnesian War must become in part a topographical investigation of the boundaries of Attica. It is possible to think of the three events of Thucydides' narrative that constituted the 'invasion of Attica' in terms of points on three concentric hypothetical boundaries of Attica (see fig. 10). The innermost

[5] Thucydides 2.31 notes the magnitude of the first Athenian invasion of the Megarid, and refers to the recurrence of such massed invasions (πανστρατιᾷ) every year, but not until 4.66.1 does he mention (without explanation) the policy of two annual invasions of the Megarid. Plutarch (*Pericles* 30.3) reports the decree of Charinus sanctioning these invasions.

boundary is the one closest to Athens, the center of Attica. Because the violation of this innermost boundary leaves the least doubt about the hostile intentions of the invader, we will begin our topographical review here, even though this event was the last in chronological order. I refer to the passage of Archidamus and the Peloponnesians into the plain of Eleusis and Thria, which is given a formal notice by Thucydides at 2.19.1–2:

> [S]o at last [the Peloponnesians] moved forward and invaded Attica. The invasion began about eighty days after the Theban attack at Plataea, when summer was on and the grain was ripening. The invading army was commanded by the Spartan King, Archidamus son of Zeuxidamus. First they encamped and ravaged the neighborhood of Eleusis and the Thriasian Plain.

The invasion of the plain of Eleusis and Thria had good historical precedent as an attack on Attica. Thucydides describes the invasion of 446 in these terms: 'the Peloponnesians invaded and laid waste to Attica as far as Eleusis and Thria under the leadership of the Spartan King, Pleistoanax son of Pausanias' (1.114.2, 2.21.1). More famous, perhaps, was the invasion of 506 reported by Herodotus, 'when Cleomenes with a Peloponnesian army marched as far as Eleusis', an event that Herodotus refers to as 'the fourth occasion on which Dorians had entered Attica' (5.76).

Archidamus' entry into the plain of Eleusis and Thria marks the unambiguous repetition of this pattern, as perceived by the Athenians. From the Peloponnesian perspective, it marked the end of Archidamus' hesitation (Thucydides 2.18.5) and his total commitment to war against the Athenians. Thucydides underscores the formal significance of this moment by naming Archidamus, here for the first time in his narrative, with his patronymic 'son of Zeuxidamus' (a formality repeated when Thucydides records each of Archidamus' two succeeding invasions of Attica, 2.47.2 and 3.1.1, and likewise his assault on Plataea, 2.71.1). By this movement of Archidamus and his army, all perspectives could agree that war between Peloponnesians and Athenians was underway.

Even though our sources are consistent in describing the hostile entry of the plain of Eleusis and Thria as an invasion of Attica, it is worth reflecting that Thucydides can recall a time when the Athenian state did not include Eleusis, when the king of Eleusis (Eumolpus) had made war on the king of Athens (Erechtheus, 2.15.1). Eleusis only became part of Attica, according to Thucydides' review

of the tradition, through the wisdom of Theseus, his 'dissolution of the governments of the other cities' (καταλύσας τῶν ἄλλων πόλεων τά τε βουλευτήρια καὶ τὰς ἀρχάς), and his centralization of all such functions at Athens, all perpetually celebrated in Athena's honor in the festival of Union (ξυνοίκια) still celebrated in Thucydides' day (ἔτι καὶ νῦν, 2.15.2).

It is also worth reflecting that one of the ultimate consequences of war and defeat by Sparta was the separation of Eleusis from Athens through the establishment of a form of autonomous enclave, the Eleusinian ἐξοικήσις, as Aristotle terms it (*Athenaion Politeia* 39, 40.4). This temporary rupture (from 403 to 401) of the customary definition of Attica, a consequence of Spartan intervention, was certainly within Thucydides' experience when he completed his account of the beginning of the war. He and his contemporaries were surely aware that the concept of 'Attica' had to be continuously asserted and defended. It had not been decided once and forever in the time of Theseus.

The Invasion of Attica: Oenoe

Oenoe defines the next hypothetical boundary of Attica, a boundary lying beyond the plain of Eleusis.[6] Archidamus' invasion of the latter, described in the quote above, proceeded from his failed assault on Oenoe. In 2.12.4–5, Thucydides reports the beginning of Archidamus' 'advance toward their land' from his camp at the Isthmus, and his union somewhere along the way with Boeotian forces. After describing Athenian preparations, Thucydides characterizes Archidamus' arrival at Oenoe in the following terms (2.18.1–2):

[6] Because a work as recent as the commentary on Thucydides by Cartwright ((1997), 102) can state that Oenoe's 'exact location is unknown', it is worth indicating the nature of the evidence. The substantial remains of the fortifications and the settlement of ancient Oenoe (modern Myoupolis) lie three kilometers east of the modern village of Oinoi (previously Mazi), at the east end of a fertile plain within the folds of the Cithaeron massif. This identification of Oenoe was established by Eugene Vanderpool (1978) against several alternative sites previously suggested according to various notions of the border of Attica, Archidamus' route, and the presumed strategic importance of the site in question. All recent scholarship has accepted Vanderpool's identification: Adam (1982) 215, with photo, 55; Ober (1985) 154–5, 224; Travlos (1988) 170, 320, with photo 327; Lauter (1992) 81–4; Munn (1993) 7–8, with photo 262.

> Meanwhile the army of the Peloponnesians was advancing. The first place they came to in Attica was Oenoe, and it was from this place that they intended to invade.... Oenoe was on the frontiers of Attica and Boeotia. It had been fortified, and the Athenians used it as a garrison post whenever there was war.

Herodotus refers to Oenoe as a deme of Attica in the late sixth century (5.74.2), and it is known as a deme of the Hippothontid tribe from documents of the late fourth century (e.g., *IG* 2^2.1594.51), so its Attic status, from an Athenian perspective, is clear. Thucydides' statement that Oenoe was 'the first place they came to in Attica' is tantamount to saying that the attack on Attica began at Oenoe. His further statement that this was the place from which the invasion was to proceed allows, however, for some ambiguity on this point. Likewise, the description of Oenoe as 'on the frontiers of Attica and Boeotia' (ἐν μεθορίοις τῆς Ἀττικῆς καὶ τῆς Βοιωτίας, 2.18.2) is a formulation of ambiguity.

The term τὰ μεθόρια, 'frontiers', describes a border region, not a sharply defined boundary. As revealed in Thucydides' description of the dispute between the Spartans and the Argives over 'the Cynurian land' (5.41.2), γῆ μεθορία describes land that lies between the ὅροι of adjacent states. It was not indisputably part of either state, although it was often controlled by one of them.[7] Such was the case with Panakton, another fort ἐν μεθορίοις, captured from the Athenians by the Boeotians in 422 (5.3.5). Thucydides later describes the ancient dispute between Boeotians and Athenians over the land around Panakton (5.42.1), giving a rare glimpse of the contested nature of the boundaries of Attica. An ancient dispute between Athenians and Boeotians over Oenoe is attested by Hellanicus,[8] and an awareness of this tradition certainly underlay Thucydides' reference to the position of Oenoe 'in the borderlands between Attica and Boeotia'.

Oenoe had been attacked on the occasion of the 'triple invasion' of Attica organized by Cleomenes in 506. Herodotus informs us that the Boeotian share of that invasion consisted in seizing 'the two outlying demes of Attica, Oenoe and Hysiae' (5.74.2). This passage confirms that the Attic status of Oenoe had been asserted in the course of Cleisthenes' organization of Attic demes.[9] It is likely that

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[7] Edmonson (1966) 160–8 provides an excellent discussion of the literal and figurative meanings of μεθόριος.

[8] Hellanicus, *FGH* 323a F 23, where the ancient dispute over Oenoe is also associated with Panakton. See also Proclus, *On Timaeus* 21b; Photius, *Library* 186.138b.

[9] Whitehead (1986) 25 n. 90, 48 n. 39 affirms that Oenoe was a Cleisthenic deme.

Oenoe was also attacked in the course of Pleistoanax's invasion of 446, when the Peloponnesians 'laid siege to various garrison posts before withdrawing to the Peloponnese' (Diodorus 12.6.1, conforming to Thucydides' statement that the Athenians used Oenoe 'as a garrison post whenever there was war'). Eventually, in 411, Aristarchus, a leader of the Four Hundred, handed Oenoe over to the Boeotians upon the collapse of the oligarchic regime (Thucydides 8.98). No source reports the return of Oenoe to Athenian control, but, as noted above, by the later fourth century it is attested as an Attic deme.

The contested status of Oenoe, then, accounts for the ambiguity in Thucydides' description of the commencement of Archidamus' invasion of Attica. According to Archidamus and his Boeotian allies, while the assaults on Oenoe were underway, Attic land had not yet been injured (Thucydides 2.18.5, cf. 1.82.3–4). This is a clear contradiction of Thucydides' own statement that Oenoe was a part 'of Attica' (2.18.2), and must have contradicted the understanding of the Athenians defending Oenoe. No one could pretend that an army carrying out siege-works and assaults was not at the same time causing extensive damage to trees, fields, and property in the surrounding countryside. The definition of what was 'Attica' was the crucial variable.

The assault on Oenoe was surely prompted by the Boeotians, who were reasserting their claim to the place. Doubtless the reassertion of ancient claims was one of the conditions of Boeotian cooperation with the Peloponnesians.[10] Without explaining any of this, Thucydides accounts for the attack on Oenoe solely in terms of Archidamus'

Curiously, however, he asserts (48) that Herodotus 5.74.2 does not refer to demes as they had been construed by Cleisthenes, presumably because Hysiae, also identified as an Attic deme in this passage, manifestly was not a deme of Attica later on. This manner of inference, however, assumes what needs to be demonstrated—that the distribution of demes and their bouleutic quotas known to us only after the beginning of the fourth century had remained unchanged since the time of Cleisthenes (see Whitehead (1986) 21). The organizational and demographic continuity that this assumes has rightly come under question; see Hansen (1983) 227–38; (1991) 47–8; Lohmann (1993) 269–70; Osborne (1996) 302–3. Herodotus was certainly aware of what a 'deme of Attica' was in the Cleisthenic sense (5.69). Therefore, the burden of proof is on those who, like Whitehead, assume that Herodotus 5.74.2 either misunderstood what a 'deme of Attica' was, or meant by this phrase something other than what the Athenians meant. What, in either case, could he have thought it meant if it was not one of 'the demes he [Cleisthenes] allotted to the tribes' (5.69.2)?

[10] Compare Thucydides 3.68.4 on the motives for Sparta's treatment of Plataea, and note the Boeotian appeal to 'ancient oaths' affecting nearby Panakton when, after the peace treaty of 421, the Spartans switched from backing the Boeotians to accepting terms negotiated with the Athenians, 5.42.1.

desire to put off the invasion of Attica as long as possible, in the hope that the Athenians would offer to negotiate before the devastation of their countryside began. Time spent besieging Oenoe was a source of annoyance to Archidamus' Peloponnesian troops, who stood to gain nothing from the assault, and who lost opportunities to gather booty each day the further invasion was postponed. From the perspective of the Peloponnesians, war against the Athenians only began when Archidamus finally decided that it was time to invade Attica proper. From the perspective of the Athenians, they were already under attack at Oenoe. Indeed, the unprovoked attack on Attica had begun months before, at Plataea.

The Invasion of Attica: Plataea

The third event in our geographical sequence is the Theban attack on Plataea. In chronological order, this was the first attack on Attica, and it was the event that Thucydides identifies most emphatically and consistently as the 'beginning of the war' (2.1–2, 5.20.1, 5.26.3, 7.18.2). That the attack on Plataea was specifically an 'invasion of Attica' is stated by Thucydides in his chronological summary of the peace treaty between Athens and Sparta in 421:

> This treaty was made in the spring, just at the end of winter, directly after the city Dionysia, just ten years, with the difference of a few days, from the first invasion of Attica and the commencement of this war. (5.20.1)

His dating leaves no doubt that he refers to the time of the attack on Plataea.[11]

The fact that this 'beginning of the war' is also called 'the invasion of Attica' (ἡ ἐσβολὴ ἡ ἐς τὴν Ἀττικὴν) has made this, in Gomme's words, 'almost the most disputed passage in Thucydides'.[12] The usual response of commentators is to recommend deleting the troublesome

[11] So, Gomme (1945–81) 2.684: 'in fact the date given for the attack on Plataia, ἅμα ἦρι ἀρξομένῳ, is the only one that fits with that of this present chapter'; Andrewes, in Gomme (1945–81) 4.18: 'No sense can be made of the phrase unless the ten years start from the attack on Plataia'; Hornblower (1991–96) 2.491: 'By "the beginning of the war" Th. is surely here referring to the attack on Plataia: ii.2.1'.

[12] Gomme (1945–81) 2.683, with previous scholarship on this question cited on 684. Gomme hesitates to recommend emendation as a solution; Hornblower ((1991–96) 2.490) is convinced that 'ἐσβολὴ ... καί should certainly be deleted'.

reference to 'the invasion of Attica'. But there is no justification for such an emendation except to accommodate modern sensibilities about what constituted an 'invasion of Attica'. Herodotus, writing in the last decades of the fifth century, felt no need to explain how Hysiae, a Boeotian neighbor of Plataea, could have been considered a part 'of Attica', except to say that it was among 'the outermost demes of Attica' (δήμους τοὺς ἐσχάτους τῆς Ἀττικῆς, 5.74.2, see n. 9). I suggest that Plataea was likewise regarded, by Athenians in the last decades of the fifth century, as one of the 'outermost demes of Attica'.

Justification for the Theban attack on Plataea only emerges, in Thucydides' narrative, from his later account of the negotiations between Archidamus and the Plataeans in 429, and from the speeches of the Plataeans and Thebans on the occasion of the surrender of Plataea in 427. Herodotus, Plutarch, and Pausanias provide additional background information elucidating the drama that unfolded at Plataea between 431 and 427.

From Herodotus we know that, long before, under duress from the Thebans (and at the advice of the Spartan king, Cleomenes) the Plataeans had 'given themselves' to the Athenians (6.108), and for that reason the Plataeans had fought with the Athenians against the Persians at Marathon in 490. The relationship between Plataea and Athens was therefore close, but the identity of the Plataeans as 'Athenians' was not perfect, for we learn from Pausanias the periegete (1.32.3) that the Plataeans who fell at Marathon had received a burial separate from the mound covering all other Athenian dead. A decade after the battle, we find the Plataeans taking measures to reinforce their 'Athenian' identity. From Plutarch we learn that, on the eve of the battle of Plataea in 479, in response to an oracle foretelling victory to the Athenians if the battle were to be fought 'on their own soil, . . . the Plataeans voted, on the motion of Arimnestus, to remove the boundaries of Plataea on the side toward Attica, and to give their territory to the Athenians' (*Aristides* 11.3–8).

From the speeches reported by Thucydides we learn that, in the eyes of the Spartans and their allies, the status of the Plataeans had been further transformed by ceremonies that took place *after* the battle of Plataea in 479. On that occasion, Pausanias, the Spartan commander, had inaugurated sacrifices to Zeus Eleutherios at Plataea, and, before the assembled allies, 'he gave back to the people of Plataea their land and their city to be held by them as an independent state, guaranteed for ever against unprovoked attack and

against foreign domination'.[13] The promise of independence (αὐτονόμους οἰκεῖν) and protection against foreign aggression (δουλεία) were terms guaranteed to all participants in this ceremony, on the strength of their mutual pledges.

In the case of the Plataeans, the terms of this oath worked in several ways. In the context of the defeat of the Persians and their Theban allies, it assured Plataea independence from future attempts by Persia or, more importantly, Thebes, to 'enslave' Plataea. For this reason, the Plataeans opened their appeal to Archidamus, in 429, with a reference to this oath to justify their grievance against the Thebans for their unprovoked attack in 431. But the declaration of Plataean independence also meant that the Plataeans were not to yield their autonomy to any other state—to Athens in particular. This was the substance of Archidamus' reply: the Plataeans were obliged by their oath to join the other Greeks with the Spartans in 'liberating' the Greek states that had been 'enslaved'—in this case by the Athenians. The ultimate refusal of the Plataeans to separate themselves from Athens was the decision that sealed their doom.

The behavior of the Plataeans prior to 427 is openly debated between them and the Thebans in the speeches before the Spartan judges that Thucydides reports, and they agree on telling points. In an effort to justify their history of cooperation with Athens, the Plataeans emphasize their obligation to the Athenians who, long ago, had rescued them from the Thebans, had granted their request for alliance, and had granted them citizenship (the Plataeans are obliged, they say, as one who προηγάγετο ξυμμάχους καὶ πολιτείας μετέλαβεν, 3.55.3).[14] The Thebans take up this point: 'It was in defense against

[13] Thucydides 2.71.2, translated by R. Warner. Badian ((1993) 119–20) clearly recognizes the meaning of this passage in its overall context: 'The Plataeans were in some sense part of the Attic state . . . they now received back an autonomy that, by their own choice, they had given up. We may say that Pausanias, standing in place of a Spartan king, undid what an earlier Spartan king (Cleomenes) had done'. We may add that Pausanias also undid what Arimnestus and the Plataeans had more recently done.

[14] Herodotus (5.66.2) attests, as a paradigm specifically for Attic citizenship, that a mythical σύμμαχος could be counted as a citizen. Further evidence that σύμμαχοι could also be πολῖται, in archaic parlance, is found in the law of a Locrian community, dated to the same period (ca. 525–500) as the reception of the Plataeans at Athens, ML 13 (= Fornara 33). After stating how members of the community are to use a specified territory, the law stipulates that no further allocations of the territory in question are to be contemplated, 'unless, under pressure of war, it is resolved by majority decision of 101 men of good families to introduce no more

us, so you say, that you became allies and citizens of Athens' ('Αθηναίων ξύμμαχοι καὶ πολῖται, 3.63.2). The Thebans then point out that Plataean cooperation with Athens exceeded the requirements of justifiable self-defense, for the Plataeans went on to 'join the Athenians in attacking others'. As the Thebans see it, by their own free choice the Plataeans have preferred to join the Athenians in 'enslaving Greece' and to betray their former confederates (the Spartans and their allies) who, then and now, were struggling to liberate Greece (3.63.3, 64.3). The essence of the Theban argument is that, ever since the Plataeans appealed to the Athenians and became their allies and citizens, the Plataeans have behaved as Athenians.

Nothing that the Plataeans say contradicts this conclusion, and much that they say and do confirms it. Following the attack in 431 (2.6.1–4), and upon the arrival of Archidamus in 429 (2.73.1–74.1), the Plataeans do nothing (with the exception of the massacre of Theban prisoners, 2.5–6) without consulting the Athenians first; this corresponds rather closely to the concept of Theseus' centralization of Attic governments in Athens (2.15.2). In their appeal to the Spartans, the Plataeans remind them of the troops they had sent to assist the Spartans during the Helot revolt on Mount Ithome (3.54.5); later, the Thebans point out that the Plataeans had participated in the 'enslavement' of the Aeginetans (3.64.3). Both of these events are described elsewhere in Thucydides (1.102, 105.2–3, 108.4) as actions of the Athenians, and the Plataeans may be understood to number among them. Likewise, the Plataeans boast that they alone of the mainlanders had served in the naval battle against the Persians at Artemisium (3.54.4); Herodotus reports that the Plataeans did so by manning Athenian ships (8.1.1).

In all these respects, the Plataeans behaved as if they were Athenians. In fact, the evidence summarized here indicates that in 431 the Athenians regarded Plataeans as part of the corporate body of Attic citizenry, and Plataea as one of the 'outermost demes of Attica'. It was only events subsequent to 431 that prevented them from continuing to be so regarded.

Our perspective on the system of Attic demes instituted by Cleisthenes, it is well to remember, is dominated by accounts composed

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than two hundred settlers capable of fighting (ἄνδρας διακατίους μεῖστον ἀξξιομάχους ἐπιϝοίκους ἐφάγεσθαι)' (lines 7–9, translating μεῖστον as μέγιστον, see Buck 62.3). Here we see that ἀξιόμαχοι ἐπίοικοι, who are in effect σύμμαχοι by virtue of their ability to fight, become landholders in the community, in effect, citizens.

in the fourth century.[15] Among the little evidence recorded in the fifth century, we find that the principle of including foreign neighbors within the Cleisthenic system is clearly attested. Herodotus reports that when Cleisthenes created his ten new tribes, he named them after 'native heroes, with the exception of Ajax, whom he added as a neighbor and ally, though he was a foreigner' (ἅτε ἀστυγείτονα καὶ σύμμαχον, ξεῖνον ἐόντα, 5.66.2).[16] Aristotle, writing in the later fourth century, recalled that Cleisthenes' reforms were said to have included living and not merely legendary ξένοι within the new tribes (*Politics* 1275b36–7). Here is a clear indication that the Cleisthenic system was capable of including as citizens those who in some sense were foreign, but who were neighbors and allies.

Although the Plataeans, as Boeotians, were 'foreigners' in origin, the bond that they were attempting to forge between themselves and Athens was analogous in all respects to the bonds created between the independent communities of Attica and Athens in Theseus' day. Thucydides' description of the disruptive effects of the present war on the inhabitants of Attica looks back to the heterogenous origins of Attic unity, and he easily comprehends the situation of the Plataeans in 431 (2.16.1–2, Crawley/Strassler translation, with modification):

> The Athenians had long lived scattered over Attica in independent cities. Even after the centralization of Theseus, old habit still prevailed; and from early times down to the present war most Athenians still lived in the country with their families and households, and were consequently not at all inclined to move now, especially as they had only just restored their establishments after the Persian invasion. Deep was their trouble and discontent at abandoning their houses and the sanctuaries that had always been the heritage of their citizenship from ancient times, and at having to change their habits of life, and for each one to bid farewell to what was nothing less than his native city.

The only real difference between the Plataeans and the rest of the inhabitants of Attica, at this time, is that they were intercepted by the enemies of Athens before they could make the change and bid farewell to their native city.[17]

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[15] See note 9, above.

[16] Pandion, another Attic tribal eponym and also king of Megara (Pausanias 1.39.4, 41.6–8), is an indication of the movement, in Cleisthenes' day, to embrace even Megara within a wider definition of 'Attica' than was later realized (cf. Hdt. 5.76; Plut., *Theseus* 25.3). Notice also that, in Herodotus' day, the concept of 'Attica' was expansive enough to include the Thracian Chersonese (Hdt. 6.139–40).

[17] On the translation of οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ πόλιν τὴν αὑτοῦ ἀπολείπων ἕκαστος, see

Representing the Contested Status of Plataea

The status of Plataea and the Plataeans was the single most sharply contested issue across nearly two centuries of Attic history. As soon as they enter the historical record in the sixth century, the Plataeans are striving to become Athenians. But from the beginning of this history their affiliation with Athens is disputed by Thebes, and moderated by Sparta. How their status is described depends upon who was representing them and to whom, and when (the same is true of Oenoe, Panakton, Oropos, and even Megara; note also the difficulty of describing the status of Salamis).[18] It was the Spartans who, most often, forced the issue of Plataean status into the open, for discussion and dispute. Leaving aside the role of King Cleomenes in originally directing the Plataeans to seek alliance with Athens (Htd. 6.108.2), the successive policies of Pausanias, Archidamus, and Agesilaus of enforcing the 'autonomy' of Plataea had the most disruptive and disastrous effects on the history of this unfortunate people. Most references to the topic, therefore, had to take account of the terms of the debate established by the Spartans.

The complexity of this issue is such that descriptions become arguments—and we cannot always recognize the direction the argument is moving. For example, consider when Herodotus describes the battle-array of the Athenians at Marathon:

> [T]he tribes followed, one after the other, in their usual order, and finally the Plataeans were positioned on the left wing. And ever since this battle, during the sacrificial rites at the public gatherings in the festival held every four years at Athens, the Athenian crier has prayed for prosperity not just for the Athenian people, but for the Plataeans as well. (6.111, translated by R. Waterfield)

Is he emphasizing, for the benefit of his listeners, that the Plataeans were and are distinct from the Athenians, or is he emphasizing the intimacy of the affiliation of Plataeans and Athenians to an audience

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Skydsgaard (2000) 229–30. The description of independent civic identity and ancestral cults (ἱερὰ ἃ διὰ παντὸς ἦν αὐτοις ἐκ τῆς κατὰ τὸ ἀρχαῖον πολιτείας πάτρια) is striking, and often remarked in discussion of Attic demes. It has not been generally noticed how closely this language conforms to the customary endorsement of autonomy and τὰ πάτρια supported by the Spartans (Thuc. 1.139.3, 2.71.2, 72.1, 4.86–7, 118.1–3, 5.18.2, 5, 5.79; Xen., *Hellenica* 3.2.23–31, 5.2.7, 5.2.12–14) and by the Boeotians (Thuc. 2.2.4, 3.61.2, 65.2, 66.1).

[18] See Taylor (1997) for a thorough historical review of the status of Salamis.

aware that this bond had recently been violently severed by the Spartans and their allies? Herodotus wrote after the Theban attack of 431 (see 7.233.2), and almost certainly after the destruction of Plataea in 427. Any reference to the honorable connection between Plataea and Athens, in that context, could also be (I believe, was) an insinuation of the illegitimacy of the judgment recently rendered by the Spartans against the Plataeans.

A similar problem attends the burial of the Plataeans who fell at Marathon. Herodotus repeatedly emphasizes the Plataean participation in the battle (6.108, 111, 113), but he makes no mention of them when he enumerates the casualties (6.117):

> In this battle at Marathon about 6,400 men of the barbarians died, while of the Athenians there were 192. These were the numbers of the fallen on both sides.

Did Herodotus omit to count the Plataeans, or are they understood to number among the 192 'Athenians'? In view of Herodotus' affirmation of the thoroughness of his count of the dead 'on both sides', I find the latter option more probable.[19] However, even if Herodotus counted the fallen Plataeans among all Athenians, he did not report the fact, attested by a much later source, that fallen Plataeans were buried separately.

Centuries later, the periegete Pausanias, after describing the Athenian burial mound at Marathon, mentions a separate tomb of 'the Boeotian Plataeans and the slaves' (1.32.3).[20] This evidence confronts us with the paradox that, on one and the same occasion (the battle of Marathon), the Plataeans both were and were not considered 'Athenians'. In seeking an understanding of this circumstance, we must ask: does some unifying explanation account for this paradox, or is it evidence that two contradictory representations of the status of the Plataeans were competing with each other in the memorials and accounts of this event?

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[19] Thucydides (2.34.5) likewise makes mention of only one τάφος of those who fell at Marathon. Regarding the later fifth-century monuments to Athenian war-dead, there is a divergence of scholarly opinion about whether or not the common heading 'These Athenians died . . .' could head a list that included 'foreigners'. Lysias (2.66) attests such a practice in the late fifth century; the inclusion of Semichides 'from Eleutherae' under such a heading in a mid-fifth-century casualty list (ML 48, 96–7) affirms the practice for residents of the border lands.

[20] Three kilometers from the large tumulus at Marathon, a mound covering eleven graves has been excavated and identified, on the basis of Pausanias' account, as the Plataean mound mentioned by Pausanias; see Marinatos (1970).

Ernst Badian has sought a unified resolution to this paradox by asserting that the Plataeans were both 'Athenians' *and* 'slaves'.[21] According to Badian, Herodotus' statement (6.108) that the Plataeans 'gave themselves' to Athens means that both Herodotus and the Athenians 'regarded the Plataeans as in some sense δοῦλοι.' As slaves, the Plataeans 'belonged' to the Athenians, but as slaves they were not on a par with free Athenian citizens. The instances of 'enslavement' that Badian cites, however, do not lend credence to the scenario of volunteer slavery that he suggests.

'Slavery' (δουλεία) is a description of a dependent relationship, most often used in a pejorative sense (it is not pejorative only when dependency is accepted as a fact of nature, as in relationships to a god). Greeks describe subjects of the Persian king as 'enslaved'. In Thucydides, the Peloponnesians and their allies often describe the allies and subjects of Athens as 'enslaved',[22] and Athenians themselves use the term, to repudiate it, when answering the rhetoric of their opponents (the Athenians never so describe any people who voluntarily submit to their leadership).[23] Because of its rhetorical currency, by Thucydides' day, 'slavery' even becomes a common figure of speech to describe a state of submission to any real or psychological force alien to one's own identity.[24] To assert, therefore, that one community was 'enslaved' by or to another was also to assert that these communities were fundamentally alien to each other, and that unity could only be maintained by the enforced (and therefore illegitimate) condition of 'slavery'. To assert that the Plataeans were fundamentally alien to the Athenians was a Spartan, or a Theban argument. To assert that the Plataeans had legitimately merged their identity with Athens, like all other independent communities of Attica under Theseus, was the meaning of the Plataean supplication at the altar

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[21] Badian (1993) 117–18.

[22] Thucydides 1.68.3, 69.1, 121.5, 122.2, 124.3 (Corinthians at Sparta); 3.10.3–5, 13.6 (Mytileneans at Olympia); 3.63.3 (Thebans at Plataea); 3.70.3, 71.1 (Corcyraean oligarchs); 4.86.1, 87.3, 5.9.9 (Brasidas in Thrace); 4.92.4, 92.7 (Thebans at Delium); 5.86, 5.92, 5.100 (Melians); 6.76.2–4, 77.1, 80.5, 88.1 (Hermocrates and Camarinaeans); 7.66.2 (Gylippus at Syracuse).

[23] Thucydides 6.83.4, 84.3 (Euphemus at Camarina). In the latter passage, and in the Athenian responses to the Melian claims (previous note), the Athenians are careful to avoid acknowledging that subservience to Athens is tantamount to 'slavery'.

[24] In all of the following figurative or symbolic instances (except the first, referring to conditions of the prehistoric past), 'slavery' or 'enslavement' clearly describes a despicable and undesirable condition: Thuc. 1.8.3, 34.1, 98.4, 141.1, 2.63.3, 8.48.5 (voluntary and involuntary political submission); 1.81.6, 2.61.3, 3.38.5, 4.34.1, 7.71.3 (minds 'enslaved' either by excessive affection, or by fear and alarm).

of the Twelve Gods (Hdt. 6.108),[25] and likewise the meaning of the explicit inclusion of the Plataeans in the most public prayers of the Athenians for the welfare of their community (Hdt. 6.111). No source actually says that the Plataeans collectively ever *were* slaves of the Athenians. Quite the contrary: in Thucydides 2.71.3 and 3.58.5, the Plataeans describe the relationship that the Thebans intend to impose upon them by force as 'slavery'. It is therefore in no way probable that Herodotus, the Athenians, or the Plataeans would have considered 'Plataea's status . . . technically one of "slavery"' to Athens', as Badian asserts.

The association of the Plataeans with slaves in their tomb at Plataea, as recorded by Pausanias (our sole source), must therefore be regarded as a representation of Plataean status at odds with the otherwise attested acceptance of the Plataeans as Athenians. This circumstance is easily accounted for when we recall that the definitions of Athenian citizenship were vigorously disputed among the Athenians themselves not long before the battle of Marathon.

We have previously noted Herodotus' testimony that the Cleisthenic system envisioned the possibility of embracing as citizens those who were ξένοι ἀστυγείτονες (5.66.2). In other respects, Cleisthenes' reforms granted citizenship to individuals that some Athenians (and, most significantly, the Spartans) felt did not deserve this distinction. Ξένοι and δοῦλοι enrolled among his demes were denounced by some (Aristotle, *Politics* 1275b36–7; cf. *Athenaion Politeia* 21.4), defended by others (μὴ φυλοκρινεῖν, *Athenaion Politeia* 21.2). The Spartans, meanwhile, were invited by Cleisthenes' opponents to intervene, and expelled 700 families from Attica.[26] This bid to limit Athenian citi-

[25] Supplication at the hearth, like an altar, was a sign of abject submission. Enslavement, even death, was theoretically a possible outcome, but the intended outcome was acceptance precisely in the manner that the legitimacy of a helpless infant was affirmed in a ceremony at the hearth, and later reaffirmed as an ephebe at an altar, where enslavement was the alternative to acceptance (Aristotle, *Athenaion Politeia* 42.1). See in general Burkert (1985) 255; cf. Odysseus at the hearth of Alcinous invoking a symbolic link with nativity in the home of Alcinous by touching the lap of his queen (*Odyssey* 7.141–81), and Themistocles at the hearth of Admetus supplicating the queen and holding the king's child (Thucydides 1.136.3). Cromey ((2000) 46–54) reviews other literary and historical testimony connecting suppliancy to citizenship from the end of the archaic period.

[26] These 'families' are called οἰκίαι in Aristotle (*Athenaion Politeia* 20.3), but ἐπίστια by Herodotus (5.72, 73), which, significantly, is Herodotus' usual term for 'suppliants' (for the implication of which, see note 25 above). Cromey (2000) examines the nature of the 700 ἐπίστια in Herodotus, and correctly identifies them as sup-

zenship eventually failed, and the Cleisthenic movement to extend citizenship to formerly excluded demesmen was affirmed. Thereafter, the Spartans coordinated the grand triple invasion of 506 that attempted to lop off Attic territory (including Hysiae, neighbor of Plataea) by main force—the fourth in Herodotus' list of 'Dorian invasions' of Attica (Hdt. 5.74–6).

The invasion of 506 evidently succeeded in severing the link between Plataea and Athens, if we may judge by the dissociation of Hysiae from Attica. Plataean involvement in the battle of Marathon must therefore be viewed as a renewed endeavor by the Plataeans (and their supporters at Athens) to forge an unbreakable link with Athens. The fact that the Plataeans who fell at Marathon were given a separate burial must indicate that the strong divisions of opinion of the previous decade among Athenians about the legitimate boundaries of citizenship were still alive. Most significantly, we know that the Spartans were again in a position to make their view on the matter known. For soon after the battle two thousand Spartan warriors were present to view the scene, and they withdrew after 'commending the Athenians on their accomplishment' (Hdt. 6.120). We may conjecture that one of the Spartans' accomplishments was to back their supporters among the Athenians and to see to it that the Plataean dead were buried separately from the rest of the Athenians, thus negating the cause for which the Plataeans had fought.[27]

As described in the previous section, the Attic identity of Plataea oscillated back and forth again on the occasion of the battle of Plataea in 479. Athenian ascendancy in the mid-fifth century, when all of Boeotia temporarily came under Athenian control, will have reaffirmed the link between Plataea and Athens. The revolt of Boeotia in 447, however, placed Plataea in jeopardy, but it took the drama of 431–427 and the presence of another Spartan army to resolve the issue as the Spartans and their Theban allies intended.

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pliants. His further conclusions, namely, that these were individuals and not families, and that they were suppliants to the persons of Cleisthenes and his supporters rather than to the Athenian state, are less convincing in light of the parallel circumstance of the Plataean suppliants at the altar of the Twelve Gods, which he does not consider.

[27] It is noteworthy that the Spartans, alone among the allies, discriminated among classes of their own deceased after the battle of Plataea, creating *three* separate burials, one for the small group of distinguished ἰρένες, one for other Spartiates, and one for the helots (Hdt. 9.85.1). On the nature of helot participation in the battle of Plataea, see Hunt (1997); (1998) 26–41.

From an Athenian perspective, the destruction of Plataea in 427 was only a temporary rupture of the link between people and place, the final meaning of which depended upon the outcome of the greater contest between Sparta and Athens. Aristophanes and Hellanicus attest that, after 427, the surviving Plataeans, having no territorial 'deme' of their own, were accepted as Athenians and enrolled among the existing demes and tribes.[28] Their Plataean identity, however, was not erased by this act. We may reasonably conjecture that, had the Delium campaign succeeded for the Athenians in 424, the Plataeans would have returned to their native land with their Attic identity affirmed.[29] As it turned out, the Plataeans were given a new home at Scione in the Chalcidice in 421, when the Athenians imposed the same harsh verdict on the people of Scione that the Spartans had imposed on the Plataeans (Thucydides 5.32.1). These Plataeans must surely have been among the 'Athenians' later expelled from Scione by Lysander, following the destruction of the Athenian fleet in 405 (Plut., *Lysander* 14.3).

Conclusion: Thucydides and Attica between Past and Future

This essay opened by noticing the ambiguity in Thucydides' definition of the beginning of the Peloponnesian War. He describes three different events as marking the commencement of Peloponnesian hostilities against Athens: the invasion of the plain of Eleusis and Thria, the attack on Oenoe, and the attack on Plataea. Closer examination has shown how each of these places could be construed as the threshold of Attica, depending upon whether one viewed Attica from an Athenian or a Boeotian point of view. Our lengthy consideration of the troubled history of Plataea in particular has revealed how closely implicated the Spartans were, historically, in contesting Plataea's relationship to Athens. It is chiefly by virtue of their long-standing involvement in this dispute that the *Theban* attack on Plataea could

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[28] Aristophanes, *Frogs* 693–94; Hellanicus *FGH* 323a F 25. The status of the Plataeans at Athens is best known from fourth-century sources (when it may have evolved from its original definition in 427); see Osborne (1981) 28; (1982) 11–16.

[29] This is implicit in the warning spoken by Pagondas, the Theban commander, to his fellow Boeotians before the battle of Delium: 'while others have to fight with their neighbors for this frontier or that, for us being conquered means one frontier for the whole country, about which there will be no dispute, for they will simply come and take by force what we have' (Thuc. 4.92.4, Crawley/Strassler translation).

be characterized by Thucydides as the commencement of *Spartan* aggression against Athens.

Other sources identify the dispute with Megara as the flashpoint of war. Since this dispute also involved conflicting interpretations of the boundaries of Attica (Thucydides 1.139.2, ἐπικαλοῦντες [οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι] ἐπεργασίαν Μεγαρεῦσι τῆς γῆς τῆς ἱερᾶς καὶ τῆς ἀορίστου), we may reasonably conclude that, in addition to the causes Thucydides identifies, the boundaries of Attica were also a major point of contention at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War. Yet we reach this conclusion despite Thucydides' scrupulous care to minimize attention to this 'Attic question'. Why, we must ask, did Thucydides not add this dispute to his own rather full consideration of both the remote and the immediate causes of the war?

If we assume (as I believe we can) that Thucydides is not completely idiosyncratic in his thematic focus, but rather, that he is a sensitive communicator of views shared within a significant sector of his peers, then we may suggest an explanation of this remarkable feature of his work. We must find a context in which it would have been most appropriate to make no general pronouncement on the 'Attic question'. When, we must ask, would it clearly have been best not to examine the claims and allegations advanced in the name of the 'Attic question' during the war that erupted in 431?

As we have already recognized, the 'Attic question' was of highest importance to the Athenians when they stood with Pericles against Megara and the entire force of the Peloponnese at the outset of the war. In negotiating the Peace of Nicias in 421, and particularly in the immediate breakdown of that peace, the 'Attic question' remained paramount. Thucydides records the Athenian demand for the return of Plataea, and when this demand was refused by the Thebans, the Athenians made a point of retaining control of Megarian Nisaea (5.17.2). The Athenian demand for the return of Panakton, seized by the Boeotians in 422, became an even greater matter of contention, and it tipped the balance of Athenian opinion in favor of the alliance with Argos (5.39–43). Indeed, arrogant indignation over any perceived infringement of their sovereignty characterizes Athenian attitudes during the entire interval between the Peace of Nicias and the collapse of the Sicilian expedition.[30] It is, therefore, most unlikely

[30] Compare the sentiments attributed by Thucydides to the Athenians in 424 (4.65.4) and in 415 (6.24.2–4), and especially as characterized in the Melian dialogue (5.85–113).

that Thucydides could have written his account of the outbreak of the war at any time between 431 and 413 without giving attention to boundary disputes, for an aggressive stance on the 'Attic question' was close to the center of Athenian thought about war during this entire period.

In the following years, between 413 and 411, a sequence of disasters chastened the Athenians. Under extreme duress, the oligarchs of 411 were even prepared to concede disputed territory to their foes, and the surrender of Oenoe to the Boeotians in 411 was the most significant achievement of this short-lived regime (8.98). But opposition to the policy of concession was the rallying cry of the opponents of the oligarchs, and the regime that led Athens from early in 410 until the disastrous outcome of the war in 405/404, epitomized in the strident rhetoric of Cleophon,[31] was again arrogantly dismissive of all talk of compromise. As long as Athenian imperial ambitions were alive, with the sole exception of the short-lived and vehemently repudiated regime of the Four Hundred in 411, it is most unlikely that the Athenian viewpoint on the war could have been meaningfully discussed without giving a full account of the 'Attic question'. Only after the war was finally over, and Athenian imperial ambitions had been decisively checked, did this situation change.

The years between the fall of Athens in 404 and the outbreak of the Corinthian War in 395 witnessed a radical transformation of the relationship between the Athenians and their Boeotian and Megarian neighbors. Boeotia and Megara had given refuge to Athenian exiles during the violently pro-Spartan regime of the Thirty in 404/403. By 396 this cooperative relationship was about to be formalized in a new alliance to oppose Sparta. The foreseeable renewal of war with Sparta, occurring in 395, was an eminently appropriate occasion to review the history of Spartan aggression, and to examine especially the complex turnings of the most recent of these 'Dorian wars', the war that erupted in 431. But because the neighbors of Attica were now partners and not the bitter foes that they had been a generation earlier, these were precisely the circumstances under which it would have been best not to revisit all of the inflammatory claims and allegations raised, ultimately to no fruitful purpose, in

[31] Compare the Athenian attitudes attested in note 30, above, to the views attributed to Cleophon in Diodorus 13.53.2–4. Note also Aristophanes' parody of Cleophon's call to battle in the name of 'ancestral fields', (πατρίοις ἐν ἀρούροις, *Frogs* 1532–3).

the most recent episode in the conflict over the 'Attic question'. Athenian ambitions to Attic territory in that war were now best left tacitly aside as the new partners endeavored to present a united front against renewed Spartan aggression. For other reasons as well, the circumstances confronting the Athenians in 396–395 define the most likely occasion for the composition of Thucydides' work, from its beginning to its abrupt ending.[32]

The interval between the surrender of Athens and the time at which Thucydides wrote is precisely the interval within which the earliest historical treatise devoted explicitly to the 'Attic question' was written—Hellanicus' Ἀττικὴ ξυγγραφή, mentioned by Thucydides in 1.97.2. From its fragments we know that this was a work of ancient history, devoting most of its space to what we would term the mythical past, but bringing its account of Attic events down to the 'present' time when both Hellanicus and Thucydides were writing.[33] This treatise, I suggest, was an effort to rationalize the still unresolved issues of Attic territorial sovereignty at the very time when, after a generation of warfare, the Athenians and their neighbors were motivated to negotiate a mutual understanding of these disputed issues rather than resorting to force.[34]

Thucydides' treatise, on the other hand, was an examination of the stages by which war had recently proceeded. He made reference to the salient events of the 'Attic war' solely for the purpose of documenting how relentless the Spartans were in using such issues to keep their rivals divided and weakened, and to promote their own domination. By leaving the 'Attic question' out of close consideration, Thucydides' major thesis (ἀληθεστάτη πρόφασις, 1.23.6) about the cause of the war emerged more clearly: regardless of the fact that the first blow against Attica had actually been struck by the Thebans at Plataea, responsibility for commencing hostilities lay with the Spartans. Such a selective focus on the facts of the past would have best suited the interests of an audience of Athenians, Thebans, and their prospective allies confronting yet another phase of Spartan interventionism.

[32] See Munn (2000) chs. 10–12, for an analysis of Athenian concerns after 403, and especially 315–23 for the reasons to place the entire composition of Thucydides' work in the years 396 395.

[33] On Hellanicus, see Pearson (1942) 1–26.

[34] The unconditional pledge of mutual support against any aggression, 'by land or by sea', in the treaty of Athenians and Boeotians in 395 (Tod 101) is strong evidence that the two sides had arrived at an understanding regarding the past disputes between them.

I offer this essay to John Graham in appreciation of the support and guidance he provided me when I was beginning to study the disputed territory along the frontiers of Attica. I thank the editors of this volume, Vanessa Gorman and Eric Robinson, and my wife, Mary Lou Zimmerman Munn, for their many helpful comments as it was in preparation. Translations, except where otherwise noted, are my own.

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

Figure 10. Notional Boundaries of the Invasion of Attica at Eleusis, Oenoe, and Plataea

THUCYDIDES 7.63.3 ON THE SAILORS 'CONSIDERED' ATHENIAN

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In Nicias' speech to his troops before the great battle in Syracuse harbor, Thuc. 7.61ff., is a startling remark that seems worth a closer look than scholars have given it.[1] Its full oddity emerges at once if one considers the whole speech, which has roughly this sequence of topics:

(61.1) *This battle's supreme importance* for all of us, Athenians and allies.
(61.2–3) *Our prior setbacks*, due to mere chances of war, must not rob us of pride and courage.
(62.1–4) *Our special new preparations* (archers, javelin-throwers, grappling-irons, etc.) will now counter the enemy's devices, and meet the conditions of fighting in this harbor, which are like those of a land battle fought at sea.
(63.1) *Our new manner of fighting* must be this: once rammed by an enemy ship, you must never try to pull away, nor allow the enemy to do so, but instead fight it out to the death.
(63.2) *You hoplites*, I am addressing you especially. Remember that the work is yours most of all; and that even now, in most points, we remain superior in hoplite fighting.
(63.3 init.) *You sailors*, I exhort and even beg you not to be demoralized by your prior defeat. Remember that you have now better preparations on deck than before, and more ships.
(63.3–4) *You foreigners* (οἳ τέως Ἀθηναῖοι νομιζόμενοι καὶ μὴ ὄντες), remember what you owe to Athens, and what the stakes are for you.
(64) *You Athenians* (τούς τε Ἀθηναίους ὑμῶν), remember what the stakes are for you.

Thus for much of the speech Nicias addresses everyone together; then separately the hoplites, the sailors, the foreigners, the Athenians. What startles is that in the Greek at 63.3 (which I shall later quote

[1] The basically anomalous nature of 7.63.3 is sometimes half noticed, but nowhere explained convincingly; e.g., Clerc (1893) 68–9; Marchant (1910) 213–15; Dover in Gomme (1945–81) ad loc. Particularly careless is Jordan ((1901) 212) who says that Nicias here mentions 'the hoplites, then the nautai, and last those nautai who were considered Athenians' etc.—as if the received text said that!

at length), a relative clause makes the sailors and foreigners identical: τοῖς δὲ ναύταις παραινῶ . . ., οἳ τέως Ἀθηναῖοι νομιζόμενοι καὶ μὴ ὄντες (κ.τ.λ.). That is, all the sailors are foreigners.

I think it very unlikely that Thucydides wrote this; it seems due to a copyist's error. My objections are 'human', historical and textual, and I shall discuss them in that order. The 'human' factor carries least weight, but should be mentioned. Even if the fact itself were true—what a strange point for Nicias to make at such a moment! He is here addressing the country's once-proud fleet just before what he thinks is its supreme crisis (7.64 passim), saying in effect, 'As for you Hoplites. . . . As for you Sailors, considered Athenians, though you are not . . .', and dwelling on that, at great length. No doubt Nicias is nobody's ideal of a general; still, this seems very improbably tactless even for him.[2]

A graver objection is that historically, no matter exactly what 'foreigners' are meant,[3] this defies all that we know of the Athenian

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[2] In other words, the speaker does *not* seem περὶ τῶν παρόντων τὰ δέοντα μάλιστ' εἰπεῖν. Marchant ((1910) 213–15) has an interesting analysis of the present speech's glories (which he attributes to Thucydides, not Nicias) and its defects (which he also attributes to Thucydides); the worst defect seems to him this long, strange address to the 'foreign sailors'.

Note also a certain rhetorical ineptness. After saying that hoplites will be at least as important in this battle—63.3 ὅσῳ τῶν ἄνωθεν μᾶλλον τὸ ἔργον τοῦτο (κ.τ.λ.)—Nicias gives them just 3 lines of the *Oxford Classical Text* (*OCT*), while our 'foreign' rowers need not less than 18 lines of *OCT*. One could explain this purely emotionally: perhaps the hoplites seem to need less exhorting, because they are Athenian, or because they have not suffered such prior ξυμφοράς. But after all the Athenians *do* need heartening (both here and at 7.69.2, where they alone are addressed), and the hoplites, too, have had disasters. Besides, nothing in Nicias' specific address to 'the Athenians' (7.64) defines them as 'the foot soldiery'.

[3] Not impossible seems any of three groups: 'allies' (i.e., the ξένοι ἀναγκαστοί of 7.13.2, 7.57.2–8: see below, n. 5), foreign mercenaries (i.e., the ὑπὸ μισθοῦ ἐπαρθέντες of 7.13.2, 7.57.8–9: see below, n. 5), and metics; but Nicias most probably has in mind the metics; for most of what follows seems most aptly said of metics (they are regarded as Athenian; they have Attic speech and customs; they help to frighten subject states). So the scholiast here ('*Nautai*: he means the metics') followed by Clerc (1893) 63; Amit (1965) 38; Jordan (1975) 212; Whitehead (1977) 43 (even though he hedges (105 n. 113)). Dover's idea that allies are meant (Gomme (1945–81) ad loc.) seems perverse for the reasons given by Clerc. As Clerc says (loc. cit.), 'to felicitate them on their resemblance to Athenians' seems 'a mediocre compliment' to pay to people nominally independent; and after all, they are *contrasted* precisely with those same 'allies', who are not *really* independent: ἐς . . . τὸ φοβερὸν τοῖς ὑπηκόοις (on this, see also n. 5 below).

Note that this whole question—exactly whom does Nicias mean?—only arises if Nicias is really saying 'You sailors, that is, you foreigners' etc. If he merely says, 'As for any of you who are not Athenian' etc. (without reference to 'sailors'—as I think: see below), nobody in his audience and probably nobody today would ever even ask the question.

navy, both in general and during this expedition. In general, the politically dominant 'nautical crowd' of citizen-sailors described, or presupposed, in most fifth- and fourth-century texts seems a thing so constant and so solid that to sift again all the proofs collected by M. Amit, who did this work carefully, seems otiose.[4] Here it will almost be enough to cite the Thucydidean evidence. The most exact definition of Athens' 'sailors' (ναῦται) is at 1.143.1. There Pericles seems to rebut a Corinthian charge (1.121.3) that Athenian sailors are purely mercenary:

> εἴ τε καὶ κινήσαντες τῶν Ὀλυμπίασιν ἢ Δελφοῖς χρημάτων μισθῷ μείζονι πειρῷντο ἡμῶν ὑπολαβεῖν τοὺς ξένους τῶν ναυτῶν, μὴ ὄντων μὲν ἡμῶν ἀντιπάλων ἐσβάντων αὐτῶν τε καὶ τῶν μετοίκων, δεινὸν ἂν ἦν. νῦν δὲ τόδε τε ὑπάρχει καί, ὅπερ κράτιστον, κυβερνήτας ἔχομεν πολίτας καὶ τὴν ἄλλην ὑπηρεσίαν πλείους καὶ ἀμείνους ἢ ἅπασα ἡ ἄλλη Ἑλλάς.

> And if, by filching money from Olympia and Delphi, they try with bigger pay to steal from us *the foreigners among our sailors*, well, if we could not match them, by embarking both *ourselves and the metics*, that would be alarming! *But in fact* (νῦν δέ) *we do thus match them*, and what matters most, we have citizen pilots and other officers more and better than does all the rest of Hellas together.

Thus, at the war's outset 'αἱ ναῦται' are 'foreigners' (i.e., mercenaries)[5] plus 'ourselves' (i.e., Athenian citizens) plus metics. 'Ourselves'

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[4] Most impressive of all, perhaps, the *locus classicus*, Ps.-Xen., *Athenaion Politeia* 1.2. Apart from the inscription *IG* I³.1032, which I later cite, not much can be added to the copious, tactfully examined evidence of Amit ((1965) 39–50) (on slave and foreign mercenary rowers, 30–9). I cite again some of his passages from Thucydides, because I think these the most decisive for the present purpose, and to answer later objections. Amit's conclusion (48)—that 'the citizens had a place of prime importance by their numbers and the fact that the specialized staff of the triremes also were citizens'—could be disputed by a stubborn critic, since we lack certain knowledge of the proportions of the various groups; but that citizens were, at least, an important crew-component he proves beyond any dispute. Thus it is curious that, apparently, he noticed nothing odd in 7.63.

[5] About the ξένοι at 1.143.1 Whitehead says ((1977) 105 n. 113), 'usually construed as mercenaries but more probably allies'. But (a) *Pericles says plainly that they are mercenaries.* That he seems to answer, in the same words, a remark made by the Corinthians at 1.121.3, that the Athenian fleet is wholly *mercenary* had already been pointed out by Amit ((1965) 39). And (b) *'allies' were not seen as mercenaries, but as people coerced.* This distinction has seemed unreal to some modern scholars (e.g., Whitehead, Jordan) but not to Thucydides. See above all the catalogue of allies at 7.57. 'Free' are only, on the one hand, the 'Athenians' from Lemnos, Imbros, Aigina and Hestiaea (7.57.2) and, on the other, the pure mercenaries (7.57.8–9, from Megara, Argos, Arcadia, etc.). Everybody else is there 'by constraint' (even though Chians are formally αὐτόνομοι). Thuc. stresses this not only by the way in which he keeps repeating ἀνάγκῃ (etc.) but also, I think, in the catalogue's very structure. It appears to rise

include all 'pilots and other officers'. And 'ourselves and the metics' so far outweigh 'foreigners' that the fleet can survive even if those join the enemy.

Does the orator exaggerate? Since no passage, anywhere, states the exact proportions of these groups, we cannot be sure. But consider what actually happened three years later, in 428, described at Thuc. 3.16.1. There it is not Pericles but Thucydides himself who uses this phrase 'ourselves and the metics': ἐπλήρωσαν ναῦς ἑκατὸν ἐσβάντες αὐτοί τε πλὴν ἱππέων καὶ πεντακοσιαμεδίμνων καὶ οἱ μέτοικοι ('[The Athenian citizens] filled one hundred ships, going aboard themselves, without Knights or Pentakosiamedimnoi, and the metics.'). This confirms the other passage, and proves that at the war's outset citizens were an important crew component.[6]

But as in 431–28, so also twenty years later. In 411, two years *after* Nicias' speech, the oligarchs feared 'what did in fact happen', that the 'nautical crowd' at Samos (ναυτικὸς ὄχλος, 8.72.2) might topple the oligarchy. A little later, the sailors themselves imply that there are more *citizens* in the fleet at Samos than there are in Athens: 8.76.3 οὐ δεῖ ἀθυμεῖν ὅτι ἡ πόλις αὐτῶν ἀφέστηκεν· τοὺς γὰρ ἐλάσσους ἀπὸ σφῶν τῶν πλεόνων καὶ ἐς πάντα ποριμωτέρων μεθεστάναι ('They ought not to lose heart because the city had rebelled. For the people who had left were less in number than themselves and had entirely fewer resources').

Pertinent, also, seems the trireme inscription *IG* 1^3.1032 (= *IG* $2/3^2$.1951). Experts have tended to assign it to the late fifth century, and recently A.J. Graham has proven that the expedition that it commemorates could be that of Strombichides in the summer of 412. Among the many names on its fragments are 'about 30 attested names of citizen oarsmen' and 'about 40 of metics and foreigners'.[7]

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in slow, steady climax, from the allies that seemed to Thucydides the most natural, namely, (57.2) Ionians 'from Athens' fighting Dorians—through the rather natural, namely (4) Ionians not 'from Athens', and not fighting by choice, but anyway Ionians, fighting Dorians—to the unnatural, namely, (5–8) people compelled to fight their own kin (i.e., Aeolians against Aeolians, Boeotians against Boeotians, Dorians against Dorians)—to the most unnatural, namely, (8–10) pure mercenaries, who for money fight their own kin. (The barbarians at the end, 11, are a mere cadenza.)

[6] One can at least suspect that Thucydides echoes Pericles deliberately. Note that just as Pericles, at 1.143.1, was rebutting Corinthian fantasies about Athens' navy (it would run out of men and money, etc., 1.121.3), so now αὐτοί τε καὶ μέτοικοι disillusion the Mytileneans, who at 3.13.3–4 had said, καιρὸς δὲ ὡς οὔπω πρότερον. νόσῳ τε γὰρ ἐφθάραται καὶ χρημάτων δαπάνῃ, etc.

[7] Graham (1992) 264 n. 26 (agreement on late 5th century); (1998) 102–8 (on the date 412 etc.) and (1992) 266 (the 70 names· not counting '32 attested names of

For the Sicilian expedition itself all scraps of evidence point the same way. First, the thranites must have included Athenian citizens, and Thucydides mentions them at 6.31.3, apropos of the expedition's fitting out, saying that special bonuses were given to the officers and, 'among the sailors', to the thranites.[8] Marchant supposed that later, during the siege at Syracuse, the Athenian citizens suffered more attrition than did other groups.[9] But he has not a scrap of evidence; and positively against this is 7.13.2 where Nicias, reporting in his letter to the assembly that sailors of all kinds are being lost, stresses most the loss (by desertion etc.) precisely of the ξένοι. And this letter, written so soon before the battle, has one still simpler, grittier detail, which is simply the fact that 'foreigners' are explicitly differentiated: (7.13.2) τῶν ναυτῶν τῶν μὲν διὰ φρυγανισμὸν . . . ἀπολλυμένων· οἱ δὲ θεράποντες . . . αὐτομολοῦσι, καὶ οἱ ξένοι οἱ μὲν . . . ἀποχοροῦσιν (etc.). The first group, τῶν μέν, *must* include Athenian citizens, for otherwise there would be no point in this three-part antithesis, μὲν . . . δὲ . . . καὶ . . ., whose third part is οἱ ξένοι.[10]

trierarchs, marines and officers'). Strombichides' expedition consisted of eight triremes and so, apparently, did that of the inscription (Graham (1998) 97). His other arguments for 412 are based on tortuous and tentative, but plausible, identification of the inscription's rarer Athenian names, and also on the prevalence of Strombichides' own tribe, Erectheis (of 106 demotics, thirty-two are Erechtheid; the next most frequently attested tribe has only ten).

[8] Cf. Ar., *Arcanians* 162–3: ὁ θρανίτης λέως/ὁ σωσίπολις. On their importance to the fleet, see also Thuc. 7.14.1. At 6.31.3 some editors excise καὶ ταῖς ὑπηρεσίαις on the grounds 'schol. non legit', but that is a senseless reason for excision. The scholiast says: οἱ δὲ θρανῖται μετὰ μακροτέρων κωπῶν ἐρέττοντες πλέονα κόπον ἔχουσι τῶν ἄλλων· διὰ τοῦτο τούτοις μόνοις ἐπιδόσεις ἐποιοῦντο οἱ τριηράρχοι, οὐχὶ δὲ πᾶσι τοῖς ἐρέταις ('The thranites rowing with long oars have a harder job than the others. For this reason the trierarchs give bonuses only to them, not to all the rowers'). Helpfully, he thus explains why some *rowers* were paid more. Why must he add another note, about the officers? ('Helpfully' even if wrongly. For modern views of the thranites' special status, see, e.g., Dover ad loc., and—more convincing—Casson (1995) 84, n. 35). Nonsense, too, is Jordan's point ((1975) 217 n. 23) that τοῖς θρανίταις τῶν ναυτῶν must mean 'to those of the thranitai who were nautaî. He thinks that otherwise 'τῶν ναυτῶν' is superfluous. In fact 'τῶν ναυτῶν' is there for the antithesis, which is also carefully made at 1.143.1, between sailors and officers.

[9] Marchant (1910) ad loc.: 'There would be few true-born Athenians among the ναῦται now owing to the disasters in Sicily. Probably many θῆτες, who ordinarily served as sailors, were employed as hoplites'. Such a mass conversion of thetes seems a fact so pertinent to Thucydides' theme (that of a land battle fought at sea) that one can scarcely imagine him failing to mention it—yet he nowhere mentions it. In private correspondence with me, Dr. Scott Rusch adds two other points: 'there was scant need of arming sailors; with the abandonment of the upper walls numerous hoplites and light armed infantry had been freed up'; also sailors were, after all, needed to row 110 ships, more than at any other time in Sicily.

[10] The point is made by Classen and Steup (1967) ad loc.; Graham (1992) 258 n. 3. No doubt, Athenian citizens desert much more rarely than do other groups,

Such evidence could be said to yield a sort of massive, but not quite certain, argument from silence. For even if all of it thus points the same way, it does not necessarily cover *every* occasion. So I turn to my final point, which is that at 7.63.3–4 there is something amiss in the Greek. I here quote Jones' Oxford text. My reasons for quoting so much, and for printing a large apparatus, will emerge presently. I underline the two places that I think necessitate that apparatus:

[7.63.3] τοῖς δὲ ναύταις παραινῶ καὶ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ τῷδε καὶ δέομαι μὴ ἐκπεπλῆχθαί τι ταῖς ξυμφοραῖς ἄγαν, τήν τε παρασκευὴν ἀπὸ τῶν καταστρωμάτων βελτίω νῦν ἔχοντας καὶ τὰς ναῦς πλείους, ἐκείνην τε τὴν ἡδονὴν ἐνθυμεῖσθαι ὡς ἀξία ἐστὶ διασώσασθαι, οἱ τέως Ἀθηναῖοι νομιζόμενοι καὶ μὴ ὄντες ἡμῶν τῆς τε φωνῆς τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ καὶ τῶν τρόπων τῇ μιμήσει ἐθαυμάζεσθε κατὰ τὴν Ἑλλάδα, καὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς τῆς ἡμετέρας οὐκ ἔλασσον κατὰ τὸ ὠφελεῖσθαι ἔς τε τὸ φοβερὸν τοῖς ὑπηκόοις καὶ τὸ μὴ ἀδικεῖσθαι πολὺ πλέον μετείχετε.

[7.63.4] ὥστε κοινωνοὶ μόνοι ἐλευθέρως ἡμῖν τῆς ἀρχῆς ὄντες δικαίως [ἂν] αὐτὴν νῦν μὴ καταπροδίδοτε, καταφρονήσαντες δὲ Κορινθίων τε, οὓς πολλάκις νενικήκατε, καὶ Σικελιωτῶν, ὧν οὐδ' ἀντιστῆναι οὐδεὶς ἕως ἤκμαζε τὸ ναυτικὸν ἡμῖν ἠξίωσεν, ἀμύνασθε αὐτούς, καὶ δείξατε ὅτι καὶ μετ' ἀσθενείας καὶ ξυμφορῶν ἡ ὑμετέρα ἐπιστήμη κρείσσων ἐστὶν ἑτέρας εὐτυχούσης ῥώμης.

Apparatus Criticus

63.3 οἱ τέως] οἵ τε ὡς J, recc. alii (cf. Valla '*et* qui Athenienses nuncupamini'). ἡμῶν recc. (e.g., Pe) et edd.: ὑμῶν cett. 63.4 δικαίως ἂν [om. Pi Pd Pg (Π[18] hic incertus)] αὐτὴν νῦν μὴ [om. F A] καταπροδίδοτε [-δίδωτε E, - διδῶτε E[2]: -διδοίητε Ar O Ha],—ita codd. δικαίως [ἂν] αὐτὴν νῦν μὴ καταπροδίδοτε Bekker (& Jones, Marchant, alii). δικαιώσατε . . . μὴ καταπροδιδόναι Boehme, Herwerden, Hude,

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and thus are lost only in the forage expeditions. Commentators in this place, beginning with Poppo, have often excised τῶν and tried to see τῶν ναυτῶν [τῶν] μέν etc. as referring only to Athenian citizens. Of course if that were right, it would make my other points superfluous. Unfortunately it was disproven by Graham who showed (op. cit.) that amongst 'the sailors' here, οἱ θεράποντες are also included. The only 'evidence' that the term 'οἱ ναῦται' could be synonymous with 'citizens' is ναῦται ἄστοι in *IG* I[3].1032—but even there, after all, the noun seems to need the adjective.

Sitzler, Steup. δικαίως ἂν . . . μὴ καταπροδιδοῖτε Madvig 332. δικαιοῦσαν (= 'iure postulantem') pro δικαίως ἂν Stahl.[11]

The whole passage is translated later in this paper. The second underlined place is so plainly corrupt that, for the moment, I need only say that Bekker's solution looks makeshift and not convincing.[12] The first place seems to mean:

> And you sailors—you I exhort, and in so doing even beg, that you not be too stunned by the (earlier) mishaps, since above deck you have better equipment now, and of ships a greater number, and (τε) to take that [?] enjoyment to heart as worth preserving; you who, until now [?] considered Athenians even though you are not, by your knowledge of our language and your imitating of our customs, were admired throughout Hellas (etc.)

Three things disturb one here. The worst is that ἐκείνην has to mean ταύτην, which seems impossible. Where else does ἐκεῖνος ever refer to something *not already mentioned*? Classen-Steup call this 'prolepsis' and cite the fearing constructions at 2.67.4, 6.88.1, but that analogy is too loose. More convincing would be 'prolepsis' actually using ἐκεῖνος. In Krüger's normally magnificent Greek index, s.v. ἐκεῖνος,

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[11] Some of my apparatus here is based on Arnold's old apparatus, which alone records the readings of the recentiores (whose sigla I have modernized). The readings of Valla I take from *Vat. lat.* 1801 (on which see Maurer (1995) xxi, n. 22). Generally Valla is a worthless deterior. On J see Alberti (1972) lxxxii, lxxxv. Among the other recc., all worth far less than J, are Ar, Cn, O, V (on all of which see Alberti (1972) cxliv, cxlix). οἵ τε ὡς seems pretty plainly a χ reading (on that late and contaminated, but valuable, MS see Maurer (1995) 225. On Valla and the Thucydidean stemma, Maurer (1995) 87–8). On wrong word divisions, corrected by Valla and one or two recc., see below, n. 16.

[12] On Bekker's text, which I think impossible, see Appendix. As often, Grenfell and Hunt (1908) have some good remarks, ad loc. (commentary to *P. Oxy.* 1376 on lines 486–8): 'The best MSS are corrupt here. . . . The simplest course, followed by Stuart Jones, is to omit ἂν with Bekker, who in so doing claims the support of Paris 1637, 1638 and 1736; but this makes δικαίως very difficult, since ἀδίκως would rather be expected'.

Interestingly, ἀδίκως was in fact corrupted to its opposite at 6.60.5, where some recc. have ἐνδίκως, and very possibly at 7.67.1 where the MSS have δικαίως (see Maurer (1995) 96). So that might conceivably have happened here; against it seems only the word order.

The omission of μὴ by F A seems mechanical error. The optative of Ar O Ha is perhaps an error, more likely a conjecture to help ἄν. Thus, ἄν seems precisely the problem, and by simply excising it, Bekker ignored the problem of where it came from.

subheading 'aufs Folgende', he can list only 5.98 Ἐν δ' ἐκείνῳ οὐ νομίζετε ἀσφάλειαν, which he refers to the following ὅσοι γάρ. But there ἐκείνῳ refers plainly to the neutrality proposed in 5.94.

My two other objections are weaker, yet seem worth defining. The first is the sheer clumsiness of this sentence. Two infinitives are governed by δέομαι, viz. μὴ ἐκπεπλῆχθαί and ἐνθυμεῖσθαι, but the second comes unexpectedly, as if the sentence had suddenly changed direction, because the main particles are not coordinated. The τε in τήν τε παρασκευήν merely anticipates καί ('*both* better preparation above deck *and* more ships'), and the τε in ἐκείνην τε is isolated. In itself, τε *solitarium* is all right; what makes it unpleasant here is the utter change of direction in the thought.

Lastly, what does τέως mean? The sagacious Hobbes, for example, simply skips the word, and other translators fudge it (e.g., Marchant ad loc., 'you who *for so long*...'). In Thucydides it always means 'until now', or 'until then' or 'so far', referring to *a time before another time which is specified.*[13] 'You who *until now* have been considered Athenians', etc., implies that something will change their status. We could suppose that since later, in 7.64, Nicias seems to envisage the destruction of Athens herself, he means that if Athens is destroyed, so will the honor of its honorary citizens be. But since he has not yet said a word about this, the tiny word seems to bear an improbably heavy burden of meaning.

It seems to me that all these anomalies, both in the Greek and in the speech's sense and structure, were caused by a displacement of ἐκείνην ... διασώσασθαι. That clause is pretty plainly authentic (this is shown precisely by the trouble it makes)—but may it not be out of place?[14] I can discern only one good place for it, viz. directly before the other corrupt place, where it makes sense if combined

[13] The word occurs five times in Thucydides. At 5.7 and 6.61.7 it means 'for some time ..., but then ...'; at 8.93.2 (where B omits it) it means 'until then' (i.e., a certain time in the future); and at 8.106.2 it means 'until then' (i.e., until the battle of Cynosema—but then....). Looser is only 8.99.1 ὑπὸ δὲ τοὺς αὐτοὺς χρόνους τοῦ θέρους τούτου καὶ οἱ ἐν τῇ Μιλήτῳ Πελοποννήσιοι, ὡς τροφήν τε οὐδεὶς ἐδίδου τῶν ὑπὸ Τισσαφέρνους τότε [ὅτε ἐπὶ τὴν Ἄσπενδον παρῄει] προσταχθέντων, καὶ αἱ Φοίνισσαι νῆες οὐδὲ ὁ Τισσαφέρνης τέως [om. C] που ἧκον.... Here it seems possibly a corruption (note C's omission of it. Smith conjectures πω for τέως που). But if the text is sound, τέως που seems to mean 'until now, at any rate'.

My tentative defense of the word—i.e., the point that perhaps it could refer to Athens' destruction, imagined in 7.64—was suggested to me by A.J. Graham (even though he too mistrusts it).

[14] Displacements of whole lines are usually caused either (a) by dittography followed by deletion at the wrong place or (b) by omission followed by insertion at

with Boehme's text (which is otherwise attractive—see n. 15, and the Appendix). I underline divergences from the *OCT*:

7.63.3 τοῖς δὲ ναύταις παραινῶ καὶ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ τῷδε καὶ δέομαι μὴ ἐκπεπλῆχθαί τι ταῖς ξυμφοραῖς ἄγαν, τήν τε παρασκευὴν ἀπὸ τῶν καταστρωμάτων βελτίω νῦν ἔχοντας καὶ τὰς ναῦς πλείους.
[ἐκείνην τε τὴν ἡδονὴν ἐνθυμεῖσθαι ὡς ἀξία ἐστὶ διασώσασθαι]

οἵ τε ὡς Ἀθηναῖοι νομιζόμενοι καὶ μὴ ὄντες ὑμῶν τῆς τε φωνῆς τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ καὶ τῶν τρόπων τῇ μιμήσει ἐθαυμάζεσθε κατὰ τὴν Ἑλλάδα, καὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς τῆς ἡμετέρας οὐκ ἔλασσον κατὰ τὸ ὠφελεῖσθαι ἔς τε τὸ φοβερὸν τοῖς ὑπηκόοις καὶ τὸ μὴ ἀδικεῖσθαι πολὺ πλέον μετείχετε.

7.63.4 ὥστε κοινωνοὶ μόνοι ἐλευθέρως ἡμῖν τῆς ἀρχῆς ὄντες δικαιώσατε αὐτὴν νῦν μὴ καταπροδίδοναι, <ἐκείνην τε τὴν ἡδονὴν ἐνθυμεῖσθαι ὡς ἀξία ἐστὶ διασώσασθαι>, καταφρονήσαντες δὲ Κοιρινθίων τε, οὓς πολλάκις νενικήκατε, καὶ Σικελιωτῶν, ὧν οὐδ' ἀντιστῆναι οὐδεὶς ἕως ἤκμαζε τὸ ναυτικὸν ἡμῖν ἠξίωσεν, ἀμύνασθε αὐτούς, καὶ δείξατε ὅτι καὶ μετ' ἀσθενείας καὶ ξυμφορῶν ἡ ὑμετέρα ἐπιστήμη κρείσσων ἐστὶν ἑτέρας εὐτυχούσης ῥώμης.

7.64.1 τούς τε Ἀθηναίους ὑμῶν πάλιν αὖ καὶ τάδε ὑπομιμνήσκω, [κ.τ.λ.]

And you sailors I exhort, and in so doing even beg, that you not be too stunned by the (earlier) mishaps, since above deck you have better equipment now, and of ships a greater number. [and to take that pleasure to heart, as worth fighting for]

And you men regarded as Athenians, even though you are not, by knowing our language and imitating our customs, you were admired all over Hellas, and had a stake as great as ours in this empire, so far as profit goes; and for fearfulness to the subject cities and freedom from harm, a much greater stake. And so as the only ones who share this empire with us as free men, you should decide not now to betray it <and to take that enjoyment to heart, as worth fighting for;> and scorning both the Corinthians, whom you have so often beaten, and the Siceliots, not one of whom, so long as our navy flourished, dared even resist us, beat them back, and show that even in weakness and loss your skill is greater than an opponent's lucky strength.

And you, Athenians, once again I remind you (etc.)

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the wrong place. Of course, when such an error is very old so that no extant MS has the truth, it tends to be very hard to spot. On the extensive dittography in Thucydides MSS, see Maurer [n. 1] 154–79; for lists of certain omissions, 190–205; on omission followed by wrong insertion, 177–9. (Verse-displacements are most notorious in, of course, Propertius; but few Propertian critics on either of the warring sides seem to see how many quite certain and nearly certain instances there are: for a modest, but sufficiently alarming, list of these see Butrica (1984) 193–5.)

Alternatively, one could suppose a rather large lacuna after 63.3 τὰς ναῦς πλείους. Of course, when present in all MSS, lacunae are even harder to spot than displacements. (For a list of known lacunae, see Maurer (1995) 203–5.)

This removes the spurious fact at 63.3, and 63.4 loses nothing, but gains in resonance.[15] Various other improvements seem palpable: (a) the speech's structure is suddenly clearer (hoplites, rowers, each but briefly addressed; then non-Athenians, Athenians, not tied to particular functions); (b) ἐκείνην is now intelligible; (c) the difficult τέως was just a wrong division of letters;[16] (d) 63.3 ὑμῶν, given by all capital MSS but emended by editors, is vindicated (partitive genitive with οἱ—for now οἵ τε ὡς 'Αθηναῖοι νομιζόμενοι καὶ μὴ ὄντες ὑμῶν is parallel to 7.64.1 to τούς τε 'Αθηναίους ὑμῶν); and (e) the particles now coordinate intelligibly. Just like that at 64.1, the τε at 63.3 is itemizing τε, and οἵ not the relative but the article: 'As for those of you who are considered Athenian, though you are not, . . .'[17]

If that is right, exactly what happened is now hidden. Perhaps the clause was first simply omitted on account of the homoioteleuton -AI . . . -AI, and then, as often happens, written in the top margin where it stayed. Or else it was not omitted but, since the two corrupt places are contiguous, we could imagine a damaged bottom right-hand margin. In either case, some papyrus exemplar had the following lineation (I again underline what in my text differs from the OCT):

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[15] Note that Boehme's δικαιώσατε is *less* violent, as an emendation, than excision of ἄν, for it explains where that came from. With the negative infinitive after δικαιῶς compare that at 2.41.5, a sentence similar to ours in other respects, a climax coming after praise of Athens: περὶ τοιαύτης οὖν πόλεως οἵδε τε γενναίως <u>δικαιοῦντες μὴ ἀφαιρεθῆναι αὐτὴν</u> μαχόμενοι ἐτελεύτησαν, καὶ τῶν λειπομένων πάντα τινὰ εἰκὸς ἐθέλειν ὑπὲρ αὐτῆς κάμνειν.

[16] Often word-divisions are right only in one or two recc. and in Valla, e.g., 6.87.4 ἀντιτυξεῖν codd.: ἄν τι τυξεῖν J Valla (see Maurer (1995) 125), 7.30.2 ἔξω τοῦ ζεύγματος codd.: ἔξω τοξεύματος H Valla (see Maurer (1995) 13); 7.68.1 δικαιώσωι codd.: δικαίως ἴωσι vel ἀδίκως ἴωσι Π[18] Valla (see Maurer (1995) 94–6), 8.89.2 οὐ τό EFAM: οὐ τῷ B: οὕτω mg. Pi Valla (see Maurer (1995) 72).

[17] In Thucydides 'itemizing' or 'topic-coordinating' τε appears often (as it would here) at moments of special emotion or solemnity; e.g. 1.23.1–3 (seven of them, like a crackle of thunder), 3.54.3–4, 4.81.1, 7.69.2 (five of them: grammatically, they coordinate the participles; logically, the points Nicias is making). Neither Hammer nor Denniston describe this favorite usage; but examples are amid the places listed in Hammer (1904) 47–9; Denniston (1959) 503–4. τε often almost means 'as regards' (as when we say, 'As regards X, . . . As regards Y, . . .' etc.), or even 'Point (1): . . . Point (2): . . .' etc. (There are often, of course, secondary τε's, which do not interrupt the main series; that is too common to need illustration.)

(63.4) ΩΣΤΕ

ΚΟΙΝΩΝΟΙ ΜΟΝΟΙ ΕΛΕΥΘΕΡΩΣ ΗΜ-	
ΙΝ ΤΗΣ ΑΡΧΗΣ ΟΝΤΕΣ ΔΙΚΑΙΩΣΑΤΕ	25 letters
ΑΥΤΗΝ ΝΥΝ ΜΗ ΚΑΤΑΠΡΟΔΙΔΟΝΑΙ	24
ΕΚΕΙΝΗΝ ΤΕ ΤΗΝ ΗΔΟΝΗΝ ΕΝΘΥΜΕΙ-	25
ΣΘΑΙ ΩΣ ΑΞΙΑ ΕΣΤΙ ΔΙΑΣΩΣΑΣΘΑΙ	25
ΚΑΤΑΦΡΟΝΗΣΑΝΤΕΣ ΔΕ (κ.τ.λ.)	

A line-length of ca. 25 letters has perhaps left other traces in the Thucydides tradition,[18] and is in any case suitable for a papyrus.

[18] E.g., perhaps the C omission of 24 letters at 6.25.2; the CG omission of 24 letters at 4.73.2; the apparent dittography (after 50 letters) in all MSS at 4.37.1; Maurer (1995) 170.

Appendix: Adverb = Adjective (etc.) in Thucydides

At 7.63.4 Bekker's text, δικαίως . . . μὴ καταπροδίδοτε, seems to me to mean 'do not justly betray it', which of course is nonsense. But those who render it 'justly, do not betray it' or 'be just and do not betray it' (Dover) do adduce other examples of adverbs that are as if equivalent to participles or adjectives. It seems worth quoting all of them, so as to put to rest this too popular construing, and because the topic is interesting in its own right. Examples A–D are cited ad loc. by Poppo (i.e., he refers to his vol. 1, part 1, p. 292, and cites them there); E by Dover; F by Arnold at 4.62.3, and G by Graves at 4.62.3:

(A) 1.21 τὰ πολλὰ ὑπὸ χρόνου αὐτῶν ἀπίστως ἐπὶ τὸ μυθῶδες ἐκνενικηκότα (= *οὐ πιστευθέντα, ἄπιστα, ὥστε μὴ πιστευθῆναι*)
(B) 1.140 ἐνδέχεται γὰρ τὰς ξυμφορὰς . . . οὐχ ἧσσον ἀμαθῶς χωρῆσαι (= *οὐ γνωσθείσας, ἀσαφεῖς*)
(C) 2.64 φέρειν χρὴ τὰ δαιμόνια ἀναγκαίως (= ὡς ἀνάγκαια, ὡς ἀνάγκας)
(D) 3.40 παρὰ τὸ εἰκὸς καὶ τούσδε ξυμφόρως δεῖ κολάζεσθαι (= *ἐπὶ τὸ ξυμφέρον ἡμῶν. Schol. τοῦ ξυμφέροντο ἕνεκα*)
(E) 4.62.3 τῷ παρ' ἐλπίδα μὴ χαλεπῶς σφαλλέσθω (= *χαλεπαίνοντες. Schol. μὴ χαλεπαινέτω εἰ σφαλλόμενος ἐλέγχεται ὑπ' ἐμοῦ*)
(F) 1.2 οὐ χαλεπῶς ἀπανίσταντο (= *χαλεπαίνοντες*)
(G) 4.20.2 πολεμοῦνται μὲν γὰρ ἀσαφῶς ὁποτέρων ἀρξάντων (= *οὐκ εἰδόντες = ἀσαφὲς ὄν*)

So presumably at 7. 63.4, too, the adverb = an adjective: ὥστε κοινωνοὶ μόνοι ἐλευθέρως ἡμῖν τῆς ἀρχῆς ὄντες δικαίως [= δίκαιοι ὄντες] αὐτὴν νῦν μὴ καταπροδίδοτε. But notice how, in every other example, the 'equivalent' participle, adjective, or prepositional phrase has to be taken *predicatively*. At 7.63.4 that would yield precisely what everyone is trying to avoid: 'Do not justly betray' etc. Yet if we take δίκαιοι ὄντες *attributively*, we get 'You, who are just, do not betray' (etc.)—which of course is nonsense. Closest to our passage is example E: since there too the adverb is, in effect, *part* of an imperative. But as that shows, what we really need at 7.63.4 is ἀδίκως = ἄδικοι. In sum, what these putative parallels really show is that Bekker's text is impossible.[19]

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[19] Other, simpler examples of adverb = adjective are at Poppo (1821–40) 169–70, and in them, too, it is always predicative. There is always a verbal noun, which the adverb can be seen as modifying, plus εἶναι or γίγνεσθαι, e.g., 2.14 χαλεπῶς

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[= χαλεπὴ] αὐτοῖς ἡ ἀνάστασις ἐγίγνετο, 4.10 μὴ ῥᾳδίως [= ῥᾳδίας] αὐτῷ πάλιν οὔσης τῆς ἀναχωρήσεως.

Arnold, cited with approval by Kruger, says that 'δικαίως is synonymous with ὡς τὸ δίκαιον βούλεται.' That requires a great leap of faith. According to Marchant ((1910) ad loc.), 'For μὴ καταπροδίδοτε we might have had σώσατε'—etc. With that kind of argument one can justify anything at all!

AGIS THREATENS ATHENS: THE PLAUSIBILITY OF DIODORUS 13.72.3–73.2

Scott M. Rusch

In its account of events dated to Euctemon's archonship (408/407),[1] Diodorus's *Bibliotheke* reports an onset made by Agis of Sparta against the city of Athens:

> [13.72.3] But Agis, the king of the Lacedaemonians, happened to be at Decelea busying himself with his forces; having learned that the mightiest (*tous kratistous*) of the Athenians were campaigning with Alcibiades, he led his army on a moonless night to Athens. [4] He had twenty-eight thousand infantry, of which half were picked hoplites, half light-armed; about twelve hundred cavalry also accompanied him, of which the Boeotians provided nine hundred, while the Peloponnesians sent out the rest together. As he neared the city, his approach went unobserved by its outposts, and easily putting these to flight due to surprise, he killed a few, and chased the rest inside the walls. [5] Learning what had happened, the Athenians gave orders to all the older men and the tallest youths to present themselves with their arms; since they quickly carried out the order, the circuit of the wall became filled with those who had assembled to meet the common danger, [6] but at daybreak the generals of the Athenians, seeing the enemy force deployed in a phalanx four men deep, and about eight stades in length, then at first were terrified, seeing almost two-thirds of the wall surrounded by their enemies. [7] After this, however, they sent out their horsemen, who were about equal in number to their opponents; when these met in a cavalry battle (*hippomachia*) before the city, a hard-fought battle occurred that lasted for some time. For the phalanx was about five stades away from the wall, but the horsemen locked in battle with each other were fighting it out at the very walls. [8] Having previously defeated the Athenians at Delium all by themselves, the Boeotians thought it would be terrible to show themselves inferior to those they had defeated; the Athenians, however, had as spectators of their valor those stationed on the walls, and every man was recognized, so they endured everything for the sake of victory. [9] Finally overcoming those arrayed against them, they killed many and pursued the rest as far as

[1] All dates are BC unless otherwise stated.

> the phalanx of infantry. After this, when the infantry advanced, they withdrew into the city, [73.1] but Agis, deciding not to besiege (*poliorkein*) the city at that time, encamped in the Academy. On the following day, since the Athenians had erected a trophy, he drew up his army in battle order and challenged those in the city to fight it out over the trophy. [2] The Athenians led forth their troops and deployed them along the wall, and at first the Lacedaemonians rushed into battle, but when a great number of missiles was hurled upon them from the walls, they led the army away from the city. After this they ravaged the rest of Attica, then went off to the Peloponnese [author's translation of the Teubner text].

Several features of the account have led scholars to dismiss it as a fiction, inspired by other attacks.[2] There is the oddly narrow phalanx, too short at eight stades to surround two-thirds of Athens' circuit. There is the implication that Athens had as many as 1200 cavalry at this late date. Then there are the claims that the Athenians dared to confront Agis' huge army, and that mere missile fire compelled its retreat. In addition, no other surviving ancient text mentions the event. The silence of Xenophon's *Hellenica*, the other major surviving history of the later Decelean War, is a special cause for concern. To be sure, some believe the cavalry battle inspired the one in Sophocles' *Oedipus at Colonus* (620, 785, 1044–95, 1524–32), or another depicted in the Villa Albani relief,[3] but this is unverifiable. Diodorus' likely source for the later years of the Decelean War, Ephorus,[4] and the Oxyrhynchus Historian, who was probably Ephorus' source,[5] have both been accused of creating fictitious accounts of battles for their histories.[6] Diodorus may have been their victim, and was probably responsible for errors and embellishments of his own. Lacking corroborative evidence from contemporary sources, one can-

[2] Volquardsen (1868) 129–30 (n.v.); Droysen (1888) 44 n. 2; Delbrück (1975) 135 n. 13; Busolt (1904) 1528 n. 2; Spence (1987) 167–75, (1993) 99 n. 237, 101 n. 244; Németh (1994) 98 n. 12; Will and Veh (1993) 346–7; Bleckmann (1998) 248–9, 590. Grote (1888) 373–4 rejects only the second day's battle.

[3] Robertson (1975) 368–9, 683 n. 20; Cavaignac (1944) 59 n. 1.

[4] There is no doubt Ephorus was a major source of *Bibliotheke* 11–15, though scholars disagree on how often and how closely Diodorus used him: Schwartz (1903) cols. 679–82; Palm (1955) 15–62; Casevitz (1972) xii–xv; Hornblower (1981) 18–32; Sacks (1990) 12–22, 42–4, 48–9, 52–3, 101–3, 108–16; Bertrac and Vernière (1993), xxii–xxxii; Stylianou (1994) 1–17, 49–132; Bonnet and Bennett (1997) viii–xiv, xxi–xxx.

[5] Grenfell and Hunt (1908) 117–19, 124–7, 135–7; Barber (1935) 49–67; Bruce (1967) 2–3; Koenen (1976) 63–4.

[6] Busolt (1904) 706–26; Anderson (1974) 27–53; Gray (1979) 183–200, and (1987) 72–89; Bleckmann (1998) 17–266.

not prove the incident occurred as Diodorus describes it. Those who defend the historicity of the account usually say only that there is no need to doubt it.[7]

As universal historians with hundreds of books to examine and dozens of volumes to write, Diodorus and Ephorus had no need to add fictitious events. Indeed, Book 13 of the *Bibliotheke* fails to cover the material promised (cf. Diodorus 13.1.3, 114.3). Reading through the relevant portions of the *Bibliotheke* (12.37.1–13.42.5) shows that, while its account of the first twenty years of the Peloponnesian War misdates, exaggerates, oversimplifies, and otherwise misreports events, they are always recognizable as coming from Thucydides, Diodorus' ultimate source for the period. Events are sometimes grouped by subject into separate sequences, out of proper chronological order (e.g., Diodorus 12.53–4, 65, 80.5), but elements of different events are not combined into new stories set in another sequence. The *Bibliotheke* does exaggerate the violence of sieges by reporting assaults that did not occur,[8] but its brief mentions of nonexistent 'continuous assaults' (*synecheis prosbolai*) in sieges (e.g., Diodorus 12.37.1, 55.5, 72.9), and short notes claiming that sites were assaulted where no assaults occurred (e.g., Diodorus 12.65.3, 67.1,73.3), differ greatly from the creation of a lengthy piece of fiction in which an assault is threatened, but does not take place. Only the *hippomachia* shows signs of rewriting by Diodorus or Ephorus, as we shall see. If Diodorus 13.72.3–73.2 is a creative fiction, it is probably a product of the *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia*, albeit as processed by Ephorus and Diodorus, although we have no reason to believe either altered it beyond recognition.[9]

As for the Oxyrhynchus Historian, his narrative often differs sharply from that of Xenophon, and scholars are divided over whom to prefer. Some have come to doubt Xenophon and champion the unknown historian.[10] Our knowledge of the *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* offers no help

[7] Beloch (1914) 418 n. 2; Hatzfeld (1951) 316 n. 1; Kagan (1987) 321 n. 113; Andrewes (1992) 491 n. 56; de Romilly (1995) 213 n. 17.

[8] Rusch (1997) 47–53, 91.

[9] E.g., compare *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia*, in Chambers' Teubner numbering, with Diodorus: 1–3/13.64.1; 4.1–2/13.65.1–2;8.1–4/13.71.2–4; 12.2/14.79.8; 14–15/14.80.1–5. Agis' descent upon Athens is wedged between the account of Notium in 13.71, which comes from the Oxyrhynchus Historian (*Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* 8 Chambers; Bruce (1967) 35–9), and that of Alcibiades at Cyme, almost certainly from Ephorus (Samuel (1968) 383–6). It forms an integral part of the sequence of events in Diodorus 13.68–74.

[10] E.g., Andrewes (1974) 112–22; (1982) 15–25; Pédech (1969) 43–55; Krentz (1988) 128–30; (1989) 10–14.

in confirming the historicity of the account of Agis' descent upon Athens in Diodorus. Instead, establishing the historicity of that account would help support the credibility of the *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia.*

In fact, a strong argument for the historicity of the account can be made. Xenophon's silence proves nothing, since he focused almost entirely upon events connected with the war at sea.[11] Also, an abortive attack upon Athens made during the period of Lysander's rise and Alcibiades' fall was unlikely to attract much attention. Close examination of the strategic situation and military tactics of the era shows that none of the specific objections raised carry any weight. Each section of Diodorus' account—namely, the descent upon Athens (13.72.3–72.5), the phalanx deployment (13.72.4, 6), the *hippomachia* (13.72.7–9), and the challenge to battle (13.73.1–2)—presents certain problems, but none are beyond explanation. Diodorus' story may never be proven, but it is highly plausible.

Let us begin by examining the historical background. Agis, the Eurypontid king of Sparta and victor of Mantinea in 418, led the army that built the Decelea Fort in 413 (Thuc. 7.19.1–3). He remained there until the end of the war to lead the campaign to plunder the Attic countryside (Thuc. 7.27.4). In 411, encouraged by the overthrow of Athens' democracy, he gathered a large army and marched against the Long Walls, expecting the Athenians to surrender upon his approach or fall into civil strife, allowing him to storm the defenses easily. Instead, the Athenians sent out their cavalry and some hoplites, light-armed troops, and bowmen, who shot down those Peloponnesians who came too near the walls. The king withdrew and disbanded his army (Thuc. 8.71.1–2).

A year or so later Agis made a raid (*pronomē*) from Decelea as far as the walls of Athens. Xenophon reports that the Athenian general Thrasyllus led forth the Athenians and every other man present in the city and drew them up for battle alongside the Lyceum, the gymnasium outside the eastern walls, intending to attack if Agis approached. Seeing this, the king withdrew his army quickly, but he still lost a few of his rearward troops to the missile-fire of Athenian light-armed soldiers (Xen., *Hellenica* 1.1.33–4).

These two incidents, sometimes considered the inspirations for the creation of the Diodoran report in 13.72.3–73.2, resemble it only in general terms: Agis comes to the Attic plain and is driven off by an

[11] Henry (1967) 30–1.

Athenian response. His intentions, and the nature of the Athenian response, differ in all three cases. The Diodoran story does resemble Thucydides' in that Agis attempts to assault Athenian fortifications by exploiting a perceived weakness in the defense. But the reason for the weakness is very different in the two accounts. Moreover, the opportunistic exploitation of weaknesses was a typical feature of classical Greek warfare, especially in assaults, where surprise was also stressed.[12] Agis' opportunism and use of surprise here is perfectly credible.

What the incidents reported by Thucydides and Xenophon show is that Agis occasionally brought large armies into the Attic plain during the Decelean War, and that he even threatened the Athenian fortifications with direct attack, while the Athenians responded by making sorties. The basic facts of the Diodoran account are in perfect accord with this. The question is, how closely do the details in Diodorus correspond to the strategies and tactics of both sides during the Decelean War?

In the first section, the descent upon Athens (13.72.3–72.5), we find Agis at Decelea accompanied by a large army, perhaps a one-third levy of Peloponnesian League forces.[13] Diodorus does not explain its presence. The usual garrison of Decelea consisted of shifts of allied forces, relieved at regular intervals (Thuc. 7.27.3–4; 8.98.2), and would have been far smaller. Agis had full authority to levy additional troops while at Decelea (Thuc. 8.5.3), and he could collect a large army when necessary, as in 411 (Thuc. 8.71.1). Scholars have suggested that Agis gathered one now with the specific aim of attacking Athens, either to undercut Lysander's growing influence, to prevent the rise of a new peace movement in Sparta, or to retaliate for Alcibiades' escort of the Mysteries Procession (Xen., *Hellenica* 1.4.20; Plut., *Alcibiades* 34.5–6).[14] However, since Diodorus has the king's forces ravage Attica before disbanding (13.73.2), Agis may simply have mustered the army for a major raid, which still occurred even

[12] Powell (1988) 118–28, 142–5; Garlan (1974) 125–9; Rusch (1997) chapters v, viii, x. The king's intention to assault the walls is implied by the peculiar phalanx formation, the Athenians' terror at seeing their wall nearly surrounded, and the use of *poliorkein* in Diodorus 13.73.1. This word in Diodorus refers to both active (assault) and passive (blockade) siege operations (Rusch (1997) 103–4). Since blockading Athens was impractical without control of the sea, only a direct assault was possible.

[13] Cf. Busolt (1904) 858–61; Kagan (1974) 19 n. 9.

[14] Grote (1888) 373–4; Hatzfeld (1951) 315–16; Kagan (1987) 321; de Romilly (1995) 213.

after the occupation of Decelea (Thuc. 7.19.1, 27.4; Xen., *Hellenica* 1.1.33–4). It is odd that he only learned now that Athens' best troops had left with Alcibiades. However, oligarchic deserters from Athens, whose presence at Decelea is attested,[15] perhaps chanced to bring this news now. Members of the upper classes were likelier to know the details of mobilizations than the usual slave *automoloi* (deserters). Prisoners and spies are also possible informants.[16] Diodorus' claim that Agis' decision to attack Athens came after the army was already at Decelea is therefore credible.

At this time, the entire Athenian adult male citizen body probably numbered under 30,000,[17] with perhaps half at sea (Thuc. 8.76.3). Citizen hoplites and cavalrymen allegedly totaled ca. 9000 in 411 (Lysias 20.13). To provide 22,000 men for a fleet in 406, the Athenians had to conscript slaves, metics, and all classes of citizens of field-duty age (Xenophon, *Hellenica* 1.6.24). Even aided by metics, those at home would have been hard pressed to field 5000 to 7000 hoplites and as many light-armed troops. Between Athens, the Piraeus, the Long Walls, and the forts along the Attic coast, the Athenians had at least 24 kilometers of wall to guard. With the enemy base at Decelea only 18 kilometers distant from the city of Athens,[18] connected to it by an easy wagon road,[19] the Athenians faced a difficult security situation, made worse by the constant danger of betrayal, which cost them three border forts during the Peloponnesian War (Thuc. 5.3.5; 8.60.1, 98).[20]

The Athenians had to keep a careful, active watch. Thucydides says they manned the walls by shifts during daytime, but all together at night.[21] They went armed at all times.[22] In Diodorus' account the Athenian 'oldest and youngest', the established defense force of the walls (Thuc. 2.13.6–7), appear only when the alarm is raised, but some modification of the early Decelean War procedures Thucydides

[15] Lys. 18.9, 20.28; Andoc. 1.101; Lycurgus 120; Dem. 24.128; Diod. Sic. 13.103.2; Thuc. 8.98.1.

[16] Russell (1999) 42–54, 130–3.

[17] Strauss (1986) 70–86, 179–82; Hansen (1988) 14–28.

[18] Hanson (1998) 153 n. 48.

[19] Ober (1985) 115.

[20] Cf. Ar., *Acharnae* 290, 915–24; *Aves* 328, 766; *Ranae* 362. Also, the betrayal panics of 415 (Thuc. 6.61.2–3; Andoc. 1.45) and 411 (Thuc. 8.90.3–4; 91.3; 92.1–2; 94.1–2).

[21] Thuc. 7.28.2; Ar., *Thesmophoriazusae* 493–6.

[22] Thuc. 8.69.1; Ar., *Lysistrata* 555–64.

describes is credible by this time. Of Athenians of field-service age, some were doubtless on the walls at night, since a standing watch was required there (Polyaenus 1.40.3; Front., *Strategematon* 3.12.1). Some should have been in the outposts Diodorus mentions. Thucydides says nothing about outposts, but their existence may be assumed, given the need to protect the Attic plain from raiders and create an outer guard line for the city.[23] Other infantrymen and cavalrymen of field-service age are known to have acted as reserves, spending the night massed in open areas of the city.[24] Had the walls been attacked, they would have performed a sortie, or aided threatened sectors.[25] Diodorus' account of Athenian security measures is incomplete, but what he reports appears sound.

In case of attack, the Athenians could sortie, as they did in the incidents reported by Thucydides and Xenophon, and also at Syracuse, Delphinium, and Calchedon.[26] Sorties could inflict heavy losses upon an army dispersed around a city's walls in an assault (e.g., Thuc. 4.25.9, 11). Even armies in formation near a city could be vulnerable to unexpected, concentrated attacks (e.g., Thuc. 5.6–11; Xen., *Cyropaedia* 7.5.1–6). Athens' land forces had two decades of nearly constant warfare behind them by this point, and they were skillful fighters. Already at Syracuse Athenian hoplites had dominated their opponents (e.g., Thuc. 6.68.2, 69.1, 70.1). Athens lost only two recorded land battles in the Decelean War, at Ephesus and Cyme,[27] winning ten victories in 412 and 411,[28] and seven more in the period from 410 to 406,[29] not counting those reported here. Westlake attributed Athens' success to the poor quality of the East Greek levies,[30] but the Athenians defeated Peloponnesians as well. They could sortie with confidence in their abilities and tactics.

According to Diodorus (13.72.3), the Athenians were weakened because their best men had left with Alcibiades. This may be a result

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23 Hanson (1998) 153–73; Russell (1999) 27–37.

24 Thuc. 6.61.2; Andoc. 1.45; Xen., *Hellenica* 2.4.24.

25 Thuc. 3.22.7; Eur., *Phoenissae* 1095; Aen. Tact. 1.4–5.

26 Syracuse: Thuc. 7.4.2–3; 37.3; 51.2; 53.2–3. Delphinium: Thuc. 8.55.2–3. Calchedon: Xen., *Hellenica* 1.3.6; Diod. Sic. 13.66.2; Plut., *Alcibiades* 30.1.

27 Ephesus: Xen., *Hellenica* 1.2.7–10; Diod. Sic. 13.66.1; *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* 1–3. Cyme: Diod. Sic. 13.73.3–4.

28 Thuc. 8.23.1–3; 24.1; 24.3; 25; 55.1; 62.2; 98.2; 100.3.

29 Xen., *Hellenica* 1.1.17–18; 1.2.2–3; 1.2.15–17; 1.3.10, 14–22; 1.4.21–3; Diod. Sic. 13.50.4–51.8; 65.1–2; 66.4–67.7; 69.4–5; 72.1; Plut., *Alcibiades* 28.5–6; 29.1–2, 31.2–6; 35.1. See also *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* 4.1–2 Chambers.

30 Westlake (1979) 22.

of rewriting by Ephorus or Diodorus, since a similar claim is made in the *Bibliotheke*'s account of Notium (13.71.3), but the Oxyrhynchus Historian is quite possibly the source here. In his account of the earlier Battle of Cerata in Megara, the Oxyrhynchus Historian says the Athenians condemned their generals for having undertaken 'to play dice with the whole city at stake' (*ky[be]usai peri holēs tēs poleōs*: 4.2 Chambers) by risking battle there, yet according to Diodorus, who almost certainly had the *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* as his source,[31] only 1000 infantrymen and 400 cavalrymen from Athens participated. It seems the Oxyrhynchus Historian believed the safety of Athens depended upon the existence of a relatively small body of crack foot and horse. Perhaps he thought their absence now motivated the king's attack.

Agis may indeed have felt the Athenians' ability to sortie was now critically weakened, making an assault upon their inadequately garrisoned wall system appear promising. Believing his powerful army, especially his Boeotian cavalry, could repel any sorties by the remaining Athenian forces, his only concern would have been that a massed attack of the sort Thrasyllus had threatened might be attempted as his army approached Athens in march order. Agis' response was the night march and deployment. Everything in the opening section of Diodorus' account is quite in accordance with the contemporary military situation.

The second section of Diodorus' account describes the deployment of the phalanx (13.72.4, 6). It states that Agis' phalanx was formed four deep, half the usual depth in this period.[32] Rüstow and Köchly believed the formation here was meant to impress the Athenians by doubling the normal length of the formed army.[33] However, the Athenians had seen large enemy armies in Attica before; it was the sight of two-thirds of their city wall being surrounded that terrified them. This was an assault formation.[34] Known to the Romans as a *corona* (e.g., Livy 26.45.5; 37.5.5), it was designed to exert pressure

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[31] Diod. Sic. 13.65.1–2; Bruce (1967) 28–31.

[32] Pritchett (1971–91) 1.134–43.

[33] Rüstow and Köchly (1973) 118; e.g., the Ten Thousand's Cilician review (Xen., *Anabasis* 1.2.15).

[34] A similar formation could be used to cover the movement of a besieger's baggage train (e.g., Josephus, *Bellum Judaicum* 5.130–2), but since Agis encamped in the Academy, northwest of Athens and not far from the Decelea road, his train did not require extensive protective coverage.

everywhere around a city's circuit and reveal weak points in the defense. Armies thinned their files and extended their ranks far around the circuit, exchanged missile fire with the defenders, and sought to force gates, scale walls, or undermine a tower or section of curtain wall.[35] Assaults of this kind were in fact traditional, depicted in the Trojan *teichomachia* in Book 12 of the *Iliad* and in the tale of the Seven Against Thebes, and they are described in Aeschylus (*Septem contra Thebas* 24–33, 55–7, 120–1, 150–60, 247, 249), Euripides (*Phoenissae* 710–11, 1093–1103, 1141–99), and Xenophon (*Anabasis* 5.2.10–15; cf. *Cyropaedia* 7.5.1–6). Thucydides says Cleon in 422 planned to attack Amphipolis by 'standing around it in a circle' (*hōs kyklōi peristas*: 5.7.3) in just such a fashion.[36]

If Diodorus' light-armed men stood alongside the hoplites in the phalanx, sheltering behind their shields,[37] then 28,000 infantry formed four deep, each man taking a meter of space, would have covered 7000 meters. In 13.72.4 Diodorus enumerates the king's 'force' (*dynamis*: 13.72.3), listing light and heavy infantry alike, then in 13.72.6 says the 'force' formed the phalanx, called in 13.72.9 the phalanx 'of infantry' (*pezōn*), not of hoplites. A strict reading of Diodorus' text, then, supports the 7000 meters length. However, Diodorus, no military expert, may have misunderstood his source and assumed that both heavy and light infantry were together in the phalanx. If only hoplites were in formation, with the light-armed deployed as skirmishers, the phalanx would have extended at least 3500 meters, and probably further, assuming gaps were left between the units, meant to close as they approached the wall from several directions. The defeated Boeotians retreated through the phalanx (13.72.9), suggesting it was not formed in an unbroken line.

In either deployment the phalanx could have threatened two-thirds of the circuit wall of Athens; indeed, in theory the longer formation could have surrounded all of it.[38] But hilly terrain and the Ilissus'

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[35] For Roman-era examples see Caes., *Bellum Gallicum* 2.6.2–3; Sall., *Bellum Jugurthinum* 57, 60; Tac., *Historiae* 3.26–9; Amm. Marc. 19.2.2; 20.11.21; 21.12.4; 24.2.9, 4.10 (formations two, three, or five deep).

[36] See also Plut., *Moralia* 346D. Polyaenus (2.1.24) has Agesilaus using a two-deep formation to threaten an assault (*pace* Droysen (1888) 44 n. 2, who failed to understand the reason for the deployment).

[37] Cf. Xen., *Hellenica* 2.4.11–12; *Anabasis* 3.3.7; 3.4.15; 4.25–6; Arr., *Tactica* 9.1.

[38] For descriptions of the city's circuit walls, see Travlos (1971) 158–79; Knigge (1988) 6–13, 35–40, 49–79.

riverbed, 30 to 50 meters wide and dry in summer, obstructed movement against the southeastern walls by an attacker in formation,[39] while in the southwest the line of the abandoned Phaleric Long Wall and the Museum Hill would have proven equally difficult.[40] Agis would probably have deployed against only the northern and eastern thirds of the circuit, where only the stream bed of the Eridanus, a mere 4 to 5 meters wide, and manmade obstacles such as buildings, fences, and funeral monuments would have offered any difficulties.[41]

The narrowness of the phalanx and its deployment against two-thirds of the city wall are both plausible, then. This leaves only the stated length of the phalanx, eight stades, roughly one and a half kilometers, as a source of controversy. It is an impossible figure, ridiculously small. It may be corrupt. A manuscript of Diodorus, Patmian codex 50, has 'fifty' instead of 'eight' stades, suggesting a copyist's confusion of the alphabetic numeral N (50) for H (8).[42] Attested stade lengths make fifty too large a figure for the phalanx, but a ca. 140-meter stade would fit the 7000 meter length of the combined hoplite/light infantry phalanx, and such a stade may have been known to Thucydides.[43] Lycabettus' Schisto outlier, too steep for formed troops, is some 700 to 800 meters east of Athens' circuit,[44] and the phalanx in Diodorus is deployed some five stades from the walls (13.72.7). That implies a stade length of between 140 and 160 meters. Since there is reason to believe the eight stades figure is corrupt, and a possibly correct alternative exists, the figure cannot be used to condemn Diodorus' account as fictional. Therefore nothing in this section really challenges the overall credibility of the report.

The next section, the *hippomachia* (13.72.7–9), raises the most serious questions about the report's veracity. It is presented as a stereotypical Diodoran 'hard-fought battle' (*kartera machē*: 13.72.7), evenly matched, hard-fought, and long.[45] By its mention of Delium, the

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[39] Strabo 9.1.24; Wachsmuth (1874) 116–20; Judeich (1931) 48, 416–17; Travlos (1971) 112, 160, 204, 278, 289–90, 340, 498, and figs. 154, 155, 159, 268, 379, 411, 629, 630, 634, 635; Karayiorgha-Stathakapoulou (1978) and (1979).

[40] Conwell (1992) 103–10 (Phaleric Wall abandoned), 234–69 (its possible course).

[41] Dörpfeld (1888) 211–20; Travlos (1960) maps II and III, and (1971) figs. 393, 602.

[42] Vogel (1985) v–vi, xvii; Pritchett (1971–91) 1.134–5.

[43] Scranton (1938) 529–32; Travlos (1960) 50; Bauslaugh (1979) 1–6; Conwell (1992) 240–6, 528–9.

[44] See Plan 1 in Judeich (1931); Travlos (1971) 169.

[45] Cf. Barber (1935) 142–4; Vial (1977) xx–xxii; Stylianou (1994) 15–16.

account at 13.72.8 suggests the pen of the Oxyrhynchus Historian, who often refers to events in Thucydides,[46] but it may originate in an actual battlefield oration (cf. Thuc. 4.92.6, 95.3), in harangues written by Ephorus (cf. *FGH* 70 T 21), or in observations by Ephorus or Diodorus. More certainly Diodoran is the idea of the entire populace being spectators of combatants' valor, which appears earlier in Book 13 (13.15.5, 16.7). The claim of heavy Boeotian casualties at 13.72.9 recalls exaggerations of losses by Diodorus elsewhere in the *Bibliotheke*.[47] One would not be surprised to learn that the details of the actual battle were quite different from those in Diodorus, although no doubt it also resulted in an Athenian victory. Still, both sides had capable and spirited cavalrymen who, if evenly matched, may well have fought for a long time before one side gained the upper hand.

The most serious problem is the claim at 13.72.7 that the Athenian horsemen were 'about equal in number to their opponents' (*paraplēsious ton arithmon tois enantiois*). This implies that they matched in numbers the 1200 Boeotian and Peloponnesian horse of 13.72.4. This is a far larger body than recent scholarship accepts.[48] Since the Athenian horsemen are unlikely to have challenged superior numbers of enemy cavalry, the credibility of the entire *hippomachia* comes into question.

So many uncertainties exist on this matter, however, that one cannot consider it decisive. In 13.72.7 the Athenians are said to equal in number their 'opponents', not necessarily the entire enemy cavalry force, whose deployment is not described. Only the Boeotians are mentioned (13.72.8). Agis may have divided his cavalry between the wings of his extended phalanx, and the Athenians fought only the Boeotian contingent, or even just part of it. Also, we only know how many Athenian cavalry were sent abroad on certain occasions, not how many existed at any time in the Decelean War. Payments of money for food for cavalry horses from the Treasury of Athena (*IG* I^3.375) have been taken to prove there were only ca. 600 horsemen

[46] E.g., *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* 4.2, 5, 20.3–5 Chambers. See Bleckmann (1998) 248–9.

[47] Compare Diod. Sic. 12.41.6–7, 43.2, 43.4, 47.3, 56.1, 61.5, 62.3–6, 65.4, 65.6, 70.6, 72.10, 74.1–2, 81.5; 13.6.5, 7.5, 8.1–2, and 8.4, to Thucydides' reports of these events, Diod. Sic. 13.11.5 to Plut., *Nicias* 21.9, and Diod. Sic. 14.80.4 to *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* 14.6 Chambers.

[48] Spence (1987) 167–75, and (1993) 99 n. 237, 101 n. 244 (500–650); Bugh (1988) 60 n. 86, 84–5 (850+); Worley (1994) 120–1 (600–700); Németh (1994) 98 n. 12 (1200 an exaggeration).

in 410/409, assuming the standard drachma-a-day wartime pay.[49] But it is possible cavalrymen were sometimes asked to maintain their mounts on less than a drachma a day, thereby allowing the support of a larger force. After the restoration of the democracy in 403, Lysias reports that daily pay for the *hippeis* was reduced from a drachma to four obols.[50] Reductions of this nature may have been in force during difficult financial periods of the Decelean War. The very fact of payments from the Treasury of Athena, an irregular source of military funds, argues for fiscal strain in 410/409. In any case, we cannot be certain no other source of funding existed.

With a thousand Boeotian horse always across the border, the Athenians had every reason to try to maintain their own cavalry's numbers, something they did during the Archidamian War, when they lost 300 cavalrymen to the plague between 430 and 427 (Thuc. 3.87.3), but then had 1000 *hippeis* again in 424 (Ar., *Equites* 225). The need was even greater now, when Athens' cavalry patrolled Attica daily against the threat from Decelea (Thuc. 7.27.5). Even if their forces were smaller in earlier periods of the Decelean War, the Athenians may have prospered sufficiently from their recent successes to restore their cavalry to full strength now, either using new citizen recruits or mercenaries. It is not impossible, therefore, that Athens had 1200 horsemen in Attica at this time.

Since the size of neither cavalry force in the *hippomachia* can be stated with certainty, one cannot say that a long, intense cavalry battle between two forces roughly equal in size could not have occurred. While aspects of Diodorus' account of the *hippomachia* are questionable, it is not so gravely suspect that it condemns as implausible the entire report.

In the final section, the challenge to battle (13.73.1–2), Diodorus begins by describing Agis' withdrawal after the *hippomachia* and the next day's challenge. Agis' decision not to besiege Athens is sensible, since his defeat in the *hippomachia* showed his horsemen were incapable of stopping an Athenian cavalry sortie against his infantrymen during an assault, when they were very vulnerable. *Pace* Bleckmann,[51] the report of Agis encamping in the Academy need not be a fiction inspired by Thrasyllus' deployment in the Lyceum,

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[49] Dem. 4.28; cf. Thuc. 5.47.6. Spence (1987) 167–75; also Spence (1993) 100–1, *contra* Bugh (1988) 60 n. 86.

[50] Lysias fr. 6; Grenfell and Hunt (1906) 51–2, no. 14, lines 70ff.

[51] Bleckmann (1998) 248 n. 152.

since every army needed large open areas in which to mass or encamp. Pausanias encamped in the Academy in 405.[52] Agis' challenge to fight for the trophy came about because the advance of his infantry had forced the Athenian cavalry back into the city (13.72.9). Since the Athenians did not control the battlefield, they arguably had no right to raise a trophy, making the matter a question of prestige.[53] The king's willingness to restore his reputation by aggressive activity after a setback is well attested (Thuc. 5.65.1–3).

Neither action of the king, then, inspires any distrust of Diodorus' account. It is the Athenians' willingness to accept his offer of battle that raises suspicion. The Athenian infantry must have been heavily outnumbered by Agis' forces, as we have seen. They had massed against Agis before, under Thrasyllus, but that was against an army strung out on the march, not formed for battle. Still, faced with the threat posed by the enemy's proximity, it is credible that the Athenians, buoyed by their victory in the *hippomachia*, may have accepted Agis' challenge in the hope of driving him off.

However, one would not expect such a response unless the circumstances seemed sufficiently favorable. Agis' army was ready for battle, and the Athenians would have to deploy where the trophy was located, thereby literally putting their backs against the wall. But in 413 the Athenians had deployed in front of their siege wall at Syracuse, as well as atop it, to block a threatened assault (Thuc. 7.37.3), so their action now did not lack precedent or, presumably, reason. In the situation presented by Diodorus, the Athenians could expect their cavalry to threaten the enemy's flanks during a battle, while their own flanks and rear were protected by their walls and towers. Indeed, even a part of their front would have been protected by fortifications, at least near gates. Trenches and advanced walls (*proteichismata*) protected the Sacred and Dipylon Gates at this time, and probably other gates as well.[54]

However, what Diodorus stresses is missile fire from the wall tops. Could it really have stopped Agis, as Diodorus claims? Or would those on the walls have had to cease fire once the battle began, lest they hit their own men? Both questions can be answered by reference to Xenophon's account of the Battle of Munichia in 403 (Xen., *Hellenica* 2.4.11–19). The democrats won, despite being heavily

[52] Xen., *Hellenica* 2.2.8. For the site, see Travlos (1971) 42–51, fig. 379.
[53] See Pritchett (1971–91) 2.259–60; also 159.
[54] Knigge (1988) 36, 49–50, 60, 76–9.

outnumbered in hoplites, because they were deployed on a hill where they could not be outflanked and had peltasts, akontists, and numerous stone-throwers stationed behind them. These light-armed troops could throw downhill freely, while only the front rank of the enemy could see to throw uphill; indeed, Xenophon claims that even the front rank of the attackers would be struck by missiles and easily defeated during the fighting (Xen., *Hellenica* 2.4.16). In any event the enemy, formed fifty deep, could hardly be missed.

Agis' phalanx in 13.73.2, massed to fight the Athenian infantry, would have been a much better target for missiles than when it was formed four deep for an assault. While fewer missile troops could have been deployed on the walls than on the Munichia hilltop, their vantage point was better, auxiliaries could provide them with a constant supply of missiles, and they themselves could consist solely of picked marksmen. Agis' light-armed troops had to stand behind their phalanx, so as not to be trapped between the lines of hoplites. They could not have seen the Athenian infantry in front of the wall, and they could only have fired at them blindly.[55] They were also kept further from the men atop the walls than the latter were from their targets, Agis' hoplites. As a result, they could hardly have offered an effective return fire. Nor could Agis' hoplites hurl missiles and fight a hoplite battle at the same time.

All in all, the Athenians might well have considered the circumstances favorable enough to accept the king's challenge to battle. Indeed, it now seems surprising that Agis offered battle at all. Perhaps he acted rashly, then hastily reversed himself (e.g., Thuc. 5.65.1–3). However, since this is the first recorded occasion in the Peloponnesian War that an army came under fire from Athens' walls, it may be that the king and his officers failed to realize just how heavy and effective this fire would be until they experienced it. If so, their actions are understandable.

Although questions remain, the reported actions of both sides in Diodorus 13.72.3–73.2 suit the strategies and tactics of the Decelean War period in Attica. If, as is likely, the Oxyrhynchus Historian is ultimately responsible for this account, it is very likely he had solid

[55] Xenophon allowed such blind fire in his fictional battle of Thymbrara (*Cyropaedia* 6.3.24–5; 7.1.34). Since the enemy was formed 30 to 100 men deep (*Cyropaedia* 6.3.19–20), he apparently believed missiles, even thrown blindly, could not miss. The Athenian infantry here would not have been formed so deep, and so were more likely to be overthrown.

information about an actual event, whether from personal experience or a contemporary source. Athens had to fight the Decelean War with one eye always on the fortress that gave the war its name. Xenophon might dismiss the king's efforts there as futile (Xen., *Hellenica* 1.1.35–6), but the Oxyrhynchus Historian apparently felt otherwise, and with good reason.

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NUMISMATIC PROBLEMS IN THE ACHAEMENID WEST: THE UNDUE MODERN INFLUENCE OF 'TISSAPHERNES'

Cynthia Harrison

Did Greek Mercenaries Ask for Pay in Imitation 'Owls'?

Plutarch tells an interesting story about the so-called 'imperial' Achaemenid coinage (*Artaxerxes* 20.3–4). It seems that Artaxerxes II sent Timocrates of Rhodes to Greece with a quantity of gold, with which he was to foment war against Sparta. Agesilaus of Sparta, who had been campaigning successfully against the Persians in western Anatolia, was summoned home because of Timocrates' activities. Agesilaus reported to his friends, Plutarch says, that the King had driven him out of Asia with thirty thousand archers. For those of us who might otherwise miss the *double entendre*, Plutarch explains that Persian coinage had an archer as its type. No doubt Agesilaus' friends knew quite well that he was speaking of the sturdy little figure who had occupied the obverse of the King's coins, both gold and silver, from the time of Darius I.

Contrary to the impression created by modern emphasis on representations identified as 'satrapal portraits' (see below), the King's satraps never issued a satrapal coinage comparable to the imperial, with its own instantly identifiable images. Beginning at the turn of the fourth century, however, Persian governors and military commanders occasionally contracted with local mints to strike coins on their behalf. More often than not, their coin types are borrowed from, or inspired by, the coins of the issuing mint; the coins can be identified as satrapal only by the inscribed names of the issuers.

On account of the large number of mints in western Anatolia, we might expect many satrapal coins from that area, but, if we eliminate conjectural attributions and count only those coins whose legends show that they were minted for Persians, we will discover that the known examples are few and unimpressive. Aside from a handful of silver fractions and bronzes minted for Orontes, Spithridates, Tissaphernes, and perhaps Autophradates (if the legend *OATA* stands

for that name),[1] there are just three issues of staters, and these not numerous. The staters include a half dozen examples, evidently minted at Cyzicus, inscribed *ΦΑΡΝΑΒΑ*, which must stand for Pharnabazus, a few coins issued in Caria for Orontobates, who took over the rule of Caria in 335/34 after the death of his father-in-law, Pixodarus, and a single example from Xanthos' mint with the partial legend *zis* . . . *na*, which may be restored as Tissaphernes' name in Lycian.[2]

The paucity of satrapal coins from western Anatolia docs not accord very well with the literary evidence, which indicates that the local satraps sometimes expended large sums of money, especially for military undertakings. The most reasonable explanation for this apparent contradiction is that the satraps used the 'imperial' coinage, the darics and sigloi minted at Sardis. However, darics and sigloi have been all but forgotten in the genesis of recent theories that satraps at Sardis, particularly Tissaphernes and Cyrus the Younger, minted imitation Attic tetradrachms for payments to Greek mercenaries.

The Attic imitation theory has its roots in E.S.G. Robinson's highly conjectural, but universally accepted, interpretation of a coin whose weight is equivalent to an Attic tetradrachm.[3] The coin carries on its obverse the profile head of a bearded male wearing a tiara, the soft cap with side and back flaps which, according to Herodotus (7.61–2), was part of the military dress worn by both Medes and Persians. The coin's reverse copies the owl and olive sprig from the reverse of an Athenian tetradrachm, but the legend *ΒΑΣ* (for *ΒΑΣΙΛΕΩΣ*) replaces *ΑΘΕ* (fig. 11). Robinson declared that a late fifth-century date would be suitable both for the coin's style and the evidence of the hoard in which it had been found. He then identified the image as a portrait of Tissaphernes and associated the coin with Tissaphernes' payment to the Peloponnesian fleet of a month's pay at an Attic drachma [a day] for each man (μηνὸς μὲν τροφὴν . . . ἐς δραχμὴν Ἀττικὴν ἑκάστῳ, Thuc. 8.29.1). Next, he made the remarkable suggestion that payment was made in drachmas, referring to the Attic standard, which, he observed, would have been convenient for the Sicilian contingent in the fleet.

[1] Troxell (1981); Babelon (1910) nos. 56 60, 63, pl. lxxxviii.1520, 22 (Orontes); Babelon (1910) nos. 69–73, pl. lxxxix.1–5 (Spithridates); Cahn (1985); Cahn (1989) 99 and pl. i.3 (Tissaphernes); Babelon (1910) no. 67, pl. lxxxviii.27 (Autophradates?).
[2] Babelon (1910) nos. 583, 2810 *bis*, pls. cviii.1, clxxviii.15 (Pharnabazus); Babelon (1910) nos. 114–15, pl. xci.4–5 (Orontobates); Hurter (1979) (Tissaphernes).
[3] Robinson (1948) 48–56, and pl. v.8.

The attribution of the 'owl' coin to Tissaphernes is quite uncertain. The hoard in which the coin was found was composed of fifth-century Athenian tetradrachms and imitations of fifth-century Athenian tetradrachms; the latter were being minted as late as the 340s,[4] and the hoard could therefore be dated to the later years of the Achaemenid period. The head (so it seems to me) shows signs of inspiration from a fourth century Attic tetradrachm.[5] Far more troubling is Robinson's interpretation of Thucydides, for it seems clear enough that ἐς δραχμὴν Ἀττικὴν refers to a rate of pay, not a coin; an agreement to pay at a drachma rate would not have called for the minting of Attic tetradrachms.

Despite objections that might be raised, the curious idea that Persians were obligated to pay Greek mercenaries in coins minted on the Attic standard has lingered on. It figures prominently in the recent attribution by W. Weiser of a particular group of imitation Athenian tetradrachms to Cyrus the Younger.[6] Weiser mentions Tissaphernes' presumed obligations, but more significant for his theory is Lysander's conversation with Cyrus about pay for the fleet (Xen., *Hellenica* 1.5.1–7). Lysander spoke in terms of obols per day for each man (which no doubt was Lysander's manner of calculating pay). However, as Cyrus reminded him when he urged a pay increase, the actual agreement with the King specified 30 *mnai* per ship. The formal agreement was not concerned with daily wages. Nevertheless, Weiser imagines that Cyrus was required to pay Lysander's men in Attic tetradrachms.

The coins that have encouraged Weiser to adopt the mercenary pay theory had previously been assigned to the eastern Mediterranean.[7] They carry the customary Athenian types, profile head of Athena/owl, but they are marked with Aramaic letters, usually a single letter on each coin, and with very small animal or human designs. Letters and designs are placed near the owl's foot or on Athena's cheek. Single letters are *aleph*, *kaph*, and *shin*; one of the designs is the head of a bearded man wearing a dentate crown, while another, a 'youthful', beardless male, wears the Perso-Median tiara. According to Weiser, the *aleph* stands for Artaxerxes, the *kaph* for Cyrus, and the

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[4] See Mørkholm (1974) pl. i.7.

[5] Compare the tiarate head on the 'Tissaphernes' coin, Jenkins (1972a) fig. 218, with the head of Athena on the Athenian tetradrachm, fig. 158.

[6] Weiser (1989) 267–78.

[7] Nicolet-Pierre (1986).

shin for '*hshathrapana hshathrapanam*' ('satrap of satraps'), which he seems to believe was a royal title. The minuscule heads, Weiser claims, are portraits, and he identifies the bearded, crowned head as Darius II and the youthful head as Cyrus. He concludes that the coins were minted by Cyrus when he was satrap at Sardis (407–401). Weiser's only evidence for a date and place of minting is his own association of the coins with Cyrus, and that, in turn, depends on the notion that Cyrus was under an obligation to pay for the fleet in Attic coins.

Weiser's imitation tetradrachms would be more at home in the eastern Mediterranean where they were originally assigned. Eastern imitations seem to have begun when the supply of genuine tetradrachms acquired through trade was severely curtailed because of the Peloponnesian War; they proliferated during the fourth century.[8] By the late 340s Artaxerxes III had issued an imitation Attic tetradrachm with his name and the title 'Pharaoh' in demotic.[9] It is generally agreed that this coin must have been connected with his successful personal efforts to recover Egypt. Sabakes ('Sauiakes', to judge from the coin legend) and Mazakes, the last two satraps of Egypt, followed Artaxerxes' lead, but their names are inscribed in Aramaic. (The two satraps also minted small bronze coins whose types are copied from area mints.)[10] There is also a silver fraction, evidently from the Gaza mint, which carries Athenian types and the Persian name **Mana-pata-* (*mnpt* in Aramaic).[11] These are typical cases of Persian coin issuers following local usage (in this case Egyptian and Palestinian) in their choice of coin types and standard—this practice may be seen again and again in satrapal coins—and have nothing to do with a desire to suit the tastes of the recipients.

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[8] Schlumberger (1953) 22–4.

[9] Mørkholm (1974); Shore (1974).

[10] Nicolet-Pierre (1979); for Sauiakes see Schmitt (1987).

[11] Newell (1938) 53–4, no. 25, and pl. iii.25, suggested the reading *mnpt*. The name could be a compound of *manah-*, 'thinking power, power of will', and *-pata-*, 'protected' (cf. **Arta-pata-*, 'protected by right thought'). The ending *-pata-* frequently becomes -βατης in Greek (**Arta-pata-*/'Αρταβάτης, **Mithra-pata-*//Μιθροβάτης); **Mana-pata-*'s name would be something like Μενοβάτης. Newell's example was found in the Abu Shusheh hoard, which has been given a burial date of ca. 330 (see Thompson, Mørkholm, and Kraay (1973) no. 1507). Name, mint, and approximate date may tempt one to wonder whether this coin has anything to do with the Persian called Batis (Arr., *Anabasis* 2.25.4) or Betis (Curt. 4.6.7) who, along with his Arab mercenaries, attempted to defend Gaza against Alexander in 332.

No one who subscribes to the Greek mercenary theory of Attic imitations has satisfactorily explained why Greek mercenaries would demand to be paid in imitations that, owing to departures from the customary format, could not have passed for genuine Athenian coins. As noted above, the paucity of attested satrapal coins from western Anatolia can best be explained by supposing that the satraps in this area generally used the darics and sigloi that were minted in Sardis. We know well enough that the King's gold darics were used to further the King's policies in the west. For specific pay to Greek mercenaries, we may recall Tissaphernes' offer of a 'daric stater' for each prisoner taken at Iasos (Thuc. 8.28.4) or the gold that Cyrus gave to Clearchus to raise troops (Xen., *Anabasis* 1.1.9). The same must have been true of the King's silver sigloi.

Xenophon has recorded the exchange rate, in 401, of one siglos for seven and a half Attic obols (*Anabasis* 1.5.6), that is, for one drachma and a quarter. Pay for a month (the usual pay period) of 30 drachmas for each man in the Peloponnesian fleet could not have been paid entirely in tetradrachms, but could easily have been paid in sigloi. In Tissaphernes' case, the equivalent of 30 Attic drachmas would have been 24 sigloi. Lysander's smaller obligations (three obols a day subsequently raised to four obols), could have been met with simple divisions of that amount. For his campaign against his brother, Artaxerxes II, Cyrus paid his mercenaries (ten thousand of whom, it should be noted, were Greeks) at the rate of a daric a month. The daric rate could have been paid with 20 sigloi, and when the rate was raised to three hemidarics (not a coin), with 30 sigloi (Xen., *Anabasis* 1.3.21). When food became scarce, the Lydian market that accompanied the expedition charged the troops four sigloi for a *kapithe* of grain (Xen., *Anabasis* 1.5.6), which indicates that sigloi were the coins the troops had on hand. At that point in the expedition, however, many of the coins on hand could have been Cilician staters (each of which was equivalent to two sigloi), thanks to monetary contributions from Cilicia's ruling family (Xen., *Anabasis* 1.2.12, 27). There are no reports that any of Cyrus' ten thousand Greeks refused their pay because they were offered coins on the Persic standard.

'The expectation of early fourth-century mercenaries to be paid in Attic coins' is postulated by T. Figueira, who has accepted Weiser's conjectures as proven fact and supposes that Tissaphernes and Cyrus the Younger were 'compelled by reasons of state . . . to conduct

business in tetradrachms'.[12] However, if Persians had agreed to pay their Greek mercenaries in Attic coins, we would expect to find many satraps minting coins on the Attic standard. But, in fact, the following brief review of satrapal coins whose probable purpose was to meet mercenary payrolls will show that there is not a single instance of deviation from customary local weight standards due to Persian employment of a mint.

For a campaign organized by Artaxerxes II against Evagoras of Salamis, it is said that three hundred thousand troops and three hundred triremes were mustered. These forces set out from Phocaea and Kyme in ca. 382/81 under the joint command of Tiribazus and Orontes (Diod. Sic. 15.2.1–2).[13] The locale suggests that the forces were mainly Greek, and this is confirmed by Isocrates (4.135). After a sea battle off Cyprus in which the Persians were victorious, Tiribazus crossed over to Cilicia and traveled thence up to the King. As a result of his journey, we have a rare example of literary evidence that meshes perfectly with known satrapal coins. For, according to Diodorus (15.4.1–2), Tiribazus brought away two thousand talents for the prosecution of the war. We may envision caravans of pack animals laden with silver wending their way from the royal treasury down to Cilicia. The silver, as we know from the coins themselves, was parcelled out to four Cilician mints—Tarsus, Soli, Mallus, and Issus.[14] The coins issued by those mints were, of course, Cilician staters, that is, double sigloi.

During the 370s satrapal coins were again issued in Cilicia, this time for Pharnabazus, satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia, whom Artaxerxes II twice put in charge of campaigns to recover Egypt. The first campaign was in the mid-380s (Isoc. 4.140), the second a decade later (Diod. Sic. 15.41.1; Plut., *Artaxerxes* 24.1). Considerations of type show that Pharnabazus' coins must belong to the campaign of the 370s.[15] In this second campaign an Athenian, Iphicrates, commanded the Greek mercenary force of twenty thousand men (Diod. Sic. 15.41.3), who were undoubtedly recipients of Pharnabazus' Cilician staters.

[12] Figueira (1998) 532–5.

[13] The date suggested by Beloch (1922 23) 226–8 seems to account for the available evidence in a more satisfactory way than do other proposed solutions.

[14] Babelon (1910) nos. 575–7, 579–82, pl. cvii.12–13, 15, 17–20.

[15] Babelon (1910) nos. 584–7, 594–6, 599, pls. cviii.2–5, 12–13, 15.

In the 360s Datames, who is known to have used mercenary troops (nationality unspecified) in the course of his revolt from the King (Diod. Sic. 15.91.2; Polyaen. 7.21.1), employed Sinope's mint and issued coins on that city's usual Aeginetan standard.[16]

Mazaios, who became satrap of Cilicia and the Trans-Euphratene area at an uncertain date, issued Cilician staters during the third quarter of the fourth century.[17] He also issued dated Phoenician coins from 343 to 333.[18] Mazaios was involved in several military undertakings, but there is not sufficient evidence to decide whether any of his coins were minted for Greek mercenaries.

Toward the end of the Achaemenid period, four Persians—Orontobates, Hydarnes, Mithropastes, and **Tir-ina/-aina*—minted coins with Sinope's types and on Sinope's standard. I have suggested that these coins are to be connected with the Persian counteroffensive against Alexander, which was organized after the battle of Issus.[19] According to Curtius (4.1.34), the generals of Darius who had survived the battle of Issus, and 'all the force that had followed them in their flight', along with Cappadocian and Paphlagonian soldiers, tried to recover Lydia. Thirty thousand Greek mercenaries are said to have fought on the Persian side at Issus (Polyb. 12.18 [*apud* Callisthenes]; Arr., *Anabasis* 2.8.6; Curt. 3.2.9). Some of the mercenaries must have been killed in the battle, some fled with Darius, and others (eight thousand of them) fled to Phoenicia and Egypt (Arr., *Anabasis* 2.11.1–2; 2.13.1–3). It seems likely that the remaining mercenaries would have joined the force described by Curtius.

None of the coins on the above list are on the Attic standard. None of the satrapal coins minted in western Anatolia and noted at

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[16] Babelon (1910) nos. 623–5, pl. cx.13. The Cilician coins assigned to Datames (e.g., Babelon (1910) nos. 602–21, pls. cviii.18–cix.15) are here omitted. The Aramaic legend on the coins cannot be read as Datames or any other Persian name; it seems to stand for Tarkumuwa, a local Anatolian name (see Harrison (1982b) 321–8). Attribution to Datames is based solely on Nepos (*Datames* 35), whose account puts Datames in charge of mustering troops for the Egyptian expedition after Pharnabazus' recall. But not every commander issued coins in connection with an assigned command, and Datames need not have issued any coins in Cilicia.

[17] Babelon (1910) nos. 674–85, pls. cxi.14–20, cxii.1–2; nos. 694–703, pl. cxii.12–22; nos. 709–11, pl. cxiii.5–8.

[18] Babelon (1910) nos. 934–45, pl. cxx.11–17. Interpretation of the dates is that suggested by Leuze (1935) 386–96. Recent interpretations based on the notion that the dates represent Mazaios' 'regnal' years have ignored the Achaemenid custom of dating by the year of the King.

[19] Harrison (1982a).

the beginning of this study are on the Attic standard. Those two lists comprise all certain satrapal issues except for the Attic-weight coins of Sauiakes and Mazakes in Egypt and the Persian named **Mana-pata-* in Gaza, who, as we have seen, simply followed the local custom of minting imitation Athenian coins. Furthermore, there is no doubt that Cyrus the Younger paid his mercenaries with coins on the Persic standard in his expedition of 401.[20]

To judge from the overall picture of satrapal minting, Persian commanders paid mercenaries in whatever coins they could most easily obtain, whether it was the King's coinage from Sardis or the types (more often than not) and standard of a mint that was convenient to a Persian base of operations. The mercenaries were evidently pleased enough with their pay, for they continued to seek employment with Persians down to the time of Alexander. The idea that Greek mercenaries expected pay in Attic coins is refuted by the evidence of the very coins with which the mercenaries were paid.

Is the Image on That Coin Anyone We Know?

The words 'satrapal coin' usually evoke a single image, the profile head of a man wearing the Perso-Median tiara, a soft cap with side and back flaps and a peaked crown that is folded over to one side. The coin type is a curtailed version of a person wearing the Perso-Median field dress familiar from local Anatolian representations of Persians in the so-called 'Graeco-Persian' style.[21] The coin (described above, fig. 11), which was identified by Robinson as a portrait of Tissaphernes, is probably the most famous example, partly because it is artistically impressive and partly because it has been assigned such interesting historical connections.

Owing to the prominence given to the 'tiarate head' coin type by modern commentators,[22] and the invariable identification of the type

[20] Weiser (1989), whose aim was to discover coin portraits, acknowledges the evidence for Cyrus' payments to his mercenaries in Cilician staters or in darics, but suggests (280–1) that Cyrus minted his own Cilician staters (examples on which the Cilician horseman is beardless, i.e., 'youthful') and his own darics (examples on which the archer is beardless) using a portable mint.

[21] The term is used to describe representations of Persians or Persian themes depicted in the styles of Anatolia, which include Greek style.

[22] While working on my dissertation I asked John Graham if I might coin the

as a portrait of its issuer, a distorted view of Persian satrapal coins has emerged. Persians, it is generally imagined, imposed their own likenesses on coins in contravention of the usual western practice of using gods and heroes as coin types. Nothing could be further from the truth. Any survey of coins minted in the names of satraps (thumbing through the appropriate pages of Babelon's *Traité* will do)[23] will reveal, as already noted with respect to Artaxerxes III and his satraps in Egypt, that the majority of satraps followed the customs of the mints that they employed with respect to choice of coin types. This observation alone should be sufficient to cast doubt on the notion of satrapal coin portraits.

On occasion, a mint employed by a Persian satrap would devise a type that it deemed suitable. The figure on winged disc minted in Cilicia for Tiribazus is a good example. The nude deity whose torso rests on the disc is a thoroughly westernized image. Since he is never nude in Achaemenid art, we may be sure that the image was not 'imposed' by a Persian.[24] Similarly, on coins of Pharnabazus issued at Nagidos, the die engraver has transformed the city's own enthroned Aphrodite into a 'Persian' goddess by depicting her with the long braid and full figure of Persian women shown on Graeco-Persian seals; her divinity is assured by the sphinx seated next to her.[25] No Achaemenid representation has been copied here; she is a western creation. Knowing that local mints created their own representations of Persian deities as they imagined them to be, one may begin to suspect that the tiarate head was intended to represent a mythological being.

The possibility of a mythological interpretation is also suggested by the occasional appearance of the tiarate head type in series such as those minted by Phocaea and Lampsacus, whose die engravers seem intent upon depicting every being known from myth or legend. It has been remarked of the example in the Lampsacene series, 'In this divine or mythical company there is a single mortal head,

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term 'tiarate head' as an occasional replacement for the cumbersome description, 'male head wearing Perso-Median tiara'. He turned to his Latin lexicon and, happily, found a single entry for *tiaratus*. Permission was granted.

[23] Or see the catalogue in Harrison (1982b) 466–505.

[24] Babelon (1910) pl. cvii.12–13, 17–20; Kraay (1976) pl. 59.1030.

[25] Babelon (1910) pl. cviii.15; Kraay (1976) pl. 58.1013. For representations of Persian women on seals carved in Anatolia, see Boardman (1970) figs. 879, 880, 891, 903.

that of a satrap wearing a tiara'.[26] But perhaps the tiara wearer is not an exception; perhaps he belongs in mythical company.

And then, just to confuse us further when we think we might have recognized a figure from Persian mythology, we find there are coins for which a clearly Persian design has been borrowed to represent deities who are not Persian. Several 'Persian' images on civic issues of Cilicia are identified by Aramaic legends as 'Nergal' or 'Nergal of Tarsus'.[27] An enthroned figure wearing Persian court dress and an Egyptian crown is identified, again by Aramaic legend, as 'Baal of Tarsus'.[28] Another seated figure wearing Persian dress and a dentate crown is identified, this time in Greek, as 'Zeus'.[29] Images of Persians have not only been perceived as deities, they have been perceived as local, western deities.

Faced with this sort of ambiguity, we may despair of ever discovering the true identities of the tiarate heads on coins. As it happens, however, there are two pieces of evidence, one literary and one artistic, which reinforce the idea of a mythological interpretation and provide a possible answer to the question who is represented on one group of the coins.

The literary evidence is an anecdote related by Polyaenus about the 'Seven Persians' who helped Darius I overthrow the Magi. (According to Darius' own account, inscribed at Behistun, there were six helpers, plus Darius himself, but seven came to be the canonical number in the west.) It was Jan Zahle who first observed that Polyaenus' story could explain an important, but previously overlooked, detail of the headgear worn by some 'Persians' on coins.[30] Polyaenus recounts the following (*Strategemata* 7.11.2):

> Δαρεῖος μέλλων τοῖς μάγοις νύκτωρ ἐπιτίθεσθαι μετὰ τῶν ἑπτὰ Περσῶν, ἵνα ἐν σκότῳ δύναιντο γιγνώσκειν ἀλλήλους, συνεβούλευσε τὸ τιαρόδεσμον, ὅ τῆς κεφαλῆς ὄπισθεν ἀποσφίγγει τὴν τιάραν, αὐτοὺς ἐς μέτωπον περιαγαγεῖν, ἵνα σημεῖον ᾖ [τὸ] ἅμμα τῆς τιάρας (χουμίτρας) ἀπτομένοις τοῦ μετώπου.[31]

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[26] Kraay (1976) 260.

[27] Jenkins (1972b) 98–100, pl. 31.c–d; (1973) 30–4, pl. 1; Mildenberg (1973) 78–80, pl. 28.

[28] Babelon (1910) pl. cxiv.5–6.

[29] Starr (1977) 97 and pl. 16.a.

[30] Zahle (1982) 101–12.

[31] Teubner ed., 1970. The article before ἅμμα appears in only one ms.; χουμίτρας (meaning uncertain) is a gloss.

> Darius was going to attack the Magi by night with the Seven Persians, and in order that they would be able to recognize each other in the dark, he advised that they turn the tiara-band, which fastens the tiara at the back of the head, around to the forehead, so that the tiara's knotted band would be a sign to persons touching the forehead.

Polyaenus is somewhat confused about the article of clothing he is describing, and any translation is bound to reflect his confusion. I have given my own version only because translators have generally overlooked the significance of τὸ ἅμμα as something knotted; the knot is the key to understanding the passage.

Zahle, a fervent supporter of the idea that the tiarate heads depicted on coins are intended to be representations of their issuers, noted that some examples display the very feature Polyaenus describes, a headband knotted just above the forehead 'in a bow-knot resembling a butterfly'; other examples do not have this feature. Zahle conjectured, on the basis of Polyaenus' story, that the Seven and their descendants, and perhaps other high-ranking Persians, were allowed to wear the front-tied headband as a mark of honor.[32]

The second piece of evidence comes from Achaemenid art. The relief sculpture carved above the inscription of Darius I at Behistun shows Darius standing with one foot on a prostrate figure labeled, 'This is Gaumata the Magus'. Nine more defeated enemies stand behind Gaumata. Behind Darius stand two figures wearing Persian dress. One holds a bow and the other a spear (figs. 12 and 13). These men are usually identified as two of Darius' confederates—just which two is subject to dispute because all six confederates are named in the inscription.[33] Both men are bareheaded except for their headbands. Just at the level of each man's forehead, on the side away from the viewer (and visible only in the clearest of photographs), are two small triangular objects, one above and one below each headband, that look for all the world like the wings of butterflies. But, of course, they are not butterflies' wings; they can best be explained as the ends of a headband that has been tied in a tight

[32] Zahle (1982) 104, 108. It was Zahle's aim to show that the tiarate head types minted by Lycian dynasts, most of which do not have the front-tied headband, were representations of their Lycian issuers, not of Persian satraps as is sometimes claimed.

[33] For the story of Gaumata as told by Darius, see Kent (1953) *DB* 1.35–71 on p. 120; *DB* 4.80–6 on p. 132 for Darius' followers; *DB* b on p. 135 for Gaumata's identifying label.

knot, forming a 'butterfly bow'. Owing to the artist's perspective, the knot itself is just out of our sight. It is clear enough, however, that the headbands have been tied in a knot above the forehead.[34]

The images of Darius' colleagues on the Behistun relief show that Polyaenus' description of the unusual manner in which the Seven tied their headbands had an historical basis. Furthermore, it is evident, as Zahle observed, that there is a connection between the story of Darius' confederates and the coin representations that display the front-tied headband. But Zahle's conjecture that certain Persians were permitted to tie their headbands in this special way in recognition of their distinguished ancestry should not be necessary as an explanation of the coin type. It seems more likely that the coin images were directly inspired by the story of the seven Persians who overthrew the Magi, which, in versions that differed in some details, was well known in the west (e.g., Hdt. 3.76–9). Long before the image appeared on coins, the Seven had become legendary heroes, which made them suitable subjects for coin types in the western part of the empire.

The Behistun representations are significant for our analysis of the coin type because they indicate that somewhere along the way, before the first appearance of the coin image, details of the story later recounted by Polyaenus had been altered to suit the western perception that Persians engaged in a military activity would have worn their 'field dress', which included the tiara. This alteration is reflected in the coin image that western die engravers later created. The image was surely not 'imposed' by any Persian, for the Persian version of a story about Darius' colleagues and their front-tied headbands would have put the headbands around bare heads, just as they are shown in the Behistun sculpture. Like the deity on winged disc minted for Tiribazus or the Persian goddess for Pharnabazus, both of whom must have represented notions current in the western provinces about the physical appearance of Persian deities, the tiarate heads with front-tied headbands would seem to be a western interpretation of the way certain Persian heroes would have looked.

Polyaenus' anecdote about the Seven Persians and the evidence of the Behistun relief provide strong support for the idea that the

[34] The clearest photographs are in Luschey (1968) pls. 35–6 for the individual figures, which Luschey identifies as Gobryas and Intaphernes(?); pl. 27 for the two figures together; pl. 26 for the entire relief. Root (1979) 186, describes the headbands as 'embroidered fillet[s] tied at the forehead'.

tiarate head coin types need not be identified as portraits of living coin issuers. At the very least it seems likely that the examples that display the headband tied in a bow above the forehead represent men who had long since become heroes of legend, well known in both east and west.

The major coins that show the tiara encircled by a headband tied in a 'butterfly bow' above the forehead are as follows:

1. The coin discussed above (fig. 11). Obverse: tiarate head; reverse: owl, as on Athenian coins, legend *ΒΑΣ*; weight equivalent to an Attic tetradrachm.[35]
2. Obverse: tiarate head; reverse: kithara, legend *ΒΑΣΙΛ*; Rhodian weight (fig. 14).[36]
3. Obverse: tiarate head; reverse: running archer with spear as on darics and sigloi, Sidonian-style galley as symbol in field, legend *ΒΑΣΙΛΕΩ[Σ]*; Rhodian weight (fig. 15).[37]
4. Obverse: tiarate head, legend *ΦΑΡΝΑΒΑ*; reverse: prow of war-ship with seated griffin on bow screen, in field: dolphins, tunny (symbol of Cyzicus); mixed weights, Rhodian and 'Milesian' (fig. 16).[38]
5. Obverse: tiarate head; reverse: punch mark; Phocaean *hekte*.[39]

The strong suspicion that these images are not portraits of living persons should bring into question the most popular basis for identification of 'Persian' issuers whose names are not inscribed on their presumed coins. The issuers of the first three coins on the list, the group inscribed only as 'of the king', have customarily been identified by comparing their facial features with the Pharnabazus coin. Thus the images on coins (1) and (2), with owl and kithara reverse types, respectively, were identified as Tissaphernes because they did not look like Pharnabazus. The identification of the image on coin (3) has been disputed, with some favoring Pharnabazus and others Tissaphernes.[40] These coins should be freed from identifications made by comparing noses or head shapes and allowed to await the evidence for date and place of minting which may come from future

[35] Kraay (1976) pl. 12.206; Kraay and Hirmer (1966) no. 621.
[36] Kraay (1976) pl. 55.949; Kraay and Hirmer (1966) no. 622.
[37] Kraay (1976) pl. 55.950; Kraay and Hirmer (1966) no. 623.
[38] Kraay (1976) pl. 55.951; Kraay and Hirmer (1966) no. 718.
[39] Bodenstedt (1976) with pl. 2.14.
[40] For the long and involved history of identifications, see Robinson (1948) 50–2.

hoards. The use of the legend *ΒΑΣΙΛΕΩΣ* suggests that the coins were minted for a particular king, not a satrap, and we might expect that king to have been personally involved in the activity for which they were minted.

The coin inscribed *ΦΑΡΝΑΒΑ* should be retired from use as a means of identifying other coin images. In any case, it is not certain whether it was issued for the well known satrap, as is usually supposed, or for his like-named grandson, who was active in north-western Anatolia before and after Alexander's expedition.[41]

As for the image on the Phocaean *hekte*, which is sometimes identified as a portrait of the satrap Orontes,[42] it should be allowed to join the company of mythical beings who grace Phocaea's varied and imaginative series. It need not be connected with any Persian coin issuer.

I am grateful to the editors for their thoughtfulness and patience and especially for giving me the opportunity to express my thanks to John Graham. Long ago John rescued me from a faltering dissertation about the Achaemenid west by suggesting that I 'look at the coins'. His suggestion was a wonderful gift, for the coins have never ceased to be fascinating. But that was only part of the gift, for, in all the years since, he has never ceased giving generously of his time, advice, and encouragement. This paper, which will seem familiar to him because much of it is borrowed from my dissertation, is a very small token of my gratitude.

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[41] The artistic style and mixed weights of the coins favor the younger Pharnabazus. For fluctuation in the weights of Cyzicus' coins after 340, see Le Rider (1963) 545.
[42] Bodenstedt (1976) 74.

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Figure 11. Obverse: tiarate head; reverse: owl, as on Athenian coins, legend *ΒΑΣ*; weight equivalent to an Attic tetradrachm. Courtesy of the British Museum

Figure 12. Relief of Darius I at Behistun, detail: first figure behind Darius. After H. Luschey, *AMI* N.F. 1 (1968), pl. 36. Courtesy of the Deutsches Archäologisches Institut, Eurasien-Abteilung

Figure 13. Relief of Darius I at Behistun, detail: second figure behind Darius. After H. Luschey, *AMI* N.F. 1 (1968), pl. 35. Courtesy of the Deutsches Archäologisches Institut, Eurasien-Abteilung

Figure 14. Obverse: tiarate head; reverse: kithara, legend *ΒΑΣΙΛ*. Courtesy of the British Museum

Figure 15. Obverse: tiarate head; reverse: running archer and galley, legend *ΒΑΣΙΛΕΩ[Σ]*. Cast from Newell Collection. Courtesy of the American Numismatic Society

Figure 16. Obverse: tiarate head, legend *[ΦΑΡ]ΝΑΒΑ*; reverse: prow of warship. Courtesy of the British Museum

WHAT ATHENIAN FORTIFICATIONS WERE DESTROYED IN 404 BC?

David H. Conwell

As the Peloponnesian War drew to a close early in 404 BC, Athens' enemies blockaded Piraeus, the city's main port. In March of that year, reduced to starvation, the Athenians formally capitulated.[1] Some weeks later, Lysander sailed into Piraeus to supervise the destruction of parts of the Athenian fortification system in accordance with the peace terms dictated by the Spartans.[2] While it is clear from the numerous ancient accounts that Athenian fortification walls were demolished in 404, there is substantial disagreement among the ancient reports as to which walls exactly were destroyed.

Generally, modern opinion follows Thucydides and Xenophon, who report the demolition of the Long Walls and the circuit wall of Piraeus only. It is often forgotten, however, that many ancient sources, including Lysias, Andocides, Plutarch, and Pausanias, identify the walls in question differently. Moreover, well-known modern scholars from Lenschau to Bengtson to Knigge, who hold that the Athenian city wall was destroyed in 404, reflect certain of the alternative accounts but remain unchallenged. The lack of uniformity in the ancient tradition and the continuing disagreement among modern scholars demand a thorough examination of the evidence. A full review of the ancient and modern evidence demonstrates that Thucydides and Xenophon provide our most accurate evidence. In 404, the Spartans razed the Long Walls and the enceinte of Piraeus, while they left Athens' city wall in place.

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[1] On dating the surrender in March, see Munro (1937) 32, 37; Gomme (1945–81) 4.12.

[2] Plutarch (*Lysander* 15.1) dates Lysander's arrival specifically to the sixteenth of Mounychion. Normally assigned to late April in modern terms (e.g., Munro (1937) 32; Gomme (1945–81) 4.12; Green (1991) 2, 4), that date on the ancient calendar could actually have fallen up to a few weeks earlier (Krentz (1982) 32 n. 8; (1989) 188–9).

Ancient Accounts

Xenophon reports the terms of the peace that ended the Peloponnesian War:[3]

> The Lacedaemonians . . . offered to make peace on these conditions: that the Athenians should destroy the long walls and the walls of Piraeus, surrender all their ships except twelve, allow their exiles to return, count the same people friends and enemies as the Lacedaemonians did, and follow the Lacedaemonians both by land and sea wherever they should lead the way.[4]

Thucydides, in his 'second introduction', states that he wrote the history of the Peloponnesian War in chronological order,

> Up to the time when the Lacedaemonians and their allies put an end to the dominion of the Athenians and took the Long Walls and Peiraeus.[5]

Following these ancient statements, most modern scholars believe that the Long Walls and the circuit wall surrounding Piraeus were torn down by the Spartans in 404.[6]

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[3] For the peace terms, see Bengtson (1975) 153–5 no. 211; Green (1991) 5–6. For the stages in the conclusion of the peace, see Munro (1937) *passim*; Krentz (1982) 28–43.

[4] Xen., *Hellenica* 2.2.20 (this translation by Brownson is published in the Loeb Classical Library, as are all translations provided in this paper). Accounts that agree with Xenophon include Lys. 13.14; Diod. Sic. 13.107.4, 14.85.2; Plut., *Lysander* 14.8. Contrary to the Loeb translation, Xenophon (as also Plutarch) actually refers only to 'destroying Piraeus'. Similarly oblique references to Piraeus' circuit wall appear in Thucydides (1.93.3, 5.26.1); the cited passages in Lysias and Diodorus prove clearly that Xenophon is referring to Piraeus' circuit. Additionally, while the Athenians had built three Long Walls during the mid-fifth century (two running from Athens and Piraeus, one from Athens to Phaleron), no reference to destruction of the Long Walls actually specifies which of these three structures were involved. Even so, since the Phaleric Wall was out of use by the end of the Peloponnesian War (Xen., *Hellenica* 2.2.3), the Spartans must have destroyed the two Athens-Piraeus Long Walls (see Conwell (1992) 103–10).

[5] Thuc. 5.26.1 (trans. Smith). Note that the verb *katelabon*, here translated 'took', might better be rendered 'destroyed', while the fact that Piraeus was 'taken' means specifically that the city's circuit wall was demolished. Further references to the destruction of the Long Walls and Piraeus' fortification wall include: Xen., *Hellenica* 2.2.23, 3.11; Diod. Sic. 14.85.2; Plut., *Lysander* 15.5. Xenophon and Plutarch refer simply to 'the walls', but each passage almost directly follows one which identifies the walls specifically as the Long Walls and Piraeus' circuit (Xen., *Hellenica* 2.2.20 [quoted above]; Plut., *Lysander* 14.8).

[6] Citing every instance of this widely held view would be pointless; for examples spanning different periods and types of scholarship, see Wachsmuth (1874) 574; Underhill (1900) 325; Judeich (1931) 81; Maier (1959) 21; Boersma (1970) 155 no. 9,

There exist, however, many ancient accounts that document the destruction differently. These describe the razing of the following Athenian fortifications in 404:

(1) the Long Walls (only)[7]
(2) Piraeus' circuit (only)[8]
(3) Athens' circuit[9]
(4) the circuits of both Athens and Piraeus[10]
(5) 'the walls'[11]

Oddly, at least at first glance, some of these references are made by authors whose testimony elsewhere concerning the peace terms and the actual dismantling of walls is generally considered reliable. In any event, it is possible to clarify the situation by examining closely the immediate context of each passage as well as the overall purpose(s) of the work in which each appears. In most instances, the authors' reports of the peace terms and the immediate results of Athens' loss to Sparta in the Peloponnesian War are vague and/or selective.[12] Since Athenian orators provide many of the *testimonia* listed

156 no. 11; Garlan (1974) 49; Wycherley (1978) 19; Hammond (1986) 418; Garland (1987) 32–3; Kagan (1987) 410–11; Andrewes (1992) 496; Meier (1993) 581–2; Munn (1993) 115–16, 152; Edwards (1995) 106; Pomeroy, et al. (1999) 319; Orrieux-Pantel (1999) 164; Lawall (2000) 84 n. 146.

[7] Strabo 9.1.15, 14.2.9; App., *Punica* 87.409; Plut., *Alcibiades* 37.5; Arr., *Anabasis* 1.9.3; Paus. 1.2.2 (almost certainly a reference to the Long Walls [see below]); Just. 5.8.5.

[8] Lys. 12.40 (Piraeus plus garrisons around Attica), 70; cf. Dio Chrys., *Orationes* 64.16.

[9] Xen., *Hellenica* 5.1.35; Lys. 12.63; Andoc. 3.38–9; Plut., *Lysander* 14.9–10.

[10] Nep., *Conon* 4.5.

[11] Lys. 12.40, 68, 13.15, 34, 46, 16.4, 18.5, 34.3–4; Andoc. 1.80, 101, 3.11–12, 31, 39; Isoc. 7.64, 15.319, 16.40, 20.11; Pl., *Menexenus* 244c; Lycurg. 15.61; Aesch. 2.77; Polyb. 38.2.6; Diod. Sic. 14.3.2, 6; Dion. Hal. 11.1.3; Plut., *Lysander* 15.1–5; D. Chrys., *Orationes* 13.25; Aristid. 1.252, 11.44, 12.9, 12.16, 25.65 (ed. Lenz-Behr), with schol. ad 1.252, 266, 278; Thom. Mag., *Hyper ateleias* 148 (ed. Lenz); cf. Isoc. 14.40; Pl., *Menexenus* 245e; Dem. 18.96; Aristid. 12.29 (ed. Lenz-Behr); Just. 6.5.8–10. Some of these sources qualify their references to 'the walls' as those of the *polis* or *patris*. Neither of these terms, however, has any necessarily specific connotations, as would, e.g., the word *asty*, referring to the capital city of a *polis*; on the usage of the term *polis*, see Musiolek (1981).

[12] Lys. 12.40, 70, 13.15, 34, 46, 16.4, 18.5, 34.4; Andoc. 1.80, 101, 3.11–12, 31, 39; Isoc. 7.64, 15.319, 16.40, 20.11; Pl., *Menexenus* 244c; Lycurg. 15.61; Aesch. 2.77; Polyb. 38.2.6; Diod. Sic. 14.3.2, 6; Strabo 9.1.15; Dion. Hal. 11.1.3; Plut., *Alcibiades* 37.5, *Lysander* 15.1–5; Dio Chrys., *Orationes* 13.25; Arr., *Anabasis* 1.9.3; App., *Punica* 87.409; Aristid. 1.252, 12.9, 12.16, 25.65 (ed. Lenz-Behr), with schol. ad 1.252, 266, 278; Just. 5.8.5; Thom. Mag., *Hyper ateleias* 148 (ed. Lenz). Cf. Lys. 12.68, 34.3; Isoc. 14.40; Pl., *Menexenus* 245e; Dem. 18.96; Aristid. 1.267, 11.44, 12.29 (ed. Lenz-Behr).

here and also lived through the events of 404, let us consider their evidence initially.

One finds in Lysias a typically imprecise and selective reference to Sparta's demolition of Athenian fortifications. In a speech written for the prosecution of Agoratus, who had been associated with the Thirty, Lysias states that the arrest and imprisonment of men denounced to the oligarchs by the defendant occurred at the same time as did the catastrophic events at the end of the Peloponnesian War:

> For it was just when those persons had been arrested and imprisoned that Lysander sailed into your harbours, that your ships were surrendered to the Lacedaemonians, that the walls were demolished, that the Thirty were established, and that every conceivable misery befell the city.[13]

While the events listed here do reflect the content of the peace terms, some elements of that settlement are missing, such as the provision requiring the return of the exiles. Moreover, the episode is presented in the broadest terms. Thus, just as Lysias glosses over the fact that not all of Athens' fleet was surrendered to Lysander, he neglects to specify exactly which walls were destroyed. Although Lysias knew precisely which walls had been demolished,[14] winning over the jury did not require that he offer detailed evidence here; in fact, an excess of historical precision might have drowned the listener in superfluous factual data.[15]

Plutarch's biography of Alcibiades provides another typical example of an imprecise and selective passage concerning the 404 destruction at Athens. According to Plutarch, after the Athenian generals at Aegospotami had ignored Alcibiades' advice in 405,

> Lysander suddenly and unexpectedly fell upon [the Athenians], and only eight of their triremes escaped with Conon; the rest, something less than two hundred, were captured and taken away. Three thou-

[13] Lys. 13.34 (trans. Lamb).

[14] Lys. 13.14.

[15] Speaking in general terms allowed Lysias to exploit fully the symbolism of Athens' ships and walls (on which, cf. Seager (1994) 101; Edwards (1995) 110–11). The city's fleet and fortifications had been the Empire's physical foundation, so that their loss (or, to be exact, the loss of substantial portions of both), powerfully symbolized Athens' imperial failure and consequent defenselessness. We may safely assume that Lysias, in a case against a close associate of those Athenians who had benefited from the catastrophic loss of the Empire, will have exploited such obvious imagery.

> sand of their crews were taken alive and executed by Lysander. In a short time he also captured Athens, burned her ships, and tore down her Long Walls.[16]

Since our sources customarily list the destruction of the Long Walls together with that of Piraeus' circuit, Plutarch's failure to do so here is, on the face of it, striking. Yet the omission is hardly problematic when one recognizes how much is missing from this cursory list of the Peloponnesian War's final stages. Plutarch mentions the destruction of ships in 404 but says nothing about the fact that Athens was actually left with a small fleet, nor does he convey the details of Athens' capture. As a biographer, Plutarch here does not simply narrate the events of the period. Rather, by listing selected results of the generals' failure to heed advice that might have averted an immediate disaster and—at least—delayed the final defeat of Athens, Plutarch magnifies Alcibiades' military genius.[17]

Several vague accounts of the destruction of walls in 404 involve the trickery by means of which Themistocles enabled the construction of Athens' city wall in 479.[18] Attacking his enemies among the Thirty, Eratosthenes and Theramenes, Lysias asserts the following:

> Why, I suppose, if he [sc. Eratosthenes] had been in the government with Themistocles he would have been loud in claiming that he worked for the construction of the walls, when he claims that he worked with Theramenes for their demolition! For I do not see that there is any parity of merit between them. The one constructed the walls against the wish of the Lacedaemonians, whereas the other demolished them by beguilement of the citizens.[19]

Since Theramenes is here credited with destroying the wall (in 404) that Themistocles had built (in 479), the passage might suggest that Theramenes destroyed the Athenian circuit.[20] Nevertheless, the con-

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[16] Plut., *Alcibiades* 37.5 (trans. Perrin).

[17] On Plutarch's view of Alcibiades as a brilliant (if morally objectionable) general, see Russell (1973) 110, 123, 125, 129.

[18] Lys. 12.63; Andoc. 3.38–9; Plut., *Lysander* 14.9–10. For Themistocles' ruse, see Thuc. 1.90.3–93.2. According to Thuc. 1.89.3, work began immediately after the Persians' retreat following the Battle of Plataea in late summer 479; the project could conceivably have continued into 478.

[19] Lys. 12.63 (trans. Lamb).

[20] Alternatively, the passage attributes the Long Walls and Piraeus' circuit to Themistocles (in fact, as is clear from Thuc. 1.93.3–6, he had been responsible for the latter). On associating Themistocles with the Long Walls, see Conwell (1992) 80–101.

text—a speech delivered by Lysias himself condemning an enemy of both the speaker and the State—suggests another explanation. Surely the orator Lysias overlooks historical exactitude so as to construct a symmetrical passage comparing the traitor unfavorably to a great hero of the past.[21] Lysias' usage is vague at best, equating as 'the walls' different parts of a fortification system that the Athenians divided into distinct sections, at least when accuracy counted.[22] At worst, seeking to persuade his audience, Lysias consciously commits the error of associating Theramenes with the construction of the Athenian city wall, just the sort of factual manipulation that is typical of Attic oratory.[23]

Two other passages can be grouped with Lysias' attack on Eratosthenes and Theramenes.[24] Andocides delivered his *De pace* in support of a peace treaty that he himself had helped negotiate in 392/91. In the speech, the orator recalls how Athens' walls were built without Spartan knowledge (i.e., under Themistocles' leadership) and then later seized by the Spartans (at the end of the Peloponnesian War). In other words, Andocides suggests that the walls destroyed in 404 were identical to those built by Themistocles, i.e., the Athenian city wall. Arguing in favor of his own handiwork, Andocides—like Lysias—would be prepared to subordinate accuracy of historical detail to convincing argumentation. Thus, in this conveniently symmetrical passage, Andocides, like Lysias at 12.63, is guilty of either vagueness or falsification. In fact, since *De pace* is 'notable for its reckless mistakes about fairly recent history',[25] it is quite possible that Andocides is more than just imprecise with his terminology. Plutarch provides

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[21] On Lysias' willingness to manipulate the facts in his pursuit of rhetorical symmetry, see Nouhaud (1982) 219, 357.

[22] See Thuc. 2.13.7; *IG* 2^2.463.2–3, 37, 53–4, 69–70; cf. Andoc. 1.45.

[23] See Murray (1986) 198; Hornblower (1994) 13; Edwards (1995) 3 (remarking that, with respect to historical events, the orators 'are biased and selective in the details they provide, and may simply be lying and deceitful'); Krentz (1995) 6; cf. Dover (1968) 55, 71. Thus, however full of historical information the orators' speeches may be, as Edwards (loc. cit.) notes concerning Andocides, the orators' speeches should only supplement—not outweigh—the narratives of observers like Thucydides and Xenophon. For a definition of oratory which accurately emphasizes the centrality of persuasion, see Dover (1968) 175.

[24] Andoc. 3.38–9. For further discussion of both this passage and Lys. 12.63, see Conwell (1992) 86–93.

[25] Hornblower (1994) 13; see also the similar condemnation by Edwards (1995) 194 (ad Andoc. 3.3–12).

a third reference to Themistocles' secret fortification project.[26] In a passage probably dependent ultimately on Lysias 12.63,[27] Plutarch's account juxtaposes Theramenes and Themistocles so as to suggest the Athenian circuit was destroyed in 404. Judging by the all-too-neat symmetry of this rhetorical anecdote, its author's interest in the story[28] seems to have gotten the better of him.[29]

A few accounts which appear to differ from those stating that the Long Walls and Piraeus' wall were destroyed in 404 can be explained on the basis of their authors' subject matter.[30] Remarking on the sights one sees upon leaving Piraeus, Pausanias states the following:

> As you go up from the Peiraeus you see the ruins of the walls which Conon restored after the naval battle off Cnidus. For those built by Themistocles after the retreat of the Persians were destroyed during the rule of those named the Thirty.[31]

Pausanias does not specifically label the walls in question, but he must be referring to the Long Walls since he is explicitly concerned at this point with the area between Athens and Piraeus.[32] That he does not mention the destruction of Piraeus' city wall is simply a function of his subject matter; that wall is simply not relevant at this point in Pausanias' description of local landmarks.

Scattered references to the razing of walls in 404 are either erroneous or simply too late to threaten the scenario established by sources closer in time to the actual destruction. Strabo's statement that the Spartans destroyed the Long Walls is not relevant since he confused the walls of Piraeus with the Long Walls.[33] Nepos and Justin, although perhaps indebted partly to Ephorus and Theopompus respectively,[34] are Roman-period authors who cannot stand comparison

[26] Plut., *Lysander* 14.9–10. For a fuller discussion of this passage, see Conwell (1992) 95–7.

[27] Peseley (1989) 33.

[28] Peseley (1989) 33–4 attributes this passage to Hermippus of Smyrna, an author who, writing ca. 200 BC, 'provided an ample supply of gossip, often scurrilous, by fabricating on a grand scale'.

[29] Cf. Lewis (1992) 9.

[30] Paus. 1.2.2; Just. 5.9.12; cf. Dio Chrys., *Orationes* 64.16.

[31] Paus. 1.2.2 (trans. Jones).

[32] See also Conwell (1992) 97–8. This testimony therefore implies that Themistocles built the Long Walls, an issue discussed by Conwell (1992) 80–101.

[33] Strabo 14.2.9.

[34] Shrimpton (1991) 121, 129; Hornblower (1994) 12, 18.

to our best evidence.[35] Nepos wrote for an audience less interested in accurate data or considered judgment than interesting anecdotes,[36] while Justin, whose historical deficiencies are universally recognized, was 'more interested in rhetorical flourish than keeping the historical record straight'.[37] Finally, it is hardly necessary to refute a late, vague, and anonymous scholiastic reference to the destruction of the Athenians' walls.[38]

The alternative accounts of what was destroyed at Athens in 404, then, are either vague, not meant to be comprehensive, or problematic. Returning to the statements by Thucydides, Xenophon, and others concerning both the walls named in the peace terms and the identity of the fortifications that were actually destroyed (see above p. 322), it is necessary to consider whether or not these are rightly considered authoritative.

Generally, Thucydides is recognized as the most able and most conscientious historian of ancient times, one for whom factual accuracy was essential.[39] This alone might establish his account as preferable to all others, yet there is more specific support for his version of the destruction. The demilitarization of Athens' walls in 404 was a devastating blow to Thucydides' own city, one which he himself might have witnessed. Moreover, he believed that the event marked the end of a great conflict that had shaken Greece to its foundations for twenty-seven years.[40] Given the event's prominence in his view of both the big picture and his own homeland, surely Thucydides will have been careful to report it as accurately as he could.

Xenophon confirms Thucydides' report about the 404 destruction at Athens. In continuing Thucydides' history of the Peloponnesian War, Xenophon must have possessed at least a general familiarity with that work.[41] Even so, in view of his clumsy handling of mat-

[35] Nep., *Conon* 4.5; Just. 6.5.8–10. Neither Ephorus nor Theopompus, in any event, is necessarily a better source than Xenophon. Though seemingly dependent on the Oxyrhynchus Historian, who is more reliable than Xenophon (see references below), Ephorus is known to have treated the facts liberally so as to suit his general aims (Murray (1986) 198–9), while Theopompus' *Hellenica* relied heavily on Xenophon's work of the same name (Shrimpton (1991) 12; Lewis (1992) 9).

[36] Conte (1994) 223.

[37] Yardley (1997) 17.

[38] Schol. ad Aristid. 1.267 (ed. Lenz-Behr).

[39] See Thuc. 1.22.2, with Cawkwell (1979) 30, 43; Lewis (1992) 5; Cartwright (1997) 3–4.

[40] Thuc. 5.26.1.

[41] Contra Henry (1967) 14–54. See Anderson (1974) 64; Gomme (1945–81) 5.437–44; Dillery (1995) 14, 25.

ters related to those already discussed by Thucydides,[42] one doubts that Xenophon was mining his predecessor's account for specific information. More likely, as an Athenian contemporary of the events in question who relied principally on what he himself saw and heard,[43] Xenophon presents us with the results of his own observations. While he was capable of factual inaccuracy,[44] in this instance Xenophon was unquestionably well placed to get the facts straight. He could have witnessed the destruction of fortifications in 404 and, like Andocides,[45] probably saw the actual treaty—one of the most notorious documents in Athenian history—on public display. Indeed, Xenophon's account of the terms is confirmed by Plutarch, who quotes—in Doric Greek—from the actual decree of the Spartan ephors.[46] As well, Xenophon believed that the razing of Athenian walls made manifest the downfall of Athenian imperialism.[47] Thus, as was true for Thucydides, the event was of such importance for Xenophon that he must have based his thesis on the facts that he considered most reliable.[48]

In addition to all this, another source for the destruction in 404 confirms the evidence of Thucydides and Xenophon. Diodorus agrees not only with Xenophon about the inclusion of the Long Walls and Piraeus' circuit in the peace terms but also with Thucydides that these walls were actually destroyed.[49] The tradition preserved in Diodorus derives ultimately from the Oxyrhynchus Historian, the key source for Diodorus' thirteenth and fourteenth books.[50] This

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42 Anderson (1974) 62–4; Cawkwell (1979) 30–1.

43 Cawkwell (1979) 22–33; Krentz (1995) 5.

44 Anderson (1974) 2, 8; Cawkwell (1979) 15–17; Krentz (1989) 9; Lewis (1992) 8; Tuplin (1998) 782.

45 Andoc. 3.12.

46 Plut., *Lysander* 14.8. Green (1991) 5 defends Plutarch's report against those (e.g., Peseley (1986) 33 n. 7) who doubt its validity; see also Ste. Croix (1972) 343 n. 2.

47 Xen., *Hellenica* 2.2.23.

48 In his fifth book, Xenophon does appear to contradict his earlier statements recording the destruction of the Long Walls and Piraeus' circuit in 404 (*Hellenica* 2.2.20, 23, 3.11). At *Hellenica* 5.1.35, he remarks that the King's Peace of 387 between the Spartans, Athenians, and their allies was 'the first since the outbreak of the war which followed the destruction of the walls of Athens [in 404]' (trans. Brownson). Since this account belongs to the second part of Xenophon's history and was therefore written in the 350s, it is best understood as a careless or simply vague reference of the sort discussed above, one which was written long after the first part of the work (1–2.3.10). On the two-stage composition of the *Hellenica*, see Cawkwell (1979) 17–28; Dillery (1995) 12–15; Krentz (1995) 4–5.

49 Diod. Sic. 13.107.4, 14.85.2.

50 Cawkwell (1979) 16; Lewis (1992) 8; Hornblower (1994) 10; Buckley (1996) 9.

author, who continued Thucydides' unfinished work,[51] will have read Thucydides 5.26.1,[52] but his work was independent of (and preferable to) that of Xenophon.[53] This corroboration of the most attractive ancient testimony for the destruction of walls at Athens in 404 leaves little doubt as to what precisely was demolished. The Spartans pulled down the Long Walls and Piraeus' circuit—no more and no less.

Modern Opinion

Just as ancient authors describe the 404 destruction of fortifications variously, there is likewise disagreement in modern times as to exactly which walls were razed at the end of the Peloponnesian War. Many scholars accept the scenario described by the best ancient testimony, which has been defended immediately above, but a different belief persists, as it has for many years now. Some scholars—including expert students of Athenian topography such as Lenschau, Travlos, Hoepfner, and Knigge—believe that the city wall of Athens itself was partially or completely destroyed.[54] Although those who hold this view typically do not substantiate their point, it is apparent that neither direct archaeological evidence nor ancient written sources play a role in their reasoning.[55] In fact, the view is fundamentally

[51] Bruce (1967) 2–4; Shrimpton (1991) 13, 183–4; Lewis (1992) 8.

[52] That the Oxyrhynchus Historian read and used Thucydides' history of the Peloponnesian War is clear from the reference in the Florence papyrus to Thucydides' discussion (8.28.5–55.3) of Pedaritus' activities at Chios (*Hell. Oxy.* 5 [ed. Chambers]) and his use of a system of dating by summers and winters which parallels that of Thucydides but is otherwise highly unusual in ancient Greek historiography. On these and other possible indications, see Bloch (1940) 308–16; Bruce (1967) 3, 5, 6–9, 19–20, 31–3, 50, 115–16.

[53] Bruce (1967) 5; Cawkwell (1979) 22; Hornblower (1994) 10; Buckley (1996) 9, 10.

[54] Lenschau (1937) 74; Travlos (1960) 50; Hoepfner (1976) 112; Bengtson (1977) 252; Connor (1985) 97; Spathari (1985) 21; Kagan (1987) 412; Knigge (1988) 36, 50; Travlos (1988) 344; von Eickstedt (1991) 277; Freeman (1999) 213–14. Occasionally modern sources mention only the Long Walls when discussing the peace terms and/or the destruction in 404 (Lamb (1930) xiii [but cf. xxiii]; Krentz (1982) 16–17 [but cf. 40–1]; Hammond (1986) 418; Rusten (1989) 120; Starr (1991) 346; Luce (1997) 100; Schwenk (1997) 9, cf. 13–15).

[55] While it is clear that Lenschau, Travlos, Hoepfner, and Knigge believe that the city wall around Athens was destroyed in 404, other apparent references to the destruction of that wall may simply result from the imprecise usage of terms like *city wall* and *Stadtmauer*. Paralleling the ancient imprecision of Lysias, Andocides, and Plutarch already described, this sort of vagueness probably explains some or all of the references by Connor, Spathari, Kagan, and Freeman, cited in the previous note.

hypothetical, based on what the Spartans 'must' have intended in 404 and, perhaps, the posited restoration of the Athenian city wall during the later 390s.

It is simplest to deal initially with the evidence that is *not* employed to support the minority view of the destruction of Athenian walls in 404. Archaeology offers no support, because there is no known physical evidence of damage to the city wall of Athens at the end of the fifth century.[56] It would, however, be possible to enlist the opinion of ancient authors, for some state specifically that the city wall of Athens was demolished at the end of Peloponnesian War. Alternatively, the vague statements of some ancient authors, if read carelessly, might suggest this same conclusion.[57] In any event, modern scholars cite none of these written sources to support the assertion that Athens' own wall was torn down in 404, a circumstance that ought to mean that they do not admit that evidence. In fact, Lenschau and Hoepfner accept written testimony about the 404 destruction that, as they themselves recognize, does *not* refer to the Athenian city wall.[58]

Among those who believe in the 404 destruction, Lenschau does attempt to justify his thinking.[59] He finds that the Spartans cannot possibly have allowed the city of their defeated archenemy to remain protected by a fully functional circuit wall. A historical argument based on nothing more than 'common sense', this belief contradicts the ancient evidence about Sparta's intentions in 404. While some in Corinth and Thebes favored destroying Athens and enslaving her citizens,[60] the Spartans did not take this view.[61] Perhaps it was hoped that Athens, as a weakened but surviving puppet state of Sparta, would counter the power of Corinth and Thebes.[62]

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[56] Judith Binder, whose encyclopedic grasp of Athenian topography is without parallel, states that she knows of 'no excavator or observer who has ever detected any signs of destruction [of the Athenian circuit] in 404 BC' (personal communication, 26 March 2000).

[57] See Garlan (1974) 49 n. 2.

[58] Lenschau (1937) 74 (following Lysias and Xenophon); Hoepfner (1976) 112 with n. 138 (after Xenophon).

[59] Lenschau (1937) 74.

[60] Xen., *Hellenica* 2.2.19; Plut., *Lysander* 15.3. See Ste. Croix (1972) 343 n. 1 for a full list of the ancient sources.

[61] Xen., *Hellenica* 2.2.20; Plut., *Lysander* 15.4; Just. 5.8.4. In fact, originally the Spartans had proposed relatively lenient peace terms, demanding only that the Athenians tear down ten stades of the Long Walls (Xen., *Hellenica* 2.2.15; Lys. 13.8).

[62] See Ste. Croix (1972) 343; Krentz (1982) 41–4; Andrewes (1992) 495–6; Martin (1996) 162.

Since Lenschau's hypothesis is so weak, one wonders if those who believe in the 404 destruction of the city wall have not relied on some other (or additional) line of reasoning. It seems at least possible that they have found support in the long-canonical belief in a 'Cononian' restoration of the Athenian circuit. In 1907, reporting on his excavations in the modern Kerameikos during the previous year, Noack suggested that during the later 390s, the Athenians had rebuilt their circuit wall under Conon's leadership. In dating his phase II city wall, Noack concluded that physical relationships between remains assigned to this phase and adjacent structures required a dating after Themistocles but before the mid-fourth century. He identified the 390s as the most likely date of the work,[63] for during those years the Athenians were definitely building fortifications on a massive scale, that is, the Long Walls and Piraeus' enceinte.[64] Since Noack's time, it has become almost an article of faith that the fortification wall protecting the city of Athens was restored during the later 390s, with the project typically attributed to Conon himself.[65] Some scholars, then, may assume that the city wall required renovation in the 390s because of its supposed destruction less than a decade before, when the Spartans are known to have torn down other fortification walls in the region.[66]

Conon unquestionably played a key role in rebuilding the Long Walls and the circuit wall at Piraeus,[67] but the theory that the city wall of Athens possessed a 'Cononian' phase, possible though it may

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[63] Noack (1907) 487–93. See also Gruben (1969) 34–5 and Hoepfner (1976) 24–5, 112, cf. 137, who have published further evidence from the Kerameikos based on the relationship of the fortifications in that area to the Pompeion (built ca. 400 BC) and associated remains, particularly drain *ab*. Note that there is some ancient support for the theory associating Conon with the Athenian circuit (Dem. 20.74; Nep., *Conon* 4.5; Plut., *Agesilaus* 23.1, *Moralia* 213b).

[64] Xen., *Hellenica* 4.8.9–10; Diod. Sic. 14.85.2–3; *IG* 2^2.1656–64; *SEG* 19.145, 32.165. On this building project generally, see Judeich (1931) 83; Conwell (1992) 115–23.

[65] Judeich (1931) 134; Wrede (1933) 31 no. 75–6; Kahrstedt (1950) 60; Philippson (1952) 916, 919; *FGH* 328 F 40; Ohly (1961–62) 20; Gruben (1963) 26; Gruben (1964) 418; Zschietzschmann (1964) 699; Ohly (1965) 367–8, 371; Travlos (1971) 158; Zschietzschmann (1973) 136–7; Papachatzes (1974) 140 n. 3; Hoepfner (1976) 112; Ober (1985) 56, 375, 376; Spathari (1985) 21; Knigge (1988) 39, 50, fig. 51 (p. 52), 54, fig. 54b (p. 58), 62–4, 76, fig. 164 (following p. 176); Touchais (1989) 586; Eickstedt (1991) 277; cf. Wycherley (1978) 19. Munn (1993) 42–3 with n. 9, 152 accepts an early-fourth-century phase of the city wall but prefers not to label it 'Cononian'.

[66] Noack himself ((1907) 492–3) did not believe that the circuit wall's 'Cononian' phase was caused by forcible destruction (e.g., in 404).

[67] Xen., *Hellenica* 4.8.9–10; Diod. Sic. 14.85.2–3.

be, has always been hypothetical. In fact, the physical evidence has begun to throw doubt on the existence of such a phase. Stratified discoveries at the Sacred Gate in 1991 demonstrate that the so-called Cononian socle on the southern side of the gate court dates not to the early fourth century, but rather to the last years of that same century.[68] According to Ursula Knigge, the corresponding socle of the city wall should probably be down-dated similarly.[69] Thus, the city wall apparently was not rebuilt in the 390s, which further undercuts the notion that Athens' circuit had been demolished in 404.

Some might object, however, that conclusions based on the emerging archaeological evidence remain tentative. Thus, the notion that the Athenians restored their city's circuit wall in the 390s might survive another day. Even so, any work carried out in the early fourth century need not have occurred due to damage inflicted in 404. Since fortification walls were as vulnerable to assault by nature as they were to attack by human enemies, Athens' circuit could have become run-down through exposure to the elements in the decades since its construction under Themistocles,[70] been damaged by one or more earthquakes,[71] or been threatened by moisture, at least in flood-prone areas.[72]

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[68] Knigge (1993) 125–6.

[69] Personal communication, 27 September 2000. Noting that the new dating of the Sacred Gate's 'Cononian' socle is certain, Knigge adds that 'es betrifft wahrscheinlich auch den entsprechenden Sockel der Stadtmauer'.

[70] Wycherley (1978) 19. On the continuing need for maintenance of the walls, cf. Lys. 30.22 (which could conceivably refer to the ongoing decline of the fortifications dismantled in 404) and Diod. Sic. 13.107.1. The walls seem not to have required repair due to damage inflicted by attacking forces. On the several occasions when Athens' enemies had approached and/or assaulted the city during the Peloponnesian War (Thuc. 8.71.1–2; Xen., *Hellenica* 1.1.33–34; Diod. Sic. 13.72.2–73.2), the engagements involved fighting in front of the walls rather than sustained attacks on the walls themselves (see Rusch (1997) 560–1, 595–602, and his contribution in this volume for the incidents described by Thucydides and Diodorus).

[71] We know of two earthquakes in Attica during the 420s alone (Thuc. 3.87.4, 5.45.4). There might also have been others in subsequent decades (Thuc. 1.23.3 remarks on their general frequency during the Peloponnesian War). In fact, Knigge (1988) 36, 49, 54, 60, figs. 163–4 (following p. 176) associates a phase of work on the fortifications in the Kerameikos area with repairs necessitated by the earthquakes of the 420s.

[72] On the rising ground-level in the area of the Dipylon Gate and the consequent need to raise the socle of the city wall in order to protect its mudbricks, see Noack (1907) 132, 474, 495–6, 499, cf. 491–2; Hoepfner (1976) 14–15, 24; Knigge (1988) 50, 53.

There is no reason, then, to accept the modern suggestion that the Athenian city wall was torn down in 404. While the view's proponents lack direct archaeological evidence and ignore the ancient written sources from which they might have drawn support, hypothetical scenarios are simply dubious. The theory based on supposed 'common sense' contradicts our ancient testimony about Sparta's geopolitical thinking at the time. Should some argue that work on the city wall in the 390s implies that the structure was demolished at the end of the Peloponnesian War, one might answer that (1) the alleged physical evidence for an early-fourth-century phase of Athens' enceinte is now questionable, and (2) the construction of fortifications during the 390s need have had nothing to do with the events of 404.

Conclusion

Following ancient observers like Thucydides, Xenophon, and the Oxyrhynchus Historian, most modern scholars believe that both the Athens-Piraeus Long Walls and the circuit wall guarding Piraeus were destroyed in 404. Many ancient sources, however, contradict the accepted accounts as to which Athenian fortifications the Spartans tore down at the end of the Peloponnesian War. Various modern authors, holding that the Athenian city wall was demolished in 404, reflect some of this alternative ancient testimony but at the same time seem unaware of it.

There exists no convincing reason to prefer any of the alternative ancient accounts of the 404 destruction, for these are simply vague, selective, or problematic. Accordingly, just as there is no archaeological evidence to support the modern belief that Athens' own circuit wall was pulled down in 404, sound ancient textual support is lacking. Given the shortage of actual evidence, modern scholars who reject the conventional understanding of the 404 destruction can resort only to the realm of empty hypothesis in order to justify their view. Because their case is so weak, it is fair to conclude that Athens' enemies in fact ended the Peloponnesian War by doing precisely what our best ancient sources tell us they did. They tore down the Long Walls and Piraeus' fortification wall, leaving Athens' own city wall intact.

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RECONSIDERING THE BATTLE OF ACTIUM—AGAIN*

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The Battle of Actium ranks among history's most important sea battles because of the developments set in motion by its outcome. For example, it marks the birth of the Augustan Principate and was recognized by many as the defining moment—the final victory if you will—in the rise of Augustus Caesar to sole power.[1] It also marked the decisive reaffirmation of Rome's control over the Eastern Mediterranean and stands as the last great naval conflict of antiquity.[2] In spite of these significant features, however, no one really knows for certain what happened on 2 September 31 BC, the day the final struggle took place at Actium. Almost everything lacks certainty, from the battle strategy of the vanquished to the course and character of the battle itself. This is not because we lack ancient sources to tell us what happened. It is rather because the information they provide is not always convincing.

The two main narratives, written by Plutarch and Dio Cassius long after the event, are largely derived from sources favorable to the victors.[3] Four other narratives describe the action in varying detail. The most complete one, by Zonaras, derives closely from Dio and so offers nothing new.[4] The other three (by Velleius Paterculus, Annius Florus, and Orosius) provide a few details like fleet numbers that may once have been in Livy's lost narrative but, in general, they lack the precision one needs to reconstruct a battle and are patently grounded in partisan propaganda.[5] Contemporary poetic

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[1] Cf. Tac., *Historiae* 1.1.1; Jos., *Antiquitates Judaicae* 15.109; and especially Dio Cass. 51.1.2.

[2] On the 'Actian era' (the age that commenced with the victory) in the Eastern Mediterranean, see Reinhold (1988) 225–6. Casson ((1971) 141) sums up the relevance of the battle in naval terms: 'Actium wrote finis to the formal sea battle for over 300 years'.

[3] Plut., *Antonius* 61–8; Dio Cass. 50.11.1–51.1.5; on Dio's sources, see Reinhold (1988) 6–9.

[4] Zonaras 10.29–30; cf. Cary (1914) 1.xxii.

[5] Vell. 2.84–5; Florus 2.21; Orosius 6.19.5–12.

references to the battle are few and are restricted to brief negative allusions to Cleopatra, vague movements of troops or ships, or grandiose scenes with divine portents and moralistic prophesy.[6] In general, all these accounts suffer from the intense propaganda of the period which has led to the inclusion of exaggerated rumor and hyperbole and, for this reason, our understanding has not advanced significantly beyond the opposing reconstructions developed 60 to 100 years ago by J. Kromayer and W.W. Tarn.[7]

Although one might question the need to reconsider such a battle, new clues unavailable to previous scholars imply that the battle involved fierce fighting and that many of Antony's ships were indeed destroyed by fire. Preserved near Actium in the ruins of a contemporary war memorial, this evidence reestablishes as credible two basic elements of the battle narratives that were rejected by Tarn and others as unreliable.[8] The new evidence also reveals the offensive power of Antony's largest ships and invites speculation about the strategy he employed in the final battle.

The memorial can be found just north of modern-day Preveza at the site of Octavian's personal camp (fig. 17). Although it now lies in ruins, one can make out the large rectangular podium where Octavian displayed a selection of warship rams along with other paraphernalia taken from the enemy (fig. 18). Large inscription blocks scattered about the site tell us that during his 5th consulship (29 BC) he consecrated both the camp and naval *spolia* to Neptune and Mars in thanks for the victory 'in the war which he waged on behalf of the Republic in this region'.[9] Today, the rams are long gone, but one can still see 23 elaborate cuttings or sockets that once held the weapons against the podium's southern face. Given the spacing of the sockets, the width of the podium and the nature of two ruinous gaps in the southern wall, it is clear that the original display included 33 to 35 weapons.[10] This number is suspiciously close to what we might expect from a tithe or 10% dedication (i.e., 30 weapons) from

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[6] Hor., *Epodi* 9; *Carmina* 1.37; Prop. 3.11 and 4.6; Verg., *Aeneid* 8.671–713. For a recent attempt to interpret this literature, see Gurval (1995).

[7] For an assessment of the period's pervasive propaganda, see Reinhold (1988) 222–3.

[8] Cf. Reinhold (1988) 115.

[9] What was currently known of this monument up to 1987 has been published in Murray (1989) (see pp. 62–77 for the inscription). Since 1995, the site has undergone a systematic program of study and excavation by the 12th Ephorate of Prehistoric and Classical Antiquities. For a preliminary report on this work, see Zachos (2001).

[10] Murray (1989) 55–6.

the 300 warships Octavian claimed to have captured during the war (Plut., *Antonius* 68.1). We might account for the three to five extra weapons in the display (representing an extra 30–50 warships captured) by the fact that Octavian specifically excluded warships smaller than triremes when calculating a similar total for the text of his *Res Gestae* (3.4). Unless the numbers are purely coincidental, we can reasonably conclude that Octavian captured between 330 and 350 warships during the course of the summer-long war and that 11–14% (depending on the dedication's original total) were from warships smaller than 'threes'.[11]

We can be fairly certain that Octavian would have counted every ram from seaworthy warships that came into his possession during the summer. As for damaged and destroyed vessels, their salvage was routinely carried out by the victor following both major and minor naval engagements. Rams received special attention because of the value of the bronze from which they were made.[12] And because of a warship's tendency to float at the sea's surface once it was holed, rams normally remained available for recovery.[13] Beyond the weight of metal in these weapons, the rams also possessed a potent symbolic value that Octavian fully utilized in the years following the battle. Naval spoils—and rams figure prominently among these—appear repeatedly in the representational art of the period, configured as trophy dedications or as simple decorative elements, alluding to the universal power of the *princeps* on land and sea.[14] As for the Actian rams, Octavian paraded them through Rome during the second day of his triple triumph (Dio 51.21.7; Prop. 2.1) and then used them to decorate *rostra* at the eastern and western ends of the *Forum Romanum*.[15] For Octavian, the rams from Antony's warships were valuable in more ways than one.

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[11] Cf. Murray (1989) 137–41. Strabo (7.7.6) reveals that Octavian captured vessels smaller than triremes and included them in his dedications.

[12] Although we do not know the price of bronze at the time of this battle, some three centuries earlier, the value of bronze in the Athlit ram was worth about 560 days of skilled labor; cf. Murray (1989) 127 n. 16.

[13] Cf. Casson (1991) 82. At Athens, trierarchs were required to return rams to the shipyards from vessels that had been destroyed in storms; cf. Murray (1985) 147–8. The trierarchs were obviously expected to stay at the scene of the wreck or return later to recover what was the most expensive piece of the ship's equipment.

[14] Cf. Hölscher (1984) and (1985); Zanker (1988) 79–85. We should remember that Augustus counted more than 600 warships as captured during his career (*Res Gestae* 3.4).

[15] Murray (1989) 121–4.

Beyond the total number of captured ships, Octavian's campsite memorial preserves other important details locked into the shapes and dimensions of each socket. In order to appreciate these details, one must first understand the classes or vessel sizes from which the weapons were taken. Evidence from known rostral monuments and from a half-ton warship ram recovered near Haifa in 1980 (the Athlit ram) make it certain that Octavian chose to display the largest weapons that fell into his hands. Briefly stated, the evidence is as follows: (1) Roman engineers often suspended rams from vessels as large as triremes on their rostral monuments; (2) the Athlit ram (at 465 kg.) is too heavy to be suspended in such a manner and, thus, comes from a class larger than a 'three'; and (3) the half-ton Athlit ram is dwarfed by the weapons once mounted at ground level on Octavian's campsite memorial (fig. 19).[16] Since the 23 sockets show at least five gradations in size, the weapons displayed at Octavian's camp originally came from the largest classes in Antony's fleet, that is, from 'tens', 'nines', 'eights', 'sevens', and 'sixes'.[17] The irregular numbers of similar sized sockets imply that Octavian chose to display every large ram in his collection and not simply a representative selection of sizes.[18] This evidence allows us to conclude that Antony's fleet was less a monstrous collection of 'sixes' and 'nines' (cf. Florus 2.21) than a moderately heavy Ptolemaic fleet of the late Hellenistic Age where vessels like 'threes' and 'fives' predominated. Antony's advantage lay in the fact that he possessed greater numbers and larger sizes of medium sized *polyereis* than did his enemy.[19] The focus placed by our sources on these larger vessels stems from the advantage they were expected to provide during the opening phase of the battles in which they fought.

The nature of this advantage can be detected in the design of the Athlit ram whose internal timbers were carefully crafted to transfer the shock of ramming collisions to the ship's wales and bottom timbers.[20]

[16] Murray (1989) 95–114; for the dimensions and weight of the Athlit weapon, cf. Steffy (1991) 17.

[17] Strabo 7.7.6 tells us that Antony's fleet possessed ships of every size from 'ones' to 'tens;' cf. Murray (1989) 99.

[18] Murray (1989) 113 and 142.

[19] The term '*polyeres*' (plural: '*polyereis*') is borrowed from late antiquity to define oared warships from classes larger than triremes or 'threes'. Since sizes substantially larger than 'tens' are known (the largest was a 'forty'), we might classify Antony's largest ships (his 'sixes' to 'tens') among *polyereis* of medium size.

[20] Steffy (1991) 6–39.

Since the Actium sockets reveal timbers crafted in precisely the same way, but on a much larger scale, we can be certain that Antony's largest ships were built to deliver and sustain ramming blows of terrific force.[21] I mention the ramming capability of Antony's larger ships because this particular characteristic is largely absent from the historical descriptions of the battle. Instead, we are told that Antony's ships were too heavy to be effective against Octavian's smaller, more agile vessels (Plut., *Antonius* 66.1; Dio 50.29.1–4; Velleius 2.84.1; Florus 2.21.5–7). This is only part of the story, as some (though not all) of our sources recognized. Octavian knew well the ramming potential of Antony's big ships because when the fighting began, he carefully avoided 'dashing prow-to-prow against rough and hard bronze armor' (Plut., *Antonius* 66.1). In other words, he avoided the prow-to-prow charge that typically opened naval battles of this period.

A classic prow-to-prow charge involving medium-sized *polyereis* is described for us by Diodorus (20.51.1–3) at the Battle of Salamis (Cyprus) in 306 BC.[22] Here, the two commanders (Ptolemy and Demetrius Poliorcetes) approached each other in a line-abreast formation. When the distance between the two fleets was about 600 meters (three stades), a prearranged signal (in this case, the hoisting of gilded shields) began the opening charge. Soon thereafter the trumpets blared another signal, the battle cry was raised, and the oar-crews urged into a sprint. As each ship took aim at the prow of the vessel opposite them in the line, units of archers and javelin throwers kept up a steady stream of fire from the decks of their ships, crouching down just before impact to hold on for dear life, and then resuming their fire at close range. If the initial prow strike was insufficient to fatally damage or cripple one's opponent, and the battle lines were still intact, the vessels backed water and charged again.

Smaller vessels were clearly at a disadvantage when challenged by larger, more solidly built ones, and so they developed a maneuver to take advantage of their smaller size and greater maneuverability. At the last moment of the prow-to-prow charge, a few seconds before impact, the helmsman would execute a swerve past his enemy's flank

[21] Cf. Murray (1996) 340. The importance of the ram and its support structure was apparent to Appian (*Bella Civilia* 5.119), who recognized that a solid ramming blow on the ram of an enemy vessel was 'most effective in shaking the marines on deck and in rendering the vessel inoperative'.

[22] Two other examples can be seen at Side (Livy 37.24.2) and at Myonessus in 190 BC (Livy 37.30.3–5).

in a maneuver called the *diekplous*. A skilled oar-crew would deftly feather its oars alongside the hull in order to shear off its enemy's extended oars as they passed by. Once past the crippled vessel, they could turn about in a maneuver called the *anastrophe*, destroy the two steering oars, and thus put their victim out of action.[23] The disabled vessel could then be attacked from a safe distance with long range weapons, struck in the flank by ramming, or ignored until later when it might still be sunk, or placed in tow as a captured vessel.[24] Predictably, the larger vessels preferred to crash into an opponent's prow and trust in their heavy design, while smaller vessels (like the 'threes' and 'fours' of the Rhodian navy) preferred to perfect the *diekplous* and *anastrophe* maneuvers.

Presuming, therefore, that Antony understood how properly to use his largest vessels, it is surprising that he did not open the battle with a prow-to-prow charge. Why? The ancient answer, that Antony's ships were inherently ineffective because of their excessive weight, height and mass, is not very convincing in light of the evidence from Octavian's campsite memorial. We can now appreciate Antony's fleet as comprised of medium-sized *polyereis* that were designed for a specific kind of warfare. A more convincing answer lies in the poor condition of Antony's oarcrews, which had suffered severely during the course of the summer. Sickness (Dio 50.12.8, 15.3), hunger (50.14.4), and defeats had taken their toll, and, as a result, the men were utterly demoralized (50.15.3). So many had died, deserted, or were otherwise unfit for service that Antony was forced to burn a large number of ships he could not man with crews (Plut., *Antonius* 64.1; Dio 50.15.4).[25] It is not surprising, therefore, when we read in Plutarch that Antony's larger ships were unable to gain momentum because they were undermanned (*Antonius* 65.5).

If we keep in mind the depressed and depleted nature of Antony's crews, we might begin to understand what Antony faced when he

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[23] For examples, see Diod. Sic. 20.51.3, Polyb. 16.4.14 and Livy 37.24.2. If the oar-crew was not prepared, they could lose their own oars during the maneuver; cf. Polyb. 16.3.12–14.

[24] Polyb. 16.4.14–15 (attacks immediately after the *diekplous*), 16.6.12 (towing away previously disabled ships), and 16.6.13 (holing those ships that one could not tow away).

[25] Out of the 500 warships that came with Antony to Greece, less than half (230 ships) were manned for the final battle; see below, n. 28.

called a staff meeting at the end of August to decide what to do (Dio 50.14.4).[26] According to Dio, Cleopatra suggested the plan that was finally adopted: to entrust the most important places to garrisons and to withdraw back to Egypt. It was a remarkable decision and shows the bleak outlook of Antony's staff by the end of the summer. What follows, however, rings less true. According to both Dio (50.15.3–4) and Plutarch (*Antonius* 64), Antony hid this decision from his men and then urged them to victory with a speech (Dio 50.16–22). More revealing than anything said in this dubious speech was that painfully public act of burning undamaged ships, signaling to both friend and foe that Antony was preparing to abandon camp.

The battle that ensued has received two basic interpretations over the course of the past century. The earlier of the two, published by J. Kromayer in 1899, accepted the basic outline sketched by the surviving historical narratives. According to this view, Antony intended to retreat from the Ambracian Gulf with as many ships as he could save and continue the war elsewhere. The battle that resulted on 2 September was hard fought and eventually won by Octavian after some four and one-half hours of combat. Kromayer's interpretation remained unchallenged until 1924 when A. Ferrabino argued that Antony intended to fight for victory, not flee, and that one of his generals refused to fight and returned to harbor—an action alluded to in Horace's *Epode* 9. In the decade that followed, W.W. Tarn further developed Ferrabino's ideas, crafting an extremely seductive argument that questioned the entire source tradition upon which the 'standard' interpretation was based. According to Tarn, Actium was a myth: on 2 September most of Antony's fleet returned to port without fighting and left Antony no other option but flight. Never mind that G.W. Richardson dismantled Tarn's arguments in 1937. By this time, the interpretation had been canonized in the *Cambridge Ancient History*, and it so shook scholarly confidence in the historical tradition of the battle that R. Syme pronounced Actium 'a shabby affair', a quote still used to characterize the event.[27]

[26] For the general problems surrounding Antony's strategy, cf. Reinhold (1988) 104–5.

[27] The basic sequence of published articles is as follows: Kromayer (1899), Ferrabino (1924), Kromayer (1931), Tarn (1931), Kromayer (1933), Tarn (1934), Richardson (1937), Tarn (1938) and Syme (1939) 297. For a recent assessment that shows the influence of Tarn and Syme, see Reinhold (1988) 115–16.

If my interpretation of the evidence from Octavian's campsite memorial is correct, however, we should no longer question the fact that a fierce battle occurred during the afternoon hours of 2 September 31 BC and that this battle involved the use of fire. The reasons why can be deduced from the various warship totals recorded for Antony's fleet before, during and after the battle. According to the totals that most scholars accept as reliable and which probably derive from Livy's lost account, Antony manned approximately 230 ships out of his original fleet of 500 warships.[28] If Octavian collected between 330 and 350 rams from Antony's fleet of 500 warships during the course of the war (and this would include rams still on seaworthy vessels as well as those fire-warped rams salvaged from Antony's camp), roughly 150 ships remain unaccounted for.[29] When we subtract from this total the 60 ships that escaped with Cleopatra (Plut., *Antonius* 66.3), we are left with 90 warships for which we still have no record.

What happened to these vessels? It is reasonable to assume that a few escaped from the gulf with Antony, while others made their way to Egypt from duty stations around Greece. No totals are recorded for these vessels, so the number cannot have been large, perhaps less than a half-squadron of 30 ships.[30] If fewer than 90 ships returned to Egypt with Antony and Cleopatra, more than 60 have disappeared without a trace. Had these ships been abandoned, disabled or burned on shore before, during or after the events of September 2nd, Octavian would have eventually salvaged their rams and included their number in his tithe. These 60 vessels must have been destroyed in some way that put their rams beyond Octavian's salvers and this implies to me their destruction by fire at sea.[31] This

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[28] For references to the main arguments, see Murray (1989) 133–4. The numbers are recorded by Florus (2.21.5), Orosius (6.19.9, 11) and Plutarch (*Antonius* 61.1) who says that Antony brought to Greece 'no less than 500 fighting ships' (i.e., warships). Accordingly, Antony manned about 170 vessels on the morning of the final battle; Cleopatra manned 60. This same tradition (Florus 2.21.5) records the numbers in Octavian's fleet at more than 400.

[29] For the purpose of this discussion, I will work from the larger number (i.e., a tithe of 35 rams) because it minimizes the number of ships for which we have no record.

[30] Tarn ((1931) 190–1) shows that Antony's squadrons totaled roughly 60 ships each. He originally argued ((1931) 195) that 40 ships escaped with Antony, although he admitted some years later ((1938) 167) that the number might be as low as 15 to 20. Surely some author would have mentioned them if the number escaping with Antony had approached a full squadron.

[31] See Murray (1989) 133–5, for those authors who record the use of fire before,

revelation is important because it renders Tarn's view of the battle impossible, and our much maligned sources regain some of their lost credibility, at least regarding the broad outlines of the struggle they describe, the fierceness of the fight, and the use of fire to destroy a part of Antony's fleet.

Let me briefly explain how this destruction by fire might have rendered 60 rams unsalvageable by reference to HMS *Charon*, a British warship set afire during the battle of Yorktown (Virginia) in 1781.[32] Ignited by red-hot shot from a French battery, *Charon* burned through her moorings, drifted across the river and then grounded on a sandbar. As the fire consumed her superstructure, she became lighter, floated higher in the water, and continued to burn until finally the weight of her ballast caused her to sink. In the end, only some 5% of the hull survived to be investigated. Antony's lightly ballasted warships would have suffered a similar fate. The rams of these burning vessels, being mounted at the waterline well above the keel, would have slowly emerged from the water as fire consumed their hull, and then would have dropped into the depths once their support timbers had burned through. In light of *Charon's* experience, the loss of 60 rams into deep water through the agency of fire is perfectly credible.

When we look at these totals in a slightly different way, the conclusions are still the same. If a low estimate of missing rams says that 60 warships were destroyed in such a way that their rams were unavailable for salvage, and that 90 escaped with Cleopatra and Antony, then Octavian managed to recover 80 rams from ships destroyed or captured during the course of the battle (60 + 90 + 80 = 230). This means that Octavian captured or destroyed a total of 140 vessels during the afternoon hours of September 2nd. Compared with known casualty figures from other major battles of the previous three centuries (see Table 1), these totals are credible and affirm that Actium, like other battles of the period that resulted in a similar degree of destruction, must have involved a fierce fight and the use of fire, just as our sources tell us.

during and at the end of the battle. We should also remember that Agrippa had used fire to destroy the fleet of Sextus Pompey at Naulochus just five years before (App., *Bella Civilia* 5.121).

[32] Cf. Delgado (1997) 97.

If the battle on 2 September involved more 'real' fighting than most scholars currently believe, we might profitably reconsider the battle based on what we have learned about Antony's largest warships from Octavian's campsite memorial. Considering the biased nature of our sources, however, any plausible reconstruction must be based on two factors: (1) what we know about the actual use of medium-sized *polyereis*, and (2) what our sources tell us that is consistent with the reality of naval warfare when these classes were used. What follows is not a comprehensive reconstruction of the battle but, rather, an attempt to focus on those elements of the battle most affected by these factors. By now, we have seen that normal procedure called for a prow-to-prow charge to open the fighting. Such a charge began documented battles at Salamis, Chios, Side, Myonessus, and probably also Mylae and Naulochus.[33] We also know that the standard way to attack larger classes was to avoid their bows through the use of *diekplous* and *anastrophe* tactics. For Antony's fleet, therefore, it was imperative that he adopt a plan to defend against these tactics and, at the same time, to engage the enemy in a prow-to-prow contest with his larger vessels.

What might he have done? Keep in mind that I am now offering an educated guess, based on what we know of Hellenistic naval warfare, the capabilities of Antony's ships and the use of these classes in recorded battles (we do not possess sufficient evidence to do more). Antony's only hope for victory lay in his ability to cause panic among one wing of the enemy's fleet, and then to encourage it to spread to the rest of the fleet. Following the example of Demetrius Poliorcetes at Salamis in 306 (Diod. 20.50.3–4), he might concentrate his largest *polyereis* (his 'sevens' to 'tens') on one wing and hope to crush and scatter those who opposed him. The victorious wing might then bear down on the undefeated ships of the enemy, cause them to break formation and flee, and thus allow his entire fleet to withdraw southward unopposed. Such a plan demanded that he place his strengthened wing on the north (right) side of his line, so that once it scattered the opposite wing of the enemy, it could turn beam-on to the wind, roll up the enemy's line and then escort the rest of his fleet toward the south, away from the battle zone. Additionally, any plan to protect against the *diekplous* maneuver (and a general encirclement as well)

[33] Salamis (Diod. Sic. 20.51.1–3); Chios (Polyb. 16.4.7); Side and Myonessus (Livy 37.24.2, 30.3–5); Mylae and Naulochus (Appian, *Bella Civilia* 5.106, 119).

Table 1. Known Warship Casualty Figures Sustained by Defeated Forces in Naval Battles from 306 to 31 BC

BATTLE	DATE	CASUALTIES (Warships)
Salamis (Cyprus)	306 BC	Losses = 85.7% of total fleet. Ptolemy lost 120 warships out of a total force of 140 (40 with crews by capture, 80 by ramming). Those destroyed by ramming were eventually towed, full of sea water, to Demetrius' camp before the city of Salamis.[34]
Mylae (Sicily)	260 BC	Losses = 33.8% of total fleet. The Carthaginians lost 44 warships out of a total of 130 (31 by capture, 13 by ramming).[35]
Ecnomus (Sicily)	256 BC	Losses = 26.9% of total fleet. The Carthaginians lost more than 94 warships out of a total force of 350 (64 by capture, and more than 30 by ramming).[36]
Chios	201 BC	Losses = 50.7% of total fleet. Philip V lost 103 warships out of a total force of 203 (10 by capture, 93 by ramming).[37]
Myonessus (Ionia)	190 BC	Losses = 47.2% of total fleet. Antiochus III lost 42 warships out of a total force of 89 (29 by ramming and by fire, 13 by capture).[38]
Mylae (Sicily)	36 BC	Losses = 19.4% of total fleet. Sextus Pompey lost 30 out of a total force of 155.[39]
Naulochus	36 BC	Losses = 61% of total fleet. Sextus Pompey lost 183 warships out of a total force of 300 (28 by ramming, and 155 by capture and by fire).[40]
Actium	31 BC	Losses = 60.9% of total fleet. Antony lost ca. 140 warships out of a total force of 230 (ca. 80 by ramming and/or capture, and ca. 60 by fire?).

[34] Diod. Sic. 20.49.2 (fleet size); 20.52.6 (casualty totals).

[35] Polyb. 1.23.3 (fleet size); *CIL* VI 31611 = *ILS* 65 (casualty totals; cf. Polyb. 1.23.10).

[36] Polyb. 1.25.9 (fleet size); 1.28.12, 14 (casualty totals).

[37] Philip's force consisted of 53 cataphracts, an unknown number of open galleys like trihemioliae, and 150 small open galleys called *lemboi* and *pristeis* (Polyb. 16.2.9). Of the 50 warships disabled by the Rhodians, 40 were *lemboi* (Polyb. 16.7.2). We must add to the totals given by Polybius at the end of his account (16.7.1–3) one 'eight' that was destroyed (16.3.2), and another that was captured (16.3.8–11) during the battle.

[38] Livy 37.30.1–2 (fleet size); 37.30.7–8 (casualty totals).

[39] Appian, *Bella Civilia* 5.105 (fleet size); 5.108 (casualty totals).

[40] Appian, *Bella Civilia* 5.118 (fleet size); 5.121 (casualty totals).

must have involved the positioning of a second line of warships closely behind the front line.[41] And in fact this is where we find Cleopatra's squadron of 60 warships.[42]

When the battle started, what did Antony do? First of all, there was no prow-to-prow charge. Why? Antony's ultimate goal was to get out of the Ambracian Gulf and, for this reason, he assumed a defensive posture with his ships packed closely together. His battle plan, therefore, involved a wait-and-see strategy, hoping that his enemy would make the necessary mistakes allowing him to disperse a portion of their fleet and drive the rest away in fear. It was his only chance. There was another reason that no charge occurred. Octavian's commanders kept a distance of about a sea mile (eight stades) between themselves and the enemy (Plut., *Antonius* 65.4). If Antony ordered a sprint toward the enemy line, his depleted oar-crews would have been exhausted by the time the ships finally engaged.[43] Unable to attack with his right wing, Antony had no choice but to assume a defensive posture in line-abreast formation. With roughly a ship's length between each of his vessels, his line would have stretched almost 6 km in length and gives us an idea of the position he assumed when he stopped his forward momentum.[44]

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[41] The options available to Antony were limited. One might defend against *diekplous* attacks by reducing the intervals between ships, something which he also seems to have done, but this increased the possibility of encirclement by an enemy *periplous* maneuver. Another possible defense required more ships than Antony had at his disposal. This tactic was used in 201 BC at Chios when Philip V placed small open galleys in the gaps between his medium-sized *polyereis* (Polyb. 16.4.8). The defense Antony chose to adopt, the double line formation, was used with success by Demetrius at Salamis in 306 BC (Diod. Sic. 20.50.3–4). In all three formations, success depended on the strict maintenance of order with well-disciplined and physically fit oar-crews.

[42] Many assume (cf. Reinhold (1988) 114) from the arrival of merchant ships at Tainaron after the battle (Plut., *Antonius* 67.5) that Cleopatra's squadron included heavy transports as well the treasury, but I do not see how this can be possible. If her squadron included these vessels, they must have been in tow considering the sea breeze that was blowing into the gulf. Are we then to suppose that she cut the tow lines when she made her successful dash for freedom? And if this was the case, then how did the transports make it out of the gulf to appear a few days later at Tainaron? Small details like these underscore the inadequacies of our 'best' historical accounts and the difficulties we must face in dealing with them.

[43] The distance between the fleets at Salamis was three stades when the sprint commenced (Diod. Sic. 20.51.1). Sea battles were strenuous affairs and weakened crews were at a decided disadvantage. In 190 BC, sick Rhodian oar-crews had to pause to regain their strength during the battle of Side, and their weakened condition made them unable to overtake a fleeing enemy (Livy 37.24.5–10).

[44] Information about ship spacing within the line is generally lacking from our ancient battle accounts, yet we know that it must have been an important factor.

Here he waited (fig. 20), hoping that Octavian or one of his commanders would make a mistake and close the distance between the two fleets, but no mistake was made.

Finally, it seems that the sea breeze forced Antony's hand, which, according to Plutarch (*Antonius* 65.5), began to fill in around noon (he says 'at the 6th hour'). Antony will have known by experience that the western sea breeze, which is predictable and regular throughout the summer, would strengthen throughout the afternoon and make rowing into its teeth exhausting work for his depleted crews.[45] Since his plan for escape relied on the use of his sails, his fleet had to be far enough out to sea so that when it finally turned southward to avoid the mass of Leucas, the wind would blow at an angle of 90 degrees to the fleet's direction of travel or heading. For this reason, once the breeze began to blow around noon, Antony had no choice but to extend his line out from the shore where his smaller, tighter formation of ships (cf. Dio 50.31.4–5) became increasingly vulnerable to attacks from the side and rear. Plutarch writes (*Antonius* 65.4–5) that Caesar was delighted with this development, and that he ordered his right wing to back water and to draw Antony's line ever farther from the shore. Agrippa, whose greater experience at sea implies that he, not Octavian, directed the overall battle strategy, remained motionless on the left wing (Plut., *Antonius* 66.3) and awaited Antony's advance, maintaining a loose contact with the shore.[46]

As Antony's line advanced toward the enemy, his right eventually became separated from his center (Plut., *Antonius* 66.3). The reason why this occurred is not difficult to imagine, given the topography of the coast, which recedes toward the north, and Antony's need to

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When Caesar adopted a tightly packed formation before Alexandria, he placed 17 ships in a gap that measured 400 paces from side to side (= 592 m.; cf. *Bellum Alexandrinum* 14.1; Murray (1998) 521–2). These 17 ships would have produced 18 gaps of 33 m. from centerline to centerline (including the borders of the gap). Allowing for similar gaps to the right and left of Antony's formation and using the same spacing between vessels, his line at Actium would have measured roughly 5676 m. in length (cf. fig. 20).

[45] Carter ((1970) 218–20) provides an excellent description of this sea breeze effect at Actium and offers a convincing reconstruction of the battle based upon considerations of this breeze, the local topography and Antony's use of sails to make good his escape.

[46] Carter ((1970) 221) feels that Arruntius (in the center) and Agrippa must have backed water in concert with Octavian's right wing. We should also remember, that despite what our sources report, Octavian's entire line would have had to back water slightly to offset the natural tendency for the strengthening breeze to push them downwind toward Antony's bows.

move seaward in order to make good his escape.[47] From Thucydides (7.38.3) we know that gaps up to 200 feet wide (2 *plethra*) were still considered an adequate defense against *diekplous* attacks when merchant ships were anchored as a defensive barrier against 'threes'. But once Antony's ships moved further apart than this, his squadron commanders were faced with a choice. They must either allow their entire front to become vulnerable to *diekplous* attacks, or they must maintain a defensible spacing within squadrons but allow a gap to separate one squadron from another. At this point it seems that L. Gellius Poplicola made the decision to separate from the center squadron (Plut., *Antonius* 66.3).[48] Since Agrippa's inshore position presented a serious threat to Antony's right wing as it moved seaward, he really had no choice. Thereafter, when the increasing gap between the right and center squadrons exposed the vulnerability of Antony's front line, he was forced to engage the enemy. When Antony's tiring crews finally closed the interval between the fleets and no one scattered seaward, it became clear to those in the second line that no crushing victory would occur on Antony's right. Agrippa, in command of Octavian's own considerable force of *polyereis*, had successfully avoided a vigorous prow-to-prow contest with Antony's larger vessels.[49] And now, the battle could be decided by tactics more favorable to Agrippa's better conditioned fleet—deck fighting and gang attacks on individual ships.

Elsewhere, Octavian's commanders relied on their numerical superiority to attack their opponents in groups of two or three (Dio 50.32.6). In this way, they were able to avoid the prow strikes of a more equal contest and attack their enemies in the side.[50] Eventually

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[47] Cf. Carter (1970) 219–20: '. . . for every mile Antony could make to seaward, the angle between the direction of the wind and the western tip of Leucas increased by half a point. Antony therefore wanted to bring on the battle as far out to sea as he could, so as to have the afternoon wind at least slightly behind him when he broke and ran for it'.

[48] Carter ((1970) 220–1) concludes from this that Poplicola was 'in tactical command of Antony's right'. It may be that Publicola was in command of the left side of the right squadron (i.e., wing), and was the one who chose to maintain his formation with the rest of the wing and thus to separate from the center.

[49] Octavian's fleet was not as 'light' as the historical authors would have us believe. It seems that the largest units in his fleet were 'sixes', and it is reasonable to assume that he possessed a considerable number of these. See Murray (1989) 143–51.

[50] Plutarch (*Antonius* 66.1–2) mentions that Octavian's ships avoided prow attacks as well as flank attacks because they feared the strength of Antony's hull timbers. This is surely an exaggeration, as Dio Cass. (50.32.6 and 8) makes clear.

Octavian's numerical advantage began to take its toll, as more and more of Antony's ships were put out of action. At some point, when the possibility for dispersing the enemy had definitely passed but when the fighting was still intense enough to limit pursuit, Cleopatra led her squadron through the gap that separated the right wing from the center and gained enough sea room to raise her sails. Whether we choose to censure or praise this action, we must admit that Cleopatra personally commanded the largest portion of the fleet that escaped. And if we admit that the primary objective was to retreat from the gulf with as many ships as possible, it is difficult to blame her for successfully leading an entire squadron to safety.[51]

Regardless how we interpret her action, this move precipitated a general flight on the part of Antony's fleet. The plan to disperse the enemy had not been successful, and with the protective rear line moving seaward, it became the duty of each vessel to care for itself. The result was a general rout, except that Antony's ships were unable to flee from their pursuers. This is not because they did not try. Those who were able to disengage did so and threw their fighting towers into the water to lighten their ships (Dio 50.33.4). Antony himself transferred from his flagship (probably a 'ten') to a 'five' so as to make a speedier escape (Plut., *Antonius* 66.5). But the remainder of the fleet was not so fortunate, and they were abandoned to an enemy intent upon their destruction. At this stage, when Antony's vessels were more focused on flight than on defending themselves, it seems that many vessels succumbed to fire.[52] Almost the same thing had happened to Pompey's fleet at Naulochus (cf. Appian, *Bella Civilia* 5.121).

It is well known from infantry warfare that great numbers of casualties can be inflicted on the defeated force during the chaos of a full flight. So it was at Actium, if one may judge from the 'missing' 60–90 ships implied by the dedication at Octavian's campsite memorial. Plutarch maintains that Cleopatra fled before the battle was decided and that even after Antony's departure, the fleet fought on for a long time (*Antonius* 68.1). It might be closer to the truth to say that the killing went on for a long time, and that only the degree

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[51] Cf. Kromayer (1899) 45–8; Reinhold (1988) 114.

[52] Although Dio Cass. (50.34–5) describes the fire in terms that are too sensational to be believed and falsely asserts that Octavian waited until this moment to call for fire from his camp, fire must have played a significant role in the final rout. See Murray (1989) 134–5.

of victory was in doubt.[53] In this fact we find a potent reason for the battle's troubled record in the historical accounts of the period. Although we might guess that Octavian's fleet showed no mercy toward the fleeing enemy, the blood lust of battle quickly dulled once Octavian needed to cement agreements of reconciliation with Antony's army and allies (Dio 51.1.4–5; Plut., *Antonius* 68.3).

Later still, when the conflict with Antony and Cleopatra had been successfully concluded, Octavian's main concern was to heal the wounds of civil war, so he encouraged those who wrote about the battle to continue the line of propaganda that had led 'all Italy' to support his cause. The conflict was therefore described in a general way that placed the blame for the war squarely on the shoulders of Cleopatra and Antony. The glorification of Romans killing Romans, no matter how critical for his cause at the time, was not to become part of the birth legend of the New Age. To provide an example, he wrote a personal account of the battle that stressed the role of his own Liburnians (a class of warship smaller than triremes), minimized the role of Agrippa's *polyereis*, and perhaps even understated the number of human casualties.[54] The preserved narratives still reflect the great influence of Octavian's version, which, ironically, proved so successful in obscuring the battle's details that most scholars now distrust even the basic outline of the battle as tainted beyond recovery.

Although we can never know for certain what happened at Actium on September 2nd, Octavian's dedication of rams reflects his mind soon after the battle, long before he had settled on the version he wished posterity to remember. As a result, those hoping to pierce the 'myth of Actium' and to recover the broad outlines of the final battle must consider the nature of Octavian's dedication and the physical reality suggested by Antony's largest warships. Therein may lie our best chance to refine the possibilities of an event that will always resist a complete explanation.

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[53] According to Suetonius (*Divus Augustus* 17.2), the fighting went on so long that Octavian spent the night aboard his ship.

[54] For the evidence, see Murray (1989) 143–51. By their very nature, human casualty totals are difficult to record accurately and are an easy tool for the propagandist to use. For this reason, I am not overly impressed by Octavian's claim that the casualties were limited to 5000 killed (cf. Plut., *Antonius* 68.1). Other numbers that circulated following the battle were higher; cf. Orosius (6.19.12), who reports that 12,000 were killed and 6,000 were wounded (from which an additional 1,000 died).

This is the revised version of a paper originally submitted for inclusion in the selected papers from the Eleventh Naval History Symposium held at the US Naval Academy in 1993 (Murray 2001). After excessive delays in its publication, I rewrote the paper to reflect refinements in my argument resulting from additional research conducted in the area since 1994.

To John, who, by personal example, has made me a better scholar, teacher and mentor.

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

Figure 17. Cape Actium and the entrance to the Ambracian Gulf



Figure 18. Octavian's Campsite Memorial (restored view from the southeast)



Figure 19. Comparison of socket sizes (including one appropriate for the Athlit ram)



Figure 20. Battle lines before Antony's fleet moved toward Octavian's line (ship-spacing = 33 m.; distance between fleets = 1 nautical mile)

TWO NABATAEAN AND ROMAN SITES IN SOUTHERN JORDAN: KHIRBET EL-QIRANA AND KHIRBET EL-KHALDE

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Scholars working in Central and Northern Jordan are blessed by the immense store of information recorded almost a century ago by two great expeditions. First, there was that of Rudolph Brünnow and Alfred von Domaszewski in 1897 and 1898 extending from Petra up to the Hauran in what is now southern Syria. The outcome was the volumes of their monumental study, *Die Provincia Arabia* (1904–9), incorporating both their own research and careful scouring of the reports of early travelers in the area. A few years after the Germans, the Princeton Expedition led by Howard Crosby Butler carried out its survey from northern Jordan through Syria, producing over a period of 32 years its own series of reports, the *Publications of the Princeton University Archaeological Expeditions to Syria in 1905–1905 and 1909.*[1]

Southern Jordan has been less fortunate. There has been no comparable large-scale collection or first hand investigation, and we must use scattered reports—often significantly later in date than either of the two great expeditions—and the accounts of travellers whose work is problematic and sometimes unreliable. Two places at which there are such difficulties are Khirbet el-Qirana and Khirbet el-Khalde (fig. 21). The former is a village on the Shera'a escarpment southeast of Petra overlooking the bleak Hisma Desert to the south. It incorporates a fort and the site seems to have been at its fullest extent in the Roman period although it is probably Nabataean in origin. The latter lies in the Hisma on the route through the Wadi Yitm to the Hedjaz and the Red Sea. It consists only of two structures without any settlement and it, too, is evidently Nabataean and Roman.

The present essay is an attempt to cut through the scattered, incomplete and often conflicting reports and to advance our understanding of these two places by drawing on the evidence of aerial

[1] Butler, et al. (1907–49).

photographs, both old (1953) and recent (1998). Intensive and extensive fieldwork is necessary throughout this southern region, but a more certain basis for that can be established through close scrutiny of the existing evidence.

Khirbet el-Qirana: A Nabataean and Roman Village and Fort

Location

The site is difficult to locate. The Czech explorer and orientalist Alois Musil was there in 1898, in 1902 when he drew a plan, and in 1910. However, his account allows the reader to do little more than place the site loosely on the Shera'a scarp southeast of Ras en-Naqb[2] (see Appendix, below). Likewise the description of location by the American archaeologist Nelson Glueck from his visit of 1934 is unhelpful.[3] More recently Parker has located it 21 km. south of Sadaqa; his map, however, shows it southeast, and that is implicit in his reference to it being 9 km. southeast of the *Via Nova Traiana*. Gregory also locates it south of Sadaqa ('c. 20 km.') but also then puts it southeast of the *Via Nova* ('c. 10 km.').[4]

The site is not named or marked on the relevant sheet of the 1:100,000 maps of Jordan. Much more inexplicable is its total absence from the 1:50,000 series—neither by name nor by any indication of structures or even the 'ruins' legend common elsewhere. As will be seen, this is unexpected for so large a site. More recently it has been omitted from the JADIS database of archaeological sites in Jordan. This, too, is inexplicable—Glueck visited in succession what he called Sites 35, 36 (= Qirana), 37 and 38. All *except* Site 36 is included in JADIS.[5]

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[2] Musil (1907–8) 2.229–30; (1926) 50.

[3] Glueck (1935) 63. Sir Aurel Stein visited what he thought was the same site in 1939. His description, however, does not tally with that of Musil and Glueck: he reports a site ca. 120 × 36 m., barely a tenth of what it is; he says nothing of a fort and drew a structure not readily identifiable on the site. The description and size might accord better with Kh. an-Nasara about 4 km. to the southeast of Qirana or an unnamed and smaller group of ruins about 3.5 km. south-southwest again. Gregory and Kennedy (1985) 1.330–3.

[4] Parker (1986) 102–4; Gregory (1995–97) 2.400.

[5] Glueck (1935) 60–2; *JADIS* 2.19, Sites 2092.001–2, 2093.003).

The site *is* marked by name on *The Archaeological Map of Jordan* and it can now be located precisely on the 1:50,000 K737 Series maps of Jordan using vertical air photographs taken in 1953. The relevant details are (as they should have appeared in JADIS): Map 3149.4; UTM Zone 36; UTME 7452; UTMN 33200; PGE 201.900; PGN 933.200; (YU452200).

The Site

Kh. el-Qirana lies on a high hilltop (1640 m.) of the southern edge of the Shera'a mountains 5 km. southeast of Ras en-Naqb (fig. 22). It commands extensive views north over the Shera'a plateau but has no view south over the Hisma Desert despite its proximity 400–500 m. below. A stretch of the enigmatic wall known as the Khatt Shebib runs past about 1.5 km. to the west.[6] There are traces on the air photographs of fossilized field boundaries in the vicinity and the same photographs reveal the archaeological sites recorded by Musil and Glueck on either side of Qirana.

Musil describes only a 'Viereck' (square or quadrangle) which he says is 60 × 56 'paces' (Schritten) in size—i.e., nearly square—with corner towers 3.2 × 5.2 m. He then publishes a plan of a plainly rectangular fort whose scale allows us to calculate an actual size of ca. 75 × 47 (whether in paces or meters is not indicated) (fig. 23A). The plan also depicts interval towers in the middle of all but the northeast wall (which could not be traced on the ground). Glueck describes 'a large, ruined caravanserai, about 50 m. square, with square corner towers' (See Appendix, below). He saw only one interval tower—in the middle of the 'south' wall. He published no plan. Lander published a quite different plan (fig. 23B) from that of Musil without explanation but possibly based on combining the idea of Musil's plan with the measurements of Glueck. Parker republished Lander's plan. Now Gregory has republished the Lander plan dismissing Musil's as 'of somewhere else'.[7] The confusion may be due to the evident deterioration of the site about a century ago. Musil remarked in 1926 that he intended to produce a sketch plan in 1910 but that it was 'not possible' because the bedouin had removed walls

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[6] Kennedy (2000) 179–80; (forthcoming).

[7] Musil (1907–8) 2.229–30; Glueck (1935) 62; Lander (1984) 18; Parker (1986) 106, fig. 47; Gregory (1996) 400–1.

still visible in 1898 (sic).[8] Musil's comments are strange—he seems to have forgotten he had produced a sketch plan already in 1908[9]—referring only to his visit of 1898 and saying nothing of that in 1902 when he had made the plan. The footnote reference in 1926 ostensibly to his 1898 visit is in fact to that of 1902!

Musil said nothing of other structures; the reader might think this an isolated structure. Glueck, however, noted that the 'caravanserai' was part of 'a large ruined site' and identified a watch tower 'several hundred meters' to the southwest.

Musil says nothing of a date in his 1908 publication but by 1926 was calling it a 'Roman encampment'; Glueck evidently regarded the site as fundamentally Nabataean. Lander illustrates it among comparative plans of 'Nabataean forts'. Parker concedes the possibility that what he calls the *castellum* could be Nabataean but prefers a Roman date as allowed by his reading of surface pottery and his inferences from the architectural form with projecting towers.

The Air Photographs

Air photographs allow us to see the large structure, the surrounding buildings, the overall shape of the site and its wider context. Figure 24 shows the site and field system to the east. The ruins are a compact grouping ca. 200 north-south by ca. 225 m. east-west, about 4.5 ha. There is a large structure (A) detached about 100 meters to the west and separated from the main site by a pale area. It is about 40 m. square and might be a silted up reservoir surrounded by the upcast of silt from previous cleanings. Certainly a reservoir as well as cisterns would have been expected, and the springs 600 m. to the east alluded to by Musil are too far distant.[10]

The most striking building on the site is that on the northwest (B); it is plainly the fort/caravanserai of earlier commentators. It is oriented roughly north-northeast. The photograph was taken at 11.30 a.m., but the sun is still casting a deep shadow beyond the northwest wall. This wall is ca. 90 m. long, and there are clear traces at either end of what appear to be projecting corner towers.[11] There

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[8] Musil (1926) 50.

[9] Musil (1907–8) 2.330, fig. 152.

[10] Musil (1926) 50.

[11] All these measurements are very approximate, derived from air photographs taken at a very small scale and they probably exaggerate the sizes because of rubble collapse.

may also be a projecting tower in the middle of the wall. A northeast wall can be followed for about 50 m., after which there is open ground for about 50 m. more; there are no traces of towers. The parallel southwest wall can also be traced for ca. 50 m. but seems to terminate in a heap of rubble that might be a projecting tower. Other buildings begin immediately beyond this point. It is possible both walls continued and enclosed something close to a square as Musil and Glueck claimed though the ultimate dimensions (ca. 90 × 90 m.) would be at odds with their reports. However, the open area at the eastern end of the northeast wall makes that unlikely. More telling, running between the end points of these two 50 m. walls is part of what looks like a southeast wall. The latter is visible for ca. 30 m., accentuated by shadow, and parallel to the northwest wall. This southeast wall may be part at least of what Musil is referring to when he said the bedouin had removed walls recently making it impossible to plan the fort in 1910.[12]

Internally there are clear traces of buildings aligned on the enclosure walls. Faintly they appear as rooms built against the walls all round but with perhaps two long rectangular buildings in the central courtyard in two parallel strips. Each of the latter appears to consist of 'square' rooms.

The air photographic interpretation seems closest to Musil's plan if we move his north pointer round 90 degrees to the left—errors in adding cardinal points are common. Musil saw the site almost a century ago before more recent removal of stone and damage so a combination of his observations and those of Glueck and the air photographic interpretation may advance the study of this ancient site.

Figure 25 is a suggested reconstruction based on Musil's plan and the air photographs. It consists of a rectangular enclosure, ca. 70 × 45 m., ca. 0.315 ha. There are certainly rectangular towers 5.2 × 3.2 m. projecting at two corners, and possibly they were once at all four. In the middles of the walls there are towers projecting each perhaps 2.5 m. square. That on the northwest (correcting Musil) seems to have been larger—perhaps 2.5 × 6.2. The enclosure wall is 2 m. thick but those of the towers only 1.2 m. Internally there are 'square' rooms against all four walls and four (?) ranges of rooms in rectangular buildings in the middle. There is no certain trace of a gate. Lander and Parker place it on the northeast wall but the

[12] Musil (1926) 50.

southeast wall would make more sense. Parker reports two cisterns to the west of the structure and another on the north. There may be a reservoir to the west. The towers and the barrack-like rooms in the central area favor a military site rather than a caravanserai. Moreover, the main highway is several kilometers to the northwest.

The ancient village extends in an arc from the northeast of the 'fort' round to its south side. The visible structures on the air photograph are square or rectangular and several are roughly aligned with the fort walls. There are at least ten 'buildings', some quite large—the one immediately east of the southeast wall of the fort (C) is about 20 × 15 m.

Beyond the settlement the air photograph shows a variety of walls and stone heaps. Some walls are simple straight lines (fig. 24D) while others enclose large irregular areas (E). The main farming area is probably that commencing ca. 500 m. to the east of the site (F). It is characterized by what look like fossilized fields covering a substantial area, ca. 1150 × 875m., ca. 100 ha. It consists of a series of fields of various shapes outlined by walls. Fields vary in size from those of about one quarter of a hectare to others of 10 ha or more. Some of the largest may have been for stock rather than arable farming. The walls defining the fields are probably the outcome of clearance of surface boulders; other stones were gathered into simple heaps which appear as dark spots or small dark circles. Here and there may be seen small quadrangular enclosures that may be huts or small animal pens. This seems to be the area referred to by Musil as where the Bedouin were farming in 1910 during his visit and where two named springs were located.[13]

Date

Musil offered no date, but Glueck included Qirana among what he saw as a thick scatter of Nabataean settlements all across the southern Shera'a plateau. At the site itself the only pottery he mentions is Nabataean. Parker found a little Iron Age and Ottoman pottery, but the vast majority of his collection was Nabataean and Roman in roughly equal amounts. Likewise the watchtower produced largely Nabataean and Roman pottery. The pottery can allow interpretation of the fort as Nabataean or Roman—or, indeed, both. Perhaps

[13] Musil (1926) 50.

more likely, however, is that we are looking at an essentially Nabataean fort possibly re-used in the Roman period. Little is known of Nabataean military architecture; Lander, however, compared Qirana with what he viewed as other Nabataean forts—Kh. el-Fityan and Muhattet el-Hajj (Lower) and Hatzeva in the Negev. The last now seems from excavation to be most likely Roman; Muhattet el-Hajj is likewise probably Roman and Fityan seems to be Iron Age II—including the towers—but re-used and re-modelled in the Roman period.[14]

Khirbet el-Khalde: a Nabataean and Roman Fort and Caravanserai

Location

Below the Shera'a escarpment the route south to the Red Sea or into the Hedjaz runs first across the open and generally flat terrain of the Hisma Desert past Humeima and Quweira (fig. 21). A few kilometers south of Quweira it is forced into the narrow confines of the Wadi Yitm with craggy mountains rising up on either side for some 40 km. After about 8 kilometers, however, the valley broadens where some wadis join it from the west. The resulting basin is several kilometers long and two to three kilometers wide with a spring on the northeastern side. Although the current highway runs along the western side of the basin, its two predecessors, the railway and the ancient road, all preferred the slope of the east side. It is there, between a rocky outcrop on the slope and the nearby spring, that the ruins of Khirbet el-Khalde are found (fig. 26).

Previous Exploration

Like Kh. el-Qirana, the ruins at Kh. el-Khalde have only begun to be explored this century. The earliest mention is by Maugham who passed by in March 1872:[15]

> . . . we saw upon the mountain side the remains of a ruined fort, with a stone wall round it, called by the Arabs El-Khaldeh, which, however, we did not stop to examine.

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[14] Cf. Gregory (1996) 330–2, 348, 444–5; Kennedy (2000) 136–7, 150–2).
[15] Maugham (1874) 190–1.

Half a century later George Horsfield, Director of the Antiquities Service of Transjordan, had evidently explored the Wadi Yitm before he guided Père Renée Savignac through the area in July 1931. Savignac subsequently wrote about several of these sites including what he called 'el-Khaldi'. In the little basin on the valley—called el-Medifein—he observed a spring called Moyet el-Khaldi or Ain el-Khaldi on the side of the mountain about one kilometer east of what was then the motor road. It was marked by the unexpected presence of a wild fig tree that provided a splash of greenery.[16]

He reported a 'double ruine' northwest of the spring. The first of these he identified immediately as a rectangular fortress, 45 × 35 m., with square towers at each corner. The enclosure wall was made from crude granite blocks, unmortared and leveled and held in place with small chips. On the north side, however, he observed that this rough wall had been given a facing of high quality, well-cut sandstone blocks, notable for the diagonal masons grooves on the surface that Horsfield was then first defining as 'Nabataean chiselling'.[17] He also noted a third type of wall, on top of but stepped back from the face of the rough wall below. This, he thought, might represent a heightening after the facing of good quality masonry was constructed.

Inside were ranges of rooms built against the wall on all sides. The courtyard, however, was divided into two by a further range cutting across it from north to south. In the eastern part of the courtyard lay a partly filled-in reservoir. Lying around were well-cut sandstone blocks characteristic of door frames.

About 50 meters south of the fort he reported was the second structure, smaller but of the same character. It comprised a rectangular enclosure, 30 × 20 m. with an annex projecting on the north-east. The wall is again of unformed granite blocks, and the entrance is through a gate in the north wall. Inside are rooms built against the walls and with a central courtyard.

A few hundred meters northwest of the fort, on the (eastern) edge of the wadi, Horsfield had drawn his attention to two sand-filled cisterns in which he could see the arches that once supported roofs.

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[16] Savignac (1932) 595–7, pl. XIX. Père Jaussen ((1903) 105) passed by what he called Aïn Haldi in 1902 but reported nothing. Curiously, the spring is still marked by name on the 1:50,000 map at YU166824.

[17] Savignac (1932) pl. XIX.2.

What he called Roman and Byzantine pottery was said to be abundant; there was also fine Nabataean wares though these were commonest around the southern structure.

Savignac's interpretation was of a Nabataean fort later occupied and rebuilt by the Romans, perhaps after they annexed the Nabataean kingdom in AD 106.

The next few years saw a succession of visitors: Alt was there in 1935 and Glueck in 1936; Stein in 1939; and Kirkbride and Harding in 1946 (?). Then came Parker's survey of 1976.[18] Graf visited on several occasions during the 1970s and 80s including one with the present author in 1989. In 1992 the site was visited by a team assessing the likely impact of the projected new highway alignment through the Wadi Yitm and in 1995 a follow-up team conducted a sounding.[19]

All of these visitors have added new details, and there has been useful comment, too, by others who have studied the reports or the ancient references to sites in the area but have not visited the remains.[20] There are now a number of certain features, but the accumulation of reports has resulted in contradictions in details such as the size of the structures, the existence or shape of the towers, and interpretation. More surprisingly, no plan was produced of any of these structures until Stein's visit of 1939. But Stein's Limes Report was not published until 1985. There were evident corruptions in his surviving sketches, and the two structures were unrelated to one another in the plan.[21] Only now have we had an apparently reliable plan published of the fort.[22]

Once again, it is apparent that important evidence is scattered and inadequately synthesized. Also required is a sketch plan of the site as a whole and plans of the two structures. The aerial photographs of 1953 and 1998 allow details to be added.

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[18] Alt (1936) 102–3; Glueck (1939) 15–19; Gregory and Kennedy (1985) 310–12 (Stein); Kirkbride and Harding (1947) 24; Parker (1976); cf. Parker (1986) 108–9, 179.

[19] Esp. Graf (1983) 651–2; (1995) 26–7; Bisheh et al. (1993) 124–5; Waheeb (1996) 346.

[20] E.g., Stein (1940) 437; Aharoni (1963) 40–1; Bowersock (1971) 239; (1983) 172–4.

[21] Gregory and Kennedy (1985) 311, fig. 32.

[22] Graf (1995) 26, fig. 15.

Khirbet el-Khalde: Synthesis of the Evidence

There is nothing to add to Savignac's excellent description of the location. Since his time, however, a new highway has superseded the old motor road, and a major highway has superseded that. In addition to these three roads through the valley, two of which pass relatively close to the site, there is a railway line that passes by just meters from the western wall of the fort (fig. 26).

The fort seems to consist of a rectangular enclosure, 49.5 × 32 m.,[23] oriented several degrees from north (fig. 28).[24] There are towers at each corner, ca. 6 m. square[25] and projecting ca. 3.5 m.[26] The walls of the enclosure are of two or perhaps three phases of construction. First is a wall of rough granite blocks, unmortared and filled in with stone chips. Second is a new external face of high quality sandstone blocks, mortared and laid in courses. Stein reported a width of ca. 1.75 m., but it is not clear whether that includes the later extra facing.[27] The latter bear characteristic diagonal Nabataean chisel marks. Finally, there is a wall, again of rough granite blocks, set on top of the first wall and set back. This may be a third phase or, more likely, a heightening of Phase I, when a new facing was added that also took the walls higher.[28] There is an agreed entrance through the north wall at a point to the right of centre and ca. 3.5 m. wide.[29] Interestingly, however, there may be a second entrance at the other end of that wall.[30]

Inside the enclosure there are rooms built against the walls all around; those in the southwest corner are reported to be about 4 m. wide.[31] The resulting courtyard is divided into unequal parts by a range of rooms, running north to south and apparently consisting

[23] Following the measurements on the plan of Graf ((1995) 26, fig. 15) rather than the various measurements offered by other visitors: Savignac (used by Glueck who was driven away by rain before he could draw a plan): 45 × 35 m.; Stein: 41 × 35 m.; Parker: 54 × 33 m.; Graf ((1995) 27, contradicting his plan): 54 × 33 m.

[24] Following Stein (Gregory and Kennedy (1985) 311, fig. 32) and the air photographs rather than Graf ((1995) 26, fig. 15).

[25] Only Stein (Gregory and Kennedy (1985) 310) thought they might be circular.

[26] Measured from Graf's plan ((1995) 26, fig. 15).

[27] Stein (Gregory and Kennedy (1985) 310).

[28] Largely following Savignac (1932) 58.

[29] Graf (1995) 26, fig. 15 and air photographs.

[30] Stein (Gregory and Kennedy (1985) 310) and the air photographs.

[31] Stein (Gregory and Kennedy (1985) 310).

of pairs of rooms on either side of a central wall.[32] In the center of the eastern larger courtyard is a plaster-lined *birkeh*, a reservoir, ca. 6.4 m. square and fed by a channel coming from the east.[33] The smaller, western courtyard included a bath suite, for which some hypocaust pillars formed from square tiles have been exposed.[34] A bath building at a military site is a relative rarity in the Middle East. Several visitors have reported high-quality blocks from door frames scattered inside this enclosure as a whole.

About 50 m. to the south of the fort is the smaller enclosure, ca. 32 × 22 m., orientated on the same angle as the fort and commonly identified as a caravanserai (figs. 28 and 29). Its walls, ca. 1.1 m. thick, are of rough granite blocks similar to those of the fort. The entrance is in the north wall. It leads into a small courtyard surrounded by roughly built rooms against the enclosure wall all around. These seem to be longer and deeper on the east side.[35]

The water supply was provided both by the spring and harvested from the Wadi Yitm. The former—Ain Khalde—is located some 800 m. southeast of the fort in a bay of the mountains at a height of ca. 250 m. There is a second reservoir there, ca. 12.8 × 8 m. From it, a channel, ca. 15 cm. wide and lined with mortar, has been traced intermittently but in a straight line for some 540 m. as far as the east wall of the fort.[36]

About 500 m. north of the fort, six cisterns have been found on the bank beside the main channel of the Wadi Yitm. They were originally roofed with stone slabs over arches and were grouped in three pairs with a shared sump to collect silt and debris from the wadi overflow before it was carried into the cistern. A coin of Constantius II was found when they were cleaned in the Mandate period.[37]

Pottery from the surface and the recent sondages has been extensive and is consistently identified as Nabataean and Roman. Several coins have been reported: one of Diocletian (AD 284–305) in the

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[32] Savignac (1932); Glueck (1939) 15 ('each side of a n.-s. cross wall'); air photographs.

[33] Principally Stein (Gregory and Kennedy (1985) 310).

[34] Waheeb (1996) 346 and observation of the author in 1989.

[35] Derived largely from the description of Stein (Gregory and Kennedy (1985) 310), who is also the only source for a plan (311, fig. 32).

[36] Stein (Gregory and Kennedy (1985) 312).

[37] Principally Kirkbride and Harding ((1924) 24), who have the largest number of cisterns and the report of the coin.

(eastern) gate of the fort's north wall; one of Constantine I (AD 307–37) and Constantius II (AD 337–61) from the sondages; one of Constantius II (AD 337–61) in a cistern to the northeast of the fort.[38] An inscription, possibly a tombstone through which a cross was later incised, has been found inside the fort. It bears a text in square Greek letters of a style which, at Gerasa, has been dated to the late second and third centuries.[39]

An unexpected recent find was of three crucibles, one still with slag adhering.[40]

Discussion

It is clear from a wider survey of sites along the Wadi Yitm (fig. 21) that there were significant Nabataean presences at both Kh. el-Khalde and the next military post to the south, Kh. el-Kithara. There is no good reason to doubt that the extensive Nabataean chisel finish at Khalde implies a Nabataean structure there, as the abundant pottery, too, suggests. A military post would make sense, and it is likely that both fort and caravanserai are substantially Nabataean in origin.

The *Via Nova Traiana* ran past the site, and Trajanic milestones of 112 have been found between Quweira and Khalde and further south at Kithara. There are also two milestone texts in the same area dated to AD 293–305 and 307–8.[41]

When the Roman military presence began is unknown. In view of the Trajanic date that now seems assured for the large fort at Humeima 25 km. to the north (fig. 21),[42] there is the distinct possibility that former Nabataean forts along the route to the Red Sea were garrisoned in the same period. The late-third or early-fourth-century coins found at Khalde imply occupation of some kind in that period, though not necessarily military. The Roman army was certainly there a little later. The *Notitia dignitatum in partibus orientis* (34.41) includes the entry: *Cohors quarta Frygum, Praesidio.* In other words, 'The Cohors IV Phrygum, at Praesidium' in about AD 400.

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[38] Graf (1995) 27; Waheeb (1996) 346; Kirkbride and Harding (1947) 24. In both instances I have corrected Constantine II to Constantius II as being more likely.

[39] Glueck (1939) 18.

[40] Bisheh (1993) 125. The shape suggests an oil lamp.

[41] Graf (1995) 23–8, 33.

[42] Oleson (2000).

As a result of calculations made as long ago as 1939 of the distances between places on the late Roman map,[43] the Peutinger Table, it is now accepted that Praesidium is Kh. el-Khalde. Moreover, recent discussion of the term used, has stressed that *praesidium* (*phrourion* in Greek) is the standard term from Egypt round to Thrace for a military police post on a road.[44] The place name is not among the names on the fragments of the contemporary or later Beer Sheva Edict(s) which lists the tax payments being made by military units.[45]

The heightening of walls has recently been proposed for two forts elsewhere in Jordan at Qasr el-Uweinid and Da'ajaniya.[46] The first of these is a site with an inscription describing it (or a neighboring site) as 'Castellum et Praesidium'. The alteration to the fort at el-Khalde may have involved more than raising the walls and providing an extra facing. The north-south range of rooms has the effect of creating a square courtyard surrounded by rooms against a square enclosure. There is a gateway in the centre of the north wall of this part. Was there an original fort, ca. 32 m. square, that was later extended to the west to enclose an external bath building? The dimensions are very similar to the fort at Quweira (31.5 × 32.5 m.) just 17 km. to the north and Bir Madkhur west of Petra (fig. 30). The latter, like Khalde, has strong traces of Nabataean and Roman occupation, including both pottery and Nabataean coins and Roman coins of the fourth century.

Conclusion

These are two of many sites in this area which will repay investigation. Too little is known of the area, there has been a tendency to regard most of the visible remains as 'Roman', and we are only now beginning to realize the extent to which the Nabataean background is fundamental. Even Roman military architecture in the region has been misinterpreted: the recognition now that the fort at

[43] Stein (1940) 437; Stein in Gregory and Kennedy (1985) 312–14.

[44] Isaac (1992) 174–5, 180. In the Wadi Araba there is a second place called 'Praesidium' and the small fort south of the Azraq Oasis at Qasr el-Uweinid includes a Latin inscription referring to 'Castellum and Praesidium'.

[45] The Praesidion listed in the edict is certainly the one in the Wadi Araba. Hartmann (1913) 181–2; Isaac (1998) 451.

[46] Welsby (1998); Kennedy (2000) 59–61, 160–3.

Humeima just southwest of Kh. el-Qirana is Trajanic has raised again the question of the inspiration for such designs at such an early date.[47] A detailed investigation of Nabataean military architecture is a desideratum.

Despite the limited recording in this area and the deficiencies in what was done earlier this century, much may yet be achieved in creating a foundation for future work. Combined with the information to be obtained from air photographs, we can in fact advance knowledge of this neglected corner of the Roman world.

[47] Oleson (2000); cf. Kennedy (2000): 182–6.

Appendix: The Accounts of Musil and Glueck

The accounts of Musil and Glueck, which are not readily obtainable, are worth reproducing in full.

1. Musil (1908) 229:

> El-Karana (1450 m.) bildet ein Viereck von 60 Schritten Länge und 56 Schritten Breite (Fig. 152); die Mauern sind 2 m. stark und an den Ecken waren vorspringende Türme mit 3.2 m, beziehungsweise 5.2 m. langen Seiten und 1.2 m. dicken Mauern. In der Mitte der Nordmauer ist ein 2.5 m. breites Tor, in der Mitte der Südmauer ein vorspringender 6.2 m. langer Turm sichtbar.

2. Musil (1926) 50:

> [A]t four o'clock we were standing by the ruins of the Roman encampment at al-Karana. . . . I wished to make a sketch plan of this stronghold, which I had visited as far back as 1898, but this was not possible. Some of the Hwetat, while cultivating the neighboring fields, had set up folds for their sheep and goats among the ruins and had removed the walls, which had been still preserved in 1898. They were encamped about six hundred meters east of al-Karana, near the springs of al-Mgawga and Ab-ad-Dud.

3. Glueck (1935) 62:

> About 2 kilometers east-southeast we came to a large ruined site, on the east side of the esh-Shera' plateau, called Kh. el-Qaraneh (36). There were extensive foundation ruins, among which stood a large, ruined caravanserai, about 50 meters square [note], with square corner towers. There was a gateway in the center of the north wall. There were traces of rooms built against the walls on the inside. Quantitities of Nabataean sherds of all types were found on the site. Several hundred meters southwest of Kh. el-Qaraneh is a small, square, ruined watch-tower, commanding the approach from the Hisma valley. No sherds were found on this *rujm*, which in all probability belongs to the complex of Kh. el-Qaraneh.

[Note: Mr. Head's measurements of the caravanserai differ from those of Musil (1907–8) 2.229–30, and fig. 152. Musil's plan shows rectangular towers on the east and west walls, which we did not see.]

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

Figure 21. Map of the area between the Shera'a Plateau and the Red Sea



Figure 22. Map locating Kh. el-Qirana



Figure 23. Plans of the fort/caravanserai from (A) Musil and (B) Lander



Figure 24. Kh. el-Qirana: vertical aerial view taken on 16 August 1953 (APA53/HAS 37.012 BR)



Figure 25. Kh. el-Qirana: reconstructed plan of the fort after Musil, Glueck and data from air photographs



Figure 26. Map of the basin on the Wadi Yitm with the location of the main features of Kh. el-Khalde

Figure 27. Vertical aerial view of Kh. el-Khalde in 1953



Figure 28. Plan of the fort and caravanserai at Kh. el-Khalde (after Graf and others and utilising air photographs)



Figure 29. Oblique aerial view of Kh. el-Khalde looking northwest in June 1998 (APA98/42.18). The nearest track follows the Roman road, the railway runs past the site, and in the distance are the modern highway and its more recent replacement. Note the areas of modern cultivation around the wadi where the ancient reservoirs were built. In the foreground the line of the water channel coming into the fort can be seen

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

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